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Abstract 
 
Although gang behaviour was in evidence in early colonial New Zealand, the 
advent of modern gangs can be seen to have occurred in the post World War 
II period. Since this time, gangs have been heralded as a significant and often 
severe social problem, particularly as they pertain to issues of law and order. 
Initially, concerns regarding gangs were focused on their anti social activities 
and the occasional violent episode, but as many of the gangs became more 
established this focus broadened to include organised criminal activity. 
 
Whether it is images and stories of violent brawls, murders and rapes or, as 
has been more prominent in recent times, reports of profit driven crime, gang 
activity receives considerable media attention and thus gangs are afforded a 
high public profile. Given this profile, it is not surprising that gangs have been 
an important target for politicians and governments who have introduced 
various laws in an effort to counter them. Despite the attention paid to them, 
however, gangs have not been subjected to significant research in this 
country.  
 
Using a wide range of historical documents, ethnographic research and formal 
interviews, this thesis seeks to examine the rise of gangs in New Zealand and 
track their evolutionary development. It also focuses on how the community 
has responded to the issue of gangs, and how, in turn, the gangs have 
responded to that attention. 
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The findings of this thesis will undoubtedly be surprising to many; despite 
gangs having a high profile, commonly held ‘knowledge’ of them has most 
often been learned by sensational media or political rhetoric and is 
consequently often removed from reality. Informed by many of the 
understandings gained from the plethora of international research, this thesis 
attempts to outline and give meaning to a hitherto untold story. 
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INTRODUCTION	  
 
Introduction 
 
 
There is no doubt that gangs in New Zealand are an issue that requires 
considerable study and research, something that became clear to me in the 
late 1990s. In 1998, while studying for an honours degree, I undertook a small 
project on recently introduced laws targeting gangs, which, amid much fanfare 
and promise, had been passed the year before. My initial interest in the laws 
had been sparked during an undergraduate sociology course that I was 
taking, entitled Crime and Deviance. In one of the lectures for that course, Dr 
Greg Newbold explained that there was a dearth of research on New Zealand 
gangs. It seemed unusual to me that significant legislative changes were 
being passed that were not evidence based. Nevertheless, Dr Newbold, who 
became the primary supervisor for this study, was right. As an explanatory 
note to the Harassment and Criminal Associations Bill – the package of laws 
that had captured my interest initially – made clear, “there is no independent 
data or research about gang activities”. 
 
After completing the initial project, I decided to set about making a 
contribution to redressing this issue; and in the tradition of the early Chicago 
12 
 
School sociologists, who inspired me as an undergraduate student, I decided 
to leave the classroom and enter the ‘laboratory of the street’. The result of 
that undertaking is this thesis. 
 
The major objectives of this thesis, which will thread throughout this work, can 
be broadly outlined in three interconnected themes. My primary objective is to 
plot and understand the genesis and evolutionary developments of gangs in 
New Zealand. In short, I seek to establish how and why gangs emerged when 
they did, and how and why have they changed over time. The chapters which 
follow uncover the internal dynamics of gangs that ensure their ongoing 
function and entity survival (or destruction), as well as the external factors that 
mould and shape their maturation and activity. 
 
But these external factors, such as police activity, political responses, and 
media portrayals do not just help shape gangs; they also influence the public 
perception of these groups. Public perceptions of gangs have allowed, and, in 
some cases, driven, the enactment of significant legislative measures aimed 
at combating gangs; and these measures, along with police policy and other 
gang control methods, are the second distinct focus of the thesis. 
 
Thirdly, an examination of New Zealand gangs would be largely bereft of 
meaning without an understanding of the context within which they developed. 
Gangs reflect the unique concatenation of circumstances within which they 
form, and they react and change according to the community’s response to 
them. Therefore, a further objective of this thesis is to examine the social, 
13 
 
economic and political contexts within which the gangs have developed. The 
story of New Zealand gangs, then, is also in part a story of New Zealand 
society. 
 
When first contemplating the shape of the thesis, I decided that it would be a 
history informed by significant ethnographic research. I came to this 
conclusion based on both personal and pedagogical reasons. From a 
personal perspective, I enjoy reading history and thus I believed I would enjoy 
writing one too. Secondly, a grasp of history is important to understanding 
contemporary phenomena in sociological ways. Mills (1959: p.146) summed 
up the importance of history to sociology, saying “all sociology worthy of the 
name is historical sociology.” The French Annales School historian, Fernaud 
Braudel (1980: p.37) elaborated on this by stressing the important links 
between contemporary phenomena and their historical roots, explaining that 
“past and present illuminate each other reciprocally.” 
 
Going one step further, Tosh (2008: p.140) has argued that historical 
sociology may not just inform the present, but help shape the future – by 
providing bedrock for a healthy democracy, insomuch as a more informed 
citizenry will be better able to understand and engage with issues that 
surround and affect them. This final point is important as this thesis will 
challenge many commonly held perceptions of gangs, and seeks to give a 
clearer understanding of how such groups have been addressed in the past 
and how they might be better addressed in the future.  
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Although a sociological understanding of New Zealand gangs may not have 
the social impact of many of the issues or examples with which Tosh (1995) 
engages – for example women’s liberation and African nationalism – it 
nevertheless has important political implications, by way of policy 
development and implementation. Indeed, as Huff (1990: p.313) says about 
attempting to combat gangs without adequate research: “[T]here is nothing 
more inefficient or wasteful (of financial and human resources) than policies 
based on political perspectives and intuitive judgments. The realities of life 
suggest that complex socioeconomic phenomena such as gangs (or, for that 
matter, crime in general) usually defy simple intuitive explanations, and yet 
such explanations constitute the model response”.  
 
A further reason for undertaking a history was rather practical, as I believed 
that many of the people who formed New Zealand’s most significant gangs in 
the 1960s and 1970s would still be alive, and thus their stories and insight 
might be recorded. The final reason was that the dearth of research on gangs 
meant that there were few foundations from which to launch a narrowly 
focused study, and I believed that a broad history would provide a 
springboard for future work. Indeed, the scope of this undertaking is unusual. 
As Covey (2003: p.14) states, “[m]ost American research has focused on 
individual gangs or ethnic groups and not gang prevalence or trends on a 
national scale”. In many ways, New Zealand’s small population and its lack of 
federal states – meaning that policy and laws tend to be applied nationally 
rather than regionally – enables a study of this type.  
 
15 
 
Although I believe that the breadth of this study is one of its strengths, in order 
to be able to canvass what I have considered to be the events and issues 
important to the history of gangs I have had to make often difficult choices 
about elements to exclude. I acknowledge that, in line with my intent of 
providing a broad basis for future research, at times, the depth of discussion 
has been limited so that the overall breadth of the thesis is maintained, a 
balancing act not unfamiliar to research of this kind (Gottlieb, 2006: p.51). 
Clearly there are specific issues that require more study, and, in response to 
this, I have proffered some thoughts for further research in the conclusion.  
 
Gang Definitions 
Although patched gangs have largely dominated the New Zealand gang 
scene, other types of gangs – most notably skinheads and white power 
groups, Asian gangs and LA-style street gangs – are also evident. The focus 
of this thesis, however, is primarily patched gangs, largely because of their 
dominance of the gang scene, but also due to practical restrictions concerning 
thesis length. Nevertheless, the non-patched gangs are highlighted within this 
thesis, but only in so much as to acknowledge their existence or when they 
somehow overlap with, or offer insight into, the patched gangs.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Two, the issue of defining precisely what a 
gang is has proven particularly difficult. I outline my contribution to this issue 
shortly, but for now it is important to acknowledge that because of what 
amounts to little more than a quirk of history, street gangs in New Zealand 
have adopted the wearing of back patches, generally associated with outlaw 
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motorcycle clubs. Consequently, these groups have been traditionally 
grouped together under the heading of ‘gangs’, and as such, a history of 
these groups is necessarily interwoven. Although both forms of gang 
recognise each other as different, as will become clear, they see each other 
as sufficiently similar to be considered an internecine threat. Certainly there 
are important differences that separate these two forms of gang – and indeed 
there are often significant differences within these categories as well – but 
there are nevertheless broad similarities. Therefore, unless I refer to them 
individually, as either outlaw motorcycle clubs or patched street gangs – or, 
indeed, other forms of gang – when I use the term ‘gang’ I do so meaning 
both (or all) types of groups.  
 
Notwithstanding the need to group all gangs together in parts of this thesis, 
particularly when discussing public perceptions or media commentaries, I 
believe that for reasons of both academic accuracy and in creating and 
implementing public policy, more specific definitions are of the utmost 
importance. 
 
As a result of my research, in particular a combination of the findings of the 
literature review and, most importantly, my ethnographic research, I have 
arrived at what I believe are useful definitions, the desirability of which will be 
highlighted throughout the thesis. The definitions are as follows:  
 
An Incipient Gang can be defined as:  
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A group of youths, often from disadvantaged backgrounds, with a loose 
structure, few formal rules, a common identifier (colours, a name, hand 
signals etc), whose activities are not primarily criminal but involve 
(mostly) petty crimes, and who see themselves as a gang and are 
identified as such by others in the community.  
 
A Gang can be defined as: 
 
A structured group (of five or more people) that maintains an exclusive 
membership marked by common identifiers and formal rules that 
supersede the rules of the state. 
 
A Criminal Gang can be defined as: 
 
A structured group (of five or more people) that maintains an exclusive 
membership marked by common identifiers, formal rules that 
supersede the rules of the state, and an organisational focus on profit 
through crime. 
 
Explanations of the terms used in these definitions are as follows: 
 
• Exclusive membership means that there is significant rigour in gaining 
membership – usually over a long time period. A person cannot just 
join the gang in the same way one can join a sporting or social club.  
 
18 
 
• Common identifiers are symbols that represent the gang and can only 
be worn/used by members. These may include, symbols such as back 
patches or ‘colours’, handshakes, hand signals/salutes, and tattoos. 
There may also be less formal identifiers such verbal calls or slang 
names. 
 
• Formal rules may be written or unwritten but are known by all 
members. These rules are immutable and must be adhered to under 
any conditions. If the laws of the state clash with the rules of the gang, 
gang rules take precedence. 
 
• Organisational focus on committing crime means that the gang aims to 
create profit for the club or its members through criminal enterprise. 
The criminal endeavours must be undertaken by the club, and not by 
single members, or small groups of members, acting independently. 
Also, this component does not include crimes that are undertaken 
where the activity is not primarily done to make money. For example, 
engagement in a gang confrontation would not qualify, nor would 
selling liquor illegally at a club house necessarily fulfil this criterion. If 
the primary function of selling liquor is to distribute it to members and 
associates for social interaction, then the profit motive is merely a 
latent positive outcome from distributing alcohol. However, if the 
alcohol was being sold in large volumes to people not close to the gang 
and for the sole purpose of making a profit, then by this definition the 
gang could be defined as criminal. Likewise if a gang was growing 
19 
 
marijuana for its members (and perhaps selling a small amount to 
those around them) then it would not be framed as criminal. However, 
if the primary function was to make profit from the sale of drugs, then 
they would. 
 
Methodology: Building a History 
Due to the breadth and nature of this research, as will become clear, it was 
necessary to gain data from a variety of primary and secondary sources using 
many different means. This was done to achieve what is called ‘triangulation’, 
a multifaceted approach to research that seeks to test and verify different 
stands of the data collected (Flick, 2007: pp.37-52). Furthermore, the relative 
dearth of research done on New Zealand gangs has meant that I have had to 
construct this study largely from scratch. I was, however, aided greatly by way 
of ideas and theory from international literature, and these sources, as well as 
the limited New Zealand research that exists, are detailed in two chapters to 
follow. This rest of the current chapter will outline where and how I gained 
information to construct this history as well as certain challenges I faced in 
doing so. 
 
Research Methods 
Documents and the Media 
I gained a great deal of historical information for this study from documents 
and the media. These included, but were not exclusive to: newspaper articles, 
transcripts of parliamentary debates, government and police reports and 
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research, judicial rulings, and various documents stemming from gangs 
themselves. 
 
My first significant source of media information was the archives of the New 
Zealand Herald, where I spent many days going through the Herald’s archives 
and taking copies of every article, opinion piece and editorial that related to 
gangs since 1950. There were thousands of items, which I filed 
chronologically and then took notes from in order to identify recurrent themes. 
One of the most useful outcomes of this process was that it provided me with 
a basic timeline to identify the major gang events that had entered the media.  
 
I subsequently replicated the data collection process that I had used at the 
Herald, at the offices of The Christchurch Press, as well as in Wellington at 
The Dominion and The Evening Post, whose archives were stored together 
after the two newspapers merged in 2002. As my research progressed, I also 
sourced items from other newspapers to gain information related to specific 
local events, or, for example when a newspaper undertook a campaign 
against gangs, such as The Truth did in the late 1970s. 
 
The media reports that I gathered early in my research were also an important 
initial source of information about the response to gang related issues by the 
police and politicians. To further my knowledge of police and political 
attitudes, motivations and understandings of gangs, I obtained numerous 
police and political reports, which included those publicly available and some 
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confidential information that was provided to me by contacts that I made 
through the research process.   
 
Historical police reports, which had been confidential at the time they were 
written, often offered detailed intelligence on certain gangs and as well as 
providing insight into police attitudes towards these groups. They also 
documented gang development over time. Examples of written gang material, 
such as minutes of gang meetings, which had been obtained by the police, 
were similarly given to me by police sources.  
 
By systematically going through the indexes of The New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates, the official record of all parliamentary debates, to 
1950, I filled a journal with dates of every occasion that the word ‘gang’ was 
mentioned in parliament. This proved to be a valuable reference from which to 
gauge political thinking on a range of gang events and political debates and 
reactions. Further political commentary came from select committee reports 
as well as various ministers’ reports presented in the Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives.  
 
Through the contacts that I established during my ethnographic research, 
detailed below, I also obtained copies of a number of documents written or 
compiled by gang sources.  
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Ethnographic Fieldwork 
It is widely accepted that to gain a true understanding of gang culture, it is 
important to engage with those involved (for example A. Campbell, 1984; 
Decker & Van Winkle, 1996; Hagedorn, 1988, 1990; Jankowski, 1991; Klein, 
1995; Spergel, 1995; Venkatesh, 2008; Whyte, 1943/1981; Yablonsky, 1967). 
Indeed, the greatest source of data for this study came from ethnographic 
research. At the beginning of this research, I could not have conceived that by 
its end I would become a welcome guest in many gang clubhouses around 
the country, and hold the confidence of numerous gang members. Like other 
such gang studies, gaining this degree of access took considerable time and 
a certain amount of risk (Jankowski, 1991; Venkatesh, 2008; Whyte, 
1943/1981; Yablonsky, 1967), and, despite gaining some understandings 
from previously published works, I underwent a steep learning curve once in 
the field. Certainly the culture shock I was to be presented with did not match 
that experienced by Chagnon (1997) during his famous study of the 
Yanomamo Indians, but as Fielding (1995: p.157) forewarned, ethnographers 
working with any unfamiliar groups must quickly “learn the language in use . . 
. this not only means the jargon and dialect, but special meanings and 
unfamiliar usages of familiar words”. Moreover, I had to become familiar with 
appropriate ways to conduct myself and soon learned, largely through error, 
what questions were viewed as unacceptable – particularly early in the study. 
The process of gaining access, therefore, was twofold and can be described 
as ‘getting in’ by achieving physical access and ‘getting on’ by achieving and 
maintaining social access (Hornsby-Smith, 1993: p.53). 
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Throughout the course of my research, I established contact with 13 different 
gangs across the country, although my level of contact with each of these 
gangs varied greatly. I maintained significant and ongoing contact with several 
chapters of Black Power and the Mongrel Mob, encompassing large cities and 
small rural areas, as well as the Hell’s Angels, and the Devil’s Henchmen. 
These associations included staying at various club houses and members’ 
homes for extended periods, attending parties and events put on by the 
gangs, and generally, as  Fenno (1978) famously espoused, ‘hanging around’. 
 
I had shorter term research associations with the Epitaph Riders, the 
Christchurch chapter of the Road Knights, the Head Hunters’ ‘East’ chapter, 
the Mothers, the Tyrants, and the Right Wing Resistance. I also had contacts 
with members of the Lone Legion, the Magogs, Highway 61, the Nomads, and 
members of various LA-Style Street Gangs. Many of the lesser associations 
were not because of lack of opportunity, but lack of time and finance to pursue 
ongoing contact. At times, I chose depth of study over breadth, but maintained 
a sufficient level of contact across the range of gangs to ensure that I was 
able to call upon participants for specific information when required. 
 
Gaining access to gangs and their membership is not easy, not least 
because, as Yablonsky (1967: p.159) pointed out, the “generally suspicious 
cop-fearing gang member is not easily approached”. As Payne (1997: p.12) 
discovered, trying to gain access by simply approaching a gang “cold” was 
futile because of the degree of suspicion that gang members have of 
outsiders.  
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I therefore set about meeting individual gang members, rather than gangs. I 
had no set method for establishing these initial contacts, and I gained access 
in numerous different ways and although it began slowly it soon ‘snowballed’, 
whereby initial contacts provided further participants (Decker & Van Winkle, 
1996: p.57; Feldman, Bell, & Berger, 2003: p.34). My first contacts came 
through former gang members who had gained a profile in the media. I 
approached these people and, in turn, many of them introduced me to a 
current member, who then introduced me to their gang. These initial contacts 
were slow to form, but the longer I spent in the field the more numerous they 
became as gang members grew comfortable about introducing me to a wider 
group of people.  
 
I met certain gangs because of their links with groups with whom I had 
already been associating. On one occasion, for example, I was attending the 
funeral of a Mongrel Mob member, which was also attended by five members 
of the Hell’s Angels. I got talking to one of the Hell’s Angels and from that 
initial contact I formed a long and deep association with that outlaw club; 
attending their functions, staying at clubhouses for days at a time, and 
socialising with certain members and their families – a closeness, as 
previously noted, I managed with many other groups and members.   
 
As with the Hell’s Angels, other initial contacts were equally due to 
happenstance. On one occasion, a friend of mine started a conversation with 
a woman on an aeroplane. She turned out to be the daughter of a Magog 
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gang member. After going to see her, I met him and was subsequently 
introduced to the gang. Perhaps the most unusual contact came when a Road 
Knight gang president confronted an associate of another gang that I was in 
contact with. Remarkably, although the exchange was heated, the gang 
associate came away with the president’s phone number and permission for 
me to call him.  
 
Mindful of ethical considerations, which I will address later in this chapter, I 
was always honest about my research intentions. I did, however, engage in 
certain forms of what is sometimes called ‘deception’ (Feldman et al., 2003: 
pp.41-43), but is perhaps more accurately described, in my case at least, as 
combining covert with overt ethnography (Fielding, 1995: p.159). Once I had 
gained access, although I did not conceal my role, I did try to minimise the 
true reason for my presence and just engage in behaviours of the group. This 
was to ensure I became accepted, and not so obviously appear as an 
outsider. This involved dressing in such a way as to blend in with the gang 
culture; as one undercover police officer told me, one wants to be seen as 
‘grey’, or at the very least, not stand out in any way. Apart from dress, I grew 
unkempt beard when I made significant initial contacts with the large street 
gangs and shaved my head when I began associating with white outlaw 
motorcycle clubs. In this way I sought to “adopt a role or identity that meshes 
with the values and behavior of the groups being studied” (Cassell, 1988: 
p.97). Consciously and later unconsciously, my language, both in vernacular 
terms and in my increased use of profanity changed, too, something that 
became apparent to those close to me when I came back from extended field 
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trips. I also tended to avoid expressing firm points of view, even in general 
conversation, in order to avoid any form of disagreement, mindful that even 
“innocuous circumstances” can led to violence (Lee, 1995: p.51). These 
purposeful behaviour modifications became less necessary as time went on 
and I became accepted by the groups with which I associated frequently. One 
thing I could not modify was my skin colour, and often with the large patched 
street gang I was the only Pakeha person in a room or at a clubhouse. And 
while my ethnicity was occasionally the brunt of jokes among the Polynesian 
gangs, it never caused any particular issues.  
 
With gangs in my home city of Christchurch, contact was easy to maintain but 
presented its own problems. My initial contact was with the Devil’s Henchmen, 
but I soon gained access to two other outlaw clubs; the Epitaph Riders and 
the Road Knights. Although each group knew about my involvement with the 
others, and they were not at that time at war, none of these three groups were 
on ‘good terms’ and moving between them was sometimes awkward. When I 
was asked by one group about another, I replied firmly that I would not talk 
about it, in the same way that I would not discuss their club with the others. I 
was surprised at how easily accepted this was, and few members ever 
pushed the subject. Nevertheless, it inhibited the degree to which certain 
groups would talk about their activities. These difficulties in dividing my time 
between opposition groups in the same city did not, however, last long. 
Taking exception to a media article I had written for a local newspaper1, the 
Epitaph Riders decided I was no longer welcome at their clubhouse and one 
                                                
1 The article was about white outlaw clubs and Pakeha tribes; it was commissioned by The Press 
following National leader Don Brash’s controversial race relations speech to the Orewa Rotary Club in 
early 2004. 
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of the other groups, the Road Knights chapter in Christchurch, disintegrated 
and lost their charter. 
 
By circumstance rather than by design, my contacts with both the Mongrel 
Mob and Black Power were North Island-based, meaning that I did not further 
complicate my sample in Christchurch (although toward the end of my 
research I did gain contact with members of both gangs). I did, however, have 
early and ongoing contact with chapters of the Mongrel Mob and Black Power 
in the Napier/Hastings region, and on one occasion my moving between these 
groups, during one of my fieldtrips, was perceived as an affront to one of my 
primary contacts within the Mongrel Mob, who became enraged and 
threatened me with violence. 
 
Threats made against me during my fieldwork have been many, particularly 
when gang members had been drinking, and were mostly came from 
members of the large patched street gangs. Handling these situations was a 
constant test; a balancing act between being fearful for my safety and not 
wanting to show weakness and risk losing the respect of my contacts. Despite 
these numerous threats, and several unsettling stand-offs – during one 
conflict a gang member held a knife to my throat – I never came to serious 
harm during the eight years of this research. In fact, there were only three 
occasions where I was engaged in violence. On one occasion, six outlaw club 
members and I were drinking in a bar when a group of Russian sailors began 
to sit on the gang members’ motorcycles that were parked outside. Alerted to 
this, we went outside and a fight ensued in which I became involved. My 
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participation did not go unnoticed and helped to solidify my acceptance by the 
gang. On the second occasion, I was beaten by a gang member after I could 
find no way out of an escalating argument between us. Despite being soundly 
defeated in the fight, other members were impressed that I had at least 
attempted to stand my ground – as, too, was the member involved, with whom 
I maintained a close association until he left the gang. On the third occasion, 
just as I was concluding this thesis, I was punched in the mouth by a gang 
member who took exception to me questioning him at a large gang function. 
Although under no immediate threat following that, I waited what I deemed an 
appropriate time to demonstrate that I was not particularly bothered by what 
had occurred – although I was unsettled – and left. At the time of writing I 
have not since seen the gang member who hit me. Although I had not met 
him before the incident, I do not anticipate any ongoing concerns if we meet 
again as it will almost certainly be seen by him as it was by me: just one of 
those things that happen regularly at a Mongrel Mob party. If it had have 
occurred earlier in my research, I would have actively sought to ensure this 
was the case either by tracking him down or getting a message to him through 
the gang’s leadership – just to make certain it did not disrupt my access to the 
gang. 
 
As was the case in Jankowski’s study (1991), in two of these cases, by 
fighting, I had managed to gain certain respect from the gangs involved, and it 
is this respect, and equally importantly, trust, that helped to build the 
necessary rapport between me and my contacts. As outlined by Spradley 
(1979: p.78), “Rapport refers to a harmonious relationship between 
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ethnographer and informant. It means that a basic sense of trust has 
developed that allows for the free flow of information”. One way this rapport 
was achieved was through ignoring or displaying ambivalence to illegal 
behaviour. At numerous times during my research I witnessed or became 
privy to criminal acts, something I will outline in a discussion below on ethics. 
 
Although crime and violence were present throughout much of my research, 
these actions and activities were punctuated by long periods where very little 
happened. In fact, for much of my fieldwork the issue was not overcoming 
fear, but overcoming boredom brought about by the mundane. The day-to-day 
activities of gang members, like the lives of most people, are repetitive and 
unremarkable. But it was during these periods of inactivity that I cemented 
bonds with many gang members as we worked on motorcycles, undertook 
maintenance at the club house or watched sport on television – breaking 
down the barriers between researcher and participant.  
 
In fact, within those groups that I spent considerable time, once a certain 
degree of trust had been formed and my presence became normalised; 
members seemed either to forget or become ambivalent to my role as a 
researcher. In this way, I was able to get as close as possible to the gang 
member reality or, as Hagedorn (2001: p.51) described it, get “behind the 
facade of gang members denials of, or ‘hype’ about, drug selling and 
violence”.  
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As is often the case with ethnographic work (Fielding, 1995: p.160), I found 
myself doing numerous favours for gang members. Most often these involved 
menial tasks, including participating in ‘work days’ to clean up clubhouses 
before gang events, helping out members out with problems they had with 
government agencies, retrieving historic media clippings for certain gangs, 
and acting as a ‘bush lawyer’. Most often I performed these favours to both 
prove myself useful – just as fellow gang members do for one another – and 
also as a way to maintain contacts with members.  
 
One issue that I had was recording data that I gathered during times in the 
field. Initially, I carried a small notebook and pen in my back pocket and when 
I discovered something of interest I would find a concealed place – usually the 
toilet – and scribble down notes. Carrying the notebook, however, was a 
constant concern to me as the risk of being seen taking notes was ever 
present; and to most gang members the only people who write in notebooks 
are the police and media – neither are viewed kindly. Although the gang 
members that I primarily associated with knew that I was undertaking 
research (in large chapters there were members and associates that were 
uninformed), as previously stated, I always attempted to minimise the 
perception of me as a researcher, and taking notes would compromise that. 
After I discarded my notebook, I began to use my cell phone to type notes to 
myself for later retrieval. By limiting the overt signs that I was a researcher, I 
became privy to conversations that, in the beginning, would not have been 
said around me. I became an accepted part of their communities.  
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The notes that I made in the field were then used to write up my field notes, 
which I did when I got the chance during long excursions in the field or when I 
got home after short trips or one-off events. Given that, when I was away from 
Christchurch, I stayed either at gang clubhouses or at members’ homes, 
writing up field notes was often difficult because there was always the chance 
people would ask what I was writing. In order to minimise the risk of my notes 
being read, I always wrote them up when I was away from the gang or at 
times when I knew that I would not be disturbed.  
 
Formal Interviews 
In order to supplement my understandings about gangs from observational 
ethnography, I also conducted a number of formal interviews during the 
course of the research, most of which came out of my ethnographic work. In 
total, I undertook 54 interviews: 32 with gang members and the rest were 
made up of police officers, including two who had infiltrated gangs through 
undercover operations, politicians, lawyers, and a jury member from an 
important gang trial. Forty of these interviews were done face-to-face, while 
the remainder were done over the phone or via email.  
 
The gang members that I formally interviewed were chosen because of their 
overall importance to the gang scene or because they were involved in 
particular events crucial to the study. I ensured that I had established a 
sufficient level of trust and rapport between myself and the gang member prior 
to formally interviewing them.  Although I maintain that this was the best 
approach as it allowed gang members to share information with me more 
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freely, I discovered that it also carried certain risks. Indeed, I lost a number of 
contacts, for various reasons, before I was able to interview them. Gaining 
trust and rapport, however, did not guarantee an interview and particular gang 
members that I wanted to interview declined to participate in the formal 
interview process, despite engaging with me in the field.  
 
I chose to use a semi-structured approach in the interviews with gang 
members to enable flexibility and also to ensure that the data collected 
possessed greater richness (Hornsby-Smith, 1993). Moreover, I wanted to 
explore new pathways of investigation not considered as part of the original 
interview (Gray, 2004: p.217). Standard preliminary questions included how 
the member became involved in the scene and how long they had been in the 
gang, questions that were as much about easing ‘apprehension’ (Spradley, 
1979: p.79) as eliciting specific information. I then asked set questions that I 
had previously prepared which were specific to the interviewee or a particular 
event, and then allowed time to ask follow up questions and probe my 
informants generally about gang life. It was during the latter sections of the 
interviews that I often gained unexpected and insightful information.  
 
Like the gang subjects, the non-gang interviewees were chosen because of 
their specific knowledge or because of their involvement in significant gang 
incidents. I identified the majority of these interviewees through secondary 
sources – such as media reports – and then sought their involvement. 
However, two of these sources – the jury member of a gang trial and a former 
undercover police officer – approached me when they became aware of my 
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research and thought that they could offer useful information. All of the 
individuals that I asked to interview accepted. As Jankowski (1991: p.16) 
found, many professional interviewees desired confidentiality so that they 
could speak openly. I respected their need for confidentiality in the same way 
that I did for gang participants. 
  
All of the interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed. Although some 
of the interview subjects became withdrawn and reticent when the tape 
recorder was on, others seemed to enjoy the interview process. Two of the 
interviews with gang members extended past two hours in duration. Most 
participants appeared to forget about the recorder after a short period. 
 
Recording the interviews best enabled the information transfer to develop as 
naturally as possible because as Fielding (1995: p.146) has noted, pausing 
the conversation to record data by writing notes impedes the flow of the 
conversation. Transcribing was always undertaken at the soonest possible 
time following the interview to ensure nuances in speech or non verbal 
gestures could be recalled, and thereby ensuring greater accuracy and/or 
meaning was afforded to the recorded words. Swiftly transcribing the tapes 
also meant I could follow up quickly on any answers that needed further 
elaboration. 
 
Because all of the participants were interviewed for specific information, it was 
unnecessary to code the data that I gained. In instances where I identified 
gaps in the data that required follow up with the subjects, either to clarify an 
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issue or provide additional information, I was able to contact the participants 
and ask further questions. This was one of the reasons why I tried to maintain 
contact with the interviewees, as well as other gang members, as I wanted to 
ensure that I could go back to them at a later date if necessary. 
 
Issues of Ethics 
The degree to which I became embedded within particular gangs was 
certainly the most vital element of this research, and one of its key strengths. 
But it was not without certain ethical dilemmas due to the often sensitive 
nature of the research. Renzetti and Lee (1993) define “sensitive research” as 
studies where there is a potential for negative consequences or implication, 
either to the participants directly, and/or for the class of individuals 
represented by the research. On many occasions throughout my field work 
the problems I faced were not in eliciting data, but rather in dealing with 
information that was sensitive and potentially compromising to both myself 
and my participants. 
 
Before my fieldwork commenced, it was predictable that I would become 
aware of certain criminal activities or discussions. As someone who has been 
arrested during his fieldwork, Ferrell (1998: p.20) has argued that, 
“Researchers who pursue a strategy of deep engagement with criminal 
worlds…must be prepared to face numerous personal and professional risks, 
to confront and acknowledge the human consequences of their research, and 
to make difficult decisions about personal and professional responsibility”. 
From the outset, then, I had decided that the protection of my sources was 
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paramount and that any breach of trust would not only endanger me, my 
participants and my research, but also any future research in the area. 
Moreover, it is my firm belief that the benefits garnered via my research 
findings were more important than aiding criminal investigations. 
 
However, I was aware that this position might cause me certain legal 
problems (Fitzgerald & Hamilton, 1997). Despite this, it is a position I have 
fastidiously upheld. I have never been called on by police for information, nor 
was I ever in a position where I had prior warning of violence against another 
person outside of the gang setting – something that may have entailed 
breaching confidentiality or meant intervention was necessary (Davis, 2008: 
p.108). Nevertheless, on occasions my ethical boundaries as both a 
researcher and personal moral code were stretched beyond what I had 
imagined before the research began, something upon which I will elaborate 
shortly.  
 
I had furthermore decided before embarking on my field research that I would 
not intervene in gang affairs, actions or activities as I did not want my beliefs 
and opinions to influence how gang members behaved while around me (see 
Feldman et al., 2003: p.101). This stance too presented certain ethical 
dilemmas and moral challenges.   
 
Some activities I became inured to, such as the consumption and dealing of 
drugs, brawls, property crime and racial prejudice. However, other behaviours 
continued to cause me discomfort, such as efforts to pervert the course of 
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justice, assaults on women, and in one instance, a gang member’s partner 
consuming large amounts of liquor and drugs while pregnant.  
 
As is often the case (Dane, 1990), certain issues arose that I had not 
foreseen. One issue that troubled me particularly in the field related to being 
privy to specific information about crimes. While, as noted, I maintained the 
strictest confidence throughout my research and have not divulged any of this 
type of information, my concern came from the possibility that such 
information may become known to the police, and gang suspicion would turn 
on me. There was little that I could do to nullify this threat; if I had stepped 
aside during certain discussions or activities, it would have irreparably 
damaged my ‘insider’ status, and made the gang members more conscious of 
why I was there. As I was not able to address the issues, it was something 
that I had then to accept as an inevitable research related risk. 
 
In order to preserve the confidentiality of my sources and to ensure that I was 
not putting myself, gang members, or other sources at any unnecessary risk, I 
was careful with the information that I recorded in my field notes and my notes 
from the formal interviews. Where I was required to record sensitive 
information, I did not include individual or gang names. There was an ongoing 
challenge of making my notes sufficiently anonymous so that the particular 
gang or gang members were not identifiable, while still ensuring that the 
details were sufficiently meaningful. Certain sections of my field notes and 
interview transcripts, which contained highly confidential information, I 
physically removed and stored separately to the rest of my data. This was to 
37 
 
ensure that these excerpts could not be linked back to my general comments 
concerning members or gangs. 
  
Furthermore, in writing up my research I have been conscious of the need to 
preserve the confidentiality of my sources. At times, I have attempted to make 
comments non-specific or non-identifying to protect my contacts. Given the 
violent and anti-social nature of some of my research participants, this is not 
just about protecting my sources but also my own physical well-being. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to construct a historical narrative of New 
Zealand gangs, framed by the primary themes noted above. Its structure, 
therefore, is chronological. My research traces the development of gangs from 
the end of the Second World War across the following six decades; with 
particular focus on five crucial moments that I have called “pivot points”. Each 
of these marks an event or activity that resulted in a basic reconfiguration of 
the local gang scene, either through significant gang developments, major law 
changes, or fundamental shifts in public opinion.   
 
Chapters One and Two review the literature related to gangs, and these form 
the basis for understanding many of the developments in the New Zealand 
gang scene that are discussed throughout the rest of the thesis. The first 
deals with the work of pioneer researchers in the early 1900s and the rise of 
the Chicago School of Sociology, together with the encompassing theoretical 
endeavours of the mid-century sociologists such as Cohen and Miller. It also 
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examines the key concept of ‘moral panic’, before concluding with an 
interpretation of the lull in gang research that occurred around the 1970s. The 
second chapter examines the explosion of gang research that began during 
the 1990s and highlights the changing nature of gangs and gang activities, 
primarily in the United States. It also deals with important research 
considerations that marked this era, including gangs and gender, gang 
definitions, and the important moves into international gang research. 
 
Chapter Three highlights the rise of a teenage youth movement in the 1950s 
that can be seen as the foundation of modern gangs in New Zealand. This 
youth movement can be divided into two sub-categories of ‘bodgies’ and ‘milk 
bar cowboys’. Within these broad trends, cliques of youth began to form 
gangs due to the unique social and economic conditions evident at this time. 
But despite these developments, I argue that these gangs were 
developmentally immature and failed to achieve longevity as they were unable 
to survive membership turnover.  
 
Chapters Four and Five examine in the rise of the outlaw motorcycle clubs 
and the patched street gangs respectively. Chapter Four looks at the first 
pivot point with the emergence of the Hell’s Angels in Auckland in the 1960s 
and impact this development had on the gang scene. It will be shown that this 
single event changed such all such gangs by introducing elements that made 
them more visible and  more organised, and, in turn, aided them in becoming 
ongoing entities. This chapter also looks at New Zealand’s changing social 
environment and how this bolstered the attitude and activities of ‘outlaw 
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motorcycle clubs’. Chapter Five investigates  the rise of patched street gangs 
and traces the beginnings of the Mongrel Mob and Black Power. Most 
importantly, it explores the social, economic and political contexts that aided 
gang formation among the ethnic minorities which largely made up these new 
gangs. 
 
Chapter Six highlights the importance of conflict within the gang scene during 
the 1970s and the consequences of this conflict for gang development. 
Specifically it looks at three major events: the slaying of Highway 61 member 
Bradley Haora by the Hell’s Angels and the effect of their incarceration at 
Paremoremo; the first gang war between the Devil’s Henchmen and the 
Epitaph Riders; and the Moerewa riot, the second pivot point in New Zealand 
gang history, in which the Stormtroopers fought a pitched battle with police, 
creating tremendous public unrest and unprecedented political intervention. 
 
Chapter Seven focuses on the New Zealand’s most significant attempt at 
social policies targeting gangs that occurred during the 1980s. It plots the 
reasons why this programme was introduced, and then examines four issues 
or events that led to its downfall: changing political priorities in the post-1984 
era; the ‘success’ achieved by Black Power; a police investigation into the 
government’s funding of gangs; and the pack rape that occurred at a Mongrel 
Mob convention in 1987. The latter constitutes the third pivot point, 
dramatically heralding the collapse of the social policy agenda and 
transforming gangs into an issue solely of law and order. 
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Chapter Eight explores the evolutionary developments that had occurred 
within the gang scene by the late 1990s. It shows, that the gangs had become 
quasi-community institutions, that membership had become a long term 
commitment, and that due to these factors gangs formed what I describe and 
‘gang/community balance.  
 
Chapter Nine examines gang moves in to profit driven criminal enterprises, 
via the drug trade and through a form of extortion called ‘taxing’. It looks at the 
quasi-authority gangs formed within the criminal underworld and why this did 
not translate to outsiders or ‘citizens’.  
 
Chapter Ten casts new light on the politicisation of the gang issue and reveals 
the response to gangs since the demise of the social agenda of the 1980s. 
Specifically it examines the systematic political campaign launched against 
gangs that began in 1996. This ‘pivot point’ redefined the gang issue as one 
of grave and pressing concern, requiring the introduction of numerous 
legislative measures. The chapter focuses on these new laws and examines 
the effect that they had. 
 
Chapter Eleven and Twelve examine the contemporary gang scene, the 
seemingly moribund state of patched gangs, and the rise of the LA-style street 
gangs – the final pivot point – as well as the specific gang activities that offer 
insight into the changing nature of gangs and the failure of authorities to come 
to grips with them. Finally it seeks to predict where the gang scene may move 
to in the future, and evaluates the measures being used to target them.  
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Chapter	  One.	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
1. A History of Gang Research: Part I (1898-1970) 
 
Introduction 
The systematic study of gangs stretches back over a hundred years. Of the 
early gang researchers, Fredrick Thrasher is seminal, and his ethnographic 
study maintains much of its relevance to this day. Notwithstanding this, his 
contribution was just one of many offered by Chicago School exponents in the 
early to mid-1900s. The work of these early researchers formed a knowledge 
base on which a number of academics undertook the ambitious task of 
constructing single theories to explain gang formation and action. In turn, 
these theories influenced, at least in part, policy makers to turn their attention 
to gangs. Indeed, public policy in the 1960s opened the way for a surge of 
empirical research, described by one researcher as “an explosion of gang 
knowledge” (Klein, 1995: p.52). Then, for a period after the 1970s, deflated by 
the failure of the gang theories of the 1950s to answer questions arising from 
new gang data, and changes in academic and public policy focus, interest in 
gangs waned. By this time, however, a significant body of knowledge had 
been formed. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to look at how this knowledge has developed 
by highlighting many of the important empirical and theoretical research 
contributions, beginning with the early pioneering studies and concluding with 
what is recognised as a lull in research in the 1970s. Throughout what follows, 
it will become clear that the history of gang research is “almost entirely 
American-centric” (Hagedorn, 2007b: p.14), a point that has been widely 
acknowledged (Klein, Kerner, Maxson, & Weitekamp, 2001). To a lesser 
degree, as will become clear in the following chapter, this remains the case 
today. Nevertheless, it is a theory from England, formulated in response to the 
perception of gang activity in that country, that has proven as important, and 
arguably more enduring, as anything formulated in the U.S. But it is to 
America that I first turn.   
 
The Pioneers 
Henry D. Sheldon, a professor of education and history at the University of 
Oregon, published one of the earliest examinations of gangs in 1898. Sheldon 
got nearly 3000 children to identify groups they had organised without adult 
assistance (Sheldon, 1898: p.426). Sheldon identified seven group 
classifications, one of which, ‘predatory organizations’, can be seen as made 
up of gangs and indeed many of the young respondents referred to their 
groups as such. The other categories were, ‘secret clubs’, ‘social 
organizations’, ‘industrial associations’, ‘philanthropic associations’, ‘literary, 
artistic and musical organizations’, and ‘athletic clubs’ (Sheldon, 1898: p.427). 
Although for boys, athletic clubs were the most common form of association, 
predatory organisations were second and Sheldon considered that they were 
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“liable to perversions” (Sheldon, 1898: p.428) and thus he dedicated some 
time to explaining them. 
 
Sheldon found many gangs based themselves on their interpretations of 
bands of robbers, Indians and pirates (Sheldon, 1898: p.436). These young 
gangs lacked any notable structure, and the leader of such groups tended to 
be the strongest and most daring boy who could ‘lick’ his peers in a fight or 
throw a stone the furthest (Sheldon, 1898: p.438). Although Sheldon felt that 
these predatory associations were rather harmless, he recognised that if they 
persisted their members would begin to act out their fantasies and become 
“dangerous” (Sheldon, 1898: p.439). Sheldon cited a number of incidents 
reported in newspapers around the U.S. and concluded that, “Outrages by the 
gangs are numerous” (Sheldon, 1898: p.441). Sheldon believed that the 
cause of the problem was the “artificial conditions of the modern city” that did 
not allow for the “natural modes of expression” of youth and that, “Deprived of 
the natural outlet, boys and youths revert to the ideals and institutions of 
savagery” (Sheldon, 1898: p.442). Sheldon felt that if predatory youths could 
meaningfully express themselves through sporting institutions such as 
baseball, football and cycling clubs, then a move toward greater deviance 
could be averted. He warned, however, that such activities were not available 
to youths in many inner city areas (Sheldon, 1898: p.442).  
 
In the early 1900s J. Adams Puffer, encouraged by ideas of Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Darwinism, undertook another pioneering study to produce a 
“scientific account of certain aspects of boy psychology” (Puffer, 1912: p.4-5). 
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Puffer believed that between the ages of ten and 18 boys establish 
themselves in gangs in “response to a deep seated but unconscious need” 
(Puffer, 1912: p.7). Moreover, because he found that all gangs were 
fundamentally alike, he believed “we should unhesitatingly ascribe their 
behavior to instinct. Without doubt, there is a gang-forming instinct set deep in 
the soul of boyhood” (Puffer, 1912: p.25). Puffer’s belief that gangs were 
based on instinct and innate human drives was evident in his explanation of 
certain gang activities like throwing stones, which he saw “as the direct result 
of his inheritance from some thousands of generations of savage ancestors 
who, willy nilly, have been doing these things all their lives” (Puffer, 1912: 
p.76). 
 
As the 1900s progressed, Puffer’s idea that gang formation is based on a 
natural instinct dropped out of vogue as biological explanations of human 
behaviour made way for those derived from social causation, but he did make 
a number of interesting observations that would be shored up by later 
research. He found that gangs tended to adopt a territory (Puffer, 1912: p.33) 
and that gangs were more persistent in the lower classes than those from 
“well-to-do” homes (Puffer, 1912: p.28).   
 
Unparalleled in early gang research is the work of Frederic Thrasher, and his 
large and encompassing ethnography of gangs in Chicago, published in 1927, 
is universally heralded as the true beginning of gang research. Given this, it is 
useful to put the research into context. In the early 1900s, the city of Chicago 
was undergoing tremendous growth, and significant social problems were rife. 
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Influenced by the groundbreaking ideas of Robert Park, academics within the 
within the new discipline of sociology at the University of Chicago set about 
using the city as a vast laboratory for investigating urban life by getting out of 
the classroom and on to the street. Derived from the ideas of sociobiology, it 
was the beginning of what became known as the study of urban ecology, or 
the Chicago School approach – and, as we will see, much early gang 
research is linked to this tradition.  
 
Thrasher noted that “better type” areas of the city were “practically gangless” 
(Thrasher, 1927: p.20) and that gangs formed in poor and socially 
disorganised areas of the city – what he called ‘gangland’ (Thrasher, 1927: 
p.5-25). Due to rapid urbanisation, immigration and high population turnover, 
gangland ghettos formed, within which:  
 
The feudal warfare of youthful gangs is carried on more or less 
continuously. Their disorder and violence, escaping the ordinary 
controls of police and other social agencies of the community, are so 
pronounced as to give the impression that they are almost beyond the 
pale of civil society. In some respects these regions are like the 
frontier; in others, like “no man’s land,” lawless, godless, wild 
(Thrasher, 1927: p.6).  
 
Gang development therefore was not instinct-driven but area-related, and this 
became an important determinant of gang formation and behaviour. This idea 
was fundamental to the Chicago School, and was formulated most notably by 
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Ernest Burgess who, along with Park, devised the famous Concentric Zones 
Model of urban organization in 1925. This model suggest that a city can be 
understood by mapping it with concentric rings demarking six zones that 
correlate to different types of areas (Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925). 
Between the areas of commerce and the different residential areas was the 
‘zone of transition’, and it was here where social disorganisation was rife and 
crime most common. The idea that a city area could relate to criminality was 
novel and became extremely influential among Chicago School exponents. 
 
Thrasher discovered 1313 gangs in the city with an estimated total 
membership of 25,000 members. Just twelve of these groups were female. Of 
the total gangs, he found 530 were ‘delinquent’, 609 were of dubious nature 
and 52 he thought to be non-delinquent. Subsequent early studies found that 
the majority of gangs were relatively harmless and Hardman (1967: p.7) 
points out that such discrepancies would have been cleared up by an iron-
clad definition of what a gang is, something that was a problem of early 
research and, as we will see, remains a somewhat vexing issue today. 
 
Thrasher found that most gangs had fewer than 30 members and more than 
half had less than 15. Furthermore, most gangs were ephemeral and were 
constantly forming and dissolving with few surviving more than a few years - 
but the dissolving of one would invariably lead to the creation of another in its 
place. He found that gangs were overwhelmingly youthful and that “marriage 
is one of the most potent causes for the disintegration of the older groups” 
(Thrasher, 1927: p.36).  
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Thrasher described the structure of gangs as having three elements. At the 
core of the gangs were the leaders and their lieutenants, outside of this core 
were the rank and file members, and further out were the occasional 
members or hangers on. He also found that many of the gangs had satellite 
groups made up of younger boys who were often siblings of older gang 
members. In a symbiotic relationship, the older gang would provide protection 
for the younger groups whose members would in turn act as errand boys for 
the older gangs.  
 
Thrasher found that gangs provided an outlet for youthful expression and 
drive, but the groups would often evolve from playgroups to more serious 
conflict groups. This has been described as perhaps Thrasher’s most well 
known finding (Dimitriadis, 2006: p.337). For Thrasher the gang “is an 
interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through 
conflict” (Thrasher, 1927: p.57). Accordingly, youthful groups did not become 
gangs until they “excite disapproval and opposition”, at which point they would 
draw themselves closer together and form a conflict group (Thrasher, 1927: 
p.30). Furthermore, conflict groups may become stepping-stones for a 
graduation into adult organised crime groups (Thrasher, 1927: p.418). 
 
Thrasher understood that accounting for gangs was not a simple undertaking. 
He believed that any understanding of gangs had to examine what he called 
the ‘situation complex’ whereby gangs are seen as part of a complicated web 
of social interactions. Without appreciating these interactions, gangs could not 
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be fully understood. Indeed, the situation complex, or the matrix of social 
interactions within which a gang exists, became – often without due credit to 
Thrasher - an important facet that explained differences between gangs in 
later research. 
 
The Chicago School 
As noted, Thrasher’s study was part of a wider paradigm of sociological 
inquiry underway at the University of Chicago. Most notably Clifford R. Shaw 
and Henry D. McKay maintained this approach of urban ecology and social 
disorganisation in relation to gangs in Chicago, but it was also adopted during 
the same period by others around the country like Frank Tannenbaum in New 
York and William Foote Whyte in Boston.  
 
In the early 1940s – building on their earlier work from the 1920s - Shaw and 
McKay (Shaw & McKay, 1942/1969) confirmed Thrasher’s view that gangs 
and delinquency were concentrated and maintained within ‘interstitial areas’ of 
the city marked by slums and rapid deterioration, maintaining the Chicago 
School’s tradition of social disorganisation theory. Working within the 
Concentric Zones Model, Shaw and McKay showed that problem areas 
tended to be those closest to the city centre and these areas were fewer 
further toward the outer suburbs. They also found links between gangs and 
other social problems that tended to occur in these ‘interstitial’ areas, such as 
poverty, alcoholism, morbidity, prostitution, family dissolution and organised 
vice. Shaw and McKay also linked delinquency specifically to gangs, saying 
that over 90 percent of delinquent theft offences were committed in groups. It 
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is unclear, however, whether the groups formed and then conspired to 
undertake theft or a common interest in theft was the foundation of the gang, 
but the high degree of correlation between crime and gangs was brought into 
question. Wattenburg and Balistrieri (1950: p.747), for example, in examining 
the records of adolescent ‘interviewed on complaint’ by the Detroit Police 
Department during 1946 and 1947, found that just less than 47 percent of 
crimes were undertaken by those in gangs. 
 
Shaw and McKay were also challenged regarding their assertion that rates of 
juvenile delinquency were related to area and not ethnicity (Jonassen, 1949). 
They responded by saying that, while ‘Negroes’ may have higher rates of 
delinquency than ‘white boys’ “it cannot be said that they are higher than rates 
for white boys in comparable areas, since it is impossible to reproduce in 
white communities the circumstances under which Negro children live” (cited 
in Short, 1969: xxix). Contributing to the debate on ethnic variations and gang 
behaviour in the 1940s, Emory S. Bogardus (1943) isolated social pressures 
such as language difficulties, school retardation, differential methods of 
parental control, racial discrimination and low socioeconomic status as factors 
pushing Mexican boys toward gang activity in California. Ethnic minorities, it 
was concluded, have further social problems within their communities that 
therefore influence greater involvement in delinquency.  
 
In New York in the late 1930s, Tannenbaum (1938), like Thrasher, found that 
youth gang activity started with playful exploits and that members began 
offending for diversion and excitement, but over time they progressed to more 
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serious crimes and became increasingly committed to the conception of 
themselves as gang members. While Thrasher had said that conflict with 
other groups aided gang development, Tannenbaum broadened this idea by 
incorporating conflict with the community at large. For Tannenbaum it was the 
interaction between the gang and wider community forces that transformed 
‘playgroups’ to more serious gangs. This transition took place, Tannenbaum 
believed, through the ‘dramatization of evil’, a process whereby significant 
negative attention is brought to bear on gangs, and their youthful activities are 
seen in forcefully negative ways and repressed (Tannenbaum, 1938: pp. 19-
22). Such repression results in gangs becoming more cohesive by causing 
them to generate their own value system that insulates the membership from 
the values of the community. The gang culture grows and the positive social 
forces that tie together the law-abiding community become weak - a situation 
that perpetuates itself as the gang attitude and code of conduct is passed on 
to younger members.  
 
This latter point was steeped in a Chicago School idea developed by Edwin 
Sutherland between 1934 and 1947. Sutherland (1947) argued that criminal 
behaviour can be explained through ‘differential association’, a concept that 
explains that criminals learn criminal behaviour in the same way that non-
criminals learn conventional behaviour. In other words, criminals are not 
under-socialised; they are just socialised differently. 
 
Further advancing the Chicago School tradition was William Foote Whyte. 
Whyte’s Street Corner Society is an enduring ethnographic study undertaken 
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in Boston in the in the late 1930s, and its most important contribution is its 
focus on gang dynamics. Whyte immersed himself in an area known as 
Cornerville, a slum district populated by Italian immigrants and their children. 
Whyte found that while the area may look socially disorganised to outsiders, it 
was in fact organised, albeit differently to middle class communities, and this 
was evident in the ‘corner boys’ he studied. The primary focus of Whyte’s 
ethnography, the Norton Street Gang, was very different to other gangs that 
had previously been identified by researchers. This gang was older – 
members were in their twenties – and had a stable membership that survived 
past marriage, with a married man taking time out “one evening a week” to 
spend with his wife (Whyte, 1943/1981: p.255). For Whyte, the group 
commitment of corner-gangs was often built on long associations, with the 
nuclei of most of the gangs in Cornerville being traced back to boyhood 
friendships: 
 
The gangs grew up on the corner and remained there with remarkable 
persistence from boyhood until members reached their late twenties or 
early thirties…Most groups have a regular meeting-place aside from 
the corner… The stable composition of the group and the lack of social 
assurance on the part of its members contribute toward producing very 
high rates of social interaction within the group. The group structure is 
a product of these interactions. Out of such interaction, there arises a 
system of mutual obligations which is fundamental to group cohesion 
(Whyte, 1943/1981: pp.255-256).  
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Yablonsky summarises Whyte’s work well:  
 
The “gang,” according to Whyte, emerged because the boys could 
accomplish more together than separately. The gang gave its members 
a feeling of solidarity, or belonging. They participated in constructive 
activities, engaged in athletics, helped each other financially (when 
they could), and discussed mutual problems (Yablonsky, 1967: p.128). 
 
A key component of the Norton Street Gang’s internal dynamics was its 
leader, to whom most decisions fell and without which the gang would not 
survive. Although conflict between groups did arise, Whyte’s study uncovered 
an esprit de corps within the group and the important and seemingly positive 
function the gang played in the lives of its members. In this way the study was 
unique, and it was a focus that few studies would subsequently uphold.  
 
The Post War Period: The Rise of Delinquency and Gang 
Theory 
The 1950s were prosperous and conservative years in America. Such 
prosperity allowed teenagers, through part or full-time work, the ability to 
purchase vehicles that gave them mobility and independence. It also allowed 
them to express themselves through new styles of clothing and purchase rock 
‘n’ roll music and attend teenage films that often captured and inspired ideas 
of popular rebellion (Altschuler, 2003). The new visibility of the rebellious 
teenager, offered focus to delinquency, and shocked the conservative nature 
of mainstream America and caused much political and popular concern 
(James Gilbert, 1986). One consequence of these concerns was an 
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invigorated attempt to understand the nature of working class youth gangs, 
where the delinquency was seen to be at its most acute.  
 
This period saw the rise of theoretical interpretations of gangs based around a 
sub cultural perspective. Academics of this generation did not enter the field 
like those of the Chicago tradition; instead, they tended to use general 
sociological theory in an effort to understand gang development. What these 
theorists had in common was a desire to understand the role that gangs 
played in lower-class delinquency. They also tended to see gangs less as 
evolving ‘playgroups’ and more as a reflection of frustration and protest. 
These theories proved popular and had significant value, but their accuracy in 
explaining delinquency or gang formation behaviour in toto, as will be shown, 
was later questioned. 
 
Perhaps the most famous theorist of the era was Albert Cohen, whose work 
Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang published in 1950 became an 
important text. Cohen’s work - termed ‘strain theory’ - was inspired by the idea 
of ‘anomie’. Initially proposed by 19th century French sociologist Emile 
Durkheim (1897/1952), Robert King Merton (1938) developed the theory of 
anomie in the mid-1930s to describe deviant reactions that arise when the 
socially approved goals of society are out of reach to many people through 
socially acceptable means. Reactions often involve resorting to goal 
attainment via illegitimate and criminal behaviour. From this theoretical base, 
Cohen developed a theory of ‘status frustration’ to explain gang members’ 
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delinquency. Unable to attain status through legitimate means, gang members 
define their own status in illegitimate activities. 
 
In a pointed criticism of the Chicago School, Cohen said that proponents of 
‘social disorganisation’ theory failed adequately to understand the state of 
lower class communities that were not akin to a “jungle” as they were often 
portrayed (A. K. Cohen, 1955: p.33). Furthermore, to say traits of delinquency 
were “handed down” from generation to generation “is but to state the 
problem rather than to offer a solution” (A. K. Cohen, 1955: p.32).  
 
Cohen believed that within the social and economic system of the U.S., 
working class boys found themselves at “the bottom of the heap” and it was 
here that the delinquent subculture “was most likely to be found” (A. K. 
Cohen, 1955: pp.73 & 109). The reason for this, Cohen believed, was that 
class and social stratification led to ‘status frustration’ that would in turn cause 
‘reaction formation’ via delinquency and gangs. For Cohen, “The hallmark of 
the delinquent subculture is the explicit and wholesale repudiation of middle-
class standards and the adoption of their very antithesis” (A. K. Cohen, 1955: 
p.129). This manifests itself through aggressive behaviour, theft, and 
vandalism that is “socially legitimized and given a kind of respectability” by the 
group and thus perpetuated (A. K. Cohen, 1955: p.135).  
 
The other significant advocates of strain theory were Richard A. Cloward and 
Lloyd E. Ohlin who went further than Cohen by suggesting that those within 
the lower classes were not just blocked from legitimate means to achieve 
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goals but also from illegitimate means. For example, in a neighbourhood with 
a well organised criminal element, youths will have much greater access to 
criminal role models than those from criminally unorganised neighbourhoods 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960: p.163). Therefore, the types of relationships that a 
lower class youth experiences – as defined by different neighbourhoods – will 
influence his actions and activities. Cloward and Ohlin identified three types of 
delinquent gangs; Criminal (stealing), Conflict (fighting), and Retreatist (drug 
taking). If a youth is influenced by and has access to organised criminal 
groups then that youth will likely form a criminal clique, whereas those who do 
not are more likely to express their status frustration at their ‘double failure’ by 
becoming fighters or, failing in that, drug takers. While Merton’s influence is 
obvious here, Cloward and Ohlin attempted to merge the ideas of Strain 
Theory with Sutherland’s Differential Association, and the latter is expressed 
in explanations as to how illegitimate roles are transferred and thus 
maintained within neighbourhoods. Cloward and Ohlin concluded that “acts of 
delinquency that reflect sub cultural support are likely to recur with great 
frequency” (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960: p.10). 
 
In what would become a reoccurring problem surrounding typologies of 
gangs, Cloward and Ohlin’s notion of a retreatist or drug taking gang was not 
universally accepted and received some criticism. Wilner and others, for 
example, had found that drug taking and ‘ganging’ were two entirely different 
motivational problems. Although they found that gangs whose members took 
heroin were less likely to be involved in ‘rumbles’ or fighting, this may simply 
have been a consequence of their drug talking. They found, “in general, 
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gangs who were involved in narcotics give up the kind of violent acting-out 
that would be likely to “bring the cops on their necks”” (Wilner, Rosenfeld, 
Lee, Chein, & Chein, 1957: p.403). Indeed, they concluded that, “Delinquent 
gangs do not appear to play an important role in the spread of heroin use. To 
the contrary, in some ways typical patterns of gang activity discourage drug 
use” (Wilner et al., 1957: p.409). They found that drugs were least often taken 
by gang leaders (Wilner et al., 1957: p.405) and gangs less inclined toward 
drug taking tended to be more “lively, active, and cohesive” (Wilner et al., 
1957: p.408).  
 
A decade later, Yablonsky supported this finding saying that the retreatist sub 
culture defined by Cloward and Ohlin “is simply not a gang in any sense” 
(Yablonsky, 1967: p.147). Drawing on his own work as well as Chein and 
Rosenfeld (1957), Yablonsky concluded that drug addicts have limited gang 
status and are discarded by the gang because addiction is a solitary activity 
with few group implications (Yablonsky, 1967: p.147-8). This debate 
continued, however, when research such as that by Short and Strodtbeck 
(1965) in the mid-1960s and Moore (1978) in the late 1970s found significant 
drug use – including the use of heroin – within certain gangs. 
 
In 1958, Walter B. Miller offered a rival theoretical perspective to the strain 
theorists. Miller had spent time at the University of Chicago both as a student 
and a professor and the influence of Sutherland’s theory of Differential 
Association is clear. Like Sutherland, Miller situated the problem of gangs in 
cultural circumstance and economic stratification, but he rejected Cohen’s 
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idea of middle class strain and instead suggested that gangs were simply a 
reflection of lower class values:  
 
In the case of “gang” delinquency, the cultural system which exerts the 
most direct influence on behavior is that of the lower class community 
itself – a long-established, distinctly patterned tradition with an integrity 
of its own – rather than a so-called “delinquency subculture” which has 
arisen through conflict with middle class culture and is orientated to the 
deliberate violation of middle class norms (W. B. Miller, 1958/1969: 
p.333). 
 
Miller compiled six components (which he called ‘focal concerns’) of lower 
class culture; Trouble, Toughness, Smartness, Excitement, Fate and 
Autonomy (W. B. Miller, 1958/1969: pp.333-342). For Miller, gangs are a 
vehicle for belonging and a means to gain status or “rep” (W. B. Miller, 
1958/1969: p.344) and this is achieved by exemplifying those valued qualities 
of lower class culture. “One gains status within the group by demonstrating 
superiority in Toughness (physical prowess, bravery, skill in athletics and 
games such as pool and cards), Smartness (skill in repartee, capacity to 
“dupe” fellow group members), and the like” (W. B. Miller, 1958/1969: p.344). 
The gang, he concluded, could not survive if “buttressed primarily by negative, 
hostile, or rejective motives; its principal motivational support, as in the case 
of any persisting cultural tradition, derives from a positive effort to achieve 
what is valued within that tradition, and to conform to its explicit and implicit 
norms” (W. B. Miller, 1958/1969: p.348). 
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Furthermore, Miller saw different demographic features within lower class 
culture that were also crucial to the rise of gangs, namely single (maternal) 
parent families which lead to male peer groups providing the “first real 
opportunity to learn essential aspects of the male role model” (W. B. Miller, 
1958/1969: p.343). Such youths therefore seek masculine identity through 
gang expression. 
 
The idea of masculine striving was not unique and had been at the crux of 
another theoretical explanation for gangs proposed by Herbert Bloch and 
Arthur Niederhoffer (1958) published the same year as Miller’s work. Much 
gang behaviour, they concluded, was similar to any number of behaviours in a 
variety of cultures or even within different classes of a single culture – ‘hazing’ 
in college fraternities, for example, was seen as little different to certain gang 
initiations (Bloch & Niederhoffer, 1958: p.106). Bloch and Niederhoffer saw 
gangs as an adaptation of a universal striving for manhood and power. 
 
Theory and Policy Merge – Action Research 
As noted, the above-mentioned theoretical attempts at understanding gangs 
were inspired by a surge of public concern regarding gangs and juvenile 
delinquency in America in the 1950s. These problems did not just induce 
theorists, however, but policy makers as well. In fact, motivated by the ideas 
of the strain theorists that reducing crime meant giving greater opportunity to 
the poor, during the 1960s significant public funds became available to initiate 
programmes targeting problems of poverty. This merging of theory and public 
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policy brought about a fruitful amount of empirical research. Klein, who was 
prominent in research at that time, later suggested that during this period 
“more than half” of all reliable gang knowledge was obtained (Klein, 1995: 
p.52). 
 
The dominant policy framework within which governmental authorities sought 
to address the gang problem was via detached street work (alternatively 
called detached work, detached youth work, or street work) which started, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, in Chicago during the 1930s and then spread to other 
cities in the 1950s and 60s. The specifics of this method and its outcomes will 
be addressed in a section below, but its influence was significant and 
Spergel’s Street Gang Work: Theory and Practice (1966) became an 
authoritative text, an almost ‘how to’ guide to detached youth work. But the 
practice of detached youth work did not just attempt to intervene and guide 
gang members away from illegal and anti-social activities, it also provided 
gateways by which researchers could collect data through the publicly funded 
inner city initiatives. These data, however, did not confirm the various theories 
offered up to explain the existence and actions of gangs. Indeed, by 1971 
Klein concluded, in Street Gangs and Street Workers, that: 
 
The gang theories…have proven – to me, at least – unproductive 
guideposts. As one becomes familiar with the members of a juvenile 
gang, he finds that it contains Cohen-type boys, Miller-type boys, 
Cloward-and-Ohlin-type boys, and perhaps an equal number whose 
situations seem to refute the core of each theory. I very much fear that 
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the gang has been the theoretician’s Rorschach in criminology – one 
can easily find what he seeks (Klein, 1971: p.viii). 
 
Klein therefore felt that the data should “build toward theory more than from it” 
(Klein, 1971: p.viii) and in such an effort he summarised what he and others 
were learning from their work with detached youth programmes. Klein 
concluded that the ‘interstitial’ or transitional areas in many large cities 
spawned smaller, spontaneous gangs that seldom lasted more than a year or 
two, whereas the more “stable slums”, which allowed neighbourhood patterns 
and tradition to span over many years, produced large vertically structured 
gangs that often lasted much longer (Klein, 1971: p.59 & 64-5).  
 
The typical gang structure involved core and fringe members (Klein, 1971: 
p.70) and although the demographic characteristics of core and fringe 
members were similar, core members were more committed to the group and 
more likely to be involved in criminal activity (Klein, 1971: p.74).  
 
Gangs tended to be made up of ethnic minorities, reflecting the makeup of the 
ghettos in which they existed (Klein, 1971: p.76). Gangs tended to youthful, 
and more stable gangs often had members ranging in age from ten to 25 (with 
the majority being teenagers), but smaller or spontaneous gangs tended to 
have just a two-or-three-year age range (Klein, 1971: p.76-7). Female gangs 
rarely started as independent and self-perpetuating units, but it was “quite 
common” for small and less delinquent female gangs to form as adjuncts to 
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male groups with whom they had sexual or familial relations (Klein, 1971: 
p.77).  
 
Klein noted many attempts to define types of gangs (conflict, delinquent, 
violent, retreatist etc) but could not identify such neat representations, and he 
questioned whether or not these typological differences significantly mirrored 
qualitative differences within gangs or were merely nominal distinctions for the 
convenience of typologists (Klein, 1971: p.80). Leadership in gangs did not 
tend to be a position per se but a collection of functions undertaken by a 
number of members and, contrary to Yablonsky’s (1967) influential assertion 
in The Violent Gang, the leaders were not sociopaths (Klein, 1971: p.92). 
 
Klein found that gang cohesiveness derived more from external sources than 
internal ones (Klein, 1971: p.104). He based this on the fact that group goals 
were minimal at best, stability of membership was low, group norms were 
relatively non-existent, and gang roles ill defined (Klein, 1971: p.104-5). In 
contrast, external sources of cohesion were numerous and strong: the “perils 
of poverty” like low educational performance, few job skills, disrupted family 
relations and social disability interact with one another to generate common 
attitudes (Klein, 1971: p.106). Add to this were threats from rival groups, 
police attention and teacher disapproval, and gang cohesiveness results.  
 
A further project that dovetailed on detached work was undertaken by Short 
and Strodtbeck in Chicago in the mid-1960s. Their contribution, Group 
Process and Gang Delinquency (1965) is rich in data, and an impressively 
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thorough but turgid examination of the key issues surrounding gang dynamics 
and action. The book also tests the popular theoretical perspectives of the 
time. Like Klein, Short and Stodtbeck found existing theory wanting. Parts of 
the different theories could be shored up by data, but none stacked up in a 
conclusive way. Their data also fed Klein’s findings in relation to the make-up 
and activities of gangs.  
 
Short and Strodtbeck found that gangs were a product of the working classes 
and they failed to find any examples of middle class gangs (Short & 
Strodtbeck, 1965: p.16). They also found that gang members often had low 
social skills due to the narrow range of social experiences enjoyed within the 
family, and that youths from gang neighbourhoods were often ill equipped for 
job success or indeed “getting along” (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965: p.236). Like 
Klein, they also highlighted the problems associated with broken working 
class homes. Added to this were high rates of school failure and unfavourable 
contact with police, courts and correctional institutions which compounded the 
problems of the youth gang member. And while the prospect of steady jobs 
was poor “despite their sincere desires and intentions” (Short & Strodtbeck, 
1965: p.222), if work was obtained, gang life often encroached on worker 
responsibility and it was the latter that most often gave way (Short & 
Strodtbeck, 1965: p.225 & 230). 
 
To compensate for their social failings, status and reputation were sought 
through the gang via conflict and sexual conquests. The gangs often defined 
such status subjectively. If, for instance, a gang lost a fight in the face of 
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significant odds, much could still be gained by the vanquished gang in their 
telling of the story - a process of ‘status management’ (Short & Strodtbeck, 
1965: 201-202). 
 
The First New Zealand Studies, Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs, and 
British Moral Panic 
The problem of delinquency in the post war period was not confined to the 
U.S. In fact, inspired as they were by rock ‘n’ roll and other popular culture out 
of America, the youth trends in much of the Western World had a similar feel. 
Thus, in the 1950s, New Zealand tended to focus on teenage delinquency as 
a general problem, perhaps best exemplified by a governmental report (the 
‘Mazengarb Report’) sent to all New Zealand families advising of the dangers 
of promiscuity and mischief among the country’s youth. But the specific issue 
of youth gangs was sufficient to warrant two pieces of government-funded 
research that were both published in 1959. Undertaken in Auckland by A. E 
Levitt (1959) and in Wellington by J. G. Green (1959), both reports portray an 
immature gang scene reflecting the relative lack of poverty, dense 
urbanisation, and social disorganisation evident in large American cities. The 
gangs were small, unstructured, caused little trouble and were fleeting in 
existence. Neither researcher, it would appear, sought guidance from 
American studies, but certain basic elements of commonality were evident; for 
example, gangs in New Zealand were largely of the working classes and 
members often had unsatisfactory home lives. These gangs, and this 
research, will be examined in detail in Chapter Four.  
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Throughout the 1960s in New Zealand, the term ‘gang’ was almost exclusively 
used to describe outlaw motorcycle clubs, which mirrored such groups in 
America. As will be outlined in Chapters Three and Four, the importance of 
these groups in shaping the New Zealand gang scene is difficult to overstate. 
Despite their prominence and public profile in New Zealand and America – 
and many parts of the Western World – they did not elicit academic interest. 
In fact, understandings of these types of gangs in the 1960s was dependent 
on popular books of varying quality, including Hunter S. Thompson’s (H. S. 
Thompson, 1967) Hell’s Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga, Jan Hudson’s 
(1966) The Sex and Savagery of the Hell’s Angels: The Full Story of 
America’s Wild Ones, and Michael McClure and Frank Reynolds’ (1967) 
Freewheelin Frank: Secretary of the Angels. 
 
Although, Hudson’s account has been questioned in relation to its authenticity 
(he wrote under a pseudonym, his real name was George Henry Smith) 
(Osgerby, 2005: p.74), these works did offer a certain insight into the 
motorcycle gangs – specifically the Hell’s Angels. They did not, however, 
attempt meaningfully to analyse the groups in a sociological manner – 
although Thompson did offer a limited explanation for rise and development of 
outlaw motorcycle clubs and several critiques of commonly held assumptions. 
Such works, then, offer little in the way of systematic research or theory. 
Arguably, given their wide readership, their most significant contribution was 
to hasten the rise of such gangs around the world, and certainly, as will be 
shown in Chapter Four, this was the case in New Zealand. Exactly why these 
gangs received no academic interest is unclear, but it would not be until much 
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later in the century that meaningful research would be undertaken, and these 
works will be addressed in the following chapter. 
  
In Britain, public concern regarding teen delinquency was also surfacing in the 
1950s, but gang research from the United Kingdom at this time – or before - is 
limited. One reason for this is that British sociology was slow to establish 
itself. Although already a major discipline in the U.S., the British history of 
sociology for the first half of the 20th century is largely limited to work 
undertaken at the London School of Economics, and did not become more 
fully embraced by academia until the 1950s; before receiving further 
impetuous by the radicalism of the late 1960s (Halsey, 2004). Nevertheless, 
there is some work of note. 
 
In 1950, John C. Spencer examined the ‘unclubbable’ adolescents – or youths 
unattached to organised youth activities. He acknowledged the media 
reporting on the nature of gang activity in London but suggested reliability of 
such reports “cannot adequately be tested in the absence of careful study and 
research” (Spencer, 1950:p.116). But if this was a challenge to his academic 
peers to undertake research, only a few took it up. Among them were John 
Barron Mays (1954) who engaged with Chicago School theorists in examining 
working class areas in central Liverpool, and Peter Scott (1956) who formed a 
tripartite classification of London gangs, as well as the early 1960s 
contribution of T. R Fyvels (1963) who undertook a vivid account of the ‘Teddy 
Boys’ phenomenon. But at this time research on British gangs during this 
period was skimpy at best. Indeed, in 1966 while addressing American 
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theories on gangs and delinquency and their relevance to England, David 
Downes, a London School of Economics Professor, bemoaned the “paucity of 
English work on the sociology of crime”, but he also noted that, “[r]esearch on 
delinquent gangs in England is a fair reflection of their absence” (Downes, 
1966: p.100 & 116). Downes argued that England lacked the types of 
structured gangs evident in America, but was quick to point out that his 
conclusion was based on “a certain absence of evidence” (Downes, 
1966:p.122). Some evidence on U.K. gangs would soon be provided by 
Patrick’s (1973) research in Glasgow, but it was not from the study of British 
gangs per se that a significant theoretical contribution would spring forth, but 
in that country’s response to gang activity.  
 
The groundbreaking piece of research coming out of the U.K. was Stanley 
Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics. Published in 1972, the book’s focus 
was on the social and political response to gang activity that was part of the 
wider – largely working class – teenage fashion trends of ‘Mods’ and 
‘Rockers’ (S. Cohen, 1972: p.19) and more specifically to a series of 
disturbances – battles between the groups - that occurred at English seaside 
resorts from 1964 to 1966 (S. Cohen, 1972: p.20). It was a response, he said, 
of ‘moral panic’.  
 
Cohen outlined the fact that the media overreacted to these disturbances and 
that their reports were highly exaggerated and told with unnecessarily emotive 
language (S. Cohen, 1972: p.31). Often, reports of incidents would be 
incorrect of distorted but upheld to highlight a perceived truth. Cohen cites 
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one example of a youth who told the Magistrate who had just fined him ₤75 
that he would simply ‘write a cheque’, implying the penalty was of little of no 
consequence. Although the boy’s offer was “a pathetic gesture of bravado” 
and he did not even have a bank account, this was not reported and the story 
gained significance and was used to highlight the idea that the youths were 
affluent enough that “fines couldn’t touch them” (S. Cohen, 1972: p.33).  
 
The issue quickly became framed as one of moral decay and the gangs 
became ‘folk devils’ around which a mythology was produced. Forged 
primarily out of the University of Chicago’s ‘second wave’ of sociological 
thought, Cohen used Edwin Lemert (1951, 1967) and Howard Becker’s 
(Becker, 1963) ideas of labelling theory – specifically primary and secondary 
deviation - to highlight that the youths sometime live up to the expectations 
that had been created by the media (S. Cohen, 1972:p.14 & 164). Moreover, 
the media representations had constructed the gangs as newsworthy and 
thus further incidents undertaken by the groups generated disproportionate 
coverage. This prompted an equally disproportionate response from police 
who felt pressure to act, as well as the Courts who imposed harsher 
sentences (S. Cohen, 1972: p.91 & 101). Informal control agents bemoaned 
the breakdown of ‘moral’ society and in turn politicians responded to the 
widespread concern by proposing political action be taken. From a series of 
localised incidents, the issue quickly became a national issue (S. Cohen, 
1972: p.86). A type of hysteria had taken hold and created a frenzy of 
responses that all furled off one another until the issue eventually petered out. 
Indeed, by the time Cohen’s book was published the Mods and Rockers had 
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largely faded from view as fashions and interests changed and the focus of 
attention shifted. But despite the issue diminishing, Cohen’s ideas were 
generally applicable to similar situations. 
 
For Cohen the moral panic involving Mods and Rockers was an example of 
general phenomena, whereby:  
 
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral 
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature 
is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; 
the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and 
other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) 
resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates 
and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite 
novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence 
long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the 
panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective 
memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting 
repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and 
social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself (S. Cohen, 
1972: p.9). 
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Indeed, the theory of moral panic has been used to explain historic events like 
the European witch hunts in the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as more 
contemporary issue (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). In the early 1980s it was 
used in New Zealand by Jane Kelsey and Warren Young (1982) to account 
for a wave of public anxiety surrounding gangs in the aftermath of an incident 
at Moerewa in 1979. The violence at Moerewa will be covered in detail in 
Chapter Five, and the theory of moral panic will be drawn upon at different 
times throughout this thesis.  
 
A Lull in Gang Research 
In America, the attention paid to gangs via public policy, sociological theory 
and consequently empirical research in the 1950s and 60s did not last. In fact, 
gangs “faded from public concern…replaced by concerns over race, 
increasing crime, and urban unrest” (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.12). This 
was reflected in federal funding priorities and resources for gang research 
began to dry up (Horowitz, 1983).  
 
Furthermore, this lull in gang research stemmed from a tidal change in 
sociological ideas. Social movements that emerged in the 1960s drove this 
shift, at least in part. These included broad countercultural, anti-Vietnam war, 
and civil rights movements that prompted academics to focus on how 
deviance was defined and social control maintained, and consequently a shift 
away from sub cultural and strain theories. Replacing these were the likes of 
labelling and conflict theories, and with that, the focus went on the powerful 
and their role in society and away from the issues such as gangs. 
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Indeed many people began concluding that gangs were in significant decline, 
although they were unable to provide data to support such views (Klein, 1971: 
p.22). In 1976, seriousness of the gang issue was dismissed when The 
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals stated 
that, “youth gangs are not now or [sic] should not become a major 
concern…Youth gang violence is not a major crime problem in the United 
States…what gang violence does exist can fairly readily be diverted in 
‘constructive’ channels especially through the provision of services by 
community agencies” (cited in Spergel, 1995: p.9).  
 
Not everyone was in agreement. Just the year before this statement, Walter 
Miller had undertaken a national gang survey and concluded that the gang 
problem was “of the utmost seriousness” (cited in Spergel, 1995: p.9). 
Nevertheless, public policy and the academic focus on gangs reduced before 
undertaking a dramatic resurgence reflected in published work in the 1990s. 
This lull is interesting as it highlights, at least in part, the fact that the public 
perception of gangs can rise and fall not because of gang activity but due to 
external forces such as the media or political bodies. As Miller would say 
when the resurgence of interest occurred, “Youth gangs aren’t ‘back.’ They 
never went away, except in the media” (cited in Klein, 1995: p.91). 
 
Conclusion 
It would be difficult to overstate the enterprise of Thrasher’s work and the 
importance of his findings. But despite the advances in knowledge made 
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since his and other pioneering studies, gangs have defied simple explanation. 
Single theoretical attempts at explaining gangs during the 1950s by the likes 
of Cohen and Millar can be seen to have fallen short, and at best offer 
windows of insight that may, at certain times, provide useful understandings, 
something that will become evident in Chapter Four. In fact, efforts toward a 
single theoretical explanation for gangs ended with the attempts of the 1950s 
 
Empirical research has fared better, but such attempts also failed to draw 
conclusive data that could definitively explain all gangs. Moreover, during this 
period important gang developments, primarily outlaw motorcycle clubs, were 
neglected by researchers, and gang research remained largely an issue for 
American sociologists. 
 
While empirical researchers uncovered certain elements of commonality 
among the gangs that were studied, largely around socioeconomics, family 
and community dysfunction, and issues of ethnicity, they just as often found 
significant differences between different gangs and gang neighbourhoods. 
Such differences raised important question that remained unanswered, 
including, why certain gangs persisted longer than others, why did similar 
communities have differing degrees of gang problems, and why did gangs 
appear to engage in different activities?  
 
While many of these issues would remain somewhat vexing in the face of the 
significant body of studies to emerge in the latter part of the 20th century, 
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significant advances in gang research were made and it is to this period I now 
turn. 
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  Two.	  
 
 
2. A History of Gang Research: Part II (1970 onwards) 
 
Introduction 
Notwithstanding a few notable exceptions, the dominant source of gang 
research – that out of America – was dormant during the 1970s. Driven by 
renewed community concern during the 1980s, however, such studies 
underwent a dramatic resurgence, best reflected in a flurry of published work 
in the 1990s and beyond – and eventually a greater international contribution. 
 
Building on the knowledge base provided by earlier generations, this modern 
research era has delivered more studies than any time previous, and it has 
also significantly enriched our knowledge of gangs. But much like the growing 
body of research, gangs too have become more numerous and prominent. 
Consequently, many of these new studies are devoted to examining changes 
in the modern gang situation, including greater violence and drug crime, the 
growth of gangs, and the greater organisation evident in some of these 
groups. In highlighting these changes, many researchers have sought 
answers to the fundamental questions that escaped researchers of earlier 
eras, such as why and how gangs form, and what is it that makes them 
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attractive to join. And while significant progress has been made in these 
areas, simple explanations remain elusive. 
 
Despite many questions still requiring further work, advances have been 
made in hitherto neglected areas of research. Most importantly, great 
progress is evident in research on outlaw motorcycle clubs, gangs and 
gender, definitional issues, and globalisation and gangs. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the important research that has 
highlighted gang changes in America since the 1980s, which have advanced 
our understanding of gang genesis, maturation and appeal. It will also look at 
areas of study that until recently have been largely ignored, and confront the 
issues arising from a new research milieu focusing on gangs around the 
world; a focus that has made the study of gangs literally bigger and, of course, 
more complex.  
 
Understanding Changes in the U.S. 
Given the wealth of gang research coming out of America since the 1980s 
and 90s, there is much to learn from these studies. Although it is accepted 
that different communities may produce different forms of gang, broad 
understanding that have become established in the U.S. offer valuable 
insights, comparisons, or contrasts to this study of New Zealand gangs; and 
many of the changes identified in gang research in America will be drawn  
upon throughout this thesis.  
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Growth and Gang Migration 
Although the point is contested, it is possible that the percentage of people in 
gangs relative to the general population in established American gang cities, 
like Chicago and Los Angeles, might not vary greatly over time (Spergel, 
1995: p.31). Less contested, however, is the fact that overall gang numbers 
throughout the U.S. have increased exponentially since the 1960s as gangs 
migrated or emerged in a greater number of cities across the country (Klein, 
1995; Spergel, 1995). Klein (1995: pp.90-91) notes that since 1961 cities with 
gangs increased 74 percent by 1970, 83 percent by 1980, and 345 percent by 
1992. Although larger centres are significantly more likely to have gangs, in 
recent times gang migration or emergence has also become evident in 
smaller cities and even rural areas (Howell, 1998b: p.3; Klein et al., 2001: 
p.3), although less populated centres tend to have less organised groups 
(Decker, 2001: p.36; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, & Tobin, 2003: p.190). 
In 1960, there were thought to be about 50 urban communities with gang 
problems in the U.S.; in 2000 one survey reported there were several 
thousand such communities encompassing more than 26,000 gangs and 
almost 850,000 gang members (Klein, 2002: p.244). Most researchers tend to 
be cautious of data regarding gang estimates (see section of definitions 
below), although there is some evidence that the rise in gang numbers 
peaked around 1996 and might be levelling off or falling slightly (Howell, 
Moore, & Egley, 2002: pp.4-5; Thornberry et al., 2003: p.2). 
 
Changes in Criminality 
Although the growth in gangs since the 1980s has been startling, increased 
criminal involvement has perhaps been the most significant issue of public 
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concern as well as the focus of much contemporary research. Although 
difficulties remain in establishing whether gangs create crime or criminals 
create gangs, the fact that gang members are more likely than non-gang 
members to be involved in criminal activities is well established. Indeed, “The 
observation that gang members, as compared with other youths, are more 
extensively involved in delinquency – especially serious and violent 
delinquency – is perhaps the most robust and consistent observation in 
criminological research” (Thornberry et al., 2003: p.1). Since the 1980s, 
however, the nature and seriousness of gang crime has changed. Moore 
(1978) was one of the first to observe this change beginning to occur in the 
1970s. In her study of Chicano gangs in Los Angeles, she found that violence 
was regulated and there were informal rules of engagement between gangs. 
The arrival of gun use in the early 1970s was initially frowned upon as it 
changed the code of a ‘fair fight’ but by the mid-1970s was seen as more 
legitimate. However, firing a gun when a non-combatant (called “a mother”) 
was present was still deemed to be off limits (J. W. Moore, 1978: p.40).  
 
This trend in the use of firearms appears universal and guns became common 
in gang violence in the U.S. throughout the 1980s and beyond and 
consequently gang conflicts have become more lethal (Fagan, 1996: p.43; 
Howell, 1998b: p.2; Short, 1996a: p.xi). By one recent estimate, firearms are 
‘present’ in over 90 percent of gang homicides (Klein et al., 2001: p.4), 
another study found that approximately 74 percent of gang members carried a 
hidden weapon and 29 percent had shot at someone (Esbensen & Lynskey, 
2001: p.105). As Decker says, “The proliferation of guns and shootings by 
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gang members escalates violence by creating the demand for armaments 
among rival gang” particularly because, “[A]ttacks by one gang against 
another quickly lead to retaliatory strikes” (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.23). 
Interestingly, gang violence predominately occurs between gangs of the same 
ethnicity (Klein, 1995: p.106; Spergel, 1995: p.60) and inter-ethnic gang 
violence is often avoided (Sanders, 1994: pp.51-52). As will be shown 
throughout this thesis, this international finding has been supported by events 
in New Zealand, where the major gang wars have usually been between 
gangs of the same ethnicity. 
 
Although violence and conflict have become more serious in recent decades, 
these elements of gang behaviour, in one form or another, were evident in 
early gang research (Thrasher, 1927). A somewhat new development 
concerns profit driven crime, primarily through the distribution of illicit drugs 
either by gang members or by gangs as organisations (Esbensen, Peterson, 
Freng, & Taylor, 2002; Fagan, 1990; Hagedorn, 2002; Howell, 1998b; 
Jankowski, 1991; Taylor, 1989). Reasons for such developments are explored 
later in this chapter, but these changes in violent and drug crime can be 
overstated and exaggerated (Klein, 1995). As Decker notes, “serious crimes – 
both nonviolent and violent – are a defining feature of gangs, but gang crimes 
seem neither as purposive, organized, or frequent as the popular (and official) 
mind imagines” (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.144). Therefore, the ‘popular 
mind’ often gains a distorted view, primarily driven by the selective coverage 
given to gangs in the mass media (Covey, 2003: p.29). 
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Notwithstanding this caution, two important studies have highlighted certain 
changes toward greater organisation and profit driven crime. Perhaps the 
most significant contribution in this area was made by Jankowski in 1991. This 
study spanned three cities: Los Angeles, New York, and Boston. Much like 
Whyte (1943/1981) many years before, Jankowski’s study offered up a new 
type of gang, much more sophisticated and mature than identified in other 
research. Spergel (1995: p.78) called Jankowski’s findings of sophistication 
“exaggerated”. However, his categorisation of a certain type of gang with 
“formal leadership structure, in which leadership categories are labelled and 
assigned a degree of authority” (Jankowski, 1991: p.64) that includes a 
president, vice president, warlord and treasurer, are essentially the dominant 
New Zealand gang model, and one that was – as will become clear in the 
body of this thesis – established early in New Zealand’s gang history. 
 
Jankowski reported that this type of organisation manifests itself in a rational 
interest in profit driven crime but, interestingly, he concluded that the majority 
of gang violence was not a formal gang activity and was largely undertaken by 
individuals (though intimately connected within the gang environs). Again, 
these findings were unusual. Vigil, for example, had found the reverse to be 
true, that violence was the gang norm, and that “Property related crime is 
more of an individual nature” (Vigil, 1988: p.137). This distinction between 
gang crime and crime committed by gang members is an important one and, 
as will be shown in later chapters, a point of considerable debate in New 
Zealand.  
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Evolving Gang Types 
An explanation, at least in part, for such discrepancies between research 
findings may come from the evolution of gangs. Taylor (1989) in his study of 
gangs in Detroit showed that social and economic changes as well as the 
growth of illegal drug markets had changed the gangs and they could no 
longer be defined in traditional preconceived terms. For Taylor, gangs can be 
viewed on an evolutionary scale within categories he labelled ‘Scavenger’, 
‘Territorial’ and ‘Organised’ (Taylor, 1989: pp.4-8). Scavenger gangs are 
defined by impulsive behaviour and crimes that are usually petty, senseless 
and spontaneous. These groups have no particular goals or purpose and 
often acts of violence are perpetrated just for fun. Territorial gangs stake out a 
‘patch’ and ‘rule’ it. The territory is widely known to ‘belong’ to the gang and 
the gang polices it thus. The gang monopolises the criminal trade (usually 
drugs) in that area and wars with anybody who tries to enter their turf. 
Organised gangs are well structured groups that have strong leaders and the 
unequivocal goal of financial profit. Membership is based on service to the 
group and promotion is by performance, not personality. As will become clear, 
this evolutionary perspective is useful in looking at changes within the New 
Zealand gang scene. Moreover, Taylor’s subdivision of gangs was influential 
in the creation of my definitions, outlined in the introduction to this thesis, and 
used throughout the body of my work. 
 
While there have been some criticisms as to how Taylor arrived at his 
categorisations (Klein, 1995: p.134; Spergel, 1995: p.77), his format allows for 
an important and flexible interpretation of gangs as evolving entities. Viewed 
in this way, gangs may begin as ‘play groups’ as proposed by many early 
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gang researchers, but they can evolve to provide an alternative to legitimate 
work and thus become a quasi-career option. Taylor’s findings have been 
supported by research undertaken by Fagan (1996: p.43) as well as 
Vandekesh (2008) who also identified corporate-type gangs, but comparative 
studies have shown that such well-organised groups are very much in the 
minority (Klein 2005 p142). Be this as it may, many experts now make the 
argument that the longevity of certain gangs has made them quasi community 
institutions (Fagan, 1996; Hagedorn, 2007c:p.2; Jankowski, 1991: p.43) and 
the cultures they uphold have, in many cases, “come to supplant orientation to 
the worlds of work and adulthood” (Short, 2007: p.328). 
 
Age Changes 
While findings of greater organisation and structure may not be universally 
true of all, or even the majority, of gangs, other changes appear more 
consistent, and this is evident in gang demographics. Covey (2003: p.27) 
states that, “Street gangs in the United States may be getting both older and 
younger in terms of the typical age range of members, as gang members 
remain in the gang longer, and as younger members are recruited to protect 
older members from more serious criminal penalties”. Although Klein (1995, 
p.104) points out that preteen gang membership has a long history, he 
acknowledges that the upper age of gang involvement is increasing. Although 
adult participation in gangs is not new (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943/1981), 
there is widespread agreement that U.S. gangs in more recent times have 
been significantly extending their age range at the upper end (Covey, 2003; 
Horowitz, 1983; Jankowski, 1991; Klein, 1995; J. W. Moore, 1991; Vigil, 
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1988). While gang membership remained a predominantly a teenage 
phenomenon, in the early 1990s Fagan noted there were increasingly more 
gang members in their 20s, while others found examples of members in their 
40s (Jankowski, 1991: p.323-4; Klein, 1995: p.104). A national survey from 
1999 reported that 50 percent of gang members were estimated to be young 
adults (ages 18-24) a sharp increase from 34 percent just three years before 
(Howell et al., 2002: p.6). Again, caution is required when looking at these 
data, but a trend is evident, particularly in cities with well-established gangs 
where older membership is most common (Howell, 1998b: p.2; Klein, 
1995:p.105). A further variable may relate to the ethnic makeup of the gangs. 
It may be the case that various ethnic gangs have differing age ranges. Using 
Jankowski’s data, for example, Short (Short, 2002: p.xi) found the average 
(mean) age span of Latino and black gangs to be 12.5 and 12.3 percent 
respectively but just 7.6 years for white gangs.  
 
Ethnic Differences 
Age ranges of gangs of different ethnicity may not be the only variations 
between such groups. As Vigil and Yun (2002: p.162) have pointed out, “there 
are ethnocentric nuances and contours to the ways in which gangs have 
unfolded within each ethnic population. Every ethnic group’s history (as well 
as every nation’s!) differs in such important areas as time, place, and people – 
that is, when and where people settled, how their communities formed, and 
what distinguished them from other people in the city”. While the majority of 
U.S. gangs in the first half of the 20th century were white (largely European 
immigrants), by 1970s four fifths were black or Mexican American; by the 
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1990s this number may have been as high as 90% (Howell et al., 2002: p.8; 
Short, 2002: p.xii). It is should be of little surprise then that these groups have 
been the subject of the most gang research.  
 
Although few gangs uphold an exclusive ethnic make-up, certain 
generalisations appear common within existing research. Mexican American 
gangs – variously described by different researchers as ‘Hispanic’, ‘Chicano’ 
or ‘Latino’ - have been found to be closely tied to their physical communities 
(Horowitz, 1983; J. W. Moore, 1978, 1991; Sanders, 1994; Vigil, 1988). 
Indeed, the neighbourhoods from which the gangs form are seen to be 
intrinsically and even linguistically linked, “Mi barrio” is used by members to 
refer both to ‘my neighbourhood’ and ‘my gang’ (J. W. Moore, 1978: p.35). 
Consequently the gangs are extremely territorial, ‘owning’ and protecting their 
turf. Drug use among these gangs is accepted (most significantly heroin) and 
many members disappeared into addiction (J. W. Moore, 1978). The 
organisational structure of Chicano gangs tends to be flat and diffuse with little 
formal rule structure (Jankowski, 1991; Vigil, 1988) and different age based 
klikas (cliques within each barrio) are largely autonomous (J. W. Moore, 
1991). For Vigil (1988), such gangs come about due to ‘multiple marginality’ 
or a process of ‘choloization’ whereby Chicano youths are marginalised from 
mainstream society – and this occurred on different levels including the macro 
(group history), the meso (family history), and the micro (life history).  
 
Predominantly African American gangs in recent years have perhaps become 
the best known and most renowned, primarily via two opposition gangs known 
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and ‘Bloods’ and ‘Crips’, which initially formed in the late 1960s or early 
1970s, but proliferated exponentially from the 1980s. These groups tend to 
have certain loyalty to their ‘sets’ (neighbourhood-based subgroups) but may 
not be as closely associated to their own neighbourhoods as Chicano gangs 
(Sanders, 1994: p.140). Many of these sets have a more hierarchical 
organisational structure and, compared to Chicano gangs, may be more 
concerned with profit driven crime; particularly the selling of drugs (Howell, 
1998b; Jankowski, 1991; Sanders, 1994; Taylor, 1989), and these activities 
are often undertaken by the group as a whole (Jankowski, 1991; Taylor, 
1989). Although marijuana is widely used in such gangs, hard drugs – like 
heroin - are often banned (Taylor, 1989) and their use may lead to gang 
discipline (Sanders, 1994: p.141). Crossovers between such gangs and the 
music industry - via ‘Rap’ and ‘Hip-Hop’ - as well as popular Hollywood film 
depictions, have meant the influence of the Bloods and Crips has spread 
throughout the U.S. and around the world, and their global influence will be 
looked at in a section below. 
 
Both white and Asian gangs have received much less study, although the 
latter have begun to build a certain body of work. In 1995, Klein (1995: p.106) 
said, “the white gang problem, although present, is not in any sense 
comparable to the size of the minority gang problem”. It is for this reason, 
perhaps, that there is a paucity of American research on such groups. 
Jankowski (1991) found white gangs tend to have a hierarchal structure, and 
Spergel (1995: p.65) suggested “some [white gangs] are concerned with 
protecting turf or territory, less often with expanding it”. Though tiny in 
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number, racist Skinhead gangs are evident in America – and, unlike most 
gangs are often from more middle class backgrounds – and these groups are 
an imported trend from England (Hamm, 1993). The growing body of work 
around Asian gangs suggest these groups too hold unique difference. 
Although Vigil’s ideas of multiple marginality formed in relation to Chicano 
gangs appears useful in looking at such groups (Vigil & Yun, 1990: p.147), 
their study is made difficult by their tight and secretive nature (Chin, 1996: 
p.30; Klein, 1995: p.108). Although grouped as ‘Asian’ gangs, a simple single 
category belies the fact it incorporates numerous different nationality/cultures 
(that exist in separate gangs), making generalisations difficult. With this is 
mind, it may nevertheless be reasonable to tentatively conclude that such 
groups appear to be more involved in profit drive crime – most notably, 
property crime, extortion and prostitution – than other gangs are. 
 
With these conclusions regarding differences between gangs of different 
ethnicities – and indeed differences among various gangs of the same 
ethnicity – it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that within “the United 
States, the combinations and variations in the American street gang seem at 
times to be endless” (Covey, 2003: p.56). Little perhaps has changed since 
Thrasher (1927: p.45) said, “No two gangs are just alike”. But these variations 
can perhaps be overplayed. As Klein (1995: p.108) points out, certain ethnic 
differences may reflect migration pattern as much as they do cultural patterns, 
“It remains safe to say that black-Hispanic gang differences, though notable, 
still pale in the face of their structural and behavioral  similarities”. Vigil and 
Yun (2002: p.165) suggest that street socialisation blurs ethnic differences 
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“because remarkably similar things are learned on the streets where fear and 
vulnerability generate the need for protection, friendship, loyalty, and other 
routines and rhymes provided by the gang”. In short, differences may be easy 
to find, but gang similarities may be more prevalent and significant. 
  
With this in mind, I now turn to aspects that may influence and maintain gang 
membership. 
 
Understanding the Influences of Gang Membership and 
Action 
Like researchers of earlier eras, modern gang researchers, as will become 
clear, have investigated gangs within their social and economic contexts. As 
previously noted, Thrasher (1927) talked about the ‘situation complex’, or the 
interactions between a multitude of factors that combine to encourage and 
maintain gang membership. As will be shown in this section, many studies are 
now identifying these relationships – some of which are new and unique and 
reflect modern economic and social changes; others appear more universal. 
 
One significant explanation for gang developments in the U.S. in more recent 
times has been the emergence of what are called ‘underclass’ communities, 
particularly vulnerable to economic downturns. Whereas Thrasher and other 
early researchers looked at neighbourhoods that were unstable due to 
migrant movements, underclass communities are stable but mired in 
intergenerational poverty.  
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The effects of the underclass on changes to gang longevity and heightened 
criminality was championed by Hagedorn (1988) and picked up by others 
including Short (1990) and Klein (1995: p.194) who suggested the increasing 
urban underclass is the “foremost cause of the recent proliferation of gangs 
and the most likely predictor of its continuation”. Indeed, this thesis will show 
that intergenerational welfare communities have formed in New Zealand, and 
that this underclass has been critical to the development and maturation of 
gangs. 
 
The underclass hypothesis is one of the few theoretical frameworks used to 
understand gang membership and behaviour in the contemporary era. Gone 
are the lofty aspirations of earlier gang theorists of the mid-century era who 
sought universal explanations of gang behaviour – although these 
approaches (social disorganisation, lower class culture, etc) are still often 
used and cited (Short, 2002: p.xii). In the early 1990s, one of the most famous 
gang theorists, Albert Cohen (1990: p.20), made a plea for a return to 
theoretical attempts at understanding gangs, but this call has been largely 
unanswered. Indeed, Maxson suggests that a lack of theory “is perhaps the 
most critical of our failures” (Maxson, 2001: p.302).  
 
While the underclass theory has proven useful in looking at gangs in recent 
times, it fails to address why there are no gangs where conditions suggest 
there should be (Hazelhurst & Hazelhurst, 1998a: p.6) and why gangs emerge 
in smaller communities without such deprived economic environs. 
Nevertheless, economic changes in the American since the 1980s, including a 
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shift away from manufacturing and toward a service-based economy have 
created social conditions that have influenced certain gang developments 
(Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Hagedorn, 2002; Spergel, 1995). 
 
Moore captured such changes when she returned to the barrios of Los 
Angeles in the 1980s after her initial study in the 1970s. Despite 
improvements in ‘Chicano’ political representation, economic restructuring 
had meant that ‘good’ jobs had vanished and new waves of legal and illegal 
Mexican immigrants had created further pressure on the scarce number of 
low wage and insecure jobs that existed. Furthermore, the types of 
government programmes provided by President Johnson’s War on Poverty 
were largely a thing of the past. In all, there were fewer opportunities for those 
who joined gangs to cut loose their adolescent ties (J. W. Moore, 1991: p.23). 
The gangs were more deviant and more violent, more isolated from other 
adolescent peer groups and less tolerated by adult communities (J. W. Moore, 
1991: p.132). Moore concluded, “the gangs are no longer just at the rowdy 
end of the continuum of adolescent groups – they are now really outside the 
continuum” (J. W. Moore, 1991: p.132).  
 
Similarly, Jankowski (1991) felt that structural conditions within U.S. society 
had helped gangs to gain greater longevity by offering fewer opportunities for 
working class males to enter the legal labour market and thus they tended to 
stay in the gangs for longer and move into profit driven crime. Taylor (1989) 
also linked economic and gang changes. For Taylor, the economic conditions 
of Detroit were a significant influence on that city’s evolution of gangs and 
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their moves toward sophistication and profit driven crime. During 1980s, the 
unemployment rate in Detroit exceeded the national average as the city’s 
large automotive industry suffered in the face of foreign competition. Without 
this industry to provide large numbers of jobs for unskilled workers, “urban 
gangs have replaced Ford, GM, and Chrysler as major employers. Social 
conditions created by industrialization are now producing criminalization” 
(Taylor, 1989: p.2). Similar to those conditions prevalent in Detroit, New 
Zealand underwent fundamental economic restructuring in the post-1984 era, 
and consideration to the impact of these changes is explored in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
However, it is largely accepted that there should not be an over-reliance on 
socioeconomic conditions as a single cause of gang membership. Different 
communities have different cultures and some neighbourhoods with similar 
social and economic conditions have differing degrees of gang problems. 
Thus, it is argued, there is a multitude of factors within communities that either 
encourage or discourage gang membership (W. B. Miller, 1990; Short, 
1996b). But an acceptance that gangs may be different depending on their 
social conditions should not mask the fact that there appears to be certain 
universal elements that aid and encourage gang membership. 
 
Social and Psychological Influences of Gang Membership 
Among such universal elements are the social/psychological influences of 
gang recruitment and membership, something that appears as relevant to 
New Zealand gangs as those in America. Carlie (2002), for example, has 
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described the allure of the gang in terms of needs fulfilment. Gangs, he says, 
fulfil: 
 
• Lower level needs: 
Physiological needs (hunger, thirst, shelter, sex, and other bodily 
needs); and Safety related needs (security and protection from physical 
and emotional harm). 
 
• Higher level needs: 
Belongingness (affection, belonging, acceptance, and friendship); 
Esteem (self-respect, autonomy, achievement, status recognition); and 
Self-actualization (the drive to fulfil one's potential). 
 
Thus, Carlie argues, gangs serve a purpose and are therefore functional. 
Their members “derive psychological benefits of recognition and respect” and 
gain in “self-esteem and in social status” as a consequence of acceptance 
within a gang (Carlie, 2002). Joining a gang, therefore, can be seen as a 
rational decision (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.17; Jankowski, 1991: p.40). 
 
In this regard, gang membership involves both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors 
(Decker & Van Winkle, 1996). The ‘push’ factors relate to external forces 
within the wider community while the ‘pull’ is the perceived benefits of 
membership. Expanding on this analysis, pull factors can be related to 
prestige, thrills, power, belonging and protection; while push factors can be 
seen as the negative social forces that are prominent in gang areas, such as 
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family instability, failure at school, poverty, life in new or unsettled 
communities, and having poor employment prospects. The motivation for 
joining gangs is therefore rather straightforward, the economically and socially 
deprived often face significant difficulties and hardships, to which the gang 
provides a remedy.  
 
Klein’s (1995: p.198) Structural Variables Model, below, highlights many of 
these issues: 
 
 
Structural Variables Model 
 
 
Thus, for Klein, structural ‘Underclass’ variables explain the emergence of 
gangs within young male minorities from working- and lower-class sections of 
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cities. Two other variables, ‘Onset’ and ‘Maintenance’, both contribute to the 
emergence of gangs; the former being structural and the other psychological 
(Klein, 1995: p.197-202). Of note, Klein says gang intervention programs – set 
up to alleviate gang problems – can act as a maintenance variable, a finding 
supported by Decker (2001: p.35). 
 
Lafontaine, Ferguson & Wormith (2005: p.29-30) summarise the risk factors of 
gang membership within four domains: individual, familial, community, and 
school. Their research suggests that gang youth have more risk factors than 
non-gang youth in several domains. These are: 
 
• Individual Risk factors:  
o Previous acts of delinquency 
o Negative peer associations 
o Pro-violent approaches to conflict resolution 
o Low self esteem 
o Lack of attachment to ethnic background 
• Family Risk Factors 
o Poor family management 
o Low level attachments and poor supervision 
o Violent siblings 
o Parental involvement in violent activities 
o Abuse and maltreatment 
• Community Risk Factors 
o Increased levels of criminal activity 
92 
 
o Gang presence 
o Lack of opportunities including economic, social and recreational 
o High drug trafficking areas 
• School Risk Factors 
o Lack of attachment to school, including teachers 
o Negative teacher perception of the student 
o Low achievement 
o Learning disabilities 
o Negative labels on the student 
 
As was the case in early research, for many youths, the initial contact with a 
gang or the desire for membership simply occurs out of a quest for enjoyment 
and belonging. Hanging about with a group of friends provides something to 
do, and in many areas associating with friends means getting involved with a 
gang (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.14). However, once a gang is 
established in an area and begins to build a reputation, the fear it generates 
can force a defensive reaction. Easily exploited, isolated individuals may feel 
pressured to join a gang for their own protection (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: 
p.23). At least two studies have found that the most common reason for 
joining a gang was for protection (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.73; 
Esbensen & Lynskey, 2001: p.104). Often, then, gang membership begets 
gang membership.  
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Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs 
Overwhelmingly, gang research has focused on street gangs. Outlaw 
motorcycle clubs (OMCs) in New Zealand, however, are widely seen as part 
of this country’s gang scene. In fact, they are generally grouped together with 
street gangs to such a degree that both types of gang are viewed as a single 
issue. This is due to several unique characteristics of New Zealand street 
gangs that will be explored in the main body of this work, but, as will become 
quite clear, an understanding of outlaw motorcycle clubs is vital. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, despite being prominent in America after 
World War II and spreading throughout the world in the decades after, outlaw 
motorcycle clubs failed to gain the attention of researchers. Despite 
forerunner works including short articles by Montgomery in 1978 and Hopper 
and Moore in 1983, as well as a brief book by Harris in 1985, it was not be 
until Wolf’s study of the early 1990s and Veno’s effort published in 2002 that 
this form of gang was the subject of detailed academic study.  
 
Exactly why there is such a dearth of research into outlaw motorcycle clubs is 
unclear, but the issue was addressed in two of the three earlier publications 
mentioned above. Montgomery seems to insinuate that the biker gangs were 
seen as a trend – with the implication, perhaps, that they may not last – and 
were not taken seriously by academics: “To take the attitude that the subject 
is beneath the dignity of serious social scientists is to continue to abdicate the 
analysis of popular trends to journalists and Hollywood. Until now, no analysis 
of the subject has been provided by Sociologists” (Montgomery, 1978: p.332). 
While offering no explanation as to why, Hopper and Moore (1983: p.58) 
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noted that: “In spite of attention given to gangs generally, the outlaw 
motorcycle gangs have been virtually ignored by sociologists”. Interestingly, 
all three of the early contributions were undertaken by, or with the help of, 
insiders; Montgomery had been a member of a club called the Road Gypsies 
for one and a half years, Moore was a former president of an unspecified 
outlaw motorcycle club, and Harris was prominent member of the Hell’s 
Angels. So even in these few studies, academia did not move to investigate 
the gangs, the gangs – or at least members of them – had moved toward 
academia. Although the study of such of potentially violent groups can be 
dangerous (Lee, 1995: p.48-52), this has clearly not inhibited the research of 
street gangs. Perhaps a more likely reason for the lack of academic study, 
then, is the fact that, as will become evident, outlaw motorcycle clubs are 
generally well organised and closed subcultures with strict rules and discipline 
that may inhibit easy access to researchers. This does, at least in part, 
explain why the early studies were written or co-authored by current of ex-club 
members.  
 
Looking at the studies in some detail, Hopper and Moore outline the highly 
organised and ritualistic nature of the outlaw motorcycle clubs, although their 
list of symbols used by the gangs such as 1% (signifying an outlaw), 13 (a 
drug user), and FTW (Fuck The World) were outlined in the 1960s books by 
Thompson (1967), and Hudson (1966) mentioned in the previous chapter. 
What this does highlight, however, is the uniformity of the outlaw motorcycle 
clubs over time. These symbols remain evident in the later works of Wolf and 
Veno. Hopper and Moore also outlined the central place that the motorcycle 
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upholds within these gangs. The motorcycle was seen as a focal concern, not 
just as a means of transport but of status. Those who were skilled in repair of 
their machines were regarded highly and in turn gang members motorcycles 
were heavily customised – usually stripped down to become ‘choppers’ 
(Hopper & Moore, 1983: p.60). Montgomery also highlighted the focus on 
heavily customised bikes as part of his overall effort to place outlaw 
motorcycle clubs within Bloch and Niederhoffer’s (1958) theory of masculine 
striving. Outlaw motorcyclists, Montgomery maintained, were expressing their 
‘manliness’ through physical prowess, ‘obsession’ with and ‘boasting’ about 
sexual activity, and with a “big motorcycle which swells the rider with feelings 
of pride and power” (Montgomery, 1978: p.336-337). Furthermore, he 
concluded that the motorcycles’ “long front forks (ludicrously and unsafely 
extended by as much as three feet) are obviously phallic extensions 
resembling a chromed steel erection” (Montgomery, 1978: p.337). Dubious 
Freudian-like analysis aside, Montgomery outlined further interesting 
elements of outlaw motorcycle clubs such as ‘striking’ (a term often used in 
Canada for ‘prospecting’) and the hurdles to of gain membership of such 
groups. Even from these early studies, it was clear that the outlaw motorcycle 
clubs were better structured and organised than most street gangs. Although 
Hopper and Moore give a brief explanation to the rise of outlaw motorcycle 
clubs, this was the focal concern of Harris (1985) who looked at the working 
classes and the post war economy of Britain and America and then situated 
the rise of these gangs in historical context – and these issues will be further 
examined in Chapter Three. 
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Although these studies offered some insight into outlaw motorcycle clubs, the 
later works of both Wolf (1991) and Veno (2003) dwarfed their scope and 
detail. Wolf’s book The Rebels: A Brotherhood of Outlaw Bikers was based 
primarily on a long ethnographic study of a Canadian motorcycle gang 
undertaken for a PhD. The work is impressive, detailed and thoughtful, and 
offers tremendous insight into such groups. Reminiscent of Miller’s (1958) 
lower-class thesis, Wolf suggests: 
 
 The outlaw biker lifestyle constitutes a lower-working class bohemian 
subculture. The ideological foundation of the subculture accurately 
reflects the lower-working class origins of its participants. A man who 
enters this subculture in search of identity looks to the outlaw-biker 
tradition to provide him with long-standing values, behaviours, and 
symbols. What he will find are heroes and role models, a personal 
legacy that is consistent with what he discovered on the streets about 
the complete man. He will adopt attitudes and learn behaviours that 
gravitate around lower-class focal concerns with independence, 
freedom, self-reliance, toughness, impulsiveness, and masculinity, all 
of which will be embodied in a highly romanticized image of the anti-
hero (Wolf, 1991:p.33). 
 
Also reminiscent of the work of a mid-century gang theorist, this time Cohen 
(1955), Wolf held that the outlaw motorcycle clubs made up a working class 
subculture that seeks active resistance to “respectable identity” whereby 
members defined themselves as unshackled to convention (Wolf, 1991: p.58). 
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Wolf (1991: pp.35 & 327-328) also outlined the organisational hierarchy that 
outlaw motorcycle clubs maintain, both within a single chapter and also within 
multiple chapters of the same club. He also noted the importance of the 
clubhouse (p.171), the strict rules the clubs have and enforce, the democratic 
nature of the organisations (p.301), and the often-arduous efforts members 
have to go through to achieve full membership (Wolf, 1991: pp.171, 301 & 88-
109). Of great importance to such groups was territory. Outlaw clubs, Wolf 
found, gained and held territory largely to give the group a “sense of 
legitimacy” but in some instances – perhaps a latent consequence – this was 
about monopolising an area for criminal profit (Wolf, 1991: p.320). Territorial 
disputes were the prime reason for inter-gang conflicts (Wolf, 1991: p.323). 
 
What gave Wolf’s study its gravitas was his access to the Rebels MC, and it is 
similar access to a number of Australian outlaw motorcycle clubs that is at the 
heart of Veno’s work. Given the high degree of uniformity of such groups, 
Veno confirmed many of Wolf’s findings describing him as the “only other 
academic that I know of who did similar work with the clubs” (Veno, 2003: 
p.18). Given this, I will not repeat the findings but focus on some of the areas 
where Veno’s study is unique or particularly insightful. 
 
Veno (2003: p.66) says: “The motorcycle clubs argue that unlike the apparent 
crime orientation of modern street gangs, they have a legitimate purpose – to 
pursue an alternative lifestyle through motorcycles”. And this argument he 
holds as legitimate, and much of his work seeks to highlight the non-criminal 
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elements of such groups, something that, as he points out, is incongruent with 
often myopic, though powerful, police and public opinions.  
 
Veno does not dispute the fact that crime occurs within outlaw motorcycle 
clubs. Indeed, he acknowledges it may be one element involved in gaining 
membership: “To become an outlaw motorcyclist can require years of scrutiny 
by fellow club members, impeccable credentials as a biker and, in certain 
circumstances, even a requirement to commit an illegal act” (Veno, 2003: 
p.51). He also highlights numerous, and often high profile, violent and profit 
motivated crimes that outlaw motorcycle clubs and members of outlaw 
motorcycle clubs have been involved in. But Veno points out that crime should 
not be seen as a primary motivation for joining or maintaining membership to 
such groups; indeed the primary motivation is brotherhood, non-conformity 
and motorcycles. “When members,” Veno says, “call each other ‘brother’ they 
actually mean it. For many, the club becomes their family, particularly if 
they’ve come from dysfunctional homes” (Veno, 2003: p.112). Also, clubs are 
involved in legitimate enterprises and fundraising events (Veno, 2003: pp.120-
122). Simplistic media interpretations paint a dim view of what he sees as 
legitimate and complex sub-cultural phenomena. 
 
Indeed, Veno highlights instances whereby his views – clashing with common 
but incorrect popular assumptions – have seen him sidelined by police who 
occasionally became uncooperative during his research, as it appears they 
took his perspective on the clubs to be something akin to a gang apologist. 
This has stemmed in part from his belief that the clubs’ idea that the police are 
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just a ‘big blue gang’ has some legitimacy, and he notes occasions when the 
police’s “need to be seen to be doing something overrides the rights of the 
clubs to go about their business unhindered” (Veno, 2003: p.213). 
 
One further point from Veno’s study is his estimate of an average age of an 
outlaw motorcycle club member to be 35 years. He also says that while 
membership is open to those over 18, it is “rare for someone to be admitted to 
an outlaw motorcycle club before they are 25” (Veno, 2003: p.66). From this 
study’s findings, at least, it appears that outlaw motorcycle clubs’ membership 
is much more mature than that of the street gangs that have been studied. 
Moreover, in 1983 Hopper and Moore (Hopper & Moore, 1983: p.58) found 
that the average age of club members they studied was 34, and 
“generally…between 21 and 45 years of age” and thus, it seems, outlaw 
motorcycle club membership appears to have been relatively mature for some 
time. 
 
In recent years, research into the area of outlaw motorcycle clubs has 
increased further, supplementing the above works. The most notable works 
include that of William Dulaney, Tom Barker, and James Quinn and Craig 
Forsyth. Dulaney (2005) highlighted certain social and cultural factors that 
drove the rise of outlaw clubs, while plotting important events in outlaw club 
history. Similarly, Barker (2004, 2005a, 2005b) has made a number of 
contributions, researching the history of many leading outlaw clubs in 
America, as well as their spread around the world. But primarily his focus – 
perhaps unsurprisingly given he is an ex-law enforcement officer – is to 
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highlight the particular groups that have transitioned into organised criminal 
enterprises. Finally, Quinn and Forsyth (2009) have also added significantly to 
the rise and maturation of the outlaw clubs, making their most unique 
contribution by framing such groups as movements of resistance and 
countercultural forces stepped in symbolism and rituals.  
 
Slowly but perhaps surely, the body of research involving outlaw clubs is 
expanding, although a lack of ethnographic research – Wolf and Veno aside –  
remains apparent. 
 
Understanding Gangs and Gender 
Like outlaw motorcycle clubs, researchers have also traditionally ignored 
women in gangs, but in recent times they have come an important focus of 
much gang research in the modern era. With few exceptions, studies before 
the 1980s paid little attention to females in gangs and, when they were 
addressed, they were largely defined in terms of their relationships to male 
gang members. One of perhaps three exceptions (Curry, 1998) to the male-
centred stereotypes was Walter Miller (W. B. Miller, 1973), whose study of two 
female gangs in the early 1970s led him to a tripartite classification of female 
gangs: auxiliary gangs (affiliated to male gangs), mixed sex gangs, and 
independent or autonomous gangs (W. B. Miller, 1975). Although these 
classifications have been judged sexist (“because the gender structure of 
male gangs is rarely at issue”) and, like criticisms of early male typologies of 
an earlier era, they may be too simplistic, “no researchers to date have 
advanced an alternative typology” (Maxson & Whitlock, 2002: p.22). Indeed, 
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they have been, and remain, widely used in the field of female gang research, 
an area of study that became an important focus for many researchers during 
the 1980s and beyond.  
 
Following Anne Campbell’s (1984) groundbreaking and feminist orientated 
work The Girls in the Gang of the mid-1980s, there has been significant 
attention paid to gangs and gender. In fact, less than 20 years after 
Campbell’s offering, Jody Miller (2002) concluded that it can no longer be said 
that female involvement in gangs is an understudied phenomenon. Indeed, 
Miller suggested that: “It is safe to say that we now have more information 
about girls in gangs, and from a variety of methodological perspectives, than 
at any point in the long history of gang research” (J. Miller, 2002: pp.175-176). 
Be that as it may, the findings from research on girls or women in and around 
gangs remain inconclusive.  
 
While Campbell’s pioneering study of three New York gangs (two auxiliary 
and one mixed) gave depth and texture to our understanding of women gang 
members, her female participants were nevertheless largely defined by their 
interaction with gang males. Although the role of the girls was more than just 
sexual, as had been commonly depicted in the majority of earlier research, “it 
could not be said their roles have altered significantly. They exist as an annex 
to the male gang, and the range of possibilities open to them is dictated and 
controlled by the boys” (A. Campbell, 1984: p.266). This secondary role 
played by females in gangs was supported by Mann (1984: p.45) who found 
the role of girls was “to conceal and carry weapons for the boys, to provide 
102 
 
sexual favors, and sometimes to fight against girls who were connected with 
enemy boys’ gangs”. In the early 1990s, Jankowski (1991: p.146) found that 
in every gang he studied, “women were considered a form of property”.  
 
Although this attitude was also prevalent in Moore’s (1991) research, she 
documented numerous female auxiliary gangs that had certain autonomy and 
power. Moreover, she found a significant disconnect between how male 
members viewed female members and how female members viewed 
themselves (J. W. Moore, 1991: p.53-59), lending some evidence to the 
argument that researchers whose scholarly lens was focused on males may 
have been getting a distorted view of females in gangs (A. Campbell, 1990; 
Chesney-Lind, Sheldon, & Joe, 1996).  
 
Certainly researchers in more recent times have begun to suggest that 
females may be more prominent and active in gang activities, reflecting 
increases in gang crime generally, although it is accepted that their level of 
offending is lower than that of males (Chesney-Lind et al., 1996). In Detroit, 
Taylor (1993) found that females were becoming active players in gang crime, 
particularly the drug trade. He concluded that: “A new attitude of female 
criminal independence is emerging. The male-female gang relationship is also 
being altered (Taylor, 1993: p.23). Similarly, Fisherman (1995: p.90) claimed 
that the females in an auxiliary gang in Chicago “have become more 
entrenched, more violent, and more orientated to ‘male crime’”. But whether 
or not findings such as these could be applied generally is unclear, and there 
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remained “a substantial variation both between gangs and within gang in the 
ways in which girls behave” (J. W. Moore & Hagedorn, 1996: p.206).  
 
What appears to be clearer, however, is that female participation in gang 
membership, like gang membership generally, has increased since the 1980s. 
Although autonomous female gangs are extremely rare, auxiliary gangs are 
significantly more common, but the majority of female gang members are in 
mixed gendered gangs (Maxson & Whitlock, 2002; J. Miller, 2002: p.172). 
Maxson and Whitlock (2002: p.22) have suggested that while law 
enforcement agencies produce very low figures of female gang involvement 
(less than 10 percent), “it is reasonable to conclude that girls represent… 
probably somewhere between one fourth and one third of all gang members”. 
Similar conclusions had been reached by Moore (1991), but such figures are 
a tremendous increase from Miller’s (1975) estimate of 10 percent from the 
mid-1970s, although some think that figure may have been underestimated 
(Chesney-Lind et al., 1996: p.194). Curry (1998) has pointed out that much of 
the law enforcement data were unreliable because of issues such as 
incomparability of methodology, non uniformity of police definitions, failing to 
classify females as gang members, and the fact that not all delinquency is 
brought to police attention.  
 
Other types of data collection, however, such as self reporting surveys, can 
also yield significantly different results depending on the age range of the 
samples under study (Maxson & Whitlock, 2002: p.21), and reason for this lies 
with differing gender demographics. Females tend to join gangs at a younger 
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age than males do, and they tend to exit at a younger age as well (Maxson & 
Whitlock, 2002: p.21). Fagan has suggested that the “motivations for ganging 
among young women may be weaker and shorter in duration compared to 
their male counterparts” (Fagan, 1996: p.71). He concludes that because the 
barriers to women entering the workforce are weaker than those facing men, 
there is an easier transition to adult roles and reduces the influence the gang 
has on their lives (Fagan, 1996: p.71-72). A further reason for females leaving 
gangs was put forth by Moore and Hagedorn (1996: p.211), who suggested 
that “responsibilities associated with child rearing may speed up the process 
of maturing out of the gang”. 
 
Like males, female gang membership is a product of the social environment, 
but motivations for joining the gang may be different depending on gender 
(Maxson & Whitlock, 2002: p.31). Moore (1991: p.30), for one, has suggested 
that the personal biographies of gang women may be worse than that of men, 
and she and others have suggested that the consequences of gang 
membership may impact more negatively on the lives of females than males 
(J. Miller, 2002; J. W. Moore, 1991; J. W. Moore & Hagedorn, 1996). These 
conclusions should perhaps be treated with caution, however, until further 
research is conducted. As Maxson and Whitlock (2002: p.20)  suggest, 
“Despite the recent contributions to our understanding of female gang 
involvement, we have not yet reached a level of knowledge to permit 
generalized descriptions of female gang members or to compare them with 
male gang members”. 
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Given the paucity of gang studies in New Zealand generally, it is rather 
surprising that female participation in this country’s gangs has received any 
attention at all; albeit the contribution is a single study. This work, however, 
takes on added importance, as “there is virtually no literature on female gangs 
outside of the United States” (J. W. Moore, 2007: p.189). Sharing the name of 
the Campbell’s pioneering work, Dennehy and Newbold’s (2001) The Girls in 
the Gang reported that female gang involvement (as associates to New 
Zealand’s traditional ‘patched’ gangs) is often driven by numerous negative 
social and psychological factors (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.148). Many 
women sought gang association for a sense of belonging, identity and 
feelings of security – although many found the reality meet the expectation. 
The emphasis that New Zealand gangs put on ‘toughness’ and ‘staunchness’ 
(unconditional commitment to the gang) were not seen by gang members as 
female qualities, and women were viewed as ‘weak’ and ‘unreliable’ (Dennehy 
& Newbold, 2001: p.152). Gang association, then, became an extension of 
the negative lives women had led before entering the gang realm, and a place 
of subordination and sexual and physical violence. Despite this, many stayed 
with the gangs for long periods. Although many gang women were often 
complicate in male driven crimes, the moves toward ‘male’ criminal autonomy 
present in some American research is absent. 
 
Definitional Problems 
Although recent studies have illuminated a great deal in relation to our 
understanding of gangs, much of the research has highlighted – or perhaps 
accepted – that the complexity of the issue defies simple explanation. 
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Perhaps the most obvious example of this surrounds gang definitions. Like 
the status frustration theories of the 1950s, and outlined in the previous 
chapter, gang definitions have become a significant point of fierce debate for 
many contemporary gang researchers. Indeed, to this day, how a gang is 
defined – surely the most fundamental issue of such research – remains 
contested. It is from this contestation, and based on my own research, that I 
have formulated the definitions outline in the introduction to this thesis. 
 
The issue of definition is not merely one of academic interest or musing. How 
gangs are defined has significant implications for gang statistics, public 
concern, and subsequently policy. (Esbensen, Winfree, & Taylor, 2001; 
Spergel, 1995: p.17). Studies show that different definitions produce 
significantly different results with regard to accessing gang numbers and gang 
crime (Covey, 2003: p.25; Maxson & Klein, 1996). A definition that is too 
narrow will exclude relevant data and underestimate the issue, and one that is 
too broad will elicit too many data and exaggerate it. The implication is that a 
single community under study can be seen to have a significant or benign 
gang problem based not on what is happening on the street, but on how the 
issue is defined. The impact on policy is somewhat obvious:  overestimation 
may lead to moral panic, and underestimation a denial of the problem – both 
outcomes have an impact on how the issue is addressed (Spergel, 1995: 
p.17). Unfortunately, however, gang experts have failed to agree on many 
issues surrounding definitions (Ball & Curry, 1995) and the arguments are 
such that they can only be touched upon here. 
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Early gang researchers, for example Thrasher (1927) and Short and 
Strodbeck (1965), never agreed on a precise definition of the term ‘gang’, but 
often used descriptions of the process by which they formed, describing 
unsupervised youths developing cohesiveness through conflict. In 1971, Klein 
wrote: “Practitioners, researchers, and theoreticians alike have used the 
“gang” sometimes inconsistently, sometimes loosely, and sometimes in direct 
opposition to each other, but never in concert” (Klein, 1971: p.8). Recognising 
this, it was both he and Miller who most notably attempted gang definitions 
that could be universally applied – their approaches, though, were quite 
different.  
 
For Klein (1971: p.13), a gang could be defined as: 
 
[A]ny denotable adolescent group of youngsters who (a) are generally 
perceived as a distinct aggregation by others in their neighborhood, (b) 
recognize themselves as a denotable group (almost invariably with a 
name) and (c) have been involved in a sufficient number of delinquent 
incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from 
neighborhood residents and/or enforcement agencies. 
 
Now contrast this with Miller (1975: p.9), who defined a gang as: 
 
A group of recurrently associating individuals with identifiable 
leadership and internal organization, identifying with or claiming control 
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over territory in the community, and engaging either individually or 
collectively in violent or other forms of illegal behavior. 
 
Looking at these two definitions, Klein’s is broad and encompassing (Sanders, 
1994: p.9) and could quite easily include, for example, rowdy college 
fraternities and other groups that are not readily perceived as gangs 
(Esbensen et al., 2001: p.108). Miller’s definition, on the other hand, is 
detailed and specific, and if we accept that many gangs of the time tended to 
have fluid internal organisation and informal leadership (Klein, 1971: p.92), we 
must accept that this definition would exclude some groups of interest. Even 
without these criticisms, however, which would have been valid at the time the 
definitions were devised as they are now, it is perhaps clear that both would 
have needed modification in light of recent changes to the gang scene, and 
thereby raising the possibility that any definition may have a fixed usefulness. 
Gangs are no longer solely the domain of ‘youngsters’ as outlined in Klein's 
definition, and, for example, Taylor’s (1989) ‘organised gangs’ no longer make 
claims to a specific territory as per Miller. However, what these definitions 
held in common – and it was something that remains central to many 
definitions since – is the inclusion of illegal activity as a key definitional 
component. 
 
Although, as Klein pointed out, both he and Miller saw crime as just a small 
part of gang life, he nevertheless felt criminal orientation was a crucial ‘tipping 
point’ that could be used to distinguish gang from non-gang (Klein, 1995: p.27 
& 29). Such a position has become widely but not universally held, and during 
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the resurgence of gang research since the 1980s, it has become a point of 
focal concern. The exponents of definitional criminal inclusion are many 
(Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.31; Klein, 2005: p.136; Sanders, 1994: p.11; 
Spergel, 1995: pp.22-23), but it appears that in recent times these ranks have 
swelled significantly. Klein (2005: p.136) says the ‘consensus Eurogang 
definition’ – that includes a criminal caveat – “is agreed on by more than 100 
gang research scholars in the United States and Europe”. I will examine this 
definition shortly. 
 
Although they find themselves holding a minority position, researchers who 
reject the idea of a criminal component in a definition like Hagedorn (1988), 
Moore (1991), and Short (2007), do so primarily because a research 
investigation becomes a tautology; one element a researcher seeks to explain 
(crime) is a priori in the definition. Short believes that “including law breaking 
in the definition creates a circular argument. Definitions cannot explain, and if 
we want to understand gang delinquent/criminal behaviour, such behaviour 
must not be part of the definition” (Short, 2007: p.321). A further reason 
opposing having criminality in a definition is that in doing so one raises crime 
to a position of prominence that is unwarranted and unreflective of reality  
(remember that even Klein and Miller recognised crime to be a just small part 
of gang life). Moreover, and consequently, by defining gangs as criminal, such 
groups become regarded as an issue of law and order rather than as an entity 
in themselves, creating a tendency to look at the symptoms of the problem 
rather than at the problem itself. 
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An example of a non-criminal definition is provided by Hagedorn (2005a) 
which he initially devised in 1988: 
 
 Gangs are organizations of the street composed of either 1) the 
socially excluded or 2) alienated, demoralised, or bigoted elements of a 
dominant racial, ethnic, or religious group. 
 
In looking at such a definition, it becomes quite clear that the exclusion of a 
criminal component appear to significantly change the focus of the gang 
issue. 
 
In 2007, just two years after Klein announced more than 100 researchers had 
accepted the ‘Eurogang’ definition aimed at definitional uniformity within and 
between the U.S. and Europe, Hagedorn, produced a new and ambitious 
definition that sought to encompass all of the world’s gangs. Given that, as will 
be shown in the following section, globalisation processes and their impact on 
gangs had become a popular subject around the turn of the millennium and 
beyond, an attempt at a global definition was not in itself startling. What was 
surprising, however, was the fact that Hagedorn, one of the leading 
champions of non-criminal definitions, included a criterion of criminality. He 
did not, however, totally relinquish his original position. Hagedorn (re)defined 
gangs as follows: 
 
Gangs are organizations of the socially excluded. While gangs begin 
as unsupervised adolescent peer groups and most remain so, some 
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institutionalize in barrios, favelas, ghettos, and prisons. Often these 
institutionalized gangs become business enterprises within the informal 
economy and a few are linked to international criminal cartels. Most 
gangs share a racialized or ethnic identity and a media-diffused 
oppositional culture. Gangs have variable ties to conventional 
institutions and, in given conditions, assume social, economic, political, 
cultural, religious, or military roles (Hagedorn, 2007a: p.309). 
 
He supplemented this definition with a diagram (below) that categorises 
gangs across dimensions of organisation and ethnicity (Hagedorn, 2007a: 
p.310): 
 
 
Type                                             Ethnicity 
 Dominant Group or Ethnicity Oppressed Group or Ethnicity 
 
Interstitial Industrial-era U.S. ethnic 
gangs; most European male 
and female gangs and all 
unsupervised peer groups 
of dominant ethnicities 
Most black, Latino, & Asian 
male and female U.S. gangs; 
German Turkish, British 
Bangladeshi, & New Zealand 
Maori gangs; most Third 
World gangs 
 
Institutional U.S. “Voting Gangs”; Triads 
in Asia; Hindu mandals in 
Chicago and LA “super-
gangs”; NYC Latin Kings; 
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India; U.S. mafia and 
Russian mafiya; Japanese 
Yakuza; Colombian & 
Nigerian cartels  
U.S. Tongs; some South 
African Black, Colored, and 
Indian gangs; many prison 
gangs 
 
With this typography, Hagedorn (2007a: p.310) extends his “old argument…of 
the need to reframe the gang problem outside of the criminal justice matrix”. 
In defending this assertion, he says: 
 
To see most gangs as interstitial is to say that most gang members still 
are unsupervised groups of juveniles. But to say that other gangs are 
institutional means that they must have at least a degree of legitimacy 
to survive. To say institutional gangs are similar to other organizations 
of the socially excluded demands a political and social treatment of 
these institutions as well as a criminal justice response where 
warranted…To define some gangs as institutionalized is to understand 
them not simplistically as organized crime but as social constructions 
that cognitively organize reality for their members and environment” 
(Hagedorn, 2007a: p.310). 
 
Indeed, Hagedorn makes a compelling argument that his thrust to see gangs 
in a holistic way remains the same, given his new definition has taken a 
significant step back from a position he had articulated for nearly 20 years. 
While ostensibly his new definition was in recognition of changes surrounding 
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globalisation, it was perhaps as much in recognition that many contemporary 
gangs, like the global village, had changed too. 
 
By way of comparison, I will return now to briefly discuss and review the 
Eurogang definition, which is:  
 
A street gang is any durable, street-orientated youth group whose own 
identity includes involvement in illegal activity (cited in Klein, 2005: 
p.136) 
 
Few could argue with Klein’s description of the definition as ‘minimalist’, 
indeed he uses five points to better illuminate its meaning (Klein, 2005: 
p.136). He explains: 
 
Point 1. “Durable” is a bit ambiguous, but at least several months can 
be used as a guideline. Many gang groups come together and 
dissipate in a few months. The durability refers to the group, which 
continues despite turnover of members. 
 
Point 2. “Street-orientated” implies spending a lot of group time outside, 
work, home, and school – often on streets, in malls, parks, in cars and 
so on. 
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Point 3. “Youth” can be a bit ambiguous. Most street gangs are more 
adolescent than adult, but some include members in their 20s and 
even 30s. Most have average ages in adolescence or early 20s. 
 
Point 4. “Illegal” generally means delinquent or criminal, not just 
bothersome. 
 
Point 5. “Identity” refers to the group, to the collective situation, not the 
individual self-image (Klein, 2005: p.36). 
 
The fact that Klein uses the term ‘ambiguous’ twice in explaining the 
definition, suggests that it could be loosely interpreted. Also, within the 
definition a variety of different categories of gangs can exist (Klein, 2002: 
p.241). Despite this, the definition’s focus is nevertheless narrow, purposely 
excluding groups such as prison gangs, motorcycle gangs and adult criminal 
organisations (Klein, 2005: p.136). Moreover, despite the definition being 
widely agreed to, many European researchers rejected the term ‘gang’ and 
thus an allowance was made to substitute the term with ‘problematic youth 
group’ – it was one way of appeasing those researchers who did not wish to 
create moral panic by unnecessarily labelling troublesome groups (Klein, 
2002: p.241). In light of such concerns, one wonders how tight the agreement 
around the definition will prove to be. The Eurogang definition, however, is 
one element of a holistic research endeavour and that project, as will be 
shown in the following section, does have exciting potential for comparative 
research. 
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Although the Hadgedorn and Eurogang definition were inspired by 
transnational or global research, and both have a criminal component, it is 
clear they share few similarities. In fact, any comparisons are superficial at 
best given the encompassing nature of one and the narrowness of the other. 
They may, however, serve to highlight the idea that there is room for different 
definitions. Indeed, the drive for a single universal gang definition may prove 
to be a casualty of the increasing complexity of gangs that may necessitate 
and make desirable a number of definitional approaches. Such a situation 
revives the ideas of Ruth Horowitz from the early 1990s. 
 
Horowitz (1990) has proven to be a rather lone but interesting voice. Where 
others sought uniformity of definition, she – rather persuasively – argued that 
such an endeavour was futile as social scientists were unlikely to ever 
universally agree and, if they did, they would fail to sell the idea to the public 
and policy makers (Horowitz, 1990: p.47). Moreover, she felt such an effort 
was quite probably overrated anyway; fearing focused definitional parameters 
may narrow topics studied and questions asked (Horowitz, 1990: p.43). This 
is not to say that Horowitz sought to ignore definition, as some in recent times 
have appeared inclined to do (Short, 2007: p.322), she just expressed comfort 
with definitional plurality and change, arguing that new definitions “are useful 
because they uncover phenomena and connections previously unseen and 
thus unexplored” (Horowitz, 1990: p.47). Such ideas still hold certain 
relevance, despite a consensus that a standardised definition holds significant 
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importance (Klein, 2005; Lafontaine et al., 2005; Maxson & Klein, 1996; 
Spergel, 1995). 
 
Clearly the debate around definition remains alive and, in the face of a 
growing investigation into global gangs as well as changes in American 
gangs, it appears the issues faced by those seeking to define gangs are more 
difficult than ever before. In this environment, Horowitz’s ideas resonate with 
renewed volume and while definitional conformity will undoubtedly aid 
comparative analysis, definitions that seek this may have to be narrow and 
specific and exist within a number of definitional categories. In this way, the 
Eurogang definition may be just one of many that can define the plethora of 
gang types. Such an idea does not exclude efforts such as Hagedorn’s. It 
seems to me that large and encompassing definitions are also useful in 
categorising different types of gangs within one country and indeed around 
the world. Importantly, such a definition also keeps alive the idea that gangs 
should be defined as more than just criminal entities. 
 
Globalisation, Gangs, and Comparative Research 
Perhaps the most recent development in contemporary gangs research has 
been a focus on gangs outside of America and incorporating the impact that 
globalisation has had on gangs and gang research. As noted in the previous 
chapter, and as has become clear, the history of gang research is largely an 
American history. In recent times this has begun to change; slightly perhaps, 
but in significant ways. A numbers of books, often with multiple contributors, 
have been published around the turn of the new millennium and beyond that 
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investigate gangs in different countries and the global processes that 
influence them, for example, Gangs and Youth Subcultures: International 
Explorations edited by Hazlehurst and Hazlehurst (1998b), Street Gangs 
Throughout the World by Covey (2003), and Gangs in the Global City edited 
by Hagedorn (2007d). One further example, The Eurogang Paradox: Street 
Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe edited by Klein, Kerner, 
Maxson and Weitkamp (2001) is based on the work of numerous American 
and European researchers who sought to undertake – and continue to 
encourage – comparative research between the U.S. and numerous countries 
on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.  
 
As stated above, the participants in the Eurogang project agreed upon a 
simple definition for gangs, but they also outlined a comprehensive set of 
rules in an attempt to standardise data collection via ethnographic research 
and surveys (Klein 2005 p147-148). Again, the focus is on comparative 
research and so methods are standardised in order to gain comparable 
results. Although the thrust has come from a multi-country consortium of 
researchers from different countries, the need for uniformity is as much about 
research in the U.S. as it is about Europe. This is because most U.S. studies 
have been done in isolation and have looked at specific samples, making 
comparisons between them difficult (Covey, 2003: p.14; Klein, 2005). 
 
Early results of the Eurogang project have highlighted many interesting 
findings, but most significantly, they have brought into stark relief the lack of 
research done on gangs in Europe, and the fact that many European 
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countries either do not have, or do not recognise, a gang problem. Either way, 
it is safe to say that for the most part, gangs in Europe are not as significant or 
entrenched as gangs in America (Covey, 2003: p.100; Weitekamp, 2001). 
Whether or not this perception changes as more research is undertaken 
remains to be seen. The thrust of uniform, comparable research, however, is 
one that has the potential to yield fascinating and important results. 
 
One point of interest that has emerged from initial findings of the Eurogang 
project is the influence of American gangs on youths from other countries. In 
places such as Britain, Netherlands, and Norway some youths have adopted 
the style of American street gangs, largely the Bloods and Crips. In the 
Netherlands one group had even taken a specific name of a large Los 
Angeles Crip gang the ‘Eight Trays’ they had found in a book by ‘Monster’ 
Cody, an American gang member who has penned an autobiography 
(Germet, 2001: p.150). The Dutch group had adopted the clothing, hand 
signals and language directly from their American counterparts (Gruter & 
Versteegh, 2001: p.137). Although common in style, this group – and others 
like them – were reported to be less intent on armed violence and did not fight 
over territory and seemed to be “more connected with their wish to look like 
the boys in daily MTV-clips” (Gruter & Versteegh, 2001: p.141). These groups 
are clearly not directly linked to their namesakes in the U.S., but as Maxson 
(1998: p.5) has highlighted, many such groups who share the name Bloods or 
Crips in the U.S. are not connected in any real way either, despite certain 
claims by law enforcement agencies. Indeed, Monster Cody’s autobiography 
is replete with stories of Crip inter ‘set’ violence and hatred (Kody Scott, 
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1993). In fact, it was the mistaken belief held by many European researchers 
that American gangs were more connected and organised than they 
commonly are, that led to a belief that their local ‘problematic youth groups’ 
were not gangs at all – this paradox was the inspiration for the book title ‘The 
Eurogang Paradox’.  
 
The advent of LA-style street gangs is also evident in New Zealand. Referring 
to today’s youth gangs, Eggleston believes that the Americanisation of New 
Zealand has been increasingly influential on the country’s youth. He sees the 
new ‘gangsta’ style being mimicked by the new groups as a feature that 
demarcates them from existing “well established” New Zealand gangs 
(Eggleston, 2000). As will become clear in the body of this research, however, 
New Zealand’s traditional gangs also had their genesis in American culture 
via the understudied outlaw motorcycle clubs.  
 
While the Eurogang project seeks similarities and comparisons, many new 
studies on gangs around the world show seemingly fundamental differences 
between gangs of different countries and may require a rethink of the 
traditional American approach to gang research. As Covey says, “The study 
of street gangs in different countries poses a complex set of methodological 
considerations for the scholar. Problems exist in the equivalence of data, as 
well as problems in the conceptualization and operationalization of gangs and 
the measurement of gang prevalence and activity” (Covey, 2003: p.7). For 
example, does the term dacoit in India or the term Bande in Germany mean 
the same thing as gang in the U.S? (Covey, 2003: p.7; Huizinga & Schumann, 
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2001: p231). Moreover, research has begun to highlight the tremendous 
diversity of gangs around the world in countries that do not resemble the U.S. 
(Short, 2007: p.320). Such diversity can be seen in heavily armed drug gangs 
in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas; politicised and armed youths in Haiti; or vigilante 
security groups, like the Bakassi Boys, in Nigeria; and Hagedorn (2005b: 
p.158) therefore concludes that, in a worldwide setting, “social disorganization 
and juvenile delinquency are too narrow for the study of gangs”. 
 
A further focus for researchers of gangs around the world is the impact of 
globalisation. Clearly the impact of American culture via popular media is 
having – or rather continues to have – an impact in certain countries, but 
perhaps more significant are global economic shifts, rapid urbanisation, and 
migrations of people. But these global happenings and their impact on the 
gangs around the world is little understood, and it is for this reason that calls 
for more research around the world are being made (Covey, 2003: P31; 
Hagedorn, 2005b; Klein, 2005; Short, 2007: p.330). It is my intention that this 
research will contribute to this body of knowledge. 
 
New Zealand Research Contributions 
Like non-American gang studies generally, New Zealand has not built a 
strong body of gang research. Notwithstanding this, since the arrival of 
patched gangs in the 1960s, there is some work from which I have been able 
to draw. 
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In 1971, two criminology students, J. D. Howman (1971) and C. Anastasiou 
(1971) from Victoria University, undertook research on ‘Polynesian’ 
(incorporating Maori and Pacific Peoples) gangs in Auckland and Wellington. 
Drawing on the works of both Levett (1959) and Green (1959), noted in the 
previous chapter, the study – although somewhat superficial – found that, like 
those earlier studies, gang membership was a largely youthful dalliance, 
however, they also made the important observation that certain gangs, 
namely the Hell’s Angels, the Highway 61, the Stormtroopers and the Mongrel 
Mob, were maintaining their membership into adulthood (Howman, 1971: 
p.38). It was a finding that supported a government study (Investigating 
Committee, 1970) undertaken one year earlier. Also, like the studies of Levett 
and Green before them, Howman and Anastasiou located gang membership 
largely in certain lower class suburbs, typified by state housing. 
 
In 1982, a University of Waikato Master of Arts student, Edward Marsh 
(1982), undertook a systematic study of the Mongrel Mob and Black Power by 
surveying 30 incarcerated members of those gangs. Although the research 
primarily sought to ascertain the participants’ feelings in relation to “gangs, 
formal institutions, and the community” (Marsh, 1982: p.93), it also provided 
valuable insight into the hierarchical structures, internal dynamics, and ethos 
of the two largest patched street gangs in New Zealand. 
 
In the same year that Marsh submitted his thesis, Jane Kelsey and Warren 
Young (1982) published a challenging review of attitudes toward gangs 
stemming from Cohen’s notion of ‘Moral Panic’. Examining the Moerewa riot 
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of 1978 – a critical event in New Zealand gang history – Kelsey and Young 
highlight the role that sensational media coverage can play in creating a 
distorted view of gang realities and stoking suppressive legislative measures 
as a means of social control. It is without doubt one of the most noteworthy 
pieces of work undertaken in the field of gang research in New Zealand, but 
one with which I take some issue in Chapter Six. 
 
In 1987, in what appears to be New Zealand’s first investigation of non-
patched gangs (since the emergence of patched gangs in this country, at 
least), Spoonley (1987) identified the rise of racist skinhead gangs, linking 
them to social developments – particularly musical influences – stemming 
from Britain. Although few in number, these gangs had been involved in some 
racially motivated violent activity. Despite little public concern about skinhead 
groups at that time, Spoonley warned of the potential dangers of such gangs. 
Indeed, his concern proved prescient, and in a period during the 1990s, 
skinheads burst dramatically into national consciousness, as will be discussed 
in Chapter Eight.  
 
In 1992, John Meek (1992) examined the prominence and impact of gangs in 
prison. Although narrow in focus, Meek’s work is one of the few thorough and 
detailed gang studies undertaken in this country. It was not, however, the first 
study that examined gangs in prison, having followed a minor work published 
by Currie in 1989. In a significant finding, Currie (1989) found the gangs had 
strong bonds of solidarity within prison. Similarly, and drawing on the work of 
Newbold (1989b), Meek outlined how gangs had transformed inmate culture 
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by shifting allegiances that largely encompassed the whole prison population 
to allegiances formed around the gangs. Despite these developments, Meek, 
with the aid of an ‘unpublished departmental paper’, outlined just 16 major 
disturbances in New Zealand prisons involving gangs between 1980 and 
1990. The relatively small number of major disturbances, however, belies the 
tremendous underlying tension that existed within many of the country’s penal 
institutions; and Meek’s examination of the problems at Paremoremo during 
the latter half of the 1980s offers testimony to this. Further significant 
contributions were made by Meek through his findings that, in comparison to 
the inmate population, gang members tended to be younger, were more likely 
to be serving time for crimes of violence, incarcerated for longer periods, have 
more convictions, and be convicted of their first offence at a younger age 
(Meek, 1992: pp.270-271). 
 
In a broad overview of crime and deviance in New Zealand, Greg Newbold 
(1992) engaged with the issues of gangs, outlining the limited historic 
knowledge of them and their involvement in criminal activities, and made the 
important connection between the incarceration of a number of Hell’s Angels 
members and the group’s moves into profit driven crime.  
 
In contrast to the academic work of Newbold, and undoubtedly reflecting the 
growing public fascination with gangs, Bill Payne’s (1997) journalistic book 
Staunch is almost certainly the most widely read work on gangs in New 
Zealand. Despite the book’s lack of academic rigour, it does offer important 
first hand testimonies from many gang members, who outline several 
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important historic events in New Zealand gang history. Moreover, the fact that 
Payne was able to gain a high degree of access to many of New Zealand’s 
most prominent gangs highlighted the fact that the dearth of New Zealand 
research was not due to a lack of opportunity. Despite this, few researchers 
have followed Payne’s example and entered the field to systematically study   
gangs. 
 
One relatively minor example of such work came in response to a growing 
skinhead presence in the South Island city of Christchurch. During the mid-
1990s, Rasjad Addison (1996), for his Masters of Arts degree at the University 
of Canterbury, explored the culture and activities of skinhead gangs. Like 
Spoonley before him, Addison linked the rise of skinheads in New Zealand to 
British influences and examined a form of detached youth work being 
employed in Christchurch: a scheme run by the controversial Kyle Chapman, 
who went on to become the leader of a white supremacist faction and the face 
of racial politics in New Zealand.  
 
In the late 1990s, Pahmi Winter (1998) contributed a chapter to an 
international book on gangs and youth subcultures, and it appears to be the 
first time a New Zealand study exclusively looking at gangs attempted to 
reach a world audience and thus, actively contribute or engage with the 
international canon of gang research. Winter’s focus was ostensibly on 
contemporary developments within and around the Mongrel Mob, and 
specifically the rise of MAP, the Mob Advisory Panel. Winter used these topics 
as a springboard to investigate attitudes toward addressing the issue of gangs 
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in New Zealand, suggesting that the focus had swung away from 
social/community approaches and toward a ‘political’ approach based on 
suppression. Indeed, Winter’s chapter came at a time of a sea change in New 
Zealand’s approach to gangs, something that is explored in detail in Chapters 
Seven and Nine. 
 
Despite the increasing legislative measures being targeted at gangs toward 
the end of the 1990s, there was not a corresponding increase in research 
during this period. There were, however, some interesting additions. 
 
Although, Spoonley, Addison and Payne extended a research focus beyond 
patched gangs by profiling skinhead gangs, it was Eggleston (2000) who 
broke new ground with his Ph.D research during the 1990s.  Eggleston 
studied the emergence of a new form of youth gang proliferating in many 
urban centres, stylised on the ‘Bloods’ and ‘Crips’, which, as outlined earlier in 
this chapter, formed in America and were then emulated in many parts of the 
world. Indeed, the study attributed the rise of such gangs in this country to the 
“surging” effects of ‘McDonaldisation’ (Eggleston, 2000: p.149). Eggleston 
used ethnographic research and formal interviews to understand and interpret 
the language of gang members. The study found that the gang members 
closely mimicked American popular cultural influences, such as those 
stemming from movies and music, and that these developments separated 
the new gangs from the well established patched gangs. Eggleston did, 
however, question whether these gang youths – his subjects ranged in age 
from eleven to 24 years old – who were so adept at “talking the talk”, were in 
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actual fact “walk[ing] the walk?” (Eggleston, 2000: p.160). His question, as will 
be shown in the penultimate chapter of this thesis, was to be answered in the 
affirmative, as a spate of LA-style street gang murders occurred on the mid-
2000s. 
 
Further advancing knowledge of patched gangs, and continuing the tradition 
of student produced work, University of Auckland Master of Arts candidate 
Dominic Andrae (2004) examined such gangs through the familiar themes of 
media sensationalism and moral panic. He also explored the attractions of 
gang membership including such factors as acceptance, status, power, 
economic support and respect (Andrae, 2004: p.32). Andrae’s most important 
contribution, however, was his examination of symbolism and how this 
affected and affirmed gang member behaviour and activity. This symbolism 
was primarily represented by gang attire and particularly the back patch, 
which aided in the formation of a distinct anti-social identity. Andrae also 
explored rituals – such as initiation ceremonies – and the distinct stages that a 
prospective member must move through in order to gain full gang 
membership; a process that ensures commitment to a gang’s ethos and 
commits him to the social status of an outsider.  
 
Similar themes were engaged with in 2007 by Dave Haslett (2007) in his 
Masters research at the University of Canterbury on early outlaw motorcycle 
clubs in the South Island. To date, Haslett’s work is the only significant study 
to focus on outlaw clubs in this country. Haslett explored the idea of ‘myth 
making’ around such groups and was another to draw on Cohen’s Moral 
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Panic, suggesting the outlaw clubs were ‘folk devils’, so shaped through 
sensational media and the unfettered framing done by the police. 
 
That same year, New Zealand gained its first true insider’s view of a gang 
when former Mongrel Mob president Tuhoe ‘Bruno’ Isaac (2007) published his 
memoirs. Invaluable for its detail of the Mongrel Mob’s attitudes and activities, 
it also tells his version of events at nationally uniting the gang’s many 
chapters at Ambury Park in 1987, an event that I discuss in Chapter Seven, 
and one that marks the third pivot point in New Zealand gang history. 
 
As this thesis was drawing to its conclusion, another book that sheds some 
light on women in or around the gang scene was published. Pip Desmond’s 
(2009) history of the Aroha Trust, an all female work cooperative that was 
closely aligned with the Wellington chapter of the Black Power.  As well as 
giving further insight into women associated with gangs, their motivations and 
experiences, and supporting the prior work done by Dennehy and Newbold 
(2001) outlined earlier in this chapter, it also offers a unique perspective on 
the activities of certain key people who influenced the development of Black 
Power, something outlined in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
 
Notwithstanding some important contributions, it is clear that gangs in New 
Zealand have failed to gain significant academic attention. This relative 
paucity of research means that a sound base of knowledge is lacking, and this 
thesis is an effort at working toward building such a foundation. 
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Conclusion 
Since the 1980s, gang research has advanced significantly, yet in many ways 
the issue has become less clear. The complexity of the gang situation, 
observed by Thrasher in Chicago in the 1920s, has become even more 
evident as gangs, and subsequently gang studies, have spread to a greater 
number of American cities. Rich and detailed research from throughout that 
country in recent years has proven, perhaps beyond anything else, that gangs 
in different places evolve for different reasons depending on numerous 
variables including ethnicity, economy, migration, levels of poverty, and group 
organisational structure.  
 
Nevertheless, even within these differences, many similarities are evident 
and, as has been shown, broad generalisations in relation to the social, 
psychological and economic influences surrounding gangs and their members 
are both many and valid. Moreover, during this era, the breadth of research 
has expanded to include previously ignored areas such as females in gangs 
and, particularly important for this study, outlaw motorcycle gangs.  
 
The changes within the gang scene have potentially made the already 
demanding task of defining exactly what a gang is more difficult. It appears 
increasingly clear that the pithy definitions of the past are inadequate and that 
a more sophisticated and nuanced approach is required. Although this study 
predominately focuses on patched gangs, which provide the benefit of self 
identification, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis I have set about 
creating a number of definitions to incorporate all such groups in New 
Zealand, but which also allow for the necessity of differentiation. 
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Internationally, the range of gang research now appears set to expand 
significantly given the fact that gang studies in recent times have begun to 
globalise and focus on gangs around the world. These studies seem set to 
both bolster and test American literature that has for so long provided the 
authoritative paradigms. Until now, New Zealand contributions to global gang 
research have been limited. Although a greater input to the international 
cannon is desirable, the fact that gangs are increasingly becoming imbedded 
within New Zealand society and, as such, are the target of ever increasing 
legal measures, it is increasingly obvious that more knowledge in the area is 
not only desirable but, in my view, necessary.  
 
It is with a view to contributing to that global body of knowledge, as well as to 
better informing gang policy locally, that I now turn to look at the rise and 
development of gangs in New Zealand. 
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3. The Foundations for the Modern Gang: The 1950s. 
 
Introduction 
A primary objective of this thesis is to identify the evolutionary history of 
contemporary New Zealand gangs. But before these groups could evolve they 
required a base from which to develop; and in the 1950s this base was 
established within the unique social, economic and political environments of 
the time. 
 
Gangs of the 1950s emerged from a youthful, largely working-class, sub-
cultural movement, within which there were two distinctive styles: ‘bodgies’ 
and ‘milkbar cowboys’. Indeed it was largely this youth movement, and not 
‘gangs’ specifically, that became the focus for significant community concern 
surrounding the problem of juvenile delinquency and its links to international 
popular culture. Nevertheless, the information that exists on New Zealand 
gangs, sparse as it may be, gives an insight into their nature and activities as 
well as allowing for the construction of hypotheses as to how and why they 
came about. 
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This chapter, therefore, seeks to extract the New Zealand gangs of the 1950s 
out of the wider youth groups that were common at the time, and explain their 
nature and activities, as well as offer explanations as to how and why they 
emerged. Furthermore, it explores the gangs of the 1950s in their historical 
context and highlights the political responses to their emergence. 
 
New Zealand Gangs in the 1950s 
Although they gained a significant presence in the 1950s, groups of 
troublesome youths or ‘gangs’ were not a new phenomenon in New Zealand 
and have existed since at least colonial times. In 1842 and 1843, having been 
transported from Parkhurst Prison in England, 128 male juveniles (Stone, 
2007: p.21) began roaming Auckland streets and were blamed for “a rapid 
spread of moral pestilence” (Cherrett, 1989: p.12). Twenty years later, The 
New Zealand Herald reported that a “number of boys and young men 
congregate together and commit outrages of a nature altogether unfit for 
publication”. These “outrages” included breaking windows, breaking and 
entering, assault, and stripping females naked and dragging them about, and 
these “lawless practices” occurred “at least four nights in the week on 
average” (Howman, 1971: p.21). In a similar vein, during 1888, the Weekly 
News railed against a “garden robbing, window breaking, insolent, defiant and 
ferocious generation of young cubs” (NZ Herald 5.1.1971). There were “well 
organised” gangs of about ten to 20 youths reported in the 1890s, with 
leaders and a code of signals, who deliberately jostled pedestrians and 
squirted tobacco juice at passers-by while making “obscene and insulting 
remarks” (NZ Herald 5.1.1971). Similar gangs were evident in the early the 
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1900s and these groups were believed to have developed secret languages 
and engaged in initiation ceremonies involving urine – human or equine – 
being placed in new members’ hats (Belich, 2001: p.362). In 1927, it was said 
that youth gangs in Auckland were engaged in fights (with knives and 
coshes), vandalism, stealing, and the claiming of territory that they would 
defend “with great viciousness” (Levett, 1959: pp.7-8).  
 
Little, however, is known of these groups and it was not until the late 1950s 
that youth gangs were subjected to any degree of systematic study, via the 
works of A. E. Levett, a Child Welfare Officer, and J. G. Green, the head of a 
government research unit. Levett (1959: p.1) identified 41 gangs in New 
Zealand’s largest city of Auckland, incorporating between 486 and 730 
members aged between 12 and 24. Green (1959: p.27), in a more detailed 
study, found 17 gangs in the country’s capital city of Wellington that 
maintained a total membership of between 251 and 278 with ages ranging 
from 14 to 21. Both researchers, however, acknowledged that their gang 
numbers were conservative due to methodological issues surrounding the 
collection of data (Green, 1959: pp.27-28; Levett, 1959: p.1). Levett’s study, 
for instance, excluded large tracts of the city. 
 
These gangs emerged from a larger, primarily Anglo American working class 
youth movement based on consumption, independence and rebellion. At the 
same time, crime and delinquency had become a major concern in many 
countries (Fyvel, 1963: pp.18-20). In New Zealand, charges brought before 
the Children’s Court leapt from 3,662 to 10,365 between 1950 and 1960 
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(Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.132). These increases in crime became linked 
here, as in other parts of the world, to this boisterous youth subculture. In 
England, such youths were termed ‘teddy boys’ (Fyvel, 1963), and in Australia 
they were known as ‘bodgies’ (Bessant & Watts, 1998; Stratton, 1984). As in 
New Zealand, both groups were influenced by American popular culture, 
particularly teenage movies and rock ‘n’ roll music. In New Zealand, youth of 
this type were also called bodgies, after their Australian counterparts and, in a 
manner similar to the groups elsewhere, they were distinguished by their own 
unique sense of style. 
 
Bodgie attire often included long coats, brightly coloured shirts with slim ties, 
tapered pants, garish socks, and thick-soled black shoes (Crowther, 1956: 
p.4; Green, 1959: p.8; Levett, 1959: p.2; M. Ritchie, 1997: p.1; Yska, 1993: 
p.173 & 176). Their female counterparts were ‘widgies’ who typically had short 
hair, and wore tight slacks or a skirt with a split at the back, men’s shirts or 
coloured blouses – often accompanied by a patterned scarf – colourful 
sweaters, and slip-on pumps or flat black shoes (Crowther, 1956: p.2; M. 
Ritchie, 1997: pp.1-2; Yska, 1993: p.176). 
 
In New Zealand the term ‘bodgie’ was often used as a generic term meaning 
‘juvenile delinquent’ and frequently encompassed another youth identity that 
shared similar international links and influences – the milk bar cowboys. This 
group’s style was somewhat more uniform and usually included leather 
jackets and trousers or jeans rolled slightly up the leg or tucked into flying 
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boots, and typically they rode motorcycles (Crowther, 1956: p.2; Levett, 1959: 
p.2; M. Ritchie, 1997: p.2; Yska, 1993: p.176). 
 
It is important to note that only a minority of the bodgies and milk bar cowboys 
formed or joined gangs. Green (1959: p.60) suggested at the time that the 
public “lumps together” the gangs with “the larger group of non-conformists 
(particularly in dress)” and “worries about the whole assortment 
indiscriminately”. That such confusion occurred is unsurprising given that, in 
the vast majority of cases, there was no way visually to distinguish between, 
for example, a gang of bodgies and the wider bodgie youth culture. Moreover, 
such differentiation becomes harder if one accepts that a defining feature of a 
bodgie gang was “anti-social characteristics” (Green, 1959: p.5) and that a 
defining feature of bodgies generally was the “deliberate adoption of an ‘anti 
social’ stance” (Shuker, 1994: p.270). The following two chapters will 
demonstrate how New Zealand gangs soon became clearly identifiable. 
Nevertheless, the problem of distinguishing gangs from a wider youth fashion 
would emerge once again nearly half a century later, as will be discussed in 
the closing chapters of this thesis. 
 
As gangs were largely camouflaged within the wider youth trends for much of 
the 1950s, they only attracted significant interest late in the decade, through 
the research of Levett and Green. What can be revealed from both of these 
studies is that the gangs were, with few exceptions, immature groups, both in 
terms of the age of their members and in their development. Typically, these 
groups formed “in a similar way to many other human groups. They live in the 
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same locality or frequent the same area. They share similar outlooks and 
attitudes to life because of essentially similar experiences. The gangs have a 
spontaneous and unplanned origin, the natural outgrowth of a number of boys 
coming together” (Levett, 1959: p.4). Drawing on the ideas of Thrasher 
(1927), Tannenbaum (1938) and other early U.S. researchers, many of these 
gangs were little more than ‘playgroups’. Using Taylor’s (1989) typology, they 
may be seen as ‘scavenger gangs’, or alternatively, using Maxson and Klein’s 
(1995) terminology, they were perhaps ‘compressed’ gangs. But given the 
difficulty in judging exactly when a clique of youths transforms into a gang, it is 
difficult to accurately establish the precise nature of the groups examined by 
Levett and Green. Using the definitions that I have outlined in the introduction 
to this thesis, some of these groups may not have reached the required 
benchmarks to be defined as a gang, but as will be shown many were 
displaying the qualities consistent with what I have termed ‘incipient gangs’. 
 
With few exceptions, the gangs identified by both Levett and Green tended to 
be small, had few if any rules, and lacked formal structure and clear 
leadership (Green, 1959: p.10; Levett, 1959: pp.5-6). Certain groups, 
however, were beginning to show territorial desire, which was often reflected 
in their name (Green, 1959: p.8), and others had created emblems to 
distinguish their group (Levett, 1959: p.9). There was one unsubstantiated 
report of a female gang in Auckland, but overall gangs were a male 
phenomenon (Green, 1959: p.34; Levett, 1959: p.5). There were female 
members of some gangs, but this was rare. Although some gang members 
“were serious and hardened offenders” (Green, 1959: p.55), gang crime 
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tended to be petty in nature and reflected boisterous adventurism. 
Membership in these groups appears to have been fleeting and none of the 
gangs achieved any real longevity. But despite individual gang disintegration, 
it appears a type of churning was occurring whereby, as some gangs were 
folding, others were emerging so that the gang scene was in a constant state 
of unhurried rejuvenation; changing over time, but not growing older. As will 
become clear, these gangs were a reflection of, and a reaction to, the era in 
which they existed – a finding that will be shown to be consistent over the 
course of this thesis.  
 
Economic Prosperity – The Gangs of the Good Times 
Nineteen-fifties New Zealand is generally viewed as a simple and rather 
uncomplicated decade, and for good reason. The New Zealand economy was 
basic but strong, and socially the country was uniform and conformist (Belich, 
2001; Dunstall, 1992; King, 2003). On face value, the foundations of New 
Zealand’s modern gang culture would seem to have formed in an unlikely 
period.  
 
During the 1950s, the country’s rural economy entered the final stage of a 
‘grasslands revolution’, a process that began in the first quarter of the century 
whereby technological drives began to significantly increase farming outputs, 
the country’s main source of income (Belich, 2001: p.308). Beginning in 1950, 
the Korean War created a tremendous demand for New Zealand’s primary 
products, particularly wool, and this offered further impetus to an already 
thriving economy.  
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Between 1945 and 1960, output volumes of all farm produce increased over 
300 percent with value climbing from £97.1m to £316.6m (Department of 
Statistics, 1955: pp. 436-7; 1961: pp. 396-7). This long economic boom lasted 
until the early 1970s (Sinclair, 1991: p.288), and the wealth being generated 
was experienced by all workers as unemployment was virtually nil and jobs 
commanded increasingly higher wages. The supercharged economy did bring 
about inflationary pressures, but wage increases offset price rises in 
consumer goods. The nominal weekly wage-rate index (using a base of 
1954=1000) shows wages increased from 729 in 1950 to 1193 in 1960. This 
compares to just 339 in 1933, during the economic depression (Department of 
Statistics, 1961: p. 995). In 1951, just 14 percent of young men earned in 
excess of ₤300 per year, but within 5 years, 44 percent did so (Yska, 1993: 
p.47). Demand for young workers – in either full or part time employment – 
meant that New Zealand’s middle and working class youth were enjoying a 
period of unprecedented financial opportunity, and one in stark contrast to that 
which their parents had experienced. With some insight, National MP Peter 
Tait said in 1953 that the labour market was enticing young people out of 
school and into the labour market whereby, “they command…the same wage 
as older men without having their responsibilities” (NZPD, 1958, vol.317: 
p.1090). 
 
Noting an earn-and-spend mentality, Levett (1959: p.8) found that gang 
members could readily command high wages even in unskilled work. 
Similarly, Green found the tight labour market allowed gang members to 
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adopt a lackadaisical attitude to work, moving in and out of employment as it 
suited in order to spend long periods with their gang. He found certain youths 
to be “virtually full-time gang members” (Green, 1959: p.19). Echoing a finding 
of Short and Strodbeck (1965: pp.225-230) in America, work and gang life 
often clashed and it was work that tended to give way. One informant told 
Green (1959: p.19) that the gang lifestyle was about being up all night and 
sleeping through the day, a situation that made it too difficult to hold down a 
job. He responded by working just a “few days at a time”. This allowed for 
what Levett (1959: p.3) described as a ‘cultivated’ spontaneity.   
 
Although certain gang members were actively fostering free time, they were 
doing so during a period where young people in general were enjoying greater 
freedom than previous generations of youth. New Zealand’s overall prosperity 
meant that 1950s families were increasingly purchasing labour saving 
devices. The 1956 census shows that more than half of New Zealand 
households owned washing machines, electric ovens and refrigerators. Such 
technological advances freed many teenagers from traditional household 
tasks and allowed them greater leisure time. Further evidence of New 
Zealand’s wealth is evident in motor vehicle purchases. Registered ownership 
of private cars doubled in the 1950s and between 1945 and 1955, motorcycle 
ownership increased by 93 percent from 13,624 to 26,244, (Department of 
Statistics, 1946: p.221; 1960a: p.412). Many of these vehicles were affordable 
to youth, thus completing an important trinity of money, free time and mobility. 
These were the components with which significant numbers of New Zealand’s 
youth could construct the unique identities of bodgies and milk bar cowboys, 
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create broad insider/outsider distinctions and encourage a youthful 
oppositional attitude that undoubtedly helped certain cliques to solidify and 
transition into incipient gangs.  
 
Gang participation in this new era of youth mobility and independence was 
most visible in milk bar motorcycle gangs, but was apparent within other 
gangs as well. Of the gangs identified in Wellington, around three quarters 
had cars, motorcycles or both, and certain gang “activities centre round [sic] 
these” (Green, 1959: p.26). In Auckland, the data on gang transportation are 
unclear, but both motorcycles and cars were associated with many gangs and 
it was reported that gang members often came “from a wide area”, including 
the outer suburbs, to meet and congregate on Queen Street in the city centre 
(Levett, 1959: p.8). Moreover, vehicles were not just transport; they also 
provided thrills and daring entertainment. Drag racing, either against an 
opponent or against the clock, was “a popular pastime for certain motor-cycle 
or car gangs, when they could get away with it” (Levett, 1959: p.3).  
 
From the data available, one can conclude that those youth in or around 
gangs were not isolated from the rewards the labour market had to offer. In 
fact, it appears as though many used the opportunities provided by the 
economic boom to forge an alternative lifestyle that revolved not around work 
but around leisure; the primary vehicle for which was their gang. During this 
period, then, it is plausible – at face value, at least – to see financial privilege 
as a component supporting gang formation.  
 
141 
 
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, gangs of the late 1950s did not last 
for more than modest periods, and gang membership was a fleeting dalliance. 
One explanation for this is that the labour market’s open door to jobs allowed 
gang members an easy return to a conventional lifestyle after a period of fun 
provided by the gang, a situation not available, for example, to the Los 
Angeles barrio gangs under the study of Moore (1991). She found that 
difficulty in entering the workforce was a crucial reason for gang membership 
continuance. I would therefore argue that the economic privilege provided by 
the buoyant 1950s economy, while an important consideration, is best viewed 
not as a reason for gang formation, but as a critical factor in membership 
failing to persist; a conclusion that will be further evidenced as this thesis 
unfolds. This being so, more significant explanations for 1950s gang formation 
are better sought elsewhere. 
 
Relative Deprivation – Socio Economics and the Housing 
Strain 
It seems apparent that New Zealand’s young gang members were not 
obviously excluded from the prosperity and reward that the 1950s economy 
presented. As will become clear, however, they were nevertheless situated 
within socioeconomic groups and geographic locales widely recognised by 
gang researchers as being conducive to gang formation.  
 
Both Levett and Green found gangs to be composed primarily of youths from 
working class households. In Wellington, Green (1959: p.42) found that 60 
percent of gang members’ fathers were in semi or unskilled occupations, and 
thus of “lower socioeconomic class”. Of those gang members who had left 
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school, the majority were working as casual labourers or in factories and only 
a quarter “took jobs which could be assumed to provide good prospects for 
advancement” such as ‘office’ jobs, sales jobs or apprenticeships (Green, 
1959: p.50). In Auckland, Levett (1959: p.4) found that, of those out of school, 
over half were in semi-skilled or unskilled work, with trade apprenticeships 
generally making up the rest.  
 
The information that is available on New Zealand gangs at this time offers 
certain insight to avail the status frustration theory of Cohen (1955) and the 
lower class thesis devised by Miller (1958/1969), and a few points are worthy 
of note. As stated in Chapter One, Cohen (1955: p.135) suggested that: “The 
hallmark of the delinquent subculture is the explicit and wholesale repudiation 
of middle-class standards and the adoption of their very antithesis” (A. K. 
Cohen, 1955: p.129). This was certainly reflected in the gangs’, as well as the 
wider youth movement’s, manner and style, which sought to express a defiant 
status that was a deliberate clash with mainstream New Zealand. Moreover, 
Cohen’s idea that anti-social and criminal behaviours obtain elevated status 
within groups, and are thus perpetuated, is evidenced in their acceptance of 
criminality (which some ‘boasted’ about), the ongoing nature of certain 
criminal activities, a craving for notoriety, and a hostile attitude toward 
authority and the police (Green, 1959: pp.9, 13, 22 & 57; Levett, 1959: pp.3-
5).  
 
In relation to Miller and others’ idea that gangs uphold certain working class 
‘focal concerns’ or attributes, the available New Zealand gang data provide 
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few clues, but in Australia the bodgie youth movement was strongly supported 
by such notions (Stratton, 1984), and therefore one may assume this was the 
case in New Zealand. A more definitive point to be made in relation to Miller’s 
ideas, however, is that gang formation is aided by single (maternal) parent 
families in order to seek male expression (W. B. Miller, 1958/1969: p.343). It 
was one of Green’s most noted findings that 43 percent of gang members 
came from ‘broken’ homes, and a large percentage of those youths who were 
still living at home, lived in “mother only” households (Green, 1959: pp.41 & 
42). As Klein (1971: p.36) points out, however, family factors like broken 
homes “though important, probably attain that importance through 
combination with many other factors”. These ‘other factors’, as numerous 
researchers have uncovered, invariably include influences arising from 
neighbourhood conditions, to which I now turn. 
 
Both Green and Levett discovered that gangs and gang membership were 
most evident within certain geographic locales, primarily the newer urban 
areas that were being developed to house a growing population. Like many 
post-war nations, New Zealand experienced a ‘baby boom’, a dramatic 
increase in birth rates, which placed stresses on infrastructure. From 16 births 
per 1000 population in the mid-1930s, the rate increased to over 26 per 1000 
by the late 1940s and this was maintained until 1961 (King, 2003: p.414). 
Moreover, the 1950s were part of an extended period of migrant growth. 
Between 1945 and 1968, net migration to New Zealand was 250,000, and 85 
percent of these migrants were from the U.K. (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: 
p.45). That so much of this migration derived from New Zealand’s past 
144 
 
colonial parent meant the country maintained something of a homogeneous 
ethnic population, a point to which I will return. Overall, the New Zealand 
population increased by a quarter during the 1950s, reaching 2.4 million by 
1960 (Department of Statistics, 1955: p.27; 1961: p.44). This growth was 
largely concentrated in urban centres that expanded by 33 percent in the ten 
years to 1961, by which time around three quarters of the country were urban 
dwellers (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.54). These population changes created 
an acute housing shortage in the 1950s. Despite the government building 
over 32,000 state houses since 1937, in 1950 there was a waiting list of over 
45,000 (Ferguson, 1994: p.177). 
 
The state’s involvement in housing began in earnest under the first Labour 
Government, elected in 1935. This government viewed high-quality housing 
as a fundamental right that was not being delivered by the market and was 
thus in need of state intervention (Schrader, 2005: p.35). Although a change 
of government in 1949 brought about policy changes, including the 
encouragement of state house purchase rather than rental, and a narrower 
focus on targeting such accommodation at the poor and needy, it was made 
clear that, “So long as there is a need for rental houses, the Government will 
continue to build State houses” (AJHR, J-6, 1950: p.8). In order to encourage 
socially diverse communities, some early state houses were built in 
established and affluent areas (Schrader, 2005: p.36). More often, however, 
they were constructed within large projects of specifically designed suburbs, 
and the speed of their construction was often too swift for community 
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development to keep pace. Initially bereft of vegetation and parks, such 
suburbs had a “raw and impermanent feel” (King, 2003: p.433).  
 
At least two reports suggested links between rapid urban growth and juvenile 
delinquency in New Zealand in the 1950s. Undertaken in 1953, the ‘Hutt 
Valley Youth Survey’ reported that people moving into state housing areas 
were “facing rather extreme changes to their way of life” (Yska, 1993: p.46). 
Furthermore, the “instant suburbs” were deficient, it said, due to the 
“unsatisfactory provision for leisure and the inadequate provision for 
wholesome sport and recreational activities” and therefore youths were 
travelling toward urban centres, “where they are forced to find and make their 
own entertainment” (Yska, 1993: pp.48-49).  
 
A further report that considered the link between delinquency and urban 
development suggested that ‘mushroom’ suburban growth created problems 
as such areas lacked community and educational facilities (Special 
Committee, 1954: p.33). Moreover, they tended have a high proportion of 
poor families with children and thus they lacked the stabilising factor of older 
people, or the benevolence of the wealthy, creating an “abnormal distribution 
of the population” (Special Committee, 1954: pp.32 & 33). Wise planning in 
the future, the report suggested, “could avoid some of the disadvantages 
which have become evident in these areas” (Special Committee, 1954: p.32). 
This report, undertaken by a committee with Dr. Oswald Mazengarb as its 
chair, was commonly referred to as the Mazengarb Report (discussed in the 
next section). The report covered a range of topics and is now generally seen 
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to be of dubious value, but in one rare – perhaps unique – contemporary 
offering of praise, Schrader (2005: p.214) suggested that if the report’s 
recommendations around town planning had been acted on, it “might have 
moderated future social problems in state housing areas”. 
 
In Auckland, Levett (1959: p.3) found a concentration of gang membership in 
certain – newer – state housing areas that were yet to establish “churches, 
pubs, recreation, working and civic groups” and were thus characterised by a 
“lack of community spirit and community facilities”. Within the state housing 
development of Mount Roskill, for example, he noted a difference between the 
area built “in 1939” and the “newer area settled over the past 10 years”; the 
latter had three gangs, the former had none. He noted the concerns of police 
that the newer housing areas had “few facilities for growing children and 
almost none for adolescents and adults” (Levett, 1959: p.4). In Wellington, 
Green (1959: p.52) also found that gangs were concentrated within a minority 
of districts, few of which were the city’s established or affluent suburbs. 
Furthermore, and perhaps related, was the fact that both Green (1959: p.53) 
and Levett (1959: p.4) described the home lives of gangs members as 
‘unsatisfactory’ due to the presence of such things as alcoholism, adult crime, 
‘frequent and tense family quarrels’, and mental illness. The youth gangs that 
formed, therefore, can perhaps be seen as informal associations that 
attempted to fill the voids left by urban planners while at the same time 
fulfilling social and psychological benefits that many youths found absent 
within their families. Just as adults in these communities undoubtedly made 
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new networks in order to gain social contact and undertake leisure activities, 
so too did youths – and one such outcome was gangs. 
 
The finding that gangs were situated in certain geographic locales and not in 
others is consistent with the assertion made by Thrasher that “better type” 
areas of the city are “practically gangless” (Thrasher, 1927: p.20). New 
Zealand’s new suburban housing districts, however, were some way from 
suffering the degree of social disorganisation within the ‘interstitial’ areas of 
Chicago’s ‘zone of transition’2. Indeed, while it is easy to identify the problems 
arising from the rapid development of state housing, it is perhaps prudent to 
consider what the alternative to these large-scale building projects might have 
been. At a time of such urban growth, without a fundamental commitment to 
new housing, conditions may have been much worse. It was a point made by 
Labour leader Walter Nash in 1954, who stated that, “If the people living in 
those [state rental] houses had been in the conditions they were living in 
before those houses were built, those people would have been worse and not 
better [off]” (NZPD, 1954, vol.304: p.2032). In my view it is arguable, indeed 
probable, that without state housing the relatively minor gang situation New 
Zealand faced in the 1950s would have been exasperated. 
 
Undertaking research in this country in the 1950s, a visiting American scholar, 
David Ausubel of the University of Illinois, pointed out that the ‘slum 
conditions’ in New Zealand are “not nearly as severe or as extensive as in the 
United States” and hence in relation to juvenile delinquency “are a much less 
                                                
2 An explanation of these terms is outlined in the first theory chapter of this thesis. 
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important causal factor” (Ausubel, 1960/1977: p.141). He also opined that 
New Zealand gangs had little in common with their American counterparts, 
suggesting the latter were more organised and functioned under ‘despotic’ 
leadership (Ausubel, 1960/1977: pp.134 & 136). Although Ausubel offers an 
interesting critique and an invaluable cross-national perspective, his assertion 
of despotic leadership is, Yablonsky (1967) aside, not supported by American 
gang literature3. In addition, his readiness to suggest that American gangs 
had a high degree of organisation is equally contentious and often disputed 
(Klein et al., 2001: p.4). Although these points by themselves do not negate 
his contention, I would argue that local conditions were not a ‘less important’ 
cause of juvenile delinquency – and gang formation and activity – but were 
instead of relative importance. As will become clear in the following chapters, 
as social ills increased so did the nature and severity of the gang problem. 
Hence there is a strong case to make that U.S. and New Zealand gangs were 
indeed comparable, in so much as their respective social conditions reflected 
their relative nature and activities. Where conditions were worse, so were the 
gangs.  
 
At least in part, this argument gains further support from U.K. literature. The 
research of Fyvle (1963), for example, suggested that the delinquent problem 
of the 1950s within the British working classes was not a gang problem per 
se. This is similar to New Zealand where the gangs remained a relatively 
minor issue disguised within the wider bodgie and milk bar cowboy youth 
movements. Downes (1966) argued that because the degree of deprivation in 
                                                
3 Indeed, Yablonski has received some criticism for this assertion, see for example Klein (1971) 
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the U.K. was less than that encountered in the U.S., working class youth 
rebelled but did not readily form gangs. Downes, however, went so far as to 
conclude that the gang situation was a ‘myth’, and I depart from him here – in 
relation to this country, at least – in that the gang situation in New Zealand at 
that time is better characterised as ‘minor’. 
 
One contributing factor to the New Zealand gang situation remaining 
comparatively minor was, as previously noted, the highly homogeneous ethnic 
make-up of New Zealand society, particularly in its urban communities. As 
noted by Bursik and Grasmick (1993) and others, no single ethnic group is 
inherently more or less inclined toward gang formation. But as Bogardus 
(1943) found in early American gang research, ethnic minorities often face 
greater social disadvantages that influences gang membership, a situation 
that Vigil (1988) later described as ‘multiple marginality’. This theory explains 
gang formation and I will explore its utility in detail in Chapter Five when 
looking at the rise of gangs formed by Maori and Pacific youths.  
 
Both Green and Levett found gang membership to be overwhelmingly 
dominated by Pakeha youth, and as will become clear, there was good 
reason for this. In Wellington, no Maori gangs were identified and just ten 
gang members were reported to be Maori (Green, 1959: p.35). In Auckland, 
Maori were somewhat more prominent, and were evident in a small number of 
Pakeha dominated gangs, but just one group, the Red Ram Rockers, was 
predominantly Maori (Levett, 1959: p.7). One youth in fact suggested, “Being 
in a gang depends on what sort of joker you are, not whether you’re Maori or 
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Pakeha” (Levett, 1959: p.7). Unlike Australia (Bessant & Watts, 1998: p.197; 
Stratton, 1984: p.21) and the U.K. (Fyvel, 1963: p.61), there are no reports of 
racial aggression undertaken by groups of youths, although this does not 
mean it did not exist. Levett (1959: p.7) points out that his study of Maori 
gangs was made difficult as Maori Welfare Officers were reluctant to aid an 
inquiry that was not undertaken by “a member of their own race”, and thus 
Maori gangs were almost certainly understated in Auckland. Notwithstanding 
the fact that, in that city at least, Maori may have been under reported, Maori 
made up just 6.06 percent (116,034 people) of the national population in 
1950, increasing slightly to 6.61 percent (154,119 people) by 1960 
(Department of Statistics, 1950: p.18; 1960a: p.38). Moreover, in the 1950s 
most Maori were still living in rural areas and the movement to cities in search 
of better employment opportunities did become highly significant until the 
1960s. Similarly, Pacific Island migrants were beginning to gain a small 
presence in Auckland as the government looked toward the island nations to 
its north to help fill the demands of the labour market. But again, significant 
numbers did not arrive until later. In the 1950s, migrants from the Pacific were 
merely a trickle – numbering just a few hundred every year (Department of 
Statistics, 1955: p.36; 1961: p.64). Both these internal and external migrations 
were to become major factors in the New Zealand gang scene’s future, but in 
the 1950s their effect remained largely latent.  
 
The Political and Social Response 
Given that the gang scene in 1950s New Zealand was not substantial, and 
hidden within wider youth movements, the country did not respond to a ‘gang 
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problem’ but to the general problem of juvenile delinquency. As will become 
evident, this response was steeped in the conservatism of the time, and 
focused significantly on censorship of American popular culture.  
 
While teen expression and delinquency was an issue common among Anglo 
American youth around the world, older generations were affected by another 
global phenomenon: the Cold War, which emerged in the aftermath of World 
War II. Eastern Europe’s Iron Curtain and the seemingly omnipresent Soviet 
threat and nuclear capabilities, the success of the Chinese communist 
revolution in 1949, and the Korean War beginning in 1950 were among issues 
creating unease throughout the West, and New Zealand was no different.  
 
One sign of this county’s conservative social shift was the National Party’s 12-
seat defeat of a rather tired 14-year Labour government in 1949. National’s 
first Prime Minister, Sidney Holland, said, “if you want to condense our policy 
it is the private ownership of production, distribution and exchange” (cited in 
King, 2003: p.422). Holland had decided the way to beat communism was to 
create a nation of ‘little capitalists’ (Yska, 1993: p.25). The electoral victory 
over a party that had publicly maintained a drive toward gradual but real 
socialism (Belich, 2001: p.304), marked the beginning of a long reign by the 
National Party that would hold power for 19 of the next 22 years. Labour’s 
only return to government in those years came in 1957 by way of a slim two-
seat majority. As will be outlined in the next chapter, however, Labour’s tenure 
was dogged by controversy and it was soundly defeated at the polls after just 
one term. Indeed, such was National’s grip on power that many of the party 
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faithful believed it was the natural party of government (King, 2003: p.423). 
Reflecting the mood of conservatism and the fear of international conflict, 
Compulsory Military Training was reinstated in 1949. A further conservative 
policy change, which was influenced by a spike in murders in the late 1940s, 
was the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1950 (Newbold, 1989b: pp.21-
22). Although it was a significant issue in the 1950s, delinquency was just part 
of a growing law and order issue. Between 1950 and 1960, reported crime 
almost doubled. Serious violence grew 800 percent while social disorder and 
sex crimes both increased by 250 percent (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.131).  
 
Unsurprisingly, New Zealand’s political conservatism was reflected in its 
social conservatism. There was a certain uniformity to life and this was 
reflected in both fashion and leisure activities: “Clothes of the day tended to 
be drab by previous and latter standards, and short-back-and-sides haircuts 
were part of the national male uniform, while rugby, racing and beer did 
represent for most men the extent of recreational options” (King, 2003: p.431). 
Conservatism was akin to a national identity (Dunstall, 1992) and David 
Ausubel, the visiting American scholar mentioned previously, believed “that 
the sanctions for non-conformity are relatively severe” (Ausubel, 1960/1977: 
p.128). Within this environment, bodgie youths contrasted most vividly, partly 
because of their unique clothing, but also because they adopted a deliberate 
anti-social attitude (Shuker, 1994: p.270).  
 
In July 1954, concerns regarding youth and delinquency reached fever pitch, 
stemming from the activities of a group known as ‘Elbe’s Milk Bar Gang’. On 6 
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July of that year, readers of Wellington’s The Dominion newspaper awoke to 
the headline, ‘Large-Scale Police Inquiry Among Hutt Valley Children’ 
(Dominion 6.7.1954). The story was elaborated on by The Evening Post that 
night. It reported that, “Police investigations revealed a shocking degree of 
immoral conduct among adolescents in the Hutt Valley and altogether 60 
youths and girls were involved in a total of 80 offences…The conduct spread 
into sexual orgies perpetrated in private homes during the absence of parents 
and into several second-rate Hutt Valley theatres” (Evening Post 6.7.1954). 
 
With an election looming in just four months, the National government moved 
quickly. Holland said that his government would undertake an “exhaustive 
investigation” of “this grave social problem” and that “there is, I regret to say, 
ground for believing that it is not confined to the Hutt Valley” (NZ Herald 
13.7.1954). The Minister of Education Ronald Algie clearly believed in the 
seriousness of the matter, proclaiming that “there is in our midst a serious 
evil” (Evening Post 17.7.1954). The government swiftly assembled a 
Committee of Inquiry with the brief to “inquire into and report upon conditions 
and influences that tend to undermine standards of sexual morality of children 
and adolescents in New Zealand” and to make recommendations to the 
government (Special Committee, 1954: p.10). Appointed as the committee’s 
chair was Dr Oswald Mazengarb Q.C., a conservative man with strong links to 
the government having been a twice-unsuccessful National Party candidate 
for parliament (Stace, 1980: p.34). Aware of the political expediency required, 
Mazengarb wanted the committee to report back before the impending 
general election, and his demanding two-month timeframe meant several 
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older members became ill and exhausted during the committee’s investigation 
(Yska, 1993: p.70). In what will become a familiar refrain throughout this 
thesis, it would seem that political expediency was more important than taking 
time to look carefully at the issue. 
 
It was almost certainly with an eye on re-election that the Prime Minister, in an 
unprecedented and never repeated move, had the Mazengarb Report sent to 
every New Zealand household, a decision derided by the Opposition as it had 
yet to be placed before parliament (NZPD, 1954, vol.304: p.2008). Some 
300,000 copies were printed, at that time New Zealand’s largest ever printing 
job (NZ Herald 25-9-54). Among a raft of findings, the report suggested the 
problems of errant youth stemmed from a lack of Christian guidance, a 
decline in family life through working mothers, media influences, 
“unsettlement” following two world wars, new housing development, increased 
use of contraceptives, the broadening of divorce laws, an increase in pre-
marital sexual relations, and even the spread of new psychological ideas 
undermining traditional morality (Special Committee, 1954). Of all the ideas 
spelt out in the report, it was a comment made about ‘media influences’ that 
was to provide a major thrust of the government’s response to the 
delinquency problem. In light of what was to come, many wondered why “a 
target drawn so small by the Morals [Mazengarb] Committee should have 
attracted so heavy a barrage” (Perry, 1965: p.49). 
 
Interestingly, given that the initial complaint centred on a ‘gang’ of milk bar 
cowboys, gangs were not identified as a problem in the report, reflecting the 
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fact that they had yet to form in significant numbers or were yet to be seen as 
a major concern. In fact, the report reflects what appears to have been a 
widely held belief that the problem of delinquency was a somewhat wide and 
general threat. This belief was almost certainly given further currency by the 
Parker-Hulme murder case that was being tried just as the Hutt Valley issue 
was being unearthed. In June 1954, armed with a brick in a stocking, 16-year 
old Pauline Parker and 15-year old Juliet Hulme took turns at caving in the 
head of Pauline’s mother in a quiet Christchurch park (Newbold, 2000: p.49).  
 
Although Pauline lived with a step-father, both girls were from respectable 
families, confirming in the minds of many that New Zealand’s youth were 
running amok and that the problem had the potential to affect even ‘good’ 
families. As if written in a script, the Parker-Hulme murder trial also bolstered 
two other widely held notions that were becoming linked to the problems of 
youth – sex and American popular culture. Witness statements hinted at the 
fact that Pauline was sexually active with a young male boarder, and an 
expert witness brought by the prosecution testified that Pauline and Juliet 
were in a relationship that was “homosexual in nature” (NZ Herald 17.7.1954). 
Also, Pauline’s diaries contained her thoughts leading up to the murder, which 
she spelt ‘moider’, mimicking, as the Crown Prosecutor made clear, 
Hollywood gangster slang and “thereby suggesting  a connection to the 
corrupting influence on adolescents of American mass culture, which was 
about to explode as major debate of the fifties” (Yska, 1993: p.61). In fact, it 
had already begun. On 13 July, in the wake of media reports of the Hutt 
Valley saga, the Minister for Women and Children, Hilda Ross, spoke at 
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length in parliament about the American “literature which is flooding the 
country and debasing the minds of our young people” (NZPD, 1954, vol.303: 
p.377). Two days later, another National MP, James Roy, said, “what the eye 
sees is what impresses the mind. I am afraid the class of picture [movie] our 
young people go to see has not been the best” and he went on to say that the 
government was taking moves toward “stricter censorship” (NZPD, 1954, 
vol.303: p.446). 
 
In the wake of the Mazengarb Report, three bills were hastily drafted and 
passed into law before parliament went into recess for the November election 
of 1954. The Police Offences Act was amended to make contraception 
unavailable to people under 18 years of age. Changes to the Child Welfare 
Act meant girls under 16 could be deemed delinquent if they engaged in sex 
(the law already existed for boys). And the Indecent Publications Act 
thereafter ensured sales restrictions were placed on books and other reading 
material that tended to “deprave persons of any class or any group, or unduly 
emphasises matters of sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence” (NZPD, 1954, 
vol.304: p.1,944).  
 
Despite dedicating huge swathes of copy to the problem of delinquency in the 
light of the Hutt Valley issue and welcoming the Mazengarb inquiry, many 
newspapers were beginning to turn against the measures before they were 
passed into law (Shuker, Openshaw, & Soler, 1990). In an editorial, The 
Press expressed significant concern regarding the legislation, particularly in 
relation to the censorship measures, suggesting the haste with which they 
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were being pushed through was ‘regrettable’. “It is probably,” the paper said, 
“that the Government feels hesitant about ending the present session without 
having done something to give effect to the committee’s recommendations. 
But the effect of what no one doubts are good intentions will be bills virtually 
written overnight… [and] …hastened through without all the consideration that 
is their due” (The Press 28.9.1954). After the laws were passed, similar 
concerns were expressed by Victoria University College law lecturer, I. D. 
Campbell (1954), who said that the government had “marred its record” in the 
hasty drafting and passing of the Indecent Publications Amendment Act. He 
said that outside input was given “scant opportunity” and that the “Act bristles 
with ambiguities, and that its enactment was an ill-considered move” (I. D. 
Campbell, 1954: p.293). Book sellers had asked to be involved in the process 
of drafting the legislation (NZ Herald 22.9.1954), but such calls were given 
little regard and the government minister who introduced the bill to parliament, 
Charles Bowden, was critical of their “captious criticism” (NZPD, 1954, 
vol.304: p.2006). 
 
Following their re-election in 1954, the National government enthusiastically 
enforced the new provisions of the Indecent Publications Act and many books 
and comics were banned. Indeed, censorship quickly became an important 
tool by which the government sought to control the influence of American 
popular culture, and music and film were not immune.  
 
Certainly, New Zealand youth were enthusiastically embracing rock ‘n’ roll 
music. In 1955, sales of 45 rpm singles in New Zealand numbered just 200. In 
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1956, 20,000 were sold and just one year later that number soared to 576,000 
(Yska, 1993: p.142). As was the case in Britain (Fyvel, 1963) and Australia 
(Stratton, 1984), young New Zealanders were abuzz with the new genre of 
American music that “provided a fresh perspective, celebrating leisure, 
romance, and sex, deriding deferred gratification and men in grey flannel suits 
stationed at their office desks, and delighting in the separate world of the 
teenager” (Altschuler, 2003: p.8). Performers like Bill Haley, Buddy Holly, 
Gene Vincent, and Eddie Cochrane are said to have been bodgie favourites 
(Shuker, 1994: p.259). Willis (1978: p.35) compiled a remarkably similar list 
(he included Elvis Presley) as favourites of those within the British youth biker 
scene. In a statement as relevant to New Zealand as it was the U.K., he said, 
“It is difficult to evidence, but the motor-bike boys’ fundamental ontological 
security, style, gesture, speech, rough horseplay – their whole social 
ambience – seemed to owe something to the confidence and muscular style 
of early rock ‘n’ roll.” (Willis, 1978: p.35). 
 
In New Zealand, rock ‘n’ roll was decried for the social immorality that many 
saw inherent in it. Thus, in the interests of social sanitation, the state-
controlled New Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS) banned a number of 
songs from airing on public radio, and those deemed acceptable were given 
just half an hour every Thursday evening. What was prohibited from the 
airwaves, however, was permitted in milk bar jukeboxes and in halls where 
local musicians played covers of popular American songs. For example, 
music that the NZBS banned, like the Cheers’ song Black Denim Trousers 
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and Motorcycle Boots in 1955, were not heard on public radio but they were 
still publicly available.  
 
Like comics and music, many American movies were seen as a corrupting 
and unwelcome influence. The Wild One (1954), a movie inspired by the 
events of Hollister4 and motorcycle gangs in the U.S., was banned by Chief 
Censor, Gordon Mirams, in an action that met with significant public approval. 
In response, the Auto Cycle Union, the governing body of motorcycle sport in 
New Zealand, said, “this film can do damage to the motorcycling movement 
and boost the egos of our comparatively tame cowboys” (Yska, 1993: p111).  
 
Other films, too, were controversial, and partially censored. Two such films 
were Blackboard Jungle and Rebel Without a Cause, both of which were 
released in New Zealand in 1956 (Watson & Shuker, 1998: pp.43-44). Mirams 
objected strongly to these films, fearing that the behaviours they portrayed 
could adversely affect the country’s youth. As part of the growing youth-
orientated genre out of America, the films were focused on teen angst and 
defiance and included rebellion at school, violence toward teachers, knife 
fights and games of ‘chicken’ (where two cars drive at speed toward one 
another until one driver serves away).  
 
Mirams’ concerns, it would seem, were not without foundation. In 1957, The 
New Zealand Herald reported several examples of ‘chicken’ being played 
around the country by New Zealand youth (NZ Herald 27.8.1957). The 
                                                
4 It was at Hollister in 1947 where it is widely accepted that outlaw biker culture was forged (Reynolds, 
2000: p.57), following reports of the town being taken over by rebel bikers. This infamous event is well 
documented (for example, M. Harris, 1985; Hayes, 2005; H. S. Thompson, 1967; Wolf, 1991). 
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following month Labour MP Robert Macfarlane raised the issue in parliament, 
making direct links to the influence of American films (NZPD, 1957, vol.313: 
p.2217). Other examples of a growing American influence were less 
sensational, such as youths speaking with American accents mimicking the 
gangsters they read about in books (Yska, 1993: p.184). 
 
Although the increasing influence of American culture on New Zealand youth 
may have been undeniable and evident in examples of delinquency, it was 
mistaken as causal. In the U.K. and Australia, the youth movements were in 
existence before the significant onset of rock ‘n’ roll and the influx of American 
teen movies (Fyvel, 1963; Stratton, 1984). In 1955, one Wellington barber told 
the The Evening Post that the ‘bodgie’ hairstyle arrived with U.S. marines in 
the mid-1940s (Yska, 1993: p.57). Moreover, Belich (2001: pp.506-507) points 
out that the ‘teenager’, and certain concerns surrounding them, predate 
bodgies and rock ‘n’ roll. The basis for the youth movement, he argues, was 
based not in a cultural ‘site’, but with the emergence of widespread secondary 
schooling that had its beginnings in the 1930s. Without international 
influences, this country – to a greater or lesser extent – would still have had 
delinquent youth. New Zealand did not import delinquency from overseas; 
rather rebellious youth, and from them gangs, simply adopted a common 
Anglo-American style and similar, delinquent and non-delinquent, activities. 
The issue undoubtedly became a ‘moral panic’, as several scholars have 
observed (Shuker et al., 1990).  
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At least two prominent early gang researchers had investigated the links 
between pop culture and delinquency in America. Cressey (1938: p.517) 
acknowledged that youth, when suitably predisposed, would copy techniques 
seen in films. Yet he found that the movies themselves did not cause juvenile 
delinquency. Similarly, Thrasher found that the links being made between 
comics and delinquency were not based on any credible research: “The 
current alarm over the evil effects of comic books rest upon nothing more 
substantial than the opinion and conjecture of a number of psychiatrists, 
lawyers and judges” (Thrasher, 1949: p.200). 
 
The drive for censorship then, had little worth other than perhaps allowing a 
vent for community concern. However, in restricting or prohibiting certain 
movies, books and music, the authorities may have widened the generation 
gap and arguably stoked a mood of rebellion among New Zealand’s youthful 
population by depriving it of highly valued things that they almost certainly 
saw as harmless. Moreover, certain attempts at censorship appear 
demonstrably pointless, and similarly may have contributed to the mood of 
youthful defiance. For example, having restricted or censored rock ‘n’ roll on 
the radio, but allowing it to be played in jukeboxes and in dance halls (live 
music would have been near impossible to censor), the government was in 
fact encouraging young people to come together; not just in physical locality 
but also in attitude. In their peer groups and away from a ‘square’ society that 
tried to restrict their choice of music, any sense of rebellion associated with 
rock ‘n’ roll, far from being suppressed, was perhaps only being fuelled.  
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The problem of delinquency was an important, but overblown issue of the 
1950s. As King (2003: p.434) has suggested, “When American rock and roll 
reached New Zealand…it represented a minor revolt of youth against the 
comfortable and secure world of their parents. As a rebellion, it did not persist: 
real rebellion awaited the 1960s and 1970s”. And drawing a parallel 
argument, so did what became widely considered real gangs. 
 
Conclusion 
The gangs of the 1950s can be clearly seen as developmentally immature 
groups that did not yet present a significant issue or problem. Simply put, 
these gangs were an inevitable outcome of informal youthful associations 
brought about by urbanisation, although accentuated, perhaps, by the speed 
with which that urban development took place. These groups did, however, 
represent an important foundation for what was to come in the following 
decade. 
 
Growing out of a broad youth subculture, which was enabled by a strong 
economy and the ability to establish a visible and social identity, by the end of 
the 1950s certain cliques of youths were beginning to transform and adopt 
important gang components such as name and claiming a specific geographic 
territory; developments that are consistent with my definition of a ‘incipient 
gang’.  
 
Also consistent with that definition, most groups that were developing in this 
way formed within the lower social strata, suggesting that despite the strength 
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of the economy, the relative deprivation facing those of lower socioeconomic 
status was a significant factor in the moderate gang formation that took place 
during the era. Although sufficient for gangs to transpire in moderate 
numbers, the deprivation was not so severe as to allow a substantial gang 
problem to emerge.  
 
The fact that the labour market was buoyant meant that gang membership 
was a passing phase in the lives of many of the young people who joined or 
formed them. Such gangs, therefore, had a fleeting existence and generally 
did not survive membership turnover. In this way, gangs emerged, most often 
in areas with few recreational options, to provide a social function for youths 
before members transitioned into adulthood. 
 
Because of the gangs’ immature development they failed to attract specific 
political or community concern. Such concern was reserved for delinquency 
as a general issue and a significant response, reflective of a deep 
conservative streak in New Zealand society, was based around censorship of 
American popular culture. This response, although not directly targeting 
gangs, highlighted certain facets that would become synonymous with 
government and community action targeting gangs in the future: hasty, 
reactive and ultimately futile. 
 
Indeed, public and political concern surrounding gangs did not escalate 
greatly for the better part of a decade, by which time the gang scene had 
transformed. The telltale signs of moderate evolution evident in the late 1950s 
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were to be greatly accelerated by an event in the early 1960s, something that 
can be identified as the first pivot point in New Zealand gang history. 
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 Chapter	  Four.	  	  
 
 
4. The Rise of the Outlaw Clubs: 1960-1970. 
 
Introduction 
During the 1960s, the gang scene in New Zealand dramatically and 
fundamentally changed. During that decade, the milk bar cowboy gangs 
transformed from loose cliques into organised outlaw motorcycle clubs, and in 
doing so they gained longevity, or the ability to survive over time. This change 
occurred after a Hell’s Angel chapter was established in Auckland in 19605, 
something that proved to be a pivot upon which the entire gang scene turned.  
 
Despite this development occurring early in the decade, it was not until late in 
the 1960s that a significant number of outlaw clubs emerged. Consequently, 
as was the case in the 1950s, gangs were yet to be isolated as a significant 
political concern, and national attention remained focused on the wider – and 
growing – problem of youth delinquency and crime. 
 
This chapter will describe the advent and activities of outlaw motorcycle clubs 
and examines the context within which these events occurred, including the 
                                                
5 Although the date of the official charter is 1961, it will be shown that it is likely the club started in 
Auckland in 1960. 
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suppressive actions of police as well as the sub-cultural support provided by 
the unique social environment of the liberal and tumultuous 1960s. 
 
The Pivot Point 
To help uncover a moment that transformed the New Zealand gang scene, I 
tracked down one member of a small group of milk bar cowboys who began to 
hang around outside the Majestic Theatre on Auckland’s Queen Street in the 
late 1950s. This man – ‘B.B.’ – is now a successful businessperson who 
wants to remain anonymous, but when he was around 16 years of age he was 
part of a gang defining event. He recalls that his motorcycling friends had 
originally met outside various dances around Auckland’s inner city, at milk 
bars or often on the side of the road during a motorcycle breakdown – 
something that created an informal support network among bikers whose 
machines were often unreliable.  
 
One of the young bikers, a builder who had artistic abilities, had his secondary 
talents employed painting an eagle on the backs of his friends’ leather jackets. 
The inspiration came directly from the lyrics of the 1955 hit by Cheers, Black 
Denim Trousers and Motorcycle Boots – a song, as noted in the last chapter, 
that the New Zealand Broadcasting Service had banned. The chorus went, 
“He wore black denim trousers and motorcycle boots/ And a leather jacket 
with an eagle on the back/ He had a hopped-up ‘cicle that took off like a gun/ 
That fool was the terror of highway 101” (www.lyricsdepot.com). Far from 
being a symbol of exclusive membership, the eagle was largely a fashion 
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accessory and if someone wanted one they could have one. About ten bikers 
took up the offer.  
 
Sometime later, it was mooted that the group of youths should differentiate 
themselves under the moniker the ‘Auckland Outcasts’, but the name – full of 
youthful rebellion – was used infrequently:  
 
The guy that painted the eagle came up with the name the ‘Auckland 
Outcasts’, but it wasn’t really an adopted name. You didn’t go around 
saying, ‘I’m an Auckland Outcast’. It was just – we must have thought it 
was cool or something (B.B. 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
Like similar groups of the time, the Auckland Outcasts took great pride in their 
bikes. Although they provided affordable transportation, motorcycles were 
also a means to forge an identity within an image conscious milk bar cowboy 
youth movement. Members tended to ride high-powered Triumphs, BSAs, 
Ariels, Nortons, and Matchlesses; and a small number chose Vincents. These 
motorcycles tended to be standard, but the more stylish had crash bars, twin 
mirrors, extra chrome and large mud flaps that would cover the muffler to 
increase engine noise. Typical of the milk bar cowboy style, the bikers wore 
leather jackets with lambs’ wool lining, old flying boots and American jeans 
purchased from seamen docking at Auckland’s port. A white scarf was a 
popular accessory. Surplus from the armed forces offered up New Zealand Air 
Force and Army great coats. These were often not worn but rather draped 
over the legs while riding, providing the dual purposes of the ‘in’ look as well 
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as all-important warmth. As was typical at that time, none of the group wore 
helmets, which were not legally required for travelling under 30 miles per hour 
until a law change in 1974 made them mandatory at any speed. 
 
The steep decline of Upper Queen Street and an absence traffic lights made 
for a long, unimpeded road ideal for reaching high speeds, and a favourite 
pursuit of the group was allowing one’s feet to drag on the street while riding 
so that steel capped ‘hobnail’ boots created an impressive display of sparks. 
The motorway leading from Queen Street to Ellerslie was a popular strip of 
road on which to test the effectiveness of a motorcycle repair, the speed of 
one machine against another, or to impress a girl who accepted the offer of a 
pillion ride. 
 
All-in-all, there was little to differentiate the group from any number of similar 
clusters of bikers groups peppered around various youth-hangouts throughout 
New Zealand: but this soon changed. On one Queen Street night, while 
mingling around outside the Majestic Theatre in mid-1960, the Outcasts met a 
young American named Jim Carrico who spoke of a Californian group called 
the Hell’s Angels. That chance meeting was the basis for the first pivot point in 
New Zealand gang history. 
 
Youth Crime and the Response of the Second National 
Government 
Despite significant developments within the gang scene, it was not until the 
end of the 1960s that gangs gained significant attention as a distinct issue. 
Therefore, as was the case in the 1950s, it was juvenile delinquency and 
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youth crime generally that were the focus of community and political concern. 
And this concern was brought into sharp relief early in the new decade when 
the Hastings Blossom Festival descended into fights and violence, an incident 
described as New Zealand’s equivalent of America’s Hollister (Dennehy & 
Newbold, 2001: p.164), an event noted in the previous chapter. Held in 
September as an annual celebration of spring, the festival of 1960 had been 
beset by bad weather. The modest population of Hastings swelled by many 
thousands, including 4,000 who travelled to the town on specially designated 
trains (Kirkby, 1986: p.210). Many revellers were ill prepared for the inclement 
weather, and lacking coats or umbrellas, they swarmed into the town’s cafes 
and bars, filling them beyond capacity. The Albert Hotel, a large, traditional 
looking pub on the corner of Heretaunga Street and Karamu Road, was 
packed wall to wall, with patrons crowding out of its entrance and onto the 
street, and busy barmen “filled and refilled glasses by the hundreds” (Kirkby, 
1986: p.211).  
 
In the mid-afternoon, two police officers entered the Albert Hotel. Media 
reports are unclear as to why trouble started, but one author suggests that a 
“belligerent element”, seeing the “men in blue”, indiscriminately threw glasses 
and jugs (Kirkby, 1986: p.210). In a conversation with a policeman who was 
working in Hastings that day, I was told that the trouble started after a young 
man, either unable or unwilling to push through the packed bar to get to the 
toilet, relieved himself where he stood. A police officer, seeing this, tried to 
arrest him. 
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It was the beginning of trouble. The unrest and ill temper quickly spread, and 
fights broke out in the street outside the Albert. Groups of youths – reportedly 
from the Wellington region – revelled in the mayhem and upped the ante by 
throwing stones and bottles at police and damaging a police car that they 
threatened to set alight (Kirkby, 1986: p.213). Ending the ruckus, the fire 
brigade hosed down the unruly elements of the crowd. Hastings Mayor, Ron 
Giorgi, lauded police and fire service efforts: “They acted with tact and 
restraint in an extremely difficult situation… They restored law and order in the 
face of an ugly mob scene” (Kirkby, 1986: p.213).  
 
Media coverage on the Monday after the weekend incident was reignited two 
days later when an open letter written by several Hastings citizens was 
published in a number of leading newspapers. In it, they said that youths had 
openly urinated in shop doorways and foul-mouthed girls competed with the 
boys in the “depravity” of their language. Rocks were thrown at a railway car 
and a sheep was stolen, slaughtered, and roasted on a fire in the flickering 
light of which were public displays of sexual intercourse (NZ Herald 
14.9.1960). Having replaced Sid Holland as National Party leader after 
National’s defeat in the 1957 election, Keith Holyoake seized the political 
opportunity to put pressure on the Labour government, telling parliament that 
“the alarming and disgraceful incident witnessed in Hastings during the 
Blossom Festival had aroused concern from the North Cape to Bluff” and that, 
“[T]he incident had all the appearance of organised rowdyism” (NZPD, 
vol.324, 1960: p.2244). 
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The Prime Minister, Walter Nash, attempted to calm the matter while 
appearing attentive to community concern, stating that both the Minister of 
Police and the Minister of Justice were “already inquiring into the 
circumstances surrounding the occurrences in Hastings last Saturday” 
(NZPD, vol.324, 1960: p.2244). Trying to counter Holyoake’s attack, 
government MP Michael Moohan said: “The Leader of the Opposition and 
others should be warned about exaggerating the incident”, and drew parallels 
to the 1954 Hutt Valley incident, discussed in Chapter Three, that he said was 
“magnified out of all perspective” (NZPD, vol.324, 1960: p.2245). The Minister 
of Internal Affairs, Bill Anderton, was the most dismissive, suggesting, rather 
hopefully perhaps, that delinquency was a “passing phase” (NZ Herald 
5.10.1960). 
 
The government had good reason to want the Hastings unrest played down. 
With a working majority of just one seat in parliament, Labour was going into 
the November 1960 election as an unpopular government. In response to a 
surprise balance of payments deficit in their first year of office, Finance 
Minister Arnold Nordmeyer, who like Nash did not drink, smoke or drive a car, 
unveiled the 1958 budget in which taxes were hiked, and duties on beer, 
spirits, tobacco and cars were doubled (Sinclair, 1991: p.293). More than 
anything else, it was this ‘black budget’ that led to Labour’s drubbing at the 
polls, and National returned to power commanding a 12-seat majority. With 
that, National’s post-war electoral dominance marched on, and it was 14 
years before Labour was given another chance at the country’s helm.  
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Although law and order did not become a significant issue during the 1960 
election campaign (Chapman, Jackson, & Mitchell, 1962; Prichard & Tabb, 
1961), a number of rhetorical flourishes regarding juvenile delinquency and 
crime made on the hustings, and particularly in the aftermath of the 1960 
Hastings Blossom Festival, were to haunt the new government.  
 
Maintaining the trends of the 1950s, crime in New Zealand continued to 
escalate during the 1960s. Reported crime rose by nearly 60 percent with the 
main contributors being serious violence and violent disorder, which increased 
by 86 and 85 percent respectively (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.131). 
Convictions in the Children’s Court increased from 10,365 in 1960 to 21,502 
in 1970, with the largest increases occurring in the latter half of the decade 
(Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.132). 
 
Given these data, the Labour Opposition had many opportunities to point out 
to Prime Minister Holyoake and his MPs that the youth crime problem was 
getting worse. Despite only moderate promises regarding youth crime in 
National’s 1960 election manifesto (New Zealand National Party, 1960: 12A), 
comments made in relation to the Hastings incident and during the election 
campaign were continually used against the government throughout the 
decade, and parliamentary records testify to the frequency of these attacks 
(for example, NZPD, vol.331, 1962: p.1370; vol.336, 1963: p.1771; vol.344, 
1965: p.2682; vol.348, 1966: p.2673; vol.352, 1967: p.2313; vol.360, 1969: 
p.891).  
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These political assaults frustrated the government, which was anything but 
idle. Described as “an example of the perfect relationship which can exist 
between a permanent head and a politician” (Newbold, 1989b: p.120), the 
partnership of Ralph Hanan as the Minister of Justice, and John Robson as 
the Secretary for Justice, was responsible for a number of bold initiatives 
targeting the problem of youth crime. 
 
Following the 1960 election, Robson attended the second United Nations 
Congress on Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, where it became clear 
there was widespread concern about increasing levels of delinquency in well-
developed countries (Robson, 1973: p.12). Robson did not share the desire of 
the congress to undertake a large research programme embracing many 
countries, fearing it would be years before “anything productive could be 
obtained” (Robson, 1973: p.12). Consequently, he and Hanan forged ahead in 
an experimental manner with a number of custodial rehabilitation measures, 
often borrowing from overseas initiatives. Accordingly, in 1961 the first 
detention centre opened at Waikeria, where offenders aged between 16 and 
21 were sent for a maximum of three months of strict discipline and hard 
work. In an attempt to reduce the amount of time that youths spent 
incarcerated, the maximum sentence for a spell in borstal was reduced from 
three years to two. And in keeping with this philosophy, changes to the 
Criminal Justice Act in 1962 created a part-time custodial regime called 
periodic detention, whereby offenders aged 15 to 21 were detained only 
during weekends. The first periodic detention centre was built in Auckland in 
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1963, and in 1966 the scheme was expanded to include adult offenders 
(Newbold, 1989b: p.124).  
 
Relating to these developments, Hanan wrote in the Department of Justice 
annual report for the year ending 31 March 1963, that, “The young offender 
continues to be our main concern. The task of getting on top of the problem of 
youthful crime is likely to be neither simple or speedily accomplished. All I can 
say is that the offensive has begun in earnest” (AJHR, H-20, 1963: p.5). The 
‘offensive’ may have started, but the problem did not abate. In 1967, under 
questioning from the Opposition about increasing juvenile crime rates, Hanan 
said that “New Zealand had done more in the way of experimentation and 
toward seeking a solution to the problem than had any other country in the 
world” and that he “only wished more could be done” (NZPD, 1967, vol.352: 
p.2324). The efforts of the government were surprisingly liberal and certainly 
ambitious. They were well considered and intellectually rigorous. But 
ultimately the reformative programme was unsuccessful in aborting the 
advance of juvenile crime. 
 
In an unfortunate symmetry for the government, the decade ended as it had 
begun when in 1969 the Hastings Blossom Festival was again disrupted by 
violence. Unlike the incident in 1960, this time the culprits of the mischief 
could be specifically identified. The cause of the 1969 unrest was a number of 
outlaw motorcycle clubs that are the focus of this chapter, as well as a new 
street gang called “The Mongrels”6 with whom we will later investigate 
                                                
6 As will become clear, the group were soon to become widely known as the Mongrel Mob. 
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(Sunday News 5.10.1969). By this time the media could individually name 
such groups, testimony to the fact they were becoming, in ways I will outline 
below, distinctly recognisable. Indeed, the general problem of youthful 
delinquency was beginning a process of being reframed as a problem of 
gangs. Reminded of his campaign rhetoric from 1960, an exasperated Prime 
Minister Holyoake appeared at a loss: “I am asked to give reasons for this. I 
am sorry I cannot. There seems to be a kind of mental bug affecting the minds 
of men around the world” (NZPD, vol. 360, 1969: p.823).  
 
The Hell’s Angels Form in Auckland 
As outlined, the Hastings Blossom Festival of September 1960 generated a 
great deal of media coverage. It was, however, a very small article in an 
Auckland newspaper three months later, which, in hindsight, recorded more 
significant happenings.  
 
On 9 December 1960, The New Zealand Herald reported that the secretary of 
the Auckland Commercial Travellers and Warehousemen’s Association, Mr J. 
H. White, and his wife were driving home along Jervois Road in Auckland 
when they suffered a puncture. As Mr White prepared to change the wheel he 
said that he was approached by three young men wearing “standard 
motorcycle gang garb: Leather Jackets, riding boots and peaked caps” with 
an offer of help. Mr White was ‘dubious’ – presumably due to the reputation of 
milk bar cowboys – but accepted their assistance. With the wheel changed, 
the ‘leader’ of the group gave Mr White a small card that read, “You have just 
been assisted by a member of the Hell’s Angels Motor Cycle Club road patrol. 
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It is our pleasure”. The youth, speaking with an American accent, said he had 
been a member of a similar club in America and intended to start something 
along the same lines in Auckland. Jim Carrico was changing more than a 
wheel; it is no understatement to say that he was beginning to transform the 
entire gang scene in New Zealand. 
 
With little fanfare or alarm, Carrico was turning the small group of milk bar 
cowboys, known to few apart from themselves as the Auckland Outcasts, into 
the Hell’s Angels. Back patches were embroidered at Milne and Choyce, a 
department store on Queen Street, and sewn onto the members’ old short-
sleeved school pullovers (B.B. 2003 pers. comm.). The eagle remained 
painted on their jackets but it was now covered with the ‘deathshead’ 
insignia7; above which were the words ‘Hell’s Angels’, and below it, 
‘Auckland’.  
 
Although the patches were a single piece of cloth (unlike the three-piece 
patches worn in the U.S.), the embroidery was detailed, and a significant step-
up from painted jackets. The group was distinctive immediately. They were so 
distinctive, in fact, that a reporter from the Auckland Star went to find out 
about the group. On New Year’s Eve 1960, the newspaper published his 
article under the headline, “Auckland ‘weird mob’ has a proud tradition”. The 
reporter found Jim Carrico who told him, “I’m a member of the Hell’s Angels of 
San Francisco…They’re a big club, you know, and they go back to a fighter 
squadron of World War I.” He went on to say there was a Hell’s Angels group 
                                                
7 The official ‘deathshead’ insignia was designed by an early HAMC president from San Francisco, 
and was derived from images used by two World War II aircraft squadrons – see the Hell’s Angels 
official website www.hells-angels.com. 
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“in every major city in the South Western United States. Regional 
headquarters were established in San Francisco and Los Angeles and today 
there are thousands of members from Canada to Mexico and now New 
Zealand”. As will become clear, Carrico’s claims were significantly 
exaggerated. 
 
Carrico said that, along with the club in Auckland, he had established groups 
in Hamilton and Christchurch. Carrico specifically used the term ‘club’ and 
insisted the group was not a gang. When the young biker invited the journalist 
to a Herne Bay house – outside of which was a row of “sleek, polished 
motorbikes” – he found inside,  
 
“a room of teen-age boys and girls. Leather Jackets and boots 
predominated and the girls had too much eye shadow. Collectively, 
they didn’t look at all friendly, and when the boys were introduced with 
a curt handshake and by names such as “Animal,” “Crazy” and “Pinky,” 
I wondered what I had struck”. 
 
After spending some time with the youths the reporter found:  
 
I was among a likeable bunch of kids. What seemed outlandish and 
arrogant to me was something of traditional significance to them. What 
some would think surliness was resentment against those intolerant of 
any non-conformity. I came away with the idea that though only a 
special type of youth would want to be in something like “Hell’s 
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Angels,” the club was a force for good among lads who might 
otherwise drift into hooliganism and delinquency (Auckland Star 
31.12.1960). 
 
The journalist concluded by saying, “I left the club thinking the youngsters 
strange, but sincere. Motorcycling is their passion. But then with other people 
it’s racing and Rugby” (Auckland Star 31.12.1960). The reporter’s largely 
favourable opinion of the group was shared by a local policeman who was 
cited in the article as saying that he no longer considered them “another 
troublesome bunch”. He noted that over Christmas the group had taken 
several crates of soft drink to orphanages on the North Shore and in South 
Auckland (and, as B.B., told me, “to chat up the nurses”). As will become 
clear, favourable views held by police would not last.  
 
The newspaper article appears to have pleased the group as they sent a copy 
of it to the Hell’s Angels in San Francisco. In a letter dated 28 April 19618, and 
addressed to “Father Frank and the Frisco Angels”, Carrico – who signed off 
with his club name of ‘Thumper’ – was quick to explain some falsehoods and 
exaggerations he had conveyed to the reporter: 
 
I don’t know what truth there is in the storys [sic] I used to hear about 
the origin of the Angels at home, but I took the story about the flight 
squadron during the first world war and did it up good, I mean like how 
is this reporter supposed to know. As far as me telling him that I was a 
                                                
8 There are at least two surviving letters written by Jim Carrico that are held by HAMC (Auckland). 
The one I have referenced here is referred to throughout this section as ‘Carrico’s letter’. 
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member of your club, I extend my humblest of appologys [sic] to you 
and your club, but like I had to give him some sort of direct connection. 
And as far as there being thousands of members from Canada to 
Mexico, well you know how it is. I mean like I get kind of carried away 
some times.  
 
Clearly, then, Carrico had not been a member of the Angels in the U.S., and 
the exact nature of his relationship to them remains unclear. It is safe to 
conclude, however, that whatever association he had, it was a close one. As 
will become obvious, there is much evidence to show that Carrico had a clear 
understanding of how the club operated, as well as its rules and its structure – 
more or less all of which he established in New Zealand.  
 
The date that the Hell’s Angels give to Auckland’s official charter is 1 July 
1961 – at that time, unlike Carrico’s audacious claims, just the fourth chapter 
anywhere behind San Bernardino, San Francisco and Oakland (Lavigne, 
1993). It appears, however, that the Auckland club was actually recognised 
before that. The letters Carrico wrote to the U.S. that I have seen were on 
official club letterhead and it is difficult to imagine the U.S. Angels would have 
allowed this if the chapter had not been officially identified. Moreover, in 2007, 
Phil Schubert, a prominent and long-time Hell’s Angel member, went to San 
Francisco and acquired copies of minutes of meetings that appear to show 
that the New Zealand chapter was indeed acknowledged before 1 July 1961 
(Phil Schubert 2008 pers. comm.).  
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Carrico’s letter to the San Francisco chapter offers a great deal of insight into 
the club in the early 1960s. It shows that he brought with him the principles 
that were being forged by Sonny Barger, the influential president of the 
Oakland Hell’s Angels9. The same rules, structure, and discipline that were to 
make the Hell’s Angels the largest motorcycle club in the world had found root 
in New Zealand, and, as will be shown in the following chapter, by the early 
1970s they would spread beyond the motorcycle scene and become the basis 
for street gangs too.  
 
Carrico wrote that the Auckland chapter had the “usual officers”, and a 
document held by the Auckland Hell’s Angels shows this included a president, 
a vice president, a treasury/secretary and a road captain. Despite the 
Auckland Star identifying Carrico as the leader, Hell’s Angels documentation 
that I have viewed from that time shows that the club’s first president is 
recorded as Pete Skinner. As was the case in the U.S. (Barger et al., 2000) – 
the president had special rights and in certain decisions his vote held greater 
power, and outside of meeting times his authority was near absolute (B.B. 
2003 pers. comm.).  
 
Carrico’s letter outlines that to gain membership of the club, a person had to 
pay the club’s weekly fee for three weeks, ride with the group for a month and 
be unanimously voted in by existing members – a rule the same as that being 
used in the U.S (Barger et al., 2000: pp.43-44). Although there is a plethora of 
anecdotal and empirical evidence that highlights the importance of the 
                                                
9 For more on Sonny Barger see his book Hell’s Angel: The Life and Times of Sonny Barger (2000) 
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overseas connection in shaping the gang scene in New Zealand, this is 
perhaps the most tangible piece of comparable evidence that exists. This rule, 
however, took time to become consistently applied and firmly embedded. One 
Hell’s Angel who joined in 1964 told me that he was given a patch more-or-
less straight away (Phil Schubert 2006 pers. comm.). 
 
Just like the U.S. chapters, as evinced by meeting minutes I have seen from 
San Francisco (dated 13 December 1961), fines were the primary sanction for 
breaking club rules, and were levied for infringements such as turning up late 
to weekly meetings or not attending compulsory club motorcycle rides, known 
as ‘runs’. Continual breaches of rules – or unpaid fines – resulted in members 
losing their patches temporarily or permanently.  
 
As will become clear as this thesis proceeds, the numerous effects that 
Carrico had on the New Zealand gang scene were enduring and wide 
ranging, but for now, two are particularly worthy of note. First, the adoption of 
patches as an exclusive identifier gave members a distinctive sense of group 
identity. A patch wearer was no longer just an individual; he/she was part of 
an exclusive collective. The patch became a source of prestige, and helped 
create strong intra-group bonds. The insider/outsider distinction between milk 
bar cowboys and mainstream society, outlined in the previous chapter, was 
further delineated as patches created visibly separate groups within the 
previously homogenous subculture.  Furthermore, the patch, to use marketing 
jargon, became a recognisable ‘logo’. Whatever perception built up around 
the group and its associated patch was therefore carried with its members 
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over time and place. As will become clear, one effect of this was acute police 
attention. Maintaining the marketing jargon, the patch also became a type of 
advertisement. One Hell’s Angel, Steve Tidswell, told me of seeing the group 
in the 1960s: 
 
When I was a young fella I was coming back from the movies with the 
ol’ man and we got over taken by a bike going like fuck. The ol’ man 
said, “that’s the Hell’s Angels”. I’ve never been too sure about many 
things in life but from that time on I was sure [I wanted to be in the 
Hell’s Angels]. 
 
The second and perhaps most important development to consider, was the 
creation of a formal organisational structure, and rules that maintained it. 
Although universal to outlaw motorcycle clubs around the world (Veno, 2003; 
Wolf, 1991), many international researchers report that most street gangs lack 
formal organisation and leadership, something noted by early researchers, 
and many since (Horowitz, 1983; Klein, 1995; Klein et al., 2001; Thrasher, 
1927; Yablonsky, 1967). As will become clear, nearly all gangs in New 
Zealand, with varying degrees of precision, adopted the organisational 
template provided by the Hell’s Angels and this is important as it meant the 
gang scene obtained a high degree of structural form and thus arguably 
became unique. As noted in the literature review, U.S. studies that have 
identified highly structured and well-organised gangs, such as those by 
Jankowski (1991) and Taylor (1989), tend to show they are involved in, or 
more successful at, organised criminal activities. Therefore, the structure 
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adopted by New Zealand gangs allowed many an easy transition into such 
endeavours; but in the 1960s, any gang participation in profit driven crime was 
many years away. Nevertheless, I suggest that these features proved 
pertinent to the ongoing viability of the young groups. 
 
The organisational structure adopted by the Auckland Hell’s Angels and 
others subsequently, meant such groups were less inclined to disintegrate 
when key members departed the scene. Democratic processes instilled a 
greater degree of legitimate authority, and leadership became a position and 
not a person. Using Weberian terms, it was a shift from ‘charismatic’ to ‘task’ 
leadership (Glassman, 1984: p.217). In this way, when they became vacant, 
executive positions were filled by elections, and the authority vested in those 
roles was transferred. As was the case in the previous decade, gang 
participation in the 1960s was largely a fleeting phase in the life of most 
members, but these organisational developments enabled the gangs 
themselves to endure over time. Further support for this longevity came from 
the adoption of such things as club rules, fees, and fines. Along with a formal 
leadership structure, these elements had the effect of creating the gang as an 
abstract, independent entity. Unlike in the past, the group became something 
more than just the sum of its members and therefore was more likely to 
continue in the face of membership turnover, although this was by no means 
assured.  
 
In 1961, Carrico’s letter says that the Auckland Hell’s Angels had 40 members 
– including one girl – and was “growing fast all the time”. It is unknown 
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whether or not a club existed in Christchurch, as asserted by Carrico in the 
media. Certainly there is no surviving evidence of one. There was, however, a 
chapter established in Hamilton in the early 1960s and another started in 
Whangarei around 196510. As well as portraying a different area name, the 
patches were also embroidered in different colours, some of which are 
displayed at the Hell’s Angels’ Auckland clubhouse. I have been told that 
these chapters came and went rather quickly and some members from each 
moved to join the Auckland chapter (Phil Schubert 2006 pers. comm.). 
 
In April 1961, Carrico left the club. In his letter he said he had resigned from 
active membership “three weeks ago” and was planning to go home in two 
months. Exactly when he left and what happened to him is unknown, but in 
his short stay he had forged the Hell’s Angels’ first international link and 
initiated a process that fundamentally reshaped the New Zealand gang scene.  
 
The Police Reaction – a Source of Cohesion  
When Carrico said the Hell’s Angels were a club and not a gang, he had a 
legitimate claim, and one maintained by many groups to this day. Even those 
unfamiliar with such groups would note the structural elements he brought to 
New Zealand are not unique to gangs. Formal rules, informally prescribed 
behaviours, membership fees, and uniforms or badges are elements common 
to any number of clubs or organisations. One must also remember that they 
formed primarily around a common interest in motorcycling. It was not, 
                                                
10 These chapters were associated to the Auckland chapter, although neither was sanctioned or 
recognised by the American Hell’s Angels. A further chapter existed on Auckland’s North Shore 
between 1972 and 1978, but this too was closed down (as a result of not being officially sanctioned by 
the international Angels) and certain members entered the Auckland chapter. 
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therefore, what they were, as much as how they were perceived that made 
them ‘gangs’. Miller (1975: p.263) was perhaps the first to outline that 
perception is critical to group definition: “Put in general terms, if youth groups 
in a particular community appear to present a problem, they are perceived as 
gangs; if they do not, that community has ‘groups’ but no ‘gangs’.” This issue 
will be expanded further in later chapters, but for now, it is enough to say that 
the positive publicity that the young group received in the Auckland Star was 
seldom if ever repeated. In fact, the Hell’s Angels – and other motorcycle 
groups that would mimic them late in the decade – were soon creating many 
negative headlines. A selection from The New Zealand Herald is typical: 
“Concern About Conduct Of Motorcycle Club” (17.1.1965); “Clubhouse Is 
‘Headache’ To Police” (1.7.1965); “Arrest By Citizens Planned; Action Against 
‘Hells Angels’” (15.11.1965); “Motorcyclists’ Outing Finishes in Court” 
(7.6.1966); “9 Motorcyclists From Shore Group Arrested” (29.10.1968); 
“Motorcycle Louts At Beach” (25.11.1968); “Gangs Not Welcome At Taupo” 
(8.4.1969) “Motorcycle Mob On Rampage In Country Hotel” (9.4.1969); “More 
Motorcycle Gang Members Appear in Court” (12.6.1969); “Gang Member 
Convicted on 3 Charges” (24.9.1969). 
 
As noted in one of the above articles, gang clubhouses were becoming a 
problem for the police. In the early 1960s, the Hell’s Angels established a 
clubhouse in Khyber Pass, but they moved regularly. One clubhouse at 64 
Upper Queen Street burned down in 1964, and so the group rented a new 
place at Anglesea Street in Ponsonby (Phil Schubert, 2006 pers. comm.). 
Within the clubhouse walls the gang not only found a haven to party, but also 
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a place to work on their motorcycles and meet regularly. But more than this it 
was physical manifestation of the group and therefore a representation of the 
entity existing as something more than the sum of its members and 
consequently a further important component in the achievement of gang 
longevity. Indeed, the clubhouse would become a standard for all outlaw clubs 
– and, in turn, all gangs – and pose “headaches” for police (NZ Herald, 
1.7.1965) and be recognised as centres for “drinking parties and sex” (Truth, 
18.8.1968).  
 
According to one media source, by the mid-1960s, the notoriety of the Hell’s 
Angels had gained significant public prominence, and not just in Auckland 
(Sunday News 19.9.1968). After the publicity surrounding the problems at 
Hastings in 1960, as described earlier, the Angels were drawn to the city’s 
festivals later in the decade looking for adventure. Indeed long runs 
throughout many parts of the North Island were becoming common.  
 
On one trip to New Plymouth in mid-1966, the Sunday Times reported that, 
“Hundreds of local people were crowding the pavement” to see the “club 
members and their girlfriends… [who] …were mainly dressed in black leather 
jackets and tight black trousers” (Sunday Times, 5.6.1966). The Hell’s Angels 
were a novelty for many people, but local police were clearly aware of their 
growing reputation. A New Plymouth police spokesperson said that the group 
had received “a thorough talking to. We heard they had arrived from Auckland 
and we thought we had better see them” (Sunday Times, 5.6.1966).  
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That ‘talking to’, or a subsequent one, led to at least one arrest. Sourced from 
a club member’s scrapbook, a newspaper clipping (which lacks reference 
detail) says that when a member of the New Plymouth police asked why he 
had a stock whip draped around his neck, 20-year-old Hell’s Angel Geoffrey 
Strickland, replied, “For hitting nosy cops with”. This led to his arrest and 
subsequently to his companions travelling to the local police station where 
they raised a Nazi flag up the station’s flagpole in protest (Phil Schubert pers. 
comm.). It was a typical act of bravado and defiance. In fact, in the mid-1960s, 
“cop baiting” was not, perhaps, unusual, and in one example, a group of Hell’s 
Angels came across a lone country traffic officer who promptly locked himself 
in his vehicle while the group “downtrowed and pissed all over his car before 
dragging on” (Shadbolt, 1971: p.36). In fining Strickland £20 for carrying an 
offensive weapon, the presiding Magistrate said,  
 
“The Police evidently persuaded you and your friends to leave New 
Plymouth to avoid any possible disturbances and I think they should be 
commended for their action. I notice by the newspapers that your 
friends got into trouble in another town. It is youths like you who adopt 
an arrogant attitude towards the police that give teenagers a bad 
name”.  
 
The trouble in ‘another town’ occurred the night the bikers left New Plymouth, 
and in light of more recent information, there is more to the story than what 
the Magistrate could get from the newspapers. As will become clear shortly, 
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the increasing conflict between the Hell’s Angels and the police was not just a 
matter of gang members having an ‘arrogant attitude’. 
 
In the late 1950s, Green (1959: p.25) reported that one method employed to 
deal with the problem of gangs was for police to prevent “the groups from 
meeting in public places and by ‘keeping on their tails’ and laying as many 
charges as possible against gang members”. As will become clear, this 
method appears to have been maintained in the 1960s. Green also 
recommended, without elaborating in any way, that police “require instruction 
in the handling of groups of young adolescents” (Green, 1959: p.59). Whether 
or not this was a veiled criticism is unclear, but there is evidence of police 
heavy handedness in the 1960s. Early in the decade, The New Zealand 
Herald reported that many young motorcyclists were complaining of police 
harassment. One said, “I have been spoken to like a dog, my only crime being 
that I ride a motorcycle and wear a leather jacket which is regular motorcycle 
rig” (NZ Herald 24.10.61). What weight one can give to such complaints is 
difficult to judge, but they are supported by certain police activities. 
 
In 1997, retired police inspector Murray Forbes (1997) published a brief 
account of the incident that the New Plymouth Magistrate referred to when 
sentencing Geoffrey Strickland. In Confessions from the Front Line, Forbes 
writes with great candour of the night when he and his colleagues confronted 
the Hell’s Angels. Travelling home in the rain after their trip to New Plymouth 
in 1966, the bikers had stopped for shelter at a derelict house at a railway 
189 
 
settlement of Kiokio – incorrectly recorded by Forbes (1997: p.34) as Kihikihi11 
– south west of Te Awamutu. Rightly judging the house as abandoned, the 
group decided to stay a night (NZ Herald 7.6.1966). Alerted to the their 
presence by a farmer, the local weekend police muster in Hamilton – including 
a young Forbes – was bolstered by off duty staff, mostly football players who 
“were always keen for a fight in those days” (Forbes, 1997: p.34).  
 
Facetiously describing the operation as a “discreet visit”, Forbes says the 
police deliberately damaged motorcycles and tore patches from the backs of 
members. Including friends and girlfriends of club members, the police 
arrested 21 people for being unlawfully on premises. The following day a 
number of Angels went to lay complaints about the damage done to 
motorcycles and clothing, as well as assaults and the theft of patches. 
However, they were soon “sent on their way” as “complaints were not taken 
from riff-raff” (Forbes, 1997: p.35). Not mentioned in his book, Forbes told me 
in March 2008 that he was one who took a patch as souvenir but no longer 
had it as his wife threw it away “because it stunk”.  
 
The rationale given for the police action was that a show of force would 
prevent future problems (Forbes, 1997: p.34). There is a strong argument, 
however, that such actions have a contrary effect. Conflict between the 
rebellious groups and the police is almost certainly inevitable, but the cavalier 
and illegal aspects of police activity, as outlined by Forbes, undoubtedly fed 
                                                
11 Complicating matters, one media report says it was at Pioipio, slightly further south, but a Hell’s 
Angel member who was there told me it was Kiokio (Phil Schubert 2008 pers. comm.). In talking with 
Forbes, he agreed his report may be a mistake, and I believe KioKio is most likely to be correct. 
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resentment and led to greater group cohesion. As will become clear, the 
example of overzealous policing is not isolated, but it does offer a perhaps 
unique insight into how cohesion and consequently gang evolution can occur 
through conflict. 
 
The idea that conflict inspired cohesion is a requirement for gang evolution 
was first proposed by Thrasher (1927). Most often sourced from inter-group 
clashes, Thrasher believed that when a group faces hostility it derives a sense 
of ‘we’ that binds the membership more tightly together (Thrasher, 1964: 
p.24). Although gang interaction with broad social forces was integrated within 
Thrasher’s ‘situation complex’ – whereby gangs are are seen as part of a 
complicated web of social interactions – it was Tannenbaum (1938: pp.19-22) 
who explicitly developed the idea that a cohesive effect is created by 
excessive societal reactions. This occurred, he believed, through the 
‘dramatization of evil’, whereby significant negative attention is brought to 
bear on gangs, and their youthful activities are seen in forcefully negative 
ways and repressed. Regardless of how good the intentions of these actions, 
repression results in gangs becoming more cohesive, and thus causing them 
to generate their own value system that insulates the membership from the 
values of the community. More recently, Klein (1996) is among those who 
have reached similar conclusions. He argues that, “The gang dynamic 
manipulates messages of attack by the law and justice system to feed the 
special gang culture and reinforce gang cohesiveness” (Klein, 1996: p.208).  
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Whether initiated through ‘cop baiting’ or ‘discreet visits’, the interaction 
between police and the gangs was creating an escalating cycle of 
action/reaction. Although this is likely to have aided group cohesion, it also 
introduced the rebellious youth to the criminal justice system and, as will 
become clear in later chapters, this was to have a definitive effect on the 
culture and dynamics of such groups.  
 
Certainly, the abuse of power by police at Kiokio aggrieved the club members. 
Regarding the police action, one of the Angels told me, “Of course it was over 
the top. What did they achieve? We were sheltering from the rain. [Then] 
when everyone was locked up and gone, to cut your brake cables and throttle 
cables - a chicken shit thing, a cowardly act” (Phil Schubert 2008 pers. 
comm.). It appears they let their frustrations be known at the time. Travelling 
in three police vans from the police station to the Hamilton Magistrates Court 
after being arrested at KioKio, the youths were defiant and were repeatedly 
ordered to, “Cut out that filthy language” (Waikato Times 6.6.1966).  
 
Using Becker’s idea as a guide, that being to “look at all the people involved in 
any episode of alleged deviance…all the parties to a situation, and their 
relationships” (Becker, 1963: pp.183 & 199), one can gain considerable 
insight into the issues and outcomes of the incident at KioKio. The aggressive 
behaviour by police riled the youths, but given complaints were not accepted 
from ‘riff raff’, one might appreciate the youths’ subsequent feelings of 
powerlessness and contempt for authority. Those reading in the media about 
the incident would have undoubtedly perceived the ‘flthy language’ of the 
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youths as reflecting their uncouth and undesirable nature – unaware that this 
anti-social behaviour was born of, and a reaction to, the heavy handed and 
illegal tactics of police. As previously discussed, the content of these media 
reports were noted with apparent distain by the New Plymouth Judge when 
convicting Geoffrey Strickland for carrying a stock whip. Given this, one can 
assume they also influenced other authority figures and members of the 
public about what type of group the Hell’s Angels were, and therefore they 
were viewed and treated accordingly. And yet, the incident described by the 
media bore little resemblance to what actually occurred.  
 
While the majority of those arrested were either fined £10 plus £1 costs or 
remanded, three were sentenced to jail for one month with either one or two 
years probation – the group’s then leader, David Roach, was given the 
harsher sentence of two years probation (Waikato Times 6.6.1966). One of 
those sentenced to prison was Phil Schubert, who said he was shocked by 
the ruling and the attitude of police:  
 
“It was a ridiculous sentence. It’s a minor trespass, isn’t it? [The police 
action] was over the top, and the [court] sentences – It would get your 
back up, wouldn’t it? It was totally unfair, particularly when you’re 
young and you know you’re not getting treated fairly. It doesn’t make 
you conform it makes you go the other way” (Phil Schubert 2008 pers. 
comm.). 
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Schubert lodged a successful appeal to his sentence and in the end he was 
given two years probation. Apart from the mandatory conditions restricting his 
movement and employment, the probation order also specified that, “you do 
not associate with any person not approved by the Probation Officer and in 
particular any member of the ‘Hell’s Angels’ Group”.  
 
The order was given on 1 July 1966. Within a week Schubert, and two other 
Hell’s Angel members, flew to Australia. There he changed his patch to read 
‘Nomad’ instead of ‘Auckland’. It was almost certainly the first Hell’s Angels 
patch to be worn on Australian soil. Schubert told me that his two companions 
went on to establish a Hell’s Angels chapter in Sydney sometime around 
1968, although it was not formally recognised and inaugurated until 1973 
(Veno, 2003: p.31)  or 1975 (Lavigne, 1993: p.62)12. After a spell of prison in 
Australia, it was nearly ten years before Schubert would return to New 
Zealand and shortly thereafter rejoined his old club in 1978 at a time when 
many of its members were incarcerated following an incident I will detail in 
Chapter Six. At that time, he was surprised to find how much the club had 
transformed. Although by the latter half the 1960s the group had undergone 
dramatic changes since being formed from a loose clique of milk bar 
cowboys, these changes were to be matched by significant advancements in 
the 1970s. In spite of – perhaps aided by – the tensions stemming from police 
suppression efforts, the group became better organised and its members 
significantly more committed (Phil Schubert pers. comm.). Moreover, as will 
become clear, the Hell’s Angels were by that time just one of numerous 
                                                
12 In correspondence with me in September 2009, Veno said that an official charter was obtained by the 
Sydney chapter in 1968, but it was withdrawn in 1969 after its president was killed by four members of 
the Finks. 
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outlaw motorcycle clubs that were nevertheless dwarfed in membership 
numbers by large – and patched – street gangs. 
 
Rebellion and the 1960s Social Environment 
While the Hell’s Angels were gaining increasing public prominence as the 
1960s unfolded, they were not alone in their rebellious and non-conformist 
outlook. The deep and widespread conservatism that had defined New 
Zealand in the 1950s began to dissipate dramatically as the 1960s 
progressed. And within this broad social shift there were more radical 
elements that set about challenging the country’s laws, political decisions, and 
social folkways and mores. Crossover between these more radical elements 
and the rise of groups like the Hell’s Angels should not be overstated, but 
certain links are important to construct. As will become clear, outlaw 
motorcycle clubs and dissident sub-cultural groups shared certain similarities 
that I will argue aided the development of outlaw motorcycle clubs, while 
increasingly liberal attitudes were important in shaping how New Zealand 
gangs were viewed in the future.  
 
The social and cultural changes occurring in New Zealand during the 1960s 
were inspired by and in turn a part of a Western World phenomenon, and 
often germinated in the U.S. Indeed the 1960s are remembered prominently 
for countercultural revolutions and experimentation, the effects of which often 
struck deep into mainstream society but were most obvious within the youth 
and those on the fringes of society. Marginalised groups began to seek a 
voice through protest and challenged governments and mainstream thinking. 
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These protests reached a crescendo in numerous, varied, and often violent 
demonstrations and uprisings in 1968: a turbulent year for much of the world 
and one that acutely defined the turmoil of the period (Kurlansky, 2004).  
 
For many people, the questioning of traditional authority also meant the use of 
recreational drugs, most notably LSD, the hallucinogenic properties of which 
helped inspire psychedelic clothing and art – and helped establish a ‘hippie’ 
subculture. The advent of the mini skirt and the bikini, trends unthinkable a 
decade previous, were representative of a widespread movement of sexual 
liberation that found more acute representation in ‘love-ins’, events in which 
sex became a form of expression and social activism. Unsurprisingly, much 
popular music of the time reflected these events: often drug inspired and 
overtly political. 
 
Indeed the social changes between the 1950s and 1960s were arguably 
unique in their drama and rapidity. The dissent that pervaded much of western 
society in the 1960s made the threat posed by the rebellious teenager, of 
such concern in the 1950s, became a rather nostalgic memory of a seemingly 
much simpler time. 
 
The remarkable societal changes of the 1960s were unfolding as 
technological innovations began to mitigate New Zealand’s geographic 
isolation and broaden social perspectives. Before exploring two important 
technological advances and their impact, it is important to note that the take-
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up of technologies, and indeed other consumer goods of the 1960s, was 
enabled by the country’s continuing prosperity. 
 
Despite a collapse in wool prices in the latter half of the decade, the New 
Zealand economy remained very strong. As was the case in the 1950s, jobs 
were plentiful and unemployment was virtually non-existent and consequently 
wages continued to rise. The Wage Rate Index (using a base of 1000 in 1965) 
was near 1,200 by the end of the decade. This compares to 734 in 1955 and 
just 249 in 1932 (Department of Statistics, 1970a: p.941). This wealth enabled 
the country to embrace new technologies and allowed many people to free 
themselves from pragmatic economic considerations and focus on wider 
social issues. 
 
Television broadcasting began in 1960, and by 1971, more than four in five 
households had a television set (Department of Statistics, 1971: p.341). 
Among other things, the new medium contributed to New Zealand becoming 
better connected to international issues. Images of America’s involvement in 
the Vietnam War, which was steadily escalating throughout the 1960s, were 
beamed into New Zealand households and helped inspire a peace movement 
here. Similarly, the American civil rights movement, which sought an end to 
discrimination against African Americans, gave rise to increased awareness of 
racial politics in New Zealand. Similarly, many people took of the feminist fight 
for women’s liberation. In the U.S., television coverage of the demonstrations 
that accompanied issues such as these sparked what conservative 
commentator William Buckley called a “contagion of protest” (King, 2003: 
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p.454), and New Zealand it seems was not immune. Moreover, developments 
within television broadcasting in New Zealand made this country’s political 
leaders appear more accessible and accountable. First broadcast in 1968, the 
Gallery current affairs programme, hosted by former academic Brian 
Edwards, directly challenged politicians and allowed New Zealanders to be 
more acutely in-touch with political decisions. 
 
Increased air travel also shaped New Zealand’s social outlook. Between 1960 
and 1970 international passenger flights in and out of New Zealand rose from 
92,000 to 554,000, an increase of some 600 percent (Belich, 2001: p.427). 
People returning from travels overseas, or indeed immigrating or visiting here 
(as was the case with Jim Carrico), could translate to New Zealanders how 
the ‘swinging 60s’ were playing out around the world (King, 2003: p.457).  
Consequently, New Zealand fashion mimicked overseas trends, clothes 
became brighter and more extravagant, and men began to grow their hair, 
and thereby breaking free from the short-back-and-sides cut that was akin to 
male uniform in the 1950s. 
 
In 1964, British pop group the Beatles toured New Zealand drawing enormous 
crowds wherever they went, and in doing so highlighted the continuing 
popularity and influence of music on young people. As was the case in the 
1950s, these new music appetites were not being satisfied by state radio 
broadcasts, which, with usually just one station in each main centre, could not 
possibly be all things to all people. In 1967, self proclaimed ‘pirate’ radio 
station, Radio Hauraki, started broadcasting the latest hits - many of them 
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protest songs by the likes of Bob Dylan and Joan Baez - from a ship anchored 
just outside New Zealand’s territorial waters, and thus out of reach of the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Service restrictions. In 1970, the state monopoly on 
radio was officially broken when broadcasting was deregulated and licences 
began to be issued to private stations (The Radio Network, 2008). For a 
country so keen to control popular music in the 1950s via censorship, the 
change was significant.  
 
The more radical moves away from conservatism and conformity were most 
evident at university campuses. University attendance grew by 150 percent 
between 1960 and 1969, by which time there were 31,494 students enrolled 
in New Zealand’s seven universities (Department of Statistics, 1961: p.218; 
1971: p.237). These youthful elites were well represented among those who 
began to defy and challenge the state, infected, perhaps, by the ‘contagion of 
protest’.  
 
In 1960, modest demonstrations accompanied the selection of an 
incongruously named All Black team that toured apartheid South Africa with 
only white players, but it was an anti-war rally in 1967, following the 
government’s decision to send troops to Vietnam, that New Zealand first 
witnessed mass protest. Indeed, it was the first time a significant segment of 
the country openly opposed government policy (Sinclair, 1991: p.307). It was 
to signal the beginning of a growing protest culture, and from the late 1960s 
and into the 1970s there “seemed to be a superabundance of causes that 
would bring people out into the streets” (King, 2003: p.454). In what became 
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increasingly common, significant clashes between police and more radical 
protestors were being reported in the media as early as 1967 (Brown, 1971: 
pp.7-14). Although difficult to evince, it is plausible that such clashes, and 
indeed protest and dissent generally, confirmed in the minds of outlaw club 
members the repressive nature of the state and validated their rebellious 
underpinnings. More demonstrably, the wider protest movement was 
evidence of, and in turn contributing to, more liberal and independent thought 
among significant portions of the population. Many people were starting to 
challenge conventional notions and, as will be outlined in coming chapters, 
this led to a period from the 1970s and into the 1980s in which gangs were 
seen by many as troublesome but legitimate communities, and the best way 
to mend or mitigate their anti-social and criminal tendencies was to work with 
rather than against them. 
 
Many of these attitudes were inspired by a further development, most obvious 
in and around the country’s universities in the late 1960s: the arrival of the 
hippie subculture. And between this movement and outlaw bikers certain 
parallels are evident. As was the case around the world, from within the local 
hippie movement charismatic leaders emerged who encouraged people to 
resist convention and create alternative ways of thinking and lifestyles. Tim 
Shadbolt surfaced as one such leader who, among other things, rallied 
against the state on numerous issues, clashed with police, was jailed, and 
adopted and encouraged communal living. James K. Baxter, at the time one 
of New Zealand’s most celebrated poets, was another who became a symbol 
of the emerging counter culture. Baxter was “long-haired, barefooted, bearded 
200 
 
and raggedly dressed”, an appearance that would have been unthinkable just 
ten years previous, but in the late 1960s “would not have looked unusual” 
(Belich, 2001: p.511).  
 
Baxter, too, preached a radical departure from social norms and established 
communes in Auckland, Wellington, and in Jerusalem, a small settlement up 
the Wanganui River (Belich, 2001: p.460). These leaders encouraged many 
young people to ‘drop out’ of society and rally against the government and 
other state and business institutions that they perceived to be repressive. The 
use of illicit drugs such as marijuana and LSD was also beginning to become 
apparent (Newbold, 2004: p.56). By the late 1960s, then, cynicism, defiance 
and rebellion were established within mainstream youth culture as qualities to 
advertise and admire, and contempt for “the law and its representatives 
became the ‘in’ thing” (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.163).  
 
Within the developing social context of the late 1960s, then, the rebellious and 
non-conformist nature of the Hell’s Angels was in many ways not unique. 
Although the outlaw clubs were centred in the working classes and bereft of 
the lofty political ideologies common to other, middle class, dissident groups, 
they shared with hippies a sense of building their own value system and to a 
certain degree the notion of ‘dropping out’ of society. In addition, the formation 
of communes and the development of gang clubhouses, were based on 
similar concepts of sharing and community; a sense of common good rather 
than individual attainment, traits not as evident in the formation of new gangs 
in the 1990s and beyond.  
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Moreover, the fact that all of these values were being publicly articulated in 
the latter half of the 1960s by leading countercultural figures almost certainly 
gave the young outlaw bikers a degree of impetus and a sense of legitimacy 
to their lifestyle. The changing social environment, then, was important in both 
bolstering the outlaw lifestyle as well as how that lifestyle came to be viewed. 
 
An Inside View of the Hell’s Angels’ Activities 
In an interesting crossover between the predominantly working-class bikers 
and the typically middle class protest and hippie movements, Tim Shadbolt, in 
his late teens and just before becoming a the activist leader noted above, 
spent more than a year hanging out with the Hell’s Angels in the mid-1960s13. 
His book Bullshit & Jellybeans, published in 1971, gives a brief but vivid 
insight into the group.  
 
For Shadbolt, the rebellious lure of the club was appealing: “I used to love 
sitting in the gutter with barefeet, a chrome-studded chain-covered leather 
jacket and filthy jeans. Eatin’ chips. People look at you with such disgust and 
hate. It was terrific” (Shadbolt, 1971: p.34). B.B. told me that club members in 
the early 1960s were clean-cut and meticulous in their dress, going so far as 
washing the lambs’ wool that lined their boots with household chemicals to 
keep them white. This change in dress and attitude is therefore rather 
dramatic, and in adopting a worn-out and unkempt appearance, these youths, 
                                                
13 The fact that Shadbolt found the Hell’s Angels appealing and that they maintained an element of 
‘cool’ was not unique to New Zealand. In the U.S. the Hell’s Angels began to attract a number of well 
known artists and personalities and the hippie/liberal set attached themselves to the rebellious group. 
Author Ken Kesey and his ‘merry pranksters’, and ‘gonzo’ journalists and writer Hunter S. Thompson 
were among those who associated with the outlaw club in the U.S. 
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and others like James K. Baxter who I mentioned earlier, were creating –  the 
latter perhaps more consciously – a contrast with an increasingly consumerist 
society. Going one-step further in advertising their oppositional nature, the 
Angels began to don Nazi regalia, because “it really seemed to bug people. 
The swastikas meant as much to us as Napoleon’s tricolour meant to our 
parents” (Shadbolt, 1971: p.36). Although Nazi symbols may have had some 
white power connotations in the U.S. (Chase, Gast, Keating, & Kelly, 1983), 
for the New Zealand Hell’s Angels – and other groups that would mimic them 
– it was little more than a symbol advertising their rejection of social norms. 
 
Shadbolt recorded a number of the group’s activities like beer-drinking races 
and “longest prick” contests, which occasionally involved other groups such 
as the Road Runners and the 25 Club – both of whom are discussed in the 
following section of this chapter. Shadbolt also documented other activities of 
the Hell’s Angels:  
 
The gang often went on runs to Whangarei and Dargaville. After we’d 
stirred up Dargaville a bit with a few drags along the main straight we 
had this shit hot party out in an old haybarn. Booze was stacked up to 
the roof and it lasted 3 days. By the third day there were some pretty 
rude scenes. This guy called Atlas got hold of a lamb and tried to 
screw it. A girl called ‘Powderpuff’ did a strip-show for the boys. For 
her star performance while someone was screwin’ her she sucked off 
another guy pulled another two off while another two fellows 
masturbated into her ears (Shadbolt, 1971: p.34). 
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When published, this account of sexual adventurism created little if any 
widespread public stir, a sign that 15 years after the Mazengarb report, 
attitudes to sex were less tightly strung. Indeed, attitudes toward sex in New 
Zealand were changing considerably with the advent and uptake of the birth 
control pill and a breaking down of mores concerning sex before marriage. 
 
Notwithstanding that, few within the mainstream would have approved of the 
sexual behaviours described above, but within the Hell’s Angels it was 
accepted and encouraged; and therefore group sex – most often many men 
on a single woman – thrived and became a defining activity of New Zealand 
gangs, something I will discuss in Chapter Eight. For now, it is enough to say 
that the group was creating its own codes of behaviour, and increasingly they 
transcended those set down by society. Widely recognised as a feature of 
collective behaviour (Locher, 2002), the following account suggests the group 
was acting in ways that individual members may not have; but such 
behaviours became normalised and, therefore, as will become clear as this 
thesis proceeds, within many such groups, increasingly frequent. 
 
All these teeny bopper girls used to hang around trying to look tough, 
but none of the guys would touch them because they were all carnies 
[underage]. A couple of girls who looked ‘old enough’ were hangin’ 
around buggin’ everyone ’cause they wanted to go for a ride. Well, 
the boys decided to take them for a ride up Mount Eden. The first one 
went down OK and a few of the guys got stuck in; then someone tried 
to lay the other girl. Well her mate had lapped it up but this girl got 
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scared and started screamin’. Some of the lover boys parked up in 
daddies’ cars came rushing across to rescue this damsel in distress, 
but when they saw her surrounded by 20 bikies they decided she 
could get stuffed and retreated hastily. By then someone had called 
the cops and everyone split in all directions. No one was caught. The 
sentence for gang rape is 14 years. Those girls wanted the ride 
(Shadbolt, 1971: p.34). 
 
Gate crashing parties also become common, and the strength of their 
numbers meant a party host could do little to get rid of the group: “A few 
windows might have been smashed and the papers would yell and scream 
about Hells [sic] Angels gate-crashers” (Shadbolt, 1971: p.34).  
 
Although such activities were largely unthinking and outcomes of group 
bravado, within the context of the wider protest/hippie movements, these 
actions were – by some at least – justified as reactions to the perceived unjust 
state of the world: “I often wondered what was considered the most violent act 
by society – a baby dying of starvation while wheat surpluses were burnt in 
America, or a motorbike boy breaking a window. What’s the most vicious 
brutal crime?” (Shadbolt, 1971: p.34-5). The logic may be questionable, but 
the explanation gives insight into how the wider cultural environment may 
have spurred the anti-social activities of rebellious groups: “It was a wild 
insane destructive negative revolt. But it was better than death – society’s 
coffin of respectability, graveyard of progress and cross of the bourgeoisie. 
We were proud to be rejected because we didn’t want to be like those who 
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rejected us” (Shadbolt, 1971: p.36). On the whole, however, it appears that 
the young bikers had little higher purpose or thought in their rebellious 
activities, a position summed up by one of the defining scenes in the classic 
1959 biker film, The Wild One. In it, Marlon Brando’s character ‘Johnny’ is 
asked what he is rebelling against, to which he replies, “Whadda ya got?”  
 
In August 2004, I had a conversation with Tim Shadbolt, who had become a 
long-term and popular Mayor of the Southland city of Invercargill, and he told 
me that the groups were rebellious but not criminal: 
 
The gangs in those days – they weren’t like gangsters really, they were 
like rebel youths. So we all had jobs, most of the gang guys were in 
apprenticeships, motor mechanic apprentices or things like that so it 
wasn’t - there wasn’t a gangster element it was just motorbike cowboys 
- that was the irony, they weren’t really criminals and would be shocked 
to be called that. The criminals were a different culture altogether, they 
were the guys like [machine gun murderer] Ron Jorgensen and [career 
criminal and repeat prison escaper] Trevor Nash, they ran beer houses 
and had their own pecking order and prison culture and all that. They 
were the gangsters. The bikies were just rebels. 
 
Indeed, the activities of the Hell’s Angels in the 1960s were, overall, in the 
realm of youthful rebellious fun, but within a mercurial group environment they 
could quickly, but rarely, turn more serious and certainly there is no drive 
toward profit driven criminal endeavours. While the latter would not seriously 
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change until the 1980s, by the 1970s the group gained a reputation that would 
overtake the likes of notorious lawbreakers such as Nash and Jorgensen and 
they soon became some of New Zealand’s most obvious villains, not so much 
as individuals but as part of a collective: as Hell’s Angels. 
 
Follow the Leader -The Growth of Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs  
By the end of the 1960s, the Hell’s Angels were no longer the only patched 
group in the country as several outlaw motorcycle clubs had formed. These 
groups were inspired by the Auckland Angels’ media presence and their long 
runs out of the city, but the influence of the Hell’s Angels in New Zealand, 
however, was by this time not just confined to the Auckland chapter.  
 
During the 1960s, the club in America was creating something of an industry. 
By the middle of the decade, the group was demanding, and receiving, $1,000 
from reporters in order to gain access to them (H. S. Thompson, 1967: pp.48-
49). Aware of growing public interest in the Hell’s Angels, film production 
companies began to make movies that were based (sometimes rather 
loosely) on the gang, as well as motorcycling generally. The Wild Angels 
(1966), Hells Angels on Wheels (1967), and Hell’s Angels 69 (1969) were all 
inspired by the club; the latter two films included members of the gang in the 
cast. These films were part of a wider genre of films capturing the free spirit of 
bikers, including the 1969 cult classic Easy Rider (Yates, 1999: p.53). These 
movies were enormously influential in creating worldwide interest around 
motorcycling, but in New Zealand, the greatest impact during the 1960s 
appears to have come from two non-fiction books, both of which were 
published in 1966.  
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Hunter S. Thompson’s Hell’s Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga is both an 
inspired piece of writing and the result of an equally inspired ethnographic 
undertaking. Thompson ingratiated himself with Sonny Barger’s Oakland 
chapter of the Angels and rode on-and-off with the club for two years. His 
work captured the spirit of the club and many of its rules and codes of 
behaviour. The book became a classic and numerous club members have 
told me of is tremendous influence on their forming or joining outlaw clubs in 
New Zealand. 
 
Also published in 1966, George Henry Smith’s The Sex and Savagery of 
Hell’s Angels: The Full Story of America’s Wild Ones was another influential 
publication, which luridly outlined the activities of the group. Claiming to be 
written by a gang insider and published under the pseudonym of Jan Hudson, 
the book has since been discredited. Osgerby (2005: p.74), for example, 
claims that Smith/Hudson “probably culled most of his information from press 
clippings”. Despite its dubious claims of firsthand accounts, many older bikers 
have told me of its influence in the late 1960s and 70s, examples of which will 
be noted later in this thesis. These influences in New Zealand have been 
confirmed by Haslett (2007: p.44). Also, an American outlaw club mentioned 
in the book, the Devil’s Henchmen, may have been the inspiration for the 
name of a club that formed in Christchurch in 1973 and discussed in Chapter 
Six. Incidentally, the book also mentions the possibility of a New Zealand 
chapter of the Hell’s Angels (Hudson, 1966: p.20), the uncertainty signalling 
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the fact that by this time the Auckland chapter had lost contact with its 
American counterparts.  
 
These numerous media influences were to bolster groups like the Hell’s 
Angels in New Zealand during the latter part of the decade. One element that 
was adopted in New Zealand outlaw motorcycle clubs, the wearing of 1% 
badges, a symbol that the wearer is an ‘outlaw’ (for fuller explanation see 
Wethern & Colnett, 1978: pp.53-54), was almost certainly taken from the 
literature. Carrico would not have known of these emblems when he came to 
New Zealand (as they came about while he was in New Zealand, or perhaps 
even after he had left), but by the late 1960s, such badges were common, and 
with them came the ‘outlaw’ attitude detailed in the various films and books.  
 
The following example offers insight into this evolutionary shift from milk bar 
cowboy to outlaw club. In the early 1960s, a milk bar cowboy ‘gang’ calling 
themselves the Road Runners appeared on the North Island’s East Coast. 
‘Tex’, a member of the group, who later went on to become a member of the 
prominent outlaw club the Magogs of New Plymouth, told me in December 
2003 that they were a group of farmers’ sons who would ride around Hawkes 
Bay on Friday nights and party up, ‘crash out’ and then be up and home by 
5am to milk the cows. Like many such groups that disintegrated when a 
dominant member left the scene, the Road Runners dissolved when their 
leader, ‘Tony’, moved to Palmerston North. In a short time, however, Tony re-
established the club there. By 1966 the new Road Runners were typical of 
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groups at that time and their transformation into a full outlaw club, which took 
a less than a year, is worthy of note.  
 
One member of the Road Runners during this period was Cos Jeffery, who in 
1985 detailed their transformation in an unpublished paper, which I have 
obtained from him. The Road Runners enjoyed riding British motorcycles and 
the friendship and camaraderie that came from a group of like-minded people. 
Female members were welcome, although they were a minority of the 18-odd 
all-Pakeha membership. While ostensibly holding equal status, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the women fulfilled the jobs of taking minutes, writing letters to 
members advising them of up-coming runs, and cooking, if required. All 
members worked in paid employment – although it was regarded as “a 
necessary evil” (Jeffery, 1985: p.142). The club was a hobby for its members, 
a sideline activity that organised road trials, riding competitions and touring 
around the open roads surrounding Palmerston North. When they were not 
riding, the hangouts of choice were the city’s main square or the Rose 
Milkbar. Their presence, however, began to receive significant police 
attention. Upholding a theme addressed earlier, “The police had taken to 
interfering and persistently harassing members” and the club believed this 
was “completely unwarranted” (Jeffery, 1985: p.142). Given what is known 
about the relationship between conflict and cohesion, as discussed above, the 
outcome evinces a certain sense of predictability.  
 
The perception of undue police attention, Jeffery told me in 2008, created “a 
them and us attitude”. The moderate members wanted to distance themselves 
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from trouble, concentrate on the more social aspects of the club, work on a 
better public image, and avoid the police by spending more time at a 
clubhouse they had rented slightly out of town (Jeffery, 1985: p.142). The 
rebels within the club wished to become more like the Hell’s Angels and make 
the club more central to the lives of its members (Cos Jeffery, pers. comm.). 
Lending support to the idea that police suppression contributed to greater 
group cohesion, as outlined earlier, the rebel faction saw the police 
interference as a challenge to be confronted (Jeffery, 1985: p.143). The rift 
within the club soon came to a head. The matter went to a vote and the 
moderates lost by one: nine votes to eight. Trials and competitions quickly lost 
vogue and long runs that often went through the weekend and into the week 
became common. If that meant missing work, work was missed – something 
an economy with ample jobs allowed for. Club activities were now mandatory 
for all members, and commitment to the club became a significant – perhaps 
primary - focus of members’ lives. 
 
The club had shifted from a part time hobby toward a more committed 
lifestyle, and, reflecting both the Hell’s Angels and wider cultural trends, the 
group adopted an unkempt appearance. The female club members resigned, 
as did any moderates who failed to adjust to the transition (Jeffery, 1985). 
They were replaced by the likeminded, a crucial process that inevitably meant 
the group rebelliousness became entrenched – and an important and general 
process that will be explored in later chapters. By the end of 1966, the Road 
Runners sought to advertise their oppositional nature by donning a back 
patch. The transformation to an outlaw club was thereby formalised.  
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Other milk bar cowboy-type groups were also making this transition, including 
the 25 Motorcycle Club in Wellington and the Coffin Cheaters in Dunedin, and 
by the late 1960s the vast majority of rebellious biker groups were adopting, 
or being formed on, the outlaw model inspired by the Hell’s Angels. While 
there were still a number of young groups springing up and then fading away, 
by the end of the decade – as the liberalism and rebellion of the 1960s was at 
its most prominent – a number of outlaw clubs that would prove to be 
permanent and important fixtures within the New Zealand gang scene were in 
existence. With rebelliousness often reflected in their names, the Highway 61 
of Auckland was established in 1967; the Outlaws of Napier in 1968; the 
Outcasts of Hamilton, the Sinn Fein of Upper Hutt, the Satan’s Slaves of 
Wellington and the Epitaph Riders of Christchurch were all established in 
1969.  With the possible exception of the Sinn Fein, whose presence is not 
recorded, all of these groups were at the Hastings Blossom Festival 
disturbances of 1969 (Sunday News 5-10-1969). 
 
The back patch was the key identifier of the clubs. Initially, patches were a 
way for likeminded groups to recognise one another and many of these clubs 
remained on good terms, but as the outlaw motorcycle scene grew, conflict 
between groups became increasingly apparent.  
 
Like any group, whether it is rugby players or anyone else, there are 
just some - it’s their recreation. They want to prove their manhood or 
whatever, or they just liked the adrenalin rush you get from fighting. 
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There are always some people who just like fighting (Tim Shadbolt 
2005 pers. comm.) 
 
At first, these conflicts tended to be spontaneous, in the same way as 
individual fans of competing sporting teams may come into conflict. Such 
hostilities, however, tended to snowball. If a member of one club lost a fight, 
not just the individual felt the defeat, it was a loss of mana for the whole club. 
Based on the all-for-one-and-one-for-all refrain, individual fights therefore had 
the tendency to escalate into club disputes. 
 
Reflecting the important status they had achieved, the taking of opposition 
back patches during conflict became the standard way of imposing the 
ultimate humiliation over an enemy. It appears that one consequence of this 
was the cessation of female membership. Around the turn of the decade, 
women were universally banned from joining outlaw clubs as they were 
deemed to be less able to defend a patch. For the same reason, Barger had 
successfully had a motion passed banning women from the Hell’s Angels in 
America in the mid-1960s (Veno, 2003: p. 152). In an era of growing feminist 
consciousness, Bellich (2001: p.508) has suggested that the gangs were 
collectives designed to shore up a threatened sense of masculinity. The 
treatment of women will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
 
The realities of outlaw club conflict were soon faced by the Road Runners 
around the end of 1969 when they became at odds with the Sinn Fein, a 
group based about 100 kilometres to their south at Upper Hutt. The Sinn Fein 
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executed a raid on the Road Runners and stripped the patches from their 
backs. It is said that the colours were turned inside out used to print Sinn Fein 
patches in an effort to add extra insult (Cos Jeffery 2006 pers. comm.). With 
the club scene in New Zealand being so small, word of the defeat travelled 
quickly. The Road Runners had lost their patches and with them their status 
as a functioning outlaw club. Although any groups of bikers could don back 
patches, it was becoming clear that such groups had to be able to defend 
them; the scene was creating an informal governing process akin to natural 
selection whereby only the strong were able to survive and the weak vanish. 
As became standard within the scene, the Road Runners did not remake their 
patches. The club had been defeated and defrocked and had little choice but 
to close down. Certain members of the group were among those who did, 
however, establish another club in Palmerston North in 1971 named the 
‘Mother Fuckers’ (later abbreviated to ‘Mothers’) that would prove to be, and 
remains, a powerful force in the city.  
 
The defeat of the Road Runners by the Sinn Fein was an early conflict 
between clubs of the 1960s. It was, however, to pale in comparison to the 
wars that took place in the 1970s and beyond. 
 
Conclusion 
As was the case in the 1950s, for the greater part of the 1960s gangs were 
not identified as a significant social issue. These groups were seen as a part 
of the growing delinquency and crime problem; a problem that the 
government was proactive, but ultimately unsuccessful in tackling. The growth 
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of outlaw motorcycle clubs toward the end of the decade, however, meant 
they were beginning to attract some attention. In 1960, unrest at the Hastings 
Blossom Festival was seen as an acute example of the fear that many of the 
country’s youth were running amok, but by 1969, at the same event, the 
visibility of these new outlaw clubs ensured they were identifiable as being 
involved in the trouble. Looking at this one event, then, we can begin to see a 
shift that was to define the 1970s and beyond as gangs became a specific 
target of social concern. In many ways, this shift can be linked to the 
differences between the milk bar cowboys of the 1950s and the outlaw 
motorcycle clubs of the 1960s, which were fundamental and dramatic. 
 
Many of these important changes can be linked directly to the formation of the 
Hell’s Angels in Auckland – an event so crucial to the gang scene that I have 
defined it as the first pivot point in New Zealand gang history. Factors such as 
the adoption of back patches and a democratic hierarchical structure, 
supported by formally proscribed rules, aided the ongoing viability of these 
new groups. Although membership remained fleeting and the domain of 
youth, the outlaw clubs as discrete entities were better equipped to survive 
membership turnover and thus attain longevity. Unlike those seen in the 
1950s, many of the groups that formed in the 1960s remain in existence 
today. 
 
In many ways the outlaw clubs were a small part of the changing social 
landscape of New Zealand, which saw a dramatic shift away from the social 
conservatism and conformity that had defined the 1950s. Members of outlaw 
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clubs shared with hippies, for example, an unkempt appearance and an ethos 
of dropping out of society by creating distinct communities and folkways.  
Much of the enduring ethos of these groups is firmly rooted in the ideals of the 
1960s. Many of these shared folkways were not only instrumental in creating 
strong group bonds but also in how these groups were perceived – issues that 
will become apparent as this thesis proceeds. 
 
Using the definitions outlined in the introduction to this thesis, many of the 
changes can be seen to move these groups from ‘incipient gang’ to ‘gang’.  
However, it can be deemed that they were still only transitioning between 
stages, as during this period they were yet to produce a strict rule base that 
superseded the rules of the state, or an exclusive membership via 
‘prospecting’, two things that I contend are necessary to define a gang. As will 
be shown in following chapters, these important evolutionary and definitional 
components did not fully develop until the 1970s, but the geneses for these 
changes were evident during the 1960s.  
 
Instrumental in creating developmental shift, was the advent of the back patch 
that helped create a clear ‘insider and ‘outsider’ distinction while also ensuring 
the groups were readily identifiable to other groups, the public and the police.  
 
The outlaw clubs’ use of Nazi images and acts of ‘cop baiting’ suggest a 
nascent rebellious intent, so to imply that police suppression alone was the 
causal factor that created an oppositional attitude is patently false. 
Nevertheless, the attitude of the police appears certain to have had 
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considerable impact in feeding the growing internal dynamics of these groups. 
At Kiokio, for example, police engaged civilians keen to fight the young bikers, 
deliberately damaged motorcycles, and stole highly prized back patches, 
which acted as a lightning rod for existing discontent. Actions such as these 
undoubtedly solidified the growing ‘them and us’ attitude, and amplified and 
gave focus to a hitherto fledgling and largely directionless adolescent revolt.  
 
Indeed, the conflict between the outlaw clubs and the police can be seen as 
one important factor that led to or accelerated the creation of a more 
hardened and antisocial value system, things that would soon become 
synonymous with such groups, and thereby completing their transition from 
‘incipient gangs’ to ‘gangs’ in the decade that followed. 
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5. The Rise of Polynesian Street Gangs: 1960-1970s 
 
Introduction  
Around the same time as the Hell’s Angels were emerging from the milk bar 
cowboy youth movement and transforming into an outlaw motorcycle club  a 
group of Pakeha ‘bodgies’ were on their way to creating what became 
arguably New Zealand’s most notorious street gang, the Mongrel Mob.  
 
The rise of the Mongrel Mob is best viewed in two distinct stages. Stage one 
begins with a small group of predominantly Pakeha youths in the early 1960s 
who, in both Wellington and the Hawkes Bay, established the gang’s name 
and went on to create some of its defining behaviours and symbols. The 
process whereby the gang’s membership became less Pakeha and more 
Maori accelerated when the second, and perhaps most important, stage 
commenced at the beginning of the 1970s. By this time, street gangs in 
Auckland had adopted the outlaw motorcycle club-like patches and formal 
organisational structure. Further evincing the importance of the first ‘pivot 
point’ outlined in the previous chapter, this lead was subsequently followed by 
all street gangs, including the Mongrel Mob and their primary rival, Black 
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Power, and with a unique rapidity, not seen before or since, these gangs then 
migrated or emerged throughout much of the country. Like the outlaw 
motorcycle clubs, the membership of street gangs was bolstered by the wider 
social environment of the late 1960s that saw the popularisation of dissent 
and non conformity, but specific social issues facing New Zealand’s ethnic 
minorities were to provide the ingredients for mass gang formation, the likes 
of which were previously unknown.  
 
This chapter will examine the first stage of the Mongrel Mob’s development 
and investigate the importance of Pacific immigration and Maori internal 
migration during the 1960s and the advent of a social environment conducive 
to the formation of Polynesian14 gangs. It will then explore the rise of ‘patched’ 
and organised street gangs, including the Mongrel Mob (in stage two of their 
development) and Black Power, and outline the differences between these 
two groups that shaped their futures within the New Zealand gang scene, and 
what these differences can tell us about gang maturation. 
 
The Mongrel Mob (Part I) 
Given the dearth of literature on New Zealand gangs, the legend of the 
Mongrel Mob’s inception is surprisingly prolific – albeit somewhat varied. The 
Mongrel Mob – or ‘Mongrels’ as they were known until around 1970 – is 
widely reported to have formed in 1956 (Andrae, 2004: pp.25-26; Dennehy & 
Newbold, 2001: p.161; Kelsey & Young, 1982: p.2; Newbold, 2000: p.204) 
when a group of youths are said to have appeared before the Hastings 
                                                
14 I use the term ‘Polynesian’ to describe both Maori and Pacific Peoples. 
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Magistrates Court and been denounced as ‘mongrels’ (Andrae, 2004: pp.25-
26; Isaac, 2007: pp.2&35; Kelsey & Young, 1982: p.2; Payne & Quinn, 1997; 
Yelash, 2001: p.13). It is the belief of many authors, and indeed Mongrel Mob 
members themselves, that the pejorative label appealed to the youths who 
adopted it as their gang name. 
 
None of the literature cites a reference for the year 1956, but its source may 
have been an article in The Truth newspaper published in 1971 in which a 
Mongrel Mob member claimed that the gang was in existence at that time 
(Truth 20.4.1971). The age of the original members of the Mongrels, however, 
debunks this; in 1956, the founding members of the Mongrels were only 
around 10 years old, and had not yet met. Therefore, we can say for certain 
that this date is incorrect, but, as will become clear, just exactly when the 
gang started remains uncertain. 
 
Moreover, while all of the original members believe the above story to be true, 
none I have spoken to – when pressed for details – can specifically remember 
the court incident in Hastings from which the gang’s name is said to have 
derived, except one who says it happened in 1962 and occurred in either the 
Hutt Valley or Wellington (Seagull 2004 pers. comm.). Another founding 
member, while not dismissing the story, believes the name was first adopted 
after local police in Wellington habitually called the youths ‘mongrels’: 
 
It [the court case incident in Hastings] probably did [happen], but it 
happened in Wellington first and it was from the CIB it used to be in 
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them days. You know as far as I can remember back, they [the police] 
just used to think we were a pack of mongrels [and would call us that] 
(Chappy Steffert 2007 pers. comm.)15 
 
After speaking with many of the original and early members of the Mongrels, I 
am unconvinced the court incident occurred at all, and certainly I have been 
unable to find any evidence of it. It seems apparent, however, that one way or 
another the name was adopted by the gang as they saw it as an apt 
description of how they saw themselves. 
 
One long-time (but not original) Mongrel Mob member, Dennis Makalio, has 
become something akin to the gang’s unofficial historian, but his efforts at 
detailing the gang’s early history have proven as equally troubled as mine. 
Despite being unable to gather exact data, Makalio has concluded, contrary to 
popular belief, that the gang’s name first emerged in the Wellington region – 
not the Hawkes Bay – in 1962. As such, he believes Wellington and not 
Hastings is the gang’s ‘Fatherland’, the term used by Mongrel Mob members 
to recognise Hastings as the gang’s birthplace.  
 
One reason for the lack of clarity regarding the exact origin of the gang was 
the transient nature of many of its founding members. Prominent original 
Mongrels like Peter (‘PD’) Steffert, his brother Chappy, and Gary Gerbes met 
in the early 1960s after being sent to welfare establishments in the Wellington 
region as adolescents. Following stints in state care, the youths remained in 
                                                
15 The interview with Chappy Steffert was undertaken on my behalf by Mongrel Mob member Dennis 
Makalio and videoed. 
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Wellington for a short time, where some members were part of a group called 
the Petone Rebels, before following Gerbes back to Hawkes Bay, where he 
had grown up. The youths’ style at this point was a hang-over from the fading 
bodgie movement: “We had long hair…earrings, gloves – no leathers – P 
jackets, purple socks – that’s what we were, man” (Gary Gerbes 2004 pers. 
comm.).  
 
For several years the young men, singly or collectively, split their time 
between Hawkes Bay and Wellington, making friends in each region. Apart 
from lags in borstal, moving around was most often motivated by a desire to 
seek adventure and the abundant employment market of the 1960s continued 
to allow the freedom to easily pick up jobs when required. And in this they 
were not alone. During the 1960s there were only two years when labour 
turnover of the total male workforce fell below 20 percent (Dunstall, 1992: 
p.463), meaning significant amounts of people were moving freely from job to 
job.  
 
We never stayed anywhere too long. Buying cars and leering it up here 
and there. [We would g]et out of Borstal and many of these guys would 
have nowhere to go so they’d go to Wellington because there was that 
much work…We were always coming backwards and forwards…we 
always used to come back to the Bay. There was shearing at all that” 
(Chappy Steffert 2007 pers. comm.).  
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If, as Makalio believes, the Mongrels’ name was first adopted in 1962, I have 
been unable to find references to it in the media until very late in the decade 
and these are from the Hawkes Bay and not Wellington. In 1967, four original 
members of the gang were arrested in Hastings for wilful damage, obscene 
language, assault, and resisting arrest, but there is no mention of them being 
‘Mongrels’, or members of a gang at all (Herald Tribune 18-9-1967).  
 
The first specific mention of the gang that I have found is in reports of the 
disturbances at the 1969 Hastings Blossom Festival (Sunday News 5-10-
1969). After this time, the name becomes prominent in both Hawkes Bay and 
Wellington newspapers (e.g. Herald Tribune 7-12-1970; Herald Tribune 25-3-
1971; Evening Post 21-4-1971; Evening Post 28-6-1971).  
 
The paucity of media accounts of the gang in the 1960s is noteworthy and 
suggests the gang came about later in the 1960s, perhaps as late as 196816, 
or that without a common identifier, like a patch, was not easily recognised by 
the police or media. As will become clear toward the end of this thesis, this 
situation exists with many contemporary youth street gangs. In addition, they 
were possibly too small and transient to become a particular focus. By the late 
1960s, however, there were loose groups calling themselves Mongrels in the 
Hawkes Bay and in the Wellington region: “[There were] different pockets – 
there was nothing united. There were different Mobs” (Chappy Steffert 2007 
pers. comm.).  
                                                
16 Without firm evidence to the contrary, I suggest this date is as likely as any for the genuine inception 
of the gang. I base this on numerous conversations with those within and surrounding the group in the 
1960s. Nevertheless, it remains a distinct possibility that the name was used in a loose way before that 
time. 
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In contrast to the growing number of outlaw motorcycle clubs with formal 
leadership and organisational structure, by the end of the 1960s the Mongrels 
were simply a loose-knit collection of rebellious youths and young men: 
“When you look back on it nothing was planned, it just sort of happened . . . 
People drifted in and drifted out. It was like an unorganised family” (Chappy 
Steffert 2007 pers. comm.). In fact, it appears likely that different groups came 
and went in different places, but the name was kept alive by core members. 
One member of the gang in the late 1960s, was a member of a group called 
the Hastings Night Hawks in the middle of the decade, suggesting the name 
was not being used then or there was a lull in the area for a short time (V.J. 
2004 pers. comm.).  
 
Despite their disorganised nature in the late 1960s, the Mongrels were 
nevertheless establishing many of the behaviours and rituals that became 
synonymous with the gang. Although Makalio makes a claim for the Mongrel 
Mob’s ‘Fatherland’ label to be shifted to the Wellington region, it was in the 
Hawkes Bay that the gang was forging its most significant reputation for 
violence, and it was to their standard that other groups of Mongrels would 
aspire.  
 
As Gerbes explained to me:  
 
We would fight them [people wanting to join the gang] ourselves and 
see what they could do, or else we would send them in against terrible 
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odds, wait a while, and then go in and smash them [the opposition]. It 
was all about muscle. We hated bikers and the only other gangs were 
the Hell’s Angels, no Niggers [Black Power], no nothing. We just 
developed utter strength. We built strength. Our other hate was boat 
people [seamen], overseas ships. And we specialised in going out and 
wiping pubs out. About eight of us. Tough cunts. And we established 
such a strong name. If anyone said anything wrong about the Mongrels 
I would just smash them (Gary Gerbes 2004 pers. comm.). 
 
But the word ‘mongrel’ did not just offer the group of youths a name; it began 
to be used to actively define them. In what can be seen as classic case of 
‘labelling’ (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1951), the gang began a process of 
secondary deviation by embarking on ‘mongrel’ behaviour. The label that had 
been given and subsequently adopted due to petty acts of misbehaviour 
began to define the self-image and actions of its members. One story Gerbes 
related to me, which has subsequently appeared in an episode of Ross Kemp 
on Gangs17, was of him and another member of the gang drinking at the 
Provincial Hotel in Napier, when a female associate made a snide insult about 
the group. In retaliation, Gerbes grabbed her by the legs and held her up by 
her ankles, ripping her underwear off with his teeth. After discovering she was 
menstruating, he pulled the tampon out with his mouth and shook his head 
smearing blood over his face. The other Mongrel then licked the blood off his 
face and they both tore at the tampon and ate it (Gary Gerbes 2004 pers. 
comm.).  
                                                
17 The episode was part of the first series, produced by IWC media and aired originally on SKY 1 in the 
UK. 
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With a certain degree of self-consciousness from a man who at the time of my 
interview was approaching 60 years of age, Gerbes says such acts were a 
way to, 
 
Justify our standing. Class acts. Most people would go…like it was 
yuck... But those are the sort of stunts we used to pull. The sort of 
things we used to do because we were Mongrels. It was just a thing of 
class. Our law was our law. It was bad law, it was dumb law - ah - not 
bad law; it wasn’t bad then. But it was just a law all of its own (Gary 
Gerbes 2004 pers. comm.) 
 
Without the impediment of adult supervision, the young men were 
unknowingly forging enduring subcultural elements that became embedded 
within the gang. The ‘law’ Gerbies described would eventually be termed 
‘mongrelism’ by the gang. Mongrelism is somewhat difficult to define, but is 
basically any outrageous behaviour that distinguishes a Mongrel Mob 
member’s actions from those that are socially acceptable. This creed became 
embedded in the gang’s collective conscience. As noted in the previous 
chapter, outlaw motorcycle clubs were also engaging in defiant and anti-social 
activities, but the Mongrel Mob’s undertakings appear more extreme. Indeed, 
the gang would later commit some of the most notorious crimes of physical 
and sexual violence in modern New Zealand history, and much of this 
behaviour, I would argue, is linked to the ideals fostered within the gang 
during this time. 
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In recent times, one former Mongrel Mob member described the gang’s 
attitude in the 1980s: 
 
If it was considered evil, bad and lawless we embraced it as good; 
everything was backward or ironic. The ‘mystery’ of the gang was that 
we were right even if we were wrong; we were good even if we were 
bad. We embraced a living contradiction. The Mob psyche may have 
made no sense to outsiders but everything made perfect sense to us. 
Being a Mongrel meant being able to do anything your mind could 
conceive; any form of fantasy or debauchery you were able to dream 
up was acceptable (Isaac, 2007: p.2). 
 
For Gerbes, the gang’s anti-social outlook was an outcome of the treatment 
that many of the youths had received while in state care:  
 
A lot of those guys [early Mongrels] went through the same place – 
Levin Training Centre and Epuni Boys’ Home… It was pretty sad and 
pretty demoralising – there was sexual abuse by the people that ran 
the place [and] absolutely shocking violence. I was just a kid and I ran 
away once. I was made to stand on a square at strict attention and 
talk to myself. If I stopped saying ‘legs, legs why did you run away’ I 
would be beaten and thrown in a shed – locked in a shed…Those 
places destroyed our fuckin’ heads, man. [So we said] fuck the 
system. If that was the way they were going to treat us, then we will 
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treat them the same way. We were going to give them what they 
gave us – and [via the Mongrel Mob] they got it all right (Gary Gerbes 
2004 pers. comm.)  
 
While violent and anti-social acts became core elements within the Mongrels, 
other symbolic elements that would come to define the gang were also being 
established in the late 1960s. One media account from Hastings in 1966 
reported that painted swastikas appeared around the town during the 
Blossom Festival of that year (Herald Tribune 3-9-1966). Although it was not 
known who was responsible for the graffiti, the Mongrels, like the early Hell’s 
Angels at that time, claimed the swastika for their gang, not to demonstrate 
any racist attitudes, but in symbolic defiance of social norms. To mainstream 
New Zealand, the swastika represented something terrible and despicable; 
thus, the Mongrels saw it as perfect example of mongrelism. Furthermore, the 
gang took up the Nazi cry of ‘seig heil’ and this became an enduring and 
important part of the gang’s lexicon.  
 
A further, and unique, symbol taken up by the Mongrels during this period was 
the gang’s salute, whereby members extend the thumb and little finger of one 
hand while clenching the remaining three digits. In more recent times, the 
salute is given with the back of the hand pointing away from the body and 
looks like the ‘shaka’ sign commonly used within surfer culture (and indeed by 
many people as a friendly acknowledgement or greeting). Old photos show 
that the original signal, however, was given with the palm of the hand facing 
outward. The exact origin of the Mongrel Mob salute are unclear, but many 
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within the gang suggest that the extended thumb and finger look like the ears 
of a dog, and thus the salute was derived to mimic the bulldog that the gang 
adopted as a symbol in the late 1960s or early 1970s; at which point (or 
potentially before) the gang adopted a guttural bark used variously in greeting, 
celebration, or anger.  
 
Another account surrounding the salute says that PD Steffert, in a display of 
loyalty to the gang, cut off the three middle digits of one hand so that he would 
always give the Mongrel’s salute. In fact, Gerbes told me that Steffert lost his 
fingers in an industrial accident while working in a factory in Petone in the 
early 1960s. So, whenever Steffert waved or gave a Nazi salute, only his little 
finger and thumb were visible on his misshapen hand, and it is possible that 
the salute derived from that.  
 
In numerous ways, then, by means of visual representation, attitudes, 
symbolic representations, and language, the group was creating more than 
just a gang but a subculture or a collective way of defining their existence. 
 
Old photos of the gang have also captured a significant change occurring 
within the group’s make up. As further evidence of the importance of the 
gang’s name, the Mongrel label was embraced by members in a somewhat 
literal sense – mongrel dogs being dogs of mixed breed – and the gang 
members began to pride themselves on accepting anybody who could show 
true mongrelism, regardless of their ethnicity. While Pakeha youths had 
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originally formed the group’s core, by the end of the 1960s the gang had 
transformed to include a significant number of Maori members:  
 
To me that [ethnic background] doesn’t mean jackshit. A Mongrel is 
just a Mongrel whether he’s Maori, Chinese, Russian or Bob Turk down 
the fuckin’ road. He’s a mongrel” (Gary Gerbes 2004 pers. comm.). 
 
There was all sorts, mate, Maoris, Coconuts [Polynesians] – anyone 
that was sort of that way, off the beaten track – they were always with 
us. We had all fuckin sorts with us (Chappy Steffert 2007 pers. comm.) 
 
The gang’s willingness to accept members from a range of ethnicities was to 
prove even more significant as immigration and an internal migration grew 
rapidly in the 1960s. These processes transformed not just the Mongrels, but 
also the entire New Zealand gang scene. 
 
Ethnic Migrations and Multiple Marginality 
The Mongrel Mob’s shift from a Pakeha to a Maori dominated gang can be 
seen as a reflection of something occurring in the gang scene generally. I will 
examine this transformation shortly, but before doing so it is important to note 
that this change occurred during the turbulent and unique social period – 
defined by protest, alternative lifestyles, and a greater liberalism – of the 
1960s and outlined in the previous chapter. The influences impacting on 
outlaw motorcycle clubs stemming from this period are equally important to 
street gangs, but as they have been discussed in the previous chapter I will 
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not repeat them here. What follows, then, explores the unique social elements 
directly affecting Polynesian – largely Maori – communities and the 
fundamental impact these had on the gang scene. 
 
As will be recalled from chapter three, Auckland gangs in the late 1950s were 
overwhelmingly Pakeha (Levett, 1959). In contrast, by the early 1970s the 
city’s gangs were dominated by Maori and to a lesser degree youths from 
Pacific Islands (Investigating Committee, 1970: p.12). In a little more than ten 
years, then, the ethnic make-up of gangs underwent a striking and rapid 
transformation. This change reflected ethnic demographic changes brought 
about by immigration and internal migration and the social problems that 
ensued. An appreciation of the factors that created these problems in the 
1960s is crucial to understanding the widespread formation of Polynesian 
gangs in the following decade.  
 
As previously discussed, the New Zealand economy during the 1950s and 
1960s was booming. Not only did this allow young workers ample freedom to 
move between jobs, it also created a significant demand for workers. The 
island nations to New Zealand’s north, with largely subsistence economies, 
were seen as a labour pool to supply this need, and migration from these 
nations was encouraged by both the government and businesses alike 
(Belich, 2001: p.534). As a result, whereas in 1945 fewer than 2,000 Pacific 
Peoples lived in New Zealand, by 1956 the number had grown to over 8,000 
and by 1966 it was over 26,000 (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.56). Despite 
these rapid increases, the percentage of Pacific Peoples living in New 
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Zealand by the end of the 1960s remained relatively small, at a little over one 
percent of the total population. Many of these migrants, however, settled in 
just a few Auckland suburbs – like Grey Lynn and Ponsonby – giving them a 
significant presence in those areas. By the late 1950s, a number of 
predominantly Samoan youths formed a street gang called the King Cobras in 
Ponsonby (Payne & Quinn, 1997)18. It proved to be an early indication of what 
was to come when Pacific Peoples grew in number so that by the beginning of 
the new millennium they were the dominant ethnic group within certain South 
Auckland suburbs (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). 
 
As will become clear, the growth of Pacific migrants proved important to the 
development and growth of gangs, but in the 1960s and early 1970s it was 
the movement of New Zealand’s indigenous population that proved more 
significant and immediate. 
 
Maori were thought to be a dying race in the late 19th century as their 
numbers dropped to under 46,000 due to introduced diseases and war 
(Walker, 1992: p.498). But as a result of improved immunity to disease, better 
housing conditions and advances in healthcare, Maori were living longer 
(Belich, 2001: p.467), and with a birth rate that outpaced even that of the 
‘baby boom’ in the post war period, the Maori population grew from 99,000 in 
1945 to over 200,000 in 1966 (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.55). The increase 
in raw numbers, however, was not as significant as the dramatic shift in Maori 
                                                
18 The King Cobras were also mentioned in the ‘Carrico letter’ cited in the previous chapter as having 
been in conflict with the Hell’s Angels. 
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lifestyle that created a number of social problems and subsequently impacted 
on the gang scene. 
 
Beginning during World War II, Maori moved in increasing numbers from the 
country into main centres in search of work, money and pleasure (Metge, 
1964: p.128). The proportion of Maori living in cities and boroughs grew from 
17 percent in 1945 to 44 percent in 1966 (Thorns & Sedgwick, 1997: p.54). In 
short measure, then, a great wave of Maori were leaving their traditional 
lifestyles and entering the cities. This pattern was most obvious in Auckland 
where, by 1968, Maori numbered more than 30,000 (Kawharu, 1968: p.175). 
This process became known as ‘urban drift’, and it continued so that by the 
mid-1980s, 80 percent of Maori lived in urban environs (Thorns & Sedgwick, 
1997: p.54). The term ‘drift’, however, tends to understate the rapidity and 
impact of the move from rural to urban living, particularly in the 1960s. 
 
The problems associated with rapid urban change have been linked to gang 
formation in numerous U.S. studies (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; A. K. Cohen, 
1955; W. B. Miller, 1958/1969; J. W. Moore, 1978, 1991; Short & Strodtbeck, 
1965; Thrasher, 1927; Yablonsky, 1967). It was Bolitho (1930) and Bogardus 
(1943), however, who were two of the first researchers to specifically link 
cultural adjustment factors and gang membership within growing urban 
spaces. Bolitho believed the cultural clash between immigrant parents and 
American culture led to a defection from cultural norms and consequently a 
repudiation of legal norms. Bogardus identified social pressures such as 
problems with language and school, conflicting methods of parental control, 
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racial discrimination and low socioeconomic status as factors pushing 
Mexican boys toward gang activity in California. 
 
It is Vigil (1988, 2002), however, who has most thoroughly examined ethnic 
specificities and gang membership, and his concept of ‘multiple marginality’ 
first devised in a study of Hispanic gangs (1988), has since been further 
shored up by investigations of African American, Vietnamese, and 
Salvadorian gangs and communities in the U.S. (2002). Vigil’s framework 
explains that gang formation is not an inherent element of any given ethnicity, 
but that ethnic minorities are more likely to form gangs because of the specific 
social issues such groups face. 
 
The process of multiple marginality begins with ‘macrohistorical’ elements, 
such as racism and social and cultural repression, and ‘macrostructural’ 
elements, like immigration/migration, that produce enclave settlements within 
which low socioeconomic status relegates “persons or groups to the fringes of 
society” (Vigil, 2002: p.7). The marginalisation process then continues with the 
breakdown of both formal and informal social controls leading to ‘street 
socialisation’ whereby youths are moulded “to conform to the way of the 
street” (Vigil, 2002: p.10). This occurs when families, under stress in poor jobs 
and in deficient housing, fail to provide adequate supervision. This is then 
reinforced by failure at school due to language difficulties and “culturally 
insensitive and ethnocentric curriculum” (Vigil, 2002: p.9). Youths facing 
similar circumstances cling together and often find themselves having 
negative interactions with law enforcement creating hostile attitudes and a 
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rejection of mainstream social norms, at which point they commit to 
alternative street rules and identity, often via gang membership. It is with 
these ideas in mind that I outline and examine the situation of Maori within the 
urban drift in the 1960s. 
 
Although an important component of multiple marginality is the creation of an 
underclass, in the New Zealand context it is important to note that, up until the 
mid-1970s, the urban economies easily absorbed the new workers and 
unemployment rates remained negligible. Reflecting their grouping in semi- 
and unskilled jobs, however, Maori males were on average earning 90 
percent of non-Maori males (Sorrenson, 1990: p.345) creating what King 
(1983: p.250) describes as a “brown proletariat”. But as Belich (2001: p.474) 
points out, Maori were not “low-paid” and their situation represented “a 
massive improvement” on what they had experienced 30 years before, and, 
was relatively better than what it proved to be in the future (Sorrenson, 1990: 
p.345). 
 
Nevertheless, Maori experienced significant difficulty with the transition from 
traditional tribal folkways and mores to those expected in urban Pakeha 
society. “There were difficulties with managing salaried incomes for the first 
time, with budgeting, savings and investments, and with accommodation, hire 
purchase and door-to-door salesmen” (King, 2003: p.475). Moreover, 
although it was “rarely explicitly exposed in public” (A. Harris, 2004: p.19), 
Maori often faced overt discrimination in employment, accommodation and 
social activities. And some young Maori made claims of police heavy-
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handedness, described by one media witness as acting is a “surly and 
intimidating fashion” (Edwards, 1971: p.180). Therefore, it was not just Maori 
adjusting to urban life, many Pakeha were also uneasy – or even hostile – in 
their first substantial dealings with Maori people. Although New Zealand, with 
some justification, trumpeted excellent Maori/Pakeha relations, U.S. 
Academic, David Ausubel, found that race relations “are generally much 
better than in the United States, [but] they are not nearly as good as people 
think or claim they are” (Ausubel, 1960/1977: pp.149-150). 
 
Therefore, despite an overriding belief at the time that New Zealand race 
relations were excellent, by the late 1950s many of the issues fostering the 
processes of multiple marginality were clearly evident. Indeed, they were even 
acknowledged at the time as reflected in a 1960 report commissioned by 
Labour Prime Minister and Minister of Maori Affairs, Walter Nash, who it will 
be remembered led a single-term government from 1957 to 1960. Nash, 
however, shelved the report, and it was the newly elected National 
government’s Minister of Maori Affairs, Ralph Hanan, who made it publicly 
available in 1961. Hanan acknowledged in the report’s foreword that some of 
its content was “controversial” – perhaps the reason Nash was seemingly 
reticent to release it – but he nevertheless believed “that an informed public 
opinion is necessary to ensure that the reasons behind any subsequent policy 
measures are understood” (Hanan, 1961: p.3). 
 
The Report on Department of Maori Affairs (commonly known as the ‘Hunn 
Report’ after its author, the acting Secretary of Maori Affairs, Jack Hunn), 
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outlined and attempted to address the problems being created, or made more 
obvious, by the advent and speed of Maori urbanisation. For the purpose of 
looking at salient issues that can result in gang formation, a number of issues 
raised in the report are particularly pertinent. Hunn found that Maori faced an 
acute housing shortage and that they were over-represented in crime 
statistics. He also pointed to the “statistical blackout” of Maori within post-
primary and university education as well as concern that an “employment 
problem, barely incipient at present, could easily become the major challenge 
the future” and suggested, therefore, that Maori must be given the opportunity 
to become equipped to “compete on equal terms for a much wider range of 
jobs” (Hunn, 1961: pp.25 & 14). It seems Hunn was acutely aware that the 
problems faced by Maori, concentrated in semi- and unskilled occupations, 
would faced in the event of an economic downturn. It was a prescient concern 
given what lay ahead in coming decades.  
 
To counter the problems of urbanisation, the Hunn Report advocated a policy 
of ‘integration’ to “combine (not fuse) the Maori and pakeha elements to form 
one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct” (Hunn, 1961: p.15). 
However, little provision was made in the report or by the government 
subsequently, to protect Maori identity and culture. Indeed, in the 1960s, 
Ralph Piddington (1968: p.260), Professor of Anthopology at Auckland 
University, supposed that for most Pakeha, “Maori are envisaged as dark-
skinned Pakeha, having no distinctive cultural characteristics of their own”. It 
was a view increasingly resisted by urban Maori, many of whom had “powerful 
objections” to policies of assimilation but who were yet to find an equally 
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powerful voice of protest (Sharp, 1991: p.6). Indeed, the advent of a powerful 
Maori protest movement in the 1970s was to have a significant impact on the 
gangs. And, in turn, these gangs proved a difficult issue for Maori radicals to 
reconcile. Both of these issues will be explored in following chapters, but for 
now it is important to recognise the tentative but important roots of a Maori 
cultural resurgence. 
 
In the early 1960s, some urban Maori were forming singing and arts and 
crafts groups and in 1965, the first urban marae was constructed in South 
Auckland (Walker, 1990: p.200). In contrast, the government’s efforts were 
focused on what appeared more pressing issues like housing, employment, 
education, and trade training. As Hanan noted in 1962, “I have always 
advocated that emphasis should be placed on these measures as they are 
the ones best calculated to facilitate the integration of Maori and pakeha [sic]” 
(AJHR, G-9, 1962: p.3). Furthermore, Hanan felt such measures would slow 
the Maori crime rate, and given that he held not only the Maori Affair portfolio 
but that of Justice as well, this was also his concern. Toward these ends, the 
government undertook a number of initiatives. 
 
In 1961, following recommendations from the Hunn Report, parliament 
created the Maori Education Foundation, an independent trust established to 
“foster post-primary, technical, and university education and trade and 
vocational training among Maori people” (AJHR, G.9, 1962: p.4). Further 
policy changes extended Maori trade training schemes, which were seen as a 
way of “converting a sizable segment of Maori school leavers each year from 
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potential unskilled workers to skilled and qualified tradesmen” (AJHR, G.9, 
1966: p.4). In addition, pre-employment courses were initiated to instruct 
young Maori migrants in the ways of urban life in Wellington in 1966, 
Auckland in 1967 and by 1972, they were offered in Hamilton and 
Christchurch as well (AJHR, G.9, 1972: p.10).  
 
Undoubtedly well intentioned, these measures nevertheless proved 
insufficient within the rapid social change that was unfolding, and within which 
so many young Maori were struggling. In 1965, some 85 percent of Maori 
children were leaving school without achieving any qualifications (Walker, 
1990: p.208). In 1970, the Department of Education reported that “many 
young Maori pupils [are] leaving school inadequately equipped academically, 
vocationally, and socially to take effective part in the wider community” 
(AJHR, E.1, 1970: p.28). The following year, the National Advisory Committee 
on Maori Education (1971: p.6) said that English language difficulties and a 
curriculum unfamiliar to Maori meant, “Too many Maori children find 
themselves in a failure situation”. In what is often a harsh peer environment, 
for many young Maori city schooling was a difficult and frustrating time. Vigil 
(1988: pp.60-63) has made the compelling argument that problems of 
acculturation leads many children down a path of school failure, something 
that not only limits life chances but also to a diminished commitment to society 
norms. Given this, the fact that many young Maori were not coping with or 
succeeding within the education system, meant that schools were not only 
failing to instil knowledge and skills, but that they were also unsuccessful in 
their role as an important agent of social control.  
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Also in response to the Hunn Report, the government intensified its Maori 
housing campaign. In 1968, Hanan told parliament that over 10,500 houses 
had been built for Maori families and 25,000 young Maori had been 
accommodated in hostels since the government was elected in 1960 (NZPD, 
1968, vol.356: p.1752). The Census data of 1971 suggest these actions 
achieved notable success in narrowing the gap between Maori and non-Maori 
housing standards, though the number of Maori per dwelling was 6.8 
compared to non-Maori at 5.5 so the former may have experienced certain 
problems of crowding (Metge, 1976: p.88). Less successful, were efforts to 
‘pepper pot’ Maori houses among those of Pakeha. Seen as desirable to 
“promote closer integration” (Hunn, 1961: p.41), the policy had to be scrapped 
when it became clear that Maori and Pakeha alike were opposed to it (King, 
2003: p.252). The abandonment of the policy proved significant. 
 
By housing Maori together, a critical density prevailed in what were often new 
housing estates, particularly in Wellington and Auckland (Walker, 1992: 
pp.501-2) where, in an effort to curb costs, multi-unit high density housing was 
now favoured (Ferguson, 1994: p.195). Notwithstanding the problems, 
including delinquency as discussed in chapter three, which had already been 
identified as stemming from state housing areas, places like Otara in South 
Auckland and Porirua in Wellington became minority ‘enclaves’ similar – 
though not as physically decayed – to those identified as problematic by Vigil 
(1988: p.17). 
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Further problems stemmed from Maori themselves as they failed to adapt to 
their new urban locales. Perhaps as they had done in their rural environs, 
Maori children were allowed a considerable degree of time unsupervised by 
parents “busy with other things”, and as soon as they were passed “toddler 
stage” they were often on the street playing well into dusk (Metge, 1964: 
p.200). Moreover, an issue affecting Maori that has been little discussed by 
historians, was the effects of alcohol. Before a law change in 1967, all bars in 
New Zealand had to close before 6pm, with the rationale being that with such 
a short time to drink after work, men would not become intoxicated and 
distracted from their familial duties. In practice, however, men rushed to the 
pubs after work and consumed as much as they could before closing, in what 
was known as the ‘6 o’clock swill’. Historian Keith Sinclair declared it “the 
most barbarous drinking custom in the world” (Sinclair, 1991: p.300). For 
many Maori, it was their introduction to drinking in the cities. 
 
Many Maori gang members who were children in the in the 1960s told me of 
growing up in households of heavy drinking and weekend-long parties often 
leading to child neglect and abuse. These issues are significant, as 
ambivalent or negative family supervision leads youths to seek places where 
they are not marginalised and where they can find protection and identity – 
often on the street with youths whose situation are similar. 
 
Such problems were a result of, or at the least compounded by, the loss of 
Maori cultural identity within urban environs. The primary objective of 
‘integration’ was to merge the cultures into one, and while this policy allowed 
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for Maori to keep a distinct identity, little effort was made to ensure this 
occurred; perhaps in the mistaken belief that young Maori growing up in the 
cities would simply become Pakeha (King, 2003: p.483). The effect was a 
generation of young urban Maori unconstrained by traditional Maori authority 
and poorly socialised in Pakeha ways. These Maori youth “grew up in a 
cultural vacuum and felt directionless and detached from the society into 
which they emerged as adults; and these formed a large proportion of those 
subsequently represented in crime statistics” (King, 2003: p.483).  
 
As touched on above, youths weakly tethered to home and school have 
weakened ties to social norms and consequently have not internalised the 
values of mainstream society (Vigil, 2002: p.10). This inevitably leads to non-
conformist behaviour and interaction with the police and the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, the “alarming increase in [Maori] criminality”, most noticeable 
in youth offending, as outlined in the Hunn Report (1961: p.32) continued 
unabated. In 1960, Maori youth represented 1,269 or 23 percent of the 
‘distinct cases’ dealt with by the Children’s Court (Department of Statistics, 
1960b: p.56). By 1970, these data had increased to 4,866 and 42 percent 
respectively (Department of Statistics, 1970b: p.66). In the crashing wave of 
the urban migration, many young Maori were adrift, and with that there was 
one utterly inevitable response: gang formation.  
 
Given this, it is therefore important to understand how gang membership acts 
as – or, is seen as – a solution to the problems marginalised youths face. It is 
quite clear from international research that there are numerous issues 
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influencing gang membership (Carlie, 2002; Klein, 1995; Lafontaine et al., 
2005) and these can be usefully grouped as ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (Decker & 
Van Winkle, 1996). Outlined above are external forces within the wider 
community that acted to push youths toward forming or joining gangs. Those 
youths that seek gang membership, however, do so because of what they 
believe the gang can offer them – the pull of gang membership. 
Unsurprisingly, these benefits, perceived or real, are such things as prestige, 
power, and belonging. In these ways, the gang can act as a substitute for 
important human social psychological factors of wellbeing that are otherwise 
scarce, absent, or seemingly out of reach. Therefore, the gang is not an 
anomalous manifestation of an otherwise healthy society, but a symptom of 
certain social malaises, which provides an important function, or a number of 
important functions, for its membership. Given the clearly demonstrable 
problems facing many, particularly indigenous, youths during the 1960s, the 
climate was set for an explosion of predominantly Maori gang membership.  
 
Polynesian Street Gangs and the Influence of the First Pivot 
Point 
As noted in the previous chapter, gangs were not widely seen as a serious 
problem in the 1960s, when delinquency generally, and, increasingly, Maori 
youth crime, were the focus of public and governmental concern. By the late 
1960s, however, this was beginning to change. By this time distinct and 
recognisable street gangs joined the outlaw clubs in achieving longevity while 
overwhelming them in membership numbers. The drivers for this turnaround 
can be found in the specific social conditions of the 1960s that led to the 
advent of numerous high profile Polynesian gangs. Equally critical was that by 
243 
 
the late 60s these gangs were beginning to demonstrate the influence of the 
first pivot point provided by the Hell’s Angels by donning back patches and 
implementing a hierarchal organisational structure. 
 
In 1968, the Department of Justice published a detailed report titled Crime in 
New Zealand. Despite the report’s considerable size (it was some 417 pages 
in length), gangs rate merely a passing mention. The report stated that, “New 
Zealand up to the present has been free…of serious gang violence, although 
groups of young people have occasionally shown aggressive tendencies” 
(Department of Justice, 1968: p.203). This situation, the report concluded, had 
encouraged two schools of thought: “One takes the view that group violence 
exists and that it is serious and disturbing…The other view is that there is no 
evidence of group activity, in the sense of gangs, operating in New Zealand 
cities” (Department of Justice, 1968: p.203). By 1970, however, it appears the 
former view was gaining ascendancy, and at the forefront of concerns were 
the growing number of Maori and Pacific dominated gangs. 
 
In April 1970, following a number of media reports surrounding gang activity, 
the Mayor of Auckland, Sir Dove-Meyer Robinson, said he was no longer 
prepared to walk alone in the city at night and vowed to stamp out gang 
violence (Edwards, 1971: p.175). But it was in May of that year that the issue 
gained significant national attention when as many as 250 members of the 
‘Stormtroopers’ went “rampaging” through the South Auckland suburb of 
Papatoetoe (NZ Herald 20.5.1970). Police Inspector P. J. Gaines said the 
gangs consisted of Maori and Pacific Islanders with a minority – “about 10 
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percent” – of Pakeha youths. He said the gangs had dangerous potential that 
should be made known to the public: “They have no respect for property or 
people. It is much worse than the Teddy Boys (of a decade ago)” (NZ Herald 
20.5.1970). Gaines also reported that the Stormtroopers had caused damage 
to property and on orders from their “command”, had burgled a house. 
Moreover, “With a bit of incitement they can turn a crowd into a rabble. We 
are concerned at the danger to people and property before we can get there. 
We are taking firm measures to stop them getting out of hand” (NZ Herald 
20.5.1970). 
 
Prominent social and political activist, Tim Shadbolt, described the incident in 
Papatoetoe as New Zealand’s first “race riot” adding, “there’s going to be a lot 
more of it. People don’t know how bad the situation is” (Edwards, 1971: 
p.175). In July, prominent Maori leader, Sir Tui Carroll, said gangs were 
becoming a prominent problem in many places and claimed that “race 
relations are being endangered by the actions of young Maoris who leave 
school too early and face limited and frustrated lives” (Edwards, 1971: p.175). 
Further credence was given to these concerns when the chair of the Auckland 
District Maori Council, Dr. Pat Hohepa, estimated the total number of gang 
members in Auckland at 2000 (Edwards, 1971: p.176). The incident in 
Papatoetoe was not a race riot (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.169), and the 
total number of gang members was almost certainly inflated, but such 
statements heightened public concern. 
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In reaction to these comments, in mid-1970 Brian Edwards’ Gallery current 
affairs programme interviewed a number of young Polynesian gang members 
in Auckland. As discussed in chapter four, Gallery was an example of some 
elements of the media that were reflecting the emergence of a more 
questioning and liberal society. The intention for the programme initially was 
to highlight the racial unrest that Polynesian street gangs were believed to be 
fostering in certain parts of Auckland, but Edwards and his team soon found 
that the youth gangs did not display “any anti-Pakeha feeling or indeed any 
awareness of or interest in racial problems” (Edwards, 1971: p.180).  
 
What Edwards found was that the gang members “had only one topic of 
conversation, only one barrow to push, only one grudge – the police” 
(Edwards, 1971: p.180). Many gang members complained of harassment and 
physical violence from the police – similar issues highlighted by the outlaw 
motorcycle club members in the previous chapter. Edwards saw the 
allegations as serious and credible enough to make them the focus of the 
programme: “the end result [of the programme] was undeniably a serious 
indictment of the New Zealand police force. It was not what we had gone to 
get, but it was what we found” (Edwards, 1971: p.182).  
 
On Tuesday 14 July 1970, the Gallery episode went to air. Although it gave a 
glimpse into the world of the embryonic Polynesian street gangs and the 
changing nature of the gang scene, it was its focus on the role of the police 
that had the most immediate impact. 
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The Police Commissioner, Angus Sharp, made a statement that was 
published in the Auckland Star the day after the Gallery programme was 
broadcast in which he defended the police against the allegations and 
insinuated that the ideas expressed by the gang members had been 
prompted by the Gallery team.  
 
There is obviously a problem in Auckland, but…It is obvious that the 
police are the only people trying to do anything at all with these young 
people who never know any discipline in their lives until they come up 
against the police and the courts. Obviously they would be hostile to 
the police and receptive to ideas put into their minds. The police, who 
are the only ones trying to do anything at all, are being bitterly criticised 
by people who are perhaps out of sympathy with us anyway, or have a 
completely erroneous idea of the role of the police (Auckland Star 
15.7.1970).  
 
As a direct result of the public interest stirred up by the Gallery programme, 
the Minister of Police, David Thomson, requested a report on the problems of 
gangs in Auckland. Perhaps reflecting a desire to broaden the issue rather 
than focus solely on law and order, the Minister turned toward an 
encompassing body. The Joint Committee on Young Offenders, was 
comprised of senior representatives of various government departments that 
had an interest – direct or peripheral – in juvenile offending, namely: Justice, 
Police, Maori and Island Affairs, Internal Affairs, Social Security and 
Education (Joint Committee on Young Offenders, 1970: p.1). It was to this 
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committee – via the establishment of a sub-committee, the ‘Investigating 
Committee’ – that the investigation of the youth gang problem in Auckland fell.  
 
As was the case with the Mazengarb Committee of 1954, and, as will be 
shown, numerous subsequent investigations into gangs, the Investigating 
Committee was given a tight timeframe, in this instance just six weeks (Joint 
Committee on Young Offenders, 1970: p.5). It appears that, once again, 
political considerations – namely, being seen to act – seemed more important 
than gaining a thorough understanding of the issue. 
 
Due to the limited time given to research, the Investigating Committee (1970: 
p.12) was reliant on data from child welfare officers, which meant the 
demographic information “may not be typical of gang members generally”. 
Notwithstanding this, the report does offer some insight into the changing 
gang scene, observing that 75 percent of gang members were Polynesian (60 
percent of whom were Maori) and 25 percent Pakeha (Investigating 
Committee, 1970: p.12). As previously noted, this was a significant change 
from the Levett (1959) and Green (1959) studies of just over a decade 
previous when gangs were almost exclusively Pakeha.  
 
Despite the imprecise nature of the data, the sea change of the gangs’ ethnic 
composition was obvious and a reflection of the shifting social make-up of 
Auckland and the associated problems stemming from this. Moreover, these 
new Polynesian street gangs were large, and of the 30 gangs identified by the 
Investigating Committee, many were thought to have a membership of 30 or 
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more. The largest gang, made up of Maori and Pacific youths, was the 
Stormtroopers with 66 members, a number that increased to 200 when 
including ‘fringe’ members19. At least two of the gangs, the Stormtroopers and 
the Nigs, had ‘junior’ gangs made up of adolescent youths who “tend to step 
into older gangs once they are considered old enough” (Investigating 
Committee, 1970: p.6). The advent of ‘feeder gangs’ is consistent with the 
findings of a number of overseas studies, for example Thrasher (1927), 
Yablonsky (1967) and Moore (1991). 
 
The Investigating Committee (1970: p.1) believed that because most gangs 
were made up of Maori and Pacific Island youths, despite little evidence that 
they were “racialist” in nature, they “could conceivably be a source of future 
trouble”. The Investigating Committee (1970: p.1) also believed that the high 
proportion of Polynesian youths involved in gangs was a “cultural response to 
their urban environment” and they were not emotionally disturbed but were 
rather a product of “inadequate socialisation” and a “cultural void” and that the 
gangs provided them with an identity that their homes and school life did not. 
Moreover, the young gang members were typically from state housing areas 
where poorer (often large) families were concentrated, creating an 
“‘unbalanced’ type of community with an over-representation of unskilled, 
young adults and young families, and the ‘casualties’ of society” (Investigating 
Committee, 1970: p.21). The observations were rather astute given the ideas 
of multiple marginality put forward by Vigil (1988, 2002) many decades later.  
                                                
19 Interestingly, even when accounting for ‘fringe’ members, the total number is still shy of the 250 
members who were said to have rioted in the Papatoetoe incident that sparked the investigation into 
gangs. Although it is possible the committee underrepresented the figures, it is more likely to be media 
error, raising the possibility that the original incident was overblown by exaggerating gang numbers 
and/or ignoring non-gang involvement. 
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Given that the gangs were seen as a response to wider social forces, the 
Investigating Committee’s recommendations focused solely on social 
imperatives, primarily aimed at Maori and Pacific Peoples. These included: 
changes to education curricula to be more relevant to Maori and Pacific 
pupils; dealing better with truancy; promoting Maori and Pacific teachers and 
encouraging them to live in problem communities; education for citizenship; 
ensuring state housing did not create unbalanced communities; and 
appointing special job placement officers to work with school leavers. Despite 
the accusations levelled at them by Gallery, the police received only a single, 
rather ambiguous, sentence in the report: “The Committee recommends that 
the police authorities improve morale of the force and its standing in the 
community by recognising the unique contributions they can make in 
situations of domestic discord and crisis” (Investigating Committee, 1970: 
p.33). However, using the idea that gang cohesion is enhanced by conflict, 
which I outlined in the previous chapter, it is reasonable to assume that any 
undue, or heavy handed, police activity aided rather than diminished gang 
development at this time. 
 
Ultimately, it appears that little, if anything came of the report, and gangs 
remained a concern for police to deal with as and when they became a law 
and order problem. In fact, the recommendations of the Investigating 
Committee were such that the Joint Committee deemed them “too numerous 
and lengthy to summarise individually” and, “Most of the 
recommendations…are addressed to this wider social malaise rather than to 
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any specific problems of gangs”. The recommendations were considered 
beyond the original terms of reference that were “essentially to consider and 
report on the gang situation” and “because the recommendations extend well 
beyond the question of the gang situation” any action would need “further 
direction” and “further information” (Joint Committee on Young Offenders, 
1971: pp.6&12).  
 
Despite the Investigating Committee’s obvious concern for the wider social 
environs, the gangs themselves appeared to cause little concern. 
Representing a more liberal tone than that common in the 1950s, the report 
suggested that the formation of gangs was not new “nor is it necessarily an 
unhealthy or anti-social one” (Investigating Committee, 1970: p.1). 
Furthermore, the Investigating Committee said that many “activities involving 
significant numbers of gang members are not disruptive or socially 
unacceptable ways of behaving” and that, largely, the gangs provided a 
“public annoyance” through informal gatherings in shopping centres giving 
rise to claims of “loitering, obstruction and molestation” (Investigating 
Committee, 1970: p.7). They further found that offences committed by gang 
members tended to be done in isolation and rarely involved more than two or 
three associates. Thus they concluded that “gangs may provide the 
environment in which delinquents come in contact with one another 
but…organised criminal behaviour is isolated” (Investigating Committee, 
1970: p.7). It is important to note here, particularly in light of discussions later 
in this thesis, that the gangs were by no means criminal groups. Their 
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membership may have engaged in petty crimes, but the gangs’ existence was 
not determined by criminal activity.  
 
Due to this apparent lack of concern about the perceived gang threat, the 
Joint Committee asked the Investigating Committee to clarify their position on 
the “extent to which gangs pose a problem to the community” (Joint 
Committee on Young Offenders, 1971: p.7). The reply was that “the majority 
of the Committee do not believe that gangs constitute a serious social 
problem to the community at the present time” and that “sensational and often 
incomplete [media] coverage has tended to place the situation out of true 
proportion” (Joint Committee on Young Offenders, 1971: p.8). It cited as 
evidence for this the fact that “serious beaches of the law committed by gangs 
as such are rare and in recent years only one incident of planned gang activity 
is recorded in Auckland Probation Office files” (Joint Committee on Young 
Offenders, 1971: p.8).  
 
This somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the gangs was echoed, at least in 
part, by both Labour opposition and National government Members of 
Parliament (MPs) in 1970. Labour MP for Mangere, Colin Moyle, said he had 
talked to leaders of some gangs and they demonstrated “leadership qualities 
and a certain attitude of responsibility that could be built on” (NZPD, 1970, 
vol.368: p.3441). The Minister of Police, David Thomson, agreed saying they 
“would provide good leaders in the future” (NZPD, 1971, vol.368: p.3443). In 
December of that year, the Minister of Maori and Island Affairs, Duncan 
MacIntyre, who had taken over the role after Ralph Hanan died in 1969, 
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visited a music festival and met members of the Stormtroopers, and was 
taken for a “hair raising” ride by one of the youths who owned a motorcycle 
(NZ Herald 7.12.1970). It clearly made an impression. In parliament in June 
1971 he said, “I am not singing the praises of gangs but some gangs have 
been unduly criticised. I instance the case of the Stormtroopers from Otara” 
who, he said, had run dances and other social activities (NZPD, 1971, 
vol.372: p.836). 
 
Another factor that possibly reassured the Investigating Committee and 
perhaps MPs, that the gangs were not a serious problem, was the fact that 
the gangs tended not to last long and membership turnover was high. This 
finding was the same as those found by Levett (1959) and Green (1959) over 
a decade before. The majority of gangs identified by the Investigating 
Committee (1970: p.4) had been in existence for less than 18 months and 
most, less than 12 months. Moreover, gang membership remained a youthful 
occupation with the vast majority of gang members being teenagers. Although 
some of the junior gangs had members as young as eleven, few remained 
after their teenage years. The Investigating Committee (1970: p.6) found that, 
“Most gang members appear to lose interest in gang activities once they have 
reached young adulthood and are settled in steady jobs and have steady 
girlfriends”. With a strong economy, gang members were offered an easy way 
out of the gang by plenty of unskilled jobs. Notwithstanding the Polynesian 
influence and their great number, at face value, the gangs were little different 
to what they had been in the late 1950s. There were, however, signs of 
change; signs that were recognised by the Committee, but the true 
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significance of them can only be appreciated with the benefit of hindsight. 
Notably, the Investigation Committee (1970: p.1) reported that: “In recent 
years there have been several features of gangs in Auckland which suggest 
that the present fluctuations of gang membership and general fluidity of 
structure could be supplanted by more structured and permanent 
organisations”.  
 
The most important trend toward greater organisation of the Polynesian street 
gangs was exhibited perhaps exclusively by the Stormtroopers, which 
adopted the organisational structure and identifiers of the outlaw motorcycle 
clubs. This was to prove a crucial development that would soon be adopted 
by all Polynesian street gangs and was further evidence of the importance of 
the pivot point provided by the Hell’s Angels in 1960. The Stormtroopers’ 
“formal organisation” was recognised by the Investigating Committee (1970: 
p.5) but was unique and not reflective of the Polynesian street gangs 
generally at that time. However, the moves toward greater organisation within 
the scene “slight though these trends are” were nevertheless of “some 
concern” (Investigating Committee, 1970: p.1). The Stormtroopers wore 
patches – painted on the back of leather jackets, had a clear hierarchical 
structure, regular meetings, membership fees (and a club bank account), 
calling cards, and distinct chapters in Mangere, Otara, Otahuhu and 
Manurewa (NZ Herald, 20.5.1970; Investigating Committee, 1970: p.5; 
Edwards, 1971: pp.177-178). Using my definitions, the Stormtroopers were 
transitioning from ‘incipient gang’ to ‘gang’. And many others were to soon 
follow them.  
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Nevertheless, like the early outlaw motorcycle clubs, gaining membership was 
not difficult. One youth to join the Stormtroopers was Wayne Doyle, who 
joined the group for a short time before becoming one of New Zealand’s 
leading gang figures with another gang. Doyle told me in 2008, “Anyone could 
be a Storm Trooper, you just fuckin’ signed up – you just made your own 
patch…you painted the fuckin’ things. It was no great mission to become 
one…‘You wanna join up? Yeah, sweet as, here’s your patch. We were kids, 
15 or 16 years old. That’s how it was”. Doyle also told me that the influence of 
paperback books about the Hell’s Angels internationally, and other 
fictionalised accounts of biker gangs were an important influence on the 
formation of patched street gangs. 
 
The donning of back patches by street gangs proved a significant evolutionary 
shift, and the outcomes of this shift were the same as those evinced by outlaw 
motorcycle clubs described in the previous chapter, namely, that the gangs 
became obvious entities and more visible to prospective members, the media 
and the police. It is no surprise, then, that the Stormtroopers were the biggest 
street gang and were often named in media, police and political 
commentaries. Moreover, the organisational elements they adopted – with 
varying degrees of exactness – from the outlaw clubs helped these gangs 
endure over time. The Investigating Committee was correct in thinking that the 
majority of gangs were fluid. Of all of the Polynesian street gangs it identified, 
only the Stormtroopers and the King Cobras achieved a prolonged 
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existence20. The gang scene, however, was evolving rapidly and gangs, were 
emerging that copied the Stormtroopers’ organisational lead, including an 
offshoot of that group, formed by Wayne Doyle and others in 1969 or 1970, 
called the Head Hunters. These groups grew quickly and the problem of 
gangs was never again seen in such benign terms. In fact, in 1979, the 
Stormtroopers, held up by the Minister of Maori and Island Affairs as an 
example of an ‘unduly criticised’ gang, would be involved in an incident of 
such violence it would change the way the entire gang scene was 
approached: something that, as will be shown in the following chapter, 
marked the second pivot point in New Zealand gang history. 
 
The Mongrel Mob (Part II) 
Although not initially in Auckland, and therefore not covered by the study 
noted above, one 1960s group that became a permanent fixture in the New 
Zealand gang scene, and indeed become the country’s largest gang, was 
Mongrel Mob. The transformation of the Mongrel Mob from a small Pakeha to 
a large Polynesian, primarily Maori, membership was in part a consequence 
of the problems affecting Maori youth and their desire to join gangs in search 
of such things as identity, power and belonging. However, it was not until the 
gang followed the lead provided by the Stormtroopers in wearing patches and 
adopting a hierarchal organisational structure that it spread with great rapidity 
and became New Zealand’s largest gang.  
 
                                                
20 The King Cobras were identified in the report but were said to be ‘inactive’.  
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As previously discussed, by the end of the 1960s, the Mongrel Mob had a, 
perhaps fluctuating, presence in the Wellington region as well as in the 
Hawkes Bay. But at the turn of the decade, small independent groups of 
predominantly Maori youths – inspired by stories told by friends and whanau 
as well as media reports – were also emerging in parts of the middle/lower 
North Island and calling themselves ‘Mongrels’. One group in Palmerston 
North grew quickly under the leadership of Norm Hura during the early 1970s. 
Another group, made up largely of high school children, established itself in 
Waipukurau. Fights below the Waipukurau Bridge under the influence of 
sherry during 1970 proved who had the mettle to gain membership to the 
fledgling gang. However, one member of the young Waipukurau group, Ngavii 
Pekapo, told me in 2005 that none felt brave enough to say anything when the 
older ‘real’ Mongrels from Hastings – known informally as the ‘Dirty Dozen’, 
and including some of the original Pakeha members – stopped in Waipukurau 
one night and fought a number of the town’s locals.  
 
We were younger, we stayed out, we had already made the 
commitment ‘hey we are the Mongrel Mob’ – but when they came to 
town [me and] my mates freaked out…freaked out because these were 
the Mongrel Mob coming into town hammering these cunts (Ngavii 
Pekapo 2005 pers. comm.).  
 
Following the fight, the Hasting Mongrels roared out of town giving the 
Waipukurau ‘Mongrels’ the fingers. It would be a year before the young gang 
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had the courage to approach some younger Maori members of the Hastings 
group to get ‘official’ recognition, which they achieved in 1971.  
 
In April of 1971, a rock festival was held at Pekapeka, a small country town 
between Palmerston North and Wellington. It proved to be a defining event for 
the Mongrel Mob, which they enshrined in chanting-type song – something 
that would become a unique hallmark of the gang:  
 
In 1971 the Mongrels went to war,  
Down to Pekapeka, to the rock festival. 
They took a little puha and they took a little pork, 
They stole a Mark 1 so they didn’t have to walk… 
Opening verse from an early Mongrel Mob song 
 
The Satan’s Slaves – a Pakeha outlaw motorcycle club that formed in 
Wellington in 1969 – and its supporters were at the event. This group was 
building a reputation as one of the wildest outlaw motorcycle clubs in New 
Zealand, and they and the Wellington Mongrels had been in conflict in the 
weeks leading up to the festival (Evening Post, 23.4.1971) – a fight was 
perhaps inevitable. The Mongrels stormed the bikers. The verse continues: 
 
…Joe Moke said, ‘let’s take them by surprise’, 
So we crept up behind them and we stabbed them in the eyes… 
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The brawl was long and brutal and the subsequent media coverage extensive. 
One young Mongrel Mob member remembers seeing a photo published in the 
media of a group of Mongrels carrying a large swastika flag. On the back of 
one of the gang members, written in block letters at the bottom of his jacket, 
were the words Mongrel Mob. It was an image that inspired many of the 
young Mongrels (Ngavii Pekapo 2005 pers. comm.). Some members began to 
paint “Mongrel Mob” on their jackets. However, the older members of the 
gang were resistant, seeing a back patch as a symbol used by bikers and 
thus something to be scorned. 
 
The battle at Pekapeka established the reputation of the Mongrel Mob as a 
formidable gang and subsequently more youths were drawn to emulate the 
gang or join it. It was suggested that in the media-aftermath of Pekapeka, 
“every Maori youth who came into contact with officialdom, was to claim he 
was a member of the Mongrels” (Howman, 1971: p.11). Membership in the 
groups surged and they began to identify themselves with T-shirts, with 
different colours representing different towns. At this time, the gang adopted 
the Bulldog as a motif but like much of the Mongrel Mob’s history the exact 
reason for the choice appears lost: 
 
Don’t fuckin’ ask me how the Bulldog became the fuckin’ Mongrel Mob 
because I don’t fuckin’ know that. I had it because I knew somebody 
else fuckin’ had it. I mean I could have put a rottweiler or something on 
there. But it was a bulldog. Perhaps the ugliest motherfucker of the lot. 
We resembled everything ugly (Norm Hura 2006 pers. comm.). 
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With the Stormtroopers in Auckland now wearing patches, and other street 
gangs following that lead, younger Mongrels saw no reason for them not to 
don them also. The patch had become something akin to an item of fashion 
and it spread among rebellious youths. One Mongrel Mob member, who 
recognised the importance of succumbing to the growing trend in order to 
maintain relevance, was Norm Hura, the leader of Palmerston North crew, 
who was in prison with Gary Gerbes at this time. Hura recalls asking Gerbes – 
who he calls ‘the Godfather’ – for permission to don a patch. Gerbes told him 
to do as he wished but he, like most of the other original Mongrels, never 
wore one. To this day Gerbes is adamant on the matter: 
 
I’m a fuckin Mongrel Mobster, I don’t have to wear a fuckin’ 
patch…Niggers [Black Power] know who I am, Angels [Hell’s Angels] 
know who I am. I make sure they fuckin’ bleed so they remember me 
(Gary Gerbes 2004 pers. comm.). 
 
Another founding member of the gang, Chappy Steffert, saw the decision not 
to wear a patch as a practical measure: 
 
“I’m not wearing a patch. You’re just sticking out like dogs’ balls. You’re 
just a target for the coppers – but a lot of them did” (Chappy Steffert 
2007 pers. comm.) 
 
260 
 
Interestingly, given that the remaining original members resided in the area, it 
appears that Hastings was the first Mongrel Mob chapter to collectively don 
patches. It was, perhaps, an indication that the gang was now mainly 
Polynesian, largely Maori, and the influence of the Pakeha members, who by 
this time were much older than most members, had faded. In 1971, a reporter 
for the Hawkes Bay Tribune (25.3.71) asked some young Hastings members 
what was difference between youths, like them, who wore jackets bearing the 
gang’s name and the Mongrel “originals” - the youths replied that they “didn’t 
know”. After the Hastings chapter started wearing patches, the other chapters 
quickly followed including, Napier, Wairoa, Palmerston North, Wellington City, 
Petone, Porirua and Waipukurau. The impact of the patch can again be seen 
to be considerable and important as visible manifestations of rebelliousness: 
 
In 71 we bowled the town with the colours, we bowled Waipuk[urau] 
with the colours. Oh, mate, I tell you what, all hell broke loose and 
people weren’t happy at all. They weren’t happy at all with what we 
were doing. We stood out and we were loud (Ngavii Pekapo 2005 
pers. comm.). 
 
The chapters also adopted a formal organisational structure like that of outlaw 
motorcycle clubs and the Stormtroopers, and they continued to spread 
throughout the country. Although the gang, initially at least, maintained 
semantic distinctions by calling their leaders ‘boss’ instead of president, 
prospects (which came about later) were called ‘understudies’ and associates 
were ‘cling boys’ the Mongrel Mob now had all the trappings, structure, and 
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look of the bikers, without, of course, the motorcycles. Of note, their patches 
were also slightly different, in that ‘Mongrel Mob’ was written on the bottom 
rocker while the town or city was at the top – a reversal of the outlaw 
motorcycle club norm – and many of the groups had different bulldog motifs 
as a centre patch as well. 
 
However, while the patch clearly identified the different chapters as one gang, 
it failed to unite the Mongrels who had often developed as autonomous 
groups and each chapter remained focused on its own sense of identity, 
leading to conflict and fights between chapters.  
 
Helping draw the disparate Mongrel Mob chapters together was continuing 
conflict with other groups. During Easter 1972, a network of outlaw motorcycle 
clubs that had formed an informal alliance – which later became the core of 
the Bikers’ Federation, discussed in the next chapter – was visiting 
Palmerston North, a city in which the Mongrels had grown to a considerable 
number under the leadership of Norm Hura. In order to party together, the 
Epitaph Riders from Christchurch, the Outcasts from Hamilton, the Sinn Fein 
from Upper Hutt, and the Satan’s Slaves from Wellington arrived to meet the 
Mothers in their hometown. The earlier Pekapeka battle between the Mongrel 
Mob and the Satan’s Slaves as well as ongoing hostilities between local 
Mongrels and the Mothers, meant the weekend was likely to be fraught with 
violence.  
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Evincing a certain link between the liberal student base and the working class 
bikers, like that between Tim Shadbolt and the Hell’s Angels discussed in the 
previous chapter, a University of Canterbury student travelled with the Epitaph 
Riders to Palmerston North. In the student magazine CANTA (vol.42, no.6: 
pp.8-9), he wrote that trouble between the bikers and the street gang started 
when two members of the Mothers were attacked by Mob members and one 
was knocked unconscious. This aggression culminated in a fight when 
approximately 40 motorcycles – mostly two-up – were ridden from a camp just 
out of town into the city’s main square where about 70 Mongrels, many of 
whom were described as “youngsters”, were waiting (NZ Herald 3.4.1972). A 
photographer from the Manawatu Standard was on hand to take photos of the 
fight that occurred and a number of these adorn a wall in a staff-only area at 
the Palmerston North police station. Many of the outlaw club members were 
armed with chains, bottles, knives and bits of wood and road marker posts 
that they had collected along the way. One biker was carrying a large and 
unwieldy iron bar about five feet long.  
 
I have been told that the Hastings Mongrels had been intercepted by local 
police in a successful attempt to stop them joining the violence in Palmerston 
North (Ngavii Pekapo 2005 pers. comm.). Without their support, the young 
Mongrels of Palmerston North scattered when attacked by the bikers and the 
rest were routed, including some who were badly beaten. Later that night, 
police intercepted five carloads of Mongrels as they travelled to the bikers’ 
camp to exact revenge. The police found and confiscated two rifles and 
ammunition (NZ Herald 3.4.1972) and almost certainly averted a more serious 
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confrontation. In all, some 30 members from both gangs were arrested (NZ 
Herald 14.4.1972). The New Zealand Herald (3.4.1972) described it as 
“unprecedented gang violence – a weekend of beer and blood”. It was, as will 
become clear in the following chapter, an early indication the gang warfare 
and conflict that became widespread during the 1970s. 
 
But while inter gang conflict was becoming commonplace; it was ongoing 
conflicts between different chapters of the gang that troubled some of the 
Mongrel Mob’s leaders. In an effort to promote greater brotherhood within the 
group, many members have told me that it was decided at a meeting in 
Wellington in 1976 to swap the rockers of the back patch to elevate ‘Mongrel 
Mob’ to the top and thus give primacy to the gang’s name and not the town or 
area name: something the gang implemented. At the same meeting, it was 
decided that a common Bulldog motif would be decided on at the up-coming 
Gisborne convention to standardise the patch. For unknown reasons this 
never occurred. In fact, the independence of different chapters was such that 
they have never achieved a unified structure under a single command, 
something they would not attempt until 1987 which, as will be shown, failed 
amidst tremendous controversy and was never attempted again. To this day, 
the separate chapters use different versions of the bulldog as a centre patch. 
However, the font used on all patches did change in the mid-1970s from block 
lettering to the exact, Gothic-like style used by the Hell’s Angels – something 
Ngavii Pekapo told me he was first to do in Borstal using the red cotton from 
his prison blanket and, on his release, it was copied by the whole gang. 
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By the end of the 1970s, the gang had spread throughout much of New 
Zealand, and while they maintained hostility toward outlaw motorcycle clubs, it 
was the emergence of another street gang that provided them with a 
nationwide counter balance and their most consistent and formidable 
adversary.  
 
Black Power  
The rise of the Black Power gang is in many ways similar to the Mongrel 
Mob’s second stage of development. By the time of Black Power’s inception, 
patches and a formal organisational structure were the norm throughout the 
street gang scene. Although the congruities of Black Power and the Mongrel 
Mob are numerous, certain differences are both evident and important and 
these differences shaped the future directions of the gangs. I contend that the 
term ‘mongrel’ had a significant effect on the development of the Mongrel 
Mob. Similarly, I will argue that the term ‘Black Power’, with its largely positive 
connotations to ethnic equality in the U.S, may have in part shaped the nature 
and activities of Black Power, despite the gang being distinctly apolitical.  
 
The name Black Power derived from the Black Power movement that was 
prominent in the U.S. in the 1960s and 70s. In New Zealand, it had been used 
by at least one Polynesian youth gang in West Auckland in the early 1970s 
(Edwards, 1971: p.182) but the genesis of the gang as a national force had its 
beginnings in Wellington.  
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In 1970, a group of Maori youths in Wellington formed under the name the 
‘Black Bulls’. The Black Bulls were a loose-knit street gang like many others at 
that time. As a group, they were regularly confronted by the Mongrel Mob. 
Seeing the expansion of the Mob and sensing a need for protection, the Black 
Bulls joined forces with some other predominantly Maori gangs and 
established themselves as Black Power under the leadership of Reitu (Rei) 
Harris. The name change is said to have come about at a party in 1972 on 
Patterson Street in Wellington after a fight broke out when members of the 
Mongrel Mob attacked a girl. The Mongrel Mob members grouped together 
and challenged the youths who sought to protect the girl. The Mob had a 
challenge that was sung in a chant, “We are the Mongrel Mob/ Who are you?” 
One of the youths called back with the defiant cry, “We are Black Power!” 
(Dennis O’Reilly 2002 pers. comm.). Again inspired by the images from 
America’s civil rights movement, the gang adopted the clenched fist as their 
symbol and with an unknown genesis the rallying cry of ‘Yo! Yo!’. As was by 
this time the norm, the gang adopted back patches and a hierarchical 
command structure.  
 
In these ways, Black Power, as the Mongrel Mob had done before them, was 
creating subcultural elements that defined the group. The patch, the rallying 
cry, and the hand signal were signs that aided the identification of the youths 
as a gang, but to members they were means by which they could differentiate 
themselves and express a unique identity. Everything became imbibed with 
meaning, right down to colour choice; blue for Black Power, and red for the 
Mongrel Mob. To an outsider the difference between the Mongrel Mob thumb-
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and-little-finger salute and Black Power clenched fist was negligible, but to the 
members of each group these visual symbols became thick with meaning 
and, depending on one’s affiliations, were either revered or despised.  
 
Many early Black Power members had whanau connections throughout the 
North Island and, in a situation similar to that which had occurred with the 
Mongrel Mob, different groups began to rally under the same banner – 
although often with slight variation in the back patch21. A number of Black 
Power groups with loose connections formed in Wellington as well as in the 
Bay of Plenty, from where many of the Wellington members had migrated. 
Word of the new gang quickly spread. In 1974, it reached a Maori trade-
training hostel in the South Island city of Christchurch where a group formed 
using the Black Power name. Interestingly, as the group grew, one of the 
gang’s founding members, Shane ‘Baldy’ Turner told me that more than half 
of the gang were Pakeha, reflecting the demographics of the predominantly 
Pakeha city and a lack of real racial political motivation.  
 
By the mid-1970s, there were a number of groups wearing the Black Power 
patch, but apart from the Wellington and Bay of Plenty groups, they were 
independent of one another. In contrast to the various Mongrel Mob chapters, 
however, the charismatic and ambitious Rei Harris had succeeded in getting 
all the disparate Black Power groups to join a national structure under his 
leadership. The previously independent groups from Auckland, Papatoetoe 
and Christchurch formally joined the gang at a convention in Waiohiki in 1978. 
                                                
21 Many of the original patches had wings stemming from each side of the fist. 
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The Black Power as a national force had arrived, and like the Mongrel Mob, it 
grew quickly throughout the country, but predominantly in the North Island 
where Polynesians were more numerous.  
 
The gang’s quick spread throughout New Zealand provided an important 
counterbalance to the Mongrel Mob. Researchers, such as Decker and Van 
Winkle (1996) and others, have found that gang membership begets gang 
membership as isolated youth join together due to threats initiated by an 
existing gang. Across New Zealand, the Mongrel Mob could call on large 
numbers from numerous areas to support a chapter in conflict, thus 
encouraging groups of youths to establish Black Power chapters in order to 
garner a similar level of assistance. In certain ways it produced a cold war-like 
standoff effect. Numerous brawls and attacks occurred between the groups, 
but a precarious balance was always maintained that assured the survival of 
both sides. Notwithstanding this, certain chapters were more vulnerable than 
others. Denis O’Reilly described the Black Power experience in the Mongrel 
Mob stronghold area of Hawkes Bay from the mid-1970s: 
 
In those days the Bay was a sea of red, from Wairoa to the Manawatu 
Gorge, except for this one beautiful patch of blue at Waiohiki. The blue 
house – The Tareha homestead – and the walnut tree provided the 
focal point and the Mob would hit regardless of why or whatever. The 
bros were completely outnumbered but what they lacked in numbers 
they more than compensated for in balls, and their ability to scrap 
(O'Reilly, 2010). 
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Despite the linguistic and symbolic link to African American politics, Black 
Power was initially apolitical and, like other gangs, was involved in anti-social 
behaviour, drinking and fighting. Nevertheless, Black Power was distinctive, 
undertaking early efforts to curb certain anti-social tendencies. Harris, 
sometime around 1977, banned any of the chapters from wearing Nazi regalia 
(Walker, 1990: p.261) in an attempt to better connect with their predominately 
Maori roots and also to distinguish themselves from the Mongrel Mob. The 
rich irony of a predominately Polynesian gang wearing symbols denoting 
white superiority was too great for a group named Black Power. In these 
efforts, Harris was supported and influenced by people such as Denis O’Reilly 
and political activist Bill Maung, who saw the gang as a form of Maori 
resistance and tried to angle it toward positive endeavours in keeping with the 
ambitions of its U.S. namesake. The efforts of these individuals proved to 
have lasting effects. 
 
Denis O’Reilly, a Pakeha from Timaru, had a stint in Seminary training before 
moving to Wellington in his early 20s and becoming an activist and a member 
of Black Power. An intelligent and quick thinking man with a strong social 
conscience, O’Reilly sympathised with the plight of urban Maori and was often 
shocked by police attitudes toward them. O’Reilly saw Black Power as a 
modern urban tribe that could be a vehicle for positive social change in the 
lives of its members. His ability to consume alcohol and his sense of humour 
made him popular, and his capacity to organise and inspire the group made 
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him useful. He could also fight. Despite some stirrings about his ethnicity, he 
quickly earned a patch.  
 
By contrast, Bill Maung – who died in 2011 – was a softly spoken and 
thoughtful Buddhist who had previously been a magistrate in colonial Burma 
before the Burmese government was overthrown in a coup in 1962. Forced to 
flee his homeland, Maung immigrated to New Zealand in 1967 where he saw 
the Black Power as a voice of the frustration felt by the Maori community and 
felt compelled to help them. He set about becoming a mentor and advisor to 
Black Power: 
 
It was quite tricky because, you know, because you’ve got to prove 
yourself to these guys…[But] anyway over the years I’ve managed to 
prove my integrity and so they still look on me as someone they can 
rely on. Like when the sky is falling, ‘Oh, can I borrow twenty bucks, 
Bill?’ (Laughs) You know you are never going to see it again. But so 
what? You know (Bill Maung 1999 pers. comm.). 
 
For Maung the appeal of the gang to young Maori was obvious: 
 
They stood tall. And when you go Black Power! Well, people treat you 
with respect or fear or whatever. But before that you had to crawl and 
cringe and all that. But belonging to one of the two gangs [Black Power 
or Mongrel Mob], you really could go places (Bill Maung 1999 pers. 
comm.). 
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As will become clear, while Harris, O’Reilly and Maung did make a significant 
and lasting impression on Black Power as it grew and spread, these efforts 
need to be kept in context. Attempts to make the gang more positive were 
fraught with difficulty and frustration. Although the Black Power chapters in 
Wellington formed work cooperatives, and had some success in this, the gang 
lifestyle of heavy drinking, partying and travelling around the country were not 
conducive to regular work practices. Many of the members simply wanted to 
rebel, against their own culture as well as that of the mainstream, and 
anything of authority was held in disdain. The overriding ethos of the gang 
was simply to live for the day. But the influences of men such as Harris, 
O’Reilly and Maung were nevertheless a positive influential force and 
consequently Black Power became more organised and open to change than 
the Mongrel Mob.  
 
At that time, because we were so disorganised, alcohol played a great 
part in the early 70s. Say if I went for run from here to Auckland to see 
the members there. Two weeks [later] I might be home…it was cool. 
This is how we wanted to live. But as things went along we started to 
look at other things like identifying where we are from. Do we know 
anything about our culture? How many of us can’t speak the language? 
Then it started to hit home, so we moved into that area (Rei Harris 
1999 pers. comm.). 
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These positive early developments certainly shaped Black Power in significant 
ways, but as will become clear the gang nevertheless often struggled to rein 
in many of its more anti-social elements, and this was most evident in the 
formation of a splinter group called the Nomads.  
 
For some members of Black Power, the positive endeavours being heralded 
by its leaders were seen as un-gang-like and thus were rejected. A 
breakaway faction formed in a flat in Aro Street Wellington. In 2003, a 
prominent member of the this group, Dave ‘Skull’ Williams recalled: 
 
Yup, we were Black Power Nomad back then and um because a lot of 
us who were associated to the Black Power, some would say, I guess, 
we were the rebels within the movement... The Black Power wasn’t 
[acting as villains]. That wasn’t generally the rule. It wasn’t actually part 
of the kaupapa. Yes, entered into that behaviour. Yes, they were 
involved in it but it wasn’t actually part of their drive. It wasn’t on their 
menu (Dave ‘Skull’ Williams 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
The Black Power Nomads broke away from Black Power in 1977 with about 
20 members (Payne & Quinn, 1997: p.64). Thereafter simply known as the 
Nomads, the gang, under the leadership of Dennis ‘Mossie’ Hines became a 
fearsome street gang that maintained territory in lower parts of the North 
Island including Wellington, Wairarapa and Horowhenua.  
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The Nomads, along with the Stormtroopers, the King Cobras and the Head 
Hunters, built regional gangs able to survive in a nationwide street gang 
scene dominated by the Mongrel Mob and Black Power. And therefore by the 
1970s, the main Polynesian street gangs that would define the New Zealand 
gang scene for at least two decade were in existence. The rapidity of their 
migration and emergence meant battles over territory were now inevitable. As 
a consequence, the gangs quickly became a specific public and political 
concern. 
 
Conclusion 
By the early 1970s, the ethnic makeup of New Zealand’s gang scene had 
transformed, and by the end of the decade the gang problem was largely 
seen as a ‘Maori problem’. The roots of this transformation, however, were 
obvious more than a decade before, and were to mark New Zealand’s social 
landscape for decades to come. 
 
The rise of large Polynesian, predominantly Maori, gangs was a direct 
consequence of the rapidity with which these peoples moved to New 
Zealand’s urban centres and the issues that this created, like social 
disorganisation, lack of parental supervision, cultural conflict, school failure, 
and the clustering of ethnic minorities in both semi- and unskilled labour force 
and housing ‘enclaves’. Given what is known about gang formation and 
maturation, the emergence of the major street gangs came during this period 
of New Zealand history was inevitable. Only in recognising these issues can 
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we appreciate that gangs were not an outcome of ethnicity; rather, gangs 
were formed because of specific social factors. 
 
Importantly, these factors were occurring against a backdrop of wider social 
change, and this proved to be a potent mix. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, a more liberal social environment emerged in New Zealand that was 
challenging social norms, and the emerging gangs were one element of this 
environment creating their own sub cultural norms. Unlike the hippies or 
members of protest movements, however, their activities were not based on 
ideological or political goals or a sense of ‘greater good’, they were a negative 
and anti-social rebellion. Reflecting their members typically lower class 
situations and the problems they faced, they had little buy-in to society and 
did not seek to shape it, they simply sought to rebel against it and in doing so 
create a sense of identity. They may not be able to achieve mainstream 
success, but by actively rebelling and embracing a rebellious spirit they could 
become something. 
 
One element that is unique to the New Zealand street gangs that formed 
during this period was the adoption of back patches and the organisational 
elements of outlaw motorcycle clubs, without which, the street gang situation 
in New Zealand would have been fundamentally different. These factors aided 
and hastened street gang development, making them at once more obvious 
and more organised – just as had occurred with the milk bar cowboys in the 
1960s. And, like many of the outlaw clubs of the 1960s, the street gangs that 
adopted these styles became permanent fixtures. Again, these factors almost 
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certainly aided gang longevity. While these factors may not be necessary, 
numerous less organised and non-patch wearing gangs exist overseas, in 
New Zealand at this time gangs that did not adopt these elements did not 
survive. In comparison to overseas street gangs, the New Zealand situation 
overall appears to be much more structured and organised. 
 
Notwithstanding this, unlike the outlaw motorcycle clubs, the street gangs – 
and even different chapters of the same street gang – did not achieve the 
same degree of uniformity of organisational structure. Certain groups may not 
have had the formal positions of secretary of treasurer, for example, and often 
times leadership change was undertaken by violent insurrection rather than by 
democratic means. Nevertheless, these changes were enough to see them 
transitioning from ‘incipient gangs’ to ‘gangs’, a process which was soon 
completed with the advent of prospecting and the groups rules that supersede 
those of the state, which I will discuss in the following chapter. 
 
Despite these important developments, for most of the 1960s and early 
1970s, the easy availability of work meant that street gang membership, just 
as that of the outlaw motorcycle clubs, remained typically a passing teenage 
phase: although for many this was changing and certain individuals with 
gangs of the early/mid-1970s remained gang stalwarts for generations to 
come. 
 
Also during this time, what became New Zealand’s largest, nation-wide street 
gangs, the Mongrel Mob and Black Power, emerged as significant forces. 
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Although by the mid-1970s both gangs were near identical in look and 
demographic make up, important factors in their early maturation were to 
prove significant to their future development, outlook and activities. 
 
Because these groups were new, they had no history from which they could 
guide their behaviour. As noted, both their style and structure were borrowed 
from outlaw motorcycle clubs, but the internal dynamics, by way of the sub 
cultural norms that they were fostering, were developed by important 
personalities within the groups. The Mongrel Mob, for example, was shaped 
by extreme anti-social behaviour fostered by its original Pakeha members and 
this was passed on to younger members via cultural transference through the 
likes of Nazi salutes and barking like a dog. Indeed, growling like a dog was 
just one example of how the gang began to define itself around ‘mongrel’ in its 
name, and thus created an ethos of ‘mongrel’ behaviour. The Black Power, by 
contrast, and despite numerous similarities with the Mongrel Mob, was 
shaped by people who attempted to drive it – often with limited success – in a 
more positive direction. Perhaps inspired by the political associations of the 
gang’s name, the gang actively tried to foster a more socially aware sub 
culture – or at least its leadership were capable of espousing this effort. 
Therefore, although the period was fertile for gang development, the 
variations between gang dynamic and action had internal influences. 
 
As noted above, and in the previous chapter, New Zealand’s changing social 
landscape provided an important fillip to gang development, but it also 
influenced mainstream and political thinking. It was within this environment of 
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greater liberal thought that gangs were not seen as a pressing social issue. 
Although a governmental committee felt the gangs in the early 1970s were of 
little concern, the rapidity of their migration and emergence as the decade 
progressed led to significant conflicts as different gangs sought to control 
territory, and these conflicts were soon to heightened public and political 
concern.  
 
Nevertheless, the findings of the governmental committee that gangs were a 
social manifestation of their social environment were to endure within 
mainstream political thinking until late in the 1980s, by which time gangs were 
no longer just the realm of youth and social and political attitudes toward them 
began to change dramatically.  
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 Chapter	  Six.	  
 
 
6. Conflict and its Consequences: 1970-1980 
 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, as the gang scene expanded during the 
1970s, anti-social behaviour and conflict between different gangs became 
increasingly common. Initially, such conflicts were largely between different 
outlaw motorcycle clubs but toward the end of the decade, with the rapid 
growth of patched street gangs, it was the activities of these groups that 
became most obvious. One upshot of the violence in the 1970s was that the 
‘gang problem’ became a specific political issue for the first time. 
 
This chapter will begin by looking at the rise of gangs as a political issue in the 
1970s when competing ideas of tough police action and liberal social policy 
clashed. Following this, two examples of outlaw motorcycle club ‘wars’ will be 
examined to highlight the nature of these disputes, the changes that occurred 
within warring gangs, and, in relation to one of the examples, the unforeseen 
consequences that signalled future developments within the gang scene.  
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Furthermore, this chapter will explore the importance of New Zealand’s social 
and political environment of the 1970s, as well as a major street gang incident 
that marked the second pivot point in New Zealand gang history. The effect of 
this pivot point was the widespread acceptance – driven by key people, 
including the prime minister – that gangs required social redress, and 
consequently the development of the social initiatives that would dominate the 
political response to gangs for the greater part of the 1980s. 
 
Politics and Policing: Norman Kirk and Gideon Tait 
In the election year of 1972, National’s politically skilful leader, Keith 
Holyoake, resigned as Prime Minister and made way for his deputy and friend 
Jack Marshall. The leadership change was part of an effort to re-jig the party 
that had governed New Zealand since 1960, but it failed to impress the 
electorate. Led by the strong and increasingly popular Norman Kirk, the 
Labour Party surged to victory with a resounding 23-seat majority. 
 
The new government was a reflection of the more liberal and questioning 
elements within society that had been evident since the late 1960s. The 
Labour Party was no longer just the party of working class New Zealanders 
but was also made up of a number of young university-educated and left-
leaning people (McRobie, 1992: p.386) undoubtedly influenced by the politics 
within the campus orientated protest movements. This influence was evident 
in a number of major policy decisions such as: withdrawing New Zealand 
troops from Vietnam in 1972; forcing the New Zealand Rugby Football Union 
to cancel a planned tour to apartheid South Africa in 1973; and, also in that 
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year, the diplomatically radical step of sending a naval warship to protest 
against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 
 
Although it was progressive and liberal influences that came to dominate 
policies around gangs in the 1970s, interestingly, it was not the Kirk 
government that pursued them. In fact, being conservative in areas of law and 
order became a trait of governing Labour parties - suspicious, perhaps, of the 
lumpenproletariat but certainly attuned to the popular appeal of a hard hitting 
stance on such matters.  
 
In the lead up to the 1972 election, and following a number of high profile 
incidents involving outlaw clubs, both Kirk and his deputy, Hugh Watt, 
promised to take tackle the gang issue by ‘taking the bikes off the bikies’ (NZ 
Herald, 6.4.1971; NZ Herald, 1.11.1972). Although Polynesian street gangs 
were fast emerging in 1972, it was the outlaw motorcycle clubs that were the 
most obvious gang problem. And after several high profile incidents involving 
such groups – including the Palmerston North brawl between various outlaw 
clubs and the Mongrel Mob described in the previous chapter - this tough-
sounding stand had electoral appeal.  
 
The call to confiscate motorcycles was important as it signalled the first time 
that gangs had become a specific election issue; it was also the first of many 
popular political calls relating to gangs to fall flat. Once elected, Kirk faced 
resistance to the motorcycle confiscation proposal from within his own party 
and soon dropped the idea, saying it was “not as easy as I thought” (Tait & 
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Berry, 1978: pp.68-69). This lack of follow-through gave the National 
opposition many opportunities to attack the government as warring outlaw 
clubs became a significant public issue during Labour’s short stay in office. 
 
One person who was “dumbfounded” to learn that Kirk had abandoned his 
policy to confiscate gang motorcycles was Christchurch police Superintendent 
Gideon Tait. Tait (1978: p.69), an old school cop who, like those who 
overzealously policed the gangs outlined in the previous chapter, was 
unequivocal that the only way to deal with gangs was through hard line 
policing, and he was frustrated by “liberals” who ignored the troubles created 
by such groups but were quick to call “fascism” if police “resort to violent 
measures”. How else, Tait (1978: p.69) wondered, “do you deal with ‘animals’ 
who have no respect for life or property or for the dignity of others…?” If many 
of the young Labour MPs reflected the emergence of a growing portion of the 
country challenging traditional thinking, Tait was an extreme representative of 
the large portion of conservative New Zealanders who did not.  
 
Tait’s attitude was supported by many but not by all of his colleagues22. 
George Twentyman, who became Tait’s successor as police superintendent 
in Christchurch, was acutely concerned about gang activities and policed the 
gangs with vigour, but he was highly critical of Tait’s tactics. Twentyman told 
me in 2003 that he had “stories [about Tait] that would put your hair on end”. 
Although unwilling to elaborate in detail, he did say: 
 
                                                
22 Former Detective Inspector, Dave Haslett, who early in his career worked in Christchurch under 
Giddion Tait said that his style of policing did not sit well with certain members of the police (Haslett, 
2007). 
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Gideon Tait thought that the police could do anything as far as the law 
was concerned. He thought the old fist could [solve all problems]. His 
theme all the time was this (hitting his fist into his palm.)… He thought 
the police were the law, but it’s not, it’s only a segment of it. I was very 
conscious of that and I think he was dead wrong… Of course, he had a 
following because of that attitude. He seemed to believe that the police 
were all-powerful; could do anything. And that if there were difficulties 
in society, police were the answer for them. But we are only part of the 
solution; we don’t assume responsibilities that are not ours. 
 
In late 1973, Tait was fuming that, following an internal police inquiry, some 
senior police officers had been disciplined over their heavy-handling of outlaw 
club members from numerous clubs at the Alexandra Blossom Festival in 
September of that year23 (Tait & Berry, 1978: p.69). Tait said he was “itching 
for a chance to get a crack at the bikies” (Tait & Berry, 1978: p.70). So when 
the same clubs that were at Alexandra travelled from around the country to 
celebrate the impending New Year with the Epitaph Riders in Christchurch, 
Tait saw his opportunity to confront them. 
 
On the morning of December 30, Tait put the Epitaph Riders’ Kerr’s Road 
headquarters under surveillance, and, according to the media, by 8.30pm 
there were complaints about loud music, broken bottles, and urinating on the 
street (The Press 31.12.1973). Tait moved in with 25 carloads of police to 
close down the party, eventually using tear gas to break it up – the first time 
                                                
23 The fact that the Hasting Blossom Festival (noted previously) and the Alexandra Blossom Festival 
were destinations for outlaw clubs speaks volumes of the limited entertainment options in New Zealand 
in the 1960s and 70s. 
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such measures had been used in a situation not involving firearms (Tait & 
Berry, 1978: p.74). Eighty-one people were charged, mostly with unlawful 
assembly, a law targeting gangs that had recently been passed by parliament 
via an amendment to the Crimes Act. With similarities to the events in KioKio 
described in Chapter Four, various members of the different clubs complained 
that police had deliberately damaged their motorcycles while they were in 
custody (Otago Daily Times 4.1.1974, Sunday Times 6.1.1974, Evening Post 
3.1.1974). Although initially convicted by a Stipendiary Magistrate, all of those 
charged were subsequently acquitted on appeal to the Supreme Court 
(Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.170).  
 
The recently created provisions of unlawful assembly did not come into effect 
until the New Year; just over one day after the arrests were made. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court hearing revealed that neighbours of the house where the 
party occurred did not think the situation serious until the police arrived, and 
one resident said in evidence that he only laid a complaint after being put 
under pressure by the police (Jeffery, 1981: p.30). 
 
Despite the failure to obtain convictions, and questions being raised 
surrounding the raid, Tait took from it a “moral victory” (Tait & Berry, 1978: 
p.74). Moreover, his hard line approach must have impressed his superiors as 
in 1974 he was promoted to Auckland district commander as well as Assistant 
Commissioner of the New Zealand Police; although, his tactics in that city 
quickly drew criticism. 
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As district commander, Tait took control of the police Task Force that had 
been established in Auckland in 1974 to curb public drunkenness and 
violence, often associated with Polynesian street gangs. Numbering some 
200 specifically trained officers, the Task Force became highly controversial 
after complaints of racism and provocative behaviour. It was argued that their 
hard line tactics were creating more harm than good. Research by one lobby 
group, the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination, concluded that 
the Task Force was a failure in law enforcement and a disaster in community 
relations (The Press 16.4.1975). The official police view, however, was 
dismissive of such allegations. The 1975 Annual Report of the New Zealand 
Police stated that,  
 
Public reaction to the task force varied from strong opposition to police 
methods from some vociferous minority groups of ten claiming racial 
prejudice by the Police, to a growing support from the usually silent 
public who were greatly pleased with the restoration of law and order 
(AJHR, G.6, 1975: p.11) 
 
Those calling for Tait to resign due to his hard line tactics did not have to wait 
long. In 1975, the aging officer retired from the police, still adamant that the 
hard line policing was appropriate. Unrepentant to the end, the ‘old school’ 
cop used his retirement speech to call for the return of the birch in order to 
“flog the toughs!” (The Press 7.11.1975). Not long after, the Task Force 
squads were revamped and renamed Team Policing Units, although 
controversy over the police approach toward gangs did not end there. By the 
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end of the decade a chorus of questions were being publicly raised as to 
whether hard line tactics were, in fact, counterproductive.  
 
In Christchurch, at least, Tait’s approach was a reflection more of his 
personality than of good policing, and whether or not such hard line tactics 
resulted in cohesion within the gangs, as discussed in Chapter Four, is moot. 
Demonstrably, however, such actions failed to quell the gangs’ growth, 
increased organisation, and activities.  
 
Far from being weakened after the police action at Kerr’s Road, the outlaw 
clubs involved drew closer together. Cementing a plan that had been under 
discussion since 1974, the network of clubs formalised their association under 
the banner of the ‘Bikers’ Federation’ in 1976. Small symbols were made with 
the letters ‘BF’ inside a triangle and attached to members’ cut-offs24. The 
founding members of the Bikers’ Federation were the Grim Reapers 
(Auckland), the Outcasts (Hamilton), the Outlaws (Napier), the Vultures 
(Gisborne), the Magogs (New Plymouth), the Mothers (Palmerston North), the 
Sinn Fein (Upper Hutt), the Satan’s Slaves (Wellington), the Epitaph Riders 
(Christchurch) and the Antarctic Angels (Invercargill). The Bikers’ Federation 
covered much of New Zealand and meant those clubs could travel around 
knowing they had allies and places to stay. All but two of the clubs, the 
Vultures and the Grim Reapers, are still in existence, although not all remain 
in the Federation, which has undergone a number of changes over the years. 
 
                                                
24 This is an almost exact response to police pressure by outlaw clubs in the California that gave rise to 
1% badges being worn by an alliance of different clubs in that state. For more on this, see Wethern 
(1978: p.54). 
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In a mark of arrogance, Tait (1978: p.70) believed that before he was 
promoted to Auckland he had tackled the “bikies [when they] reached a zenith 
in their rampaging in 1973” and he believed his actions had made a positive 
difference. On the contrary, in the months after he left Christchurch, clashes 
between two outlaw motorcycle clubs, the Epitaph Riders and the Devil’s 
Henchmen, in that city were to produce levels of conflict and concern 
unprecedented anywhere in New Zealand; indeed these events were 
significant enough to be mentioned in the police annual report in 1975 (AJHR, 
G.6, 1975: pp.11-12). It was the first time gangs had received a specific 
mention in such reports and was an indication of growing concern around 
their activities. 
 
The First Gang War 
Whether or not the hostilities that occurred in Christchurch between the 
Epitaph Riders (the ‘Riders’) and the Devil’s Henchmen (the ‘Henchmen’) 
during 1974 and 1975 constituted New Zealand’s first ‘gang war’25 is perhaps 
open to debate. The conflict between the Mongrel Mob and the Satan’s 
Slaves that included the battles at Pekapeka in 1971 and Palmerston North in 
1972, the early clashes between the Mongrel Mob and the early Black Power 
chapters in Wellington, and hostilities that occurred between the Hell’s Angels 
and the Grim Reapers that started in 1973, all have some claim to that 
mantle. However, the close proximity of the gangs in Christchurch and the fact 
that the violence was so intense sets it appear from the others as far as gang 
wars are concerned. 
                                                
25 I use the term ‘war’ advisedly and only to separate conflicts of such intensity, commitment, and 
duration that they require separation from lesser gang conflicts.  
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A confidential police report completed in April 1975 stated that, 
 
The recent gang warfare here in Christchurch is the first time in New 
Zealand that hostilities between gangs has [sic] reached such intensity; 
with one being stabbed to death and others being shot. There have 
been serious assaults, stand-over tactics, arson, throwing of Molotov 
cocktails, large scale disorder, large groups acting in extremely 
threatening and provocative ways, and other occurrences. Up to the 
present, there had been no other situation even approaching the extent 
of this (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.2) 
 
One of the combatant groups in the Christchurch war, the Epitaph Riders, was 
formed in 1969 by a youth named Ross Jennings who, I am told, did not then, 
and never would during his time with the gang, own a motorcycle. Living with 
a couple of friends who did own bikes in a large house on Geraldine Street, 
Christchurch, and inspired by Hunter Thompson’s (1967) book Hell’s Angels 
as well as by media reports of such groups in other parts of the country, the 
young men decided to set themselves up as a motorcycle gang. A number of 
sources have reported to me that although there was a nominal president, 
initially there were few, if any, rules and no club structure. Like other outlaw 
motorcycle clubs in the South Island around this time, such as the Antarctic 
Angels of Invercargill and the Highwaymen of Timaru, before significant 
contact with the more mature scene in the North Island, the Epitaph Riders 
took their cues largely from popular media.  
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That book ‘Hell’s Angels’ that Hunter Thompson I think wrote – that 
was out and we just – it all just sort of happened and we were all 
running around with this stuff [patches] on our back and um that’s how 
it started…We didn’t [know what we were doing] we were just a bunch 
of young guys, mate, that just hung around. We’re all fuckin’ 17, 18 the 
oldest would have been 21 probably. And it’s just the way it happened. 
We all used to meet on Friday nights and just go drink piss – it just 
started from there… Drink piss and fuck women. There was nothing 
else in life – riding bikes (Bruce O’Malley 2004 pers. comm.). 
 
By 1973, however, the Epitaph Riders had matured significantly and this was 
captured by an undergraduate project undertaken at the University of 
Canterbury26. Comprised of young men from working class backgrounds aged 
in their late teens to mid-20s, the club boasted now some 22 patched 
members, including an executive consisting of a president, two vice 
presidents27 and a Sergeant at Arms (Rutherford & McLennon, 1973: pp.13-
14). By this time, rules were in place within the club and efforts were being 
made to ensure the gang was a significant part of the lives of its members.  
 
                                                
26 The project was undertaken by Margaret Rutherford and Susan McLennon in 1973 for a stage three 
paper titled ‘Social Movements’. I have been told that one of the students had an association with 
‘Sparrow’ a member of the club. 
27 Two vice presidents is different to the outlaw club norm and appears to have been an adaptation 
devised by the Riders. The role of the vice presidents was to “act as joint presidents when the president 
is not around” (Rutherford & McLennon, 1973: p.13). I have been told that the arrangement did not last 
long and may have been brought about as a compromise between two competing candidates for the 
position. 
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The increasing commitment to the club is reflected in a decision made in 
August 1973 making it compulsory to attend weekly meetings and a Sunday 
run as well as any parties the group decided to have (Rutherford & 
McLennon, 1973: p.6). A rented flat was used as a clubhouse and weekly 
fees of two dollars were collected along with an additional one-dollar levy for 
beer on the Sunday rides. Fees were used for club expenses including 
subsidising major runs, helping members in trouble, and paying fines incurred 
during group activities. The communal behaviours of the group are, in 
substantial measure, a reflection of the wider social environment – a large 
part of which focused on community and sharing – stemming from the 1960s 
and discussed in previous chapters.  
 
The club’s colours were held in significant esteem by the group but were only 
compulsorily worn on runs; however, it was against club rules to deny being a 
member of the gang (Rutherford & McLennon, 1973: p.15). Whether or not it 
was the case within the Riders at this time is unclear – I have conflicting 
reports – but certainly it became standard within outlaw clubs that back 
patches were compulsory whenever members were riding a motorcycle. I 
have been told that, in the mid-1970s, one member even rode to teacher’s 
training college on his bike wearing his patch (Cos Jeffery 2009 pers. comm.). 
It would be impossible to conceive of this occurring now without a public 
uproar, reflecting a dramatic change in attitudes toward such groups. 
 
Although the Epitaph Riders’ motorcycles were kept meticulously clean, 
members had adopted the ‘ridgies’ style, that was by this time standard within 
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the gang scene. ‘Ridgies’ (derived from ‘originals’) is the set of original 
clothing a member was wearing when he was initiated into the gang and given 
his colours. These clothes were seen as sacred and were never washed, and 
thus they soon became dirty and tatty. The exact origin of ridgies is difficult to 
assess, but they may have come about as an inevitable outcome of working 
on their machines and travelling and sleeping rough while on runs. They soon, 
however, became the desired look – a form of gang uniform – but there was 
more to ridgies than that. 
 
Grease from vehicle breakdowns, dirt from motorcycle trips around New 
Zealand, blood from fights and fluids from sexual encounters all mixed 
together to become part of the sub-cultural, or counter-cultural, style and were 
imbibed with symbolic meaning. As one Mongrel Mob member put it, “To 
wash them would be to wipe away the memory of our conquests and history” 
(Isaac, 2007: p.10). When they fell apart, they were either patched up or a 
similar item of clothing was sewn underneath them.  
 
As they were for all gangs, the clothes undoubtedly represented a visible 
expression of the Epitaph Riders’ anti-social stance, and many of the 
members had convictions for petty offences (Rutherford & McLennon, 1973: 
p.16). In what is now a common – and important - refrain, the police were 
perceived as an enemy and many of the club’s members thought they were 
unfairly targeted and victimised (Rutherford & McLennon, 1973: p.16). 
Fighting was a significant group activity that demonstrated machismo as well 
as instilling an all important group loyalty that the gang actively fostered. With 
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an ‘all for one, and one for all’ philosophy, if any member got into a fight, 
regardless of fault, other members were required to back him up (Jeffery, 
1981: p.24; Rutherford & McLennon, 1973: p.15). Protecting the gang’s 
reputation was seen as paramount and a member running from a fight would 
be a significant loss of face for the whole club (Television New Zealand, 
c1970). This ethos was important to enhance the group’s reputation and to 
ensure other people thought twice about confronting its members. There were 
many conflicts with other would-be gangs as the Riders became increasingly 
territorial and none of the fledgling gangs that were emerging in the city was 
immune from attack, but particular attention was given to other motorcycle 
clubs that were quickly stomped out. The Riders, like many other fellow Biker 
Federation Clubs, had determined that they would be the only outlaw club in 
their city. In the early 1970s, I have learned of three groups - the Apostles, the 
Heaven’s Outcasts, and the Highwaymen - that were beaten or intimidated by 
the Riders and had their colours taken.  
 
By 1973, then, the Epitaph Riders were a well established outlaw motorcycle 
club and with their frequent travels around the country, it is widely 
acknowledged by those in the scene at the time that they held a reputation as 
among the country’s staunchest, and consequently one of the most respected 
groups within the biker – and indeed the entire gang – community. In biker 
parlance, they were class.  
 
In May 1973, a group of eight working class teenage friends from broken, 
violent and neglectful home environments – previously established as 
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important factors of gang formation in chapters One and Two - met in a sleep-
out connected to a Christchurch family house. Inspired by the movie Easy 
Rider, by other overseas media images, by the Epitaph Riders, and also by 
the Satan’s Slaves who had recently been visiting Christchurch, the youths 
were determined to start a motorcycle gang28 of their own (Ferris, c1995: 
p.23).   
 
Conscious of the image required of a gang, they set about accelerating the 
process of the ‘ridgies’ look by rubbing cigarette ash into their jeans (Ferris, 
c1995: p.24). One of the youths sketched a patch based on that of the Hell’s 
Angels – a skull with wings and a piston protruding from its mouth. A number 
of names were bandied around before they settled on the Devil’s Henchmen – 
a name they either pulled out of Easy Rider magazine (Ferris, c1995: p.24) or 
from Jan Hudson’s book The Sex and Savagery of the Hell’s Angels (‘John’ 
2003 pers. comm.). The initial patch – like that of the Epitaph Riders, but 
unlike the outlaw club norm – did not identify the territory of the club; instead 
the name was divided between the top and bottom rockers29. The patches 
were sewn onto denim cut-offs along with other decorations. One member 
also attached a bottle opener, a Norton badge and a ‘Patrol Second’ badge 
that he pulled from his Boy Scout uniform (Ferris, c1995: p.24).  
 
                                                
28 Interestingly, in Ferris’s (c1995) unpublished memoir that traces the rise of the young group, he 
makes clear they wanted to be a ‘gang’ and not a club. It is unheard of in the scene now for outlaw club 
members to consider themselves as being part of a ‘gang’. 
29 Within a short time the Henchmen changed to the outlaw norm, the Riders, however, still maintain 
their name across both rockers and are the only New Zealand club to do so – their area name is noted in 
a small banner that runs underneath the bottom rocker. 
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A brother of one of the group had been an Epitaph Rider and thus he was 
aware of what was required of an outlaw motorcycle club. A weekly fee was 
levied to start a club fund and an executive was elected that included a 
president, a vice president and a secretary. The first president was ‘Shorty’ 
Jordan (Ferris, c1995: p.23). Also inspired by popular media portrayals of the 
U.S. Hell’s Angels, the members gave themselves club names; Shorty, Angel, 
Pretty Boy, Eagle, Monster, Wally, Turtle and Mouse. Alternative names 
remain common within the both the outlaw biker and street gang scene. 
These adopted names can be seen as an important ritual of initiation into a 
gang, particularly in more evolved groups where commitment to the patch and 
the gang was viewed as all encompassing. Initially taken up simply because 
they were considered ‘cool’ of the ‘done thing’, a gang name signals a 
separation from a member’s former life and is something akin to a symbolic 
rebirth. A birth name ties you to your family and therefore to your past, but for 
gang members, the gang becomes their family. By the end of the 1970s, in 
both outlaw clubs and street gangs, the gang was upheld to take primacy over 
all elements of a member’s life.  
 
Many of the group, however, were missing the primary ingredient of an outlaw 
club – motorcycles. They thus determined not to wear their patches until all 
members had bikes, and conforming to standard ‘outlaw’ practice, these were 
to be of British – and later American – manufacture. In fact, it was later 
decided that the patches were not to be worn at any time without motorcycles, 
to ensure the group was not confused with a street gang (Ferris, c1995: p.43). 
This rule became common in the outlaw club scene, and many clubs – with 
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the notable exception of the Hell’s Angels – have a specific rule about not 
wearing patches in cars. 
 
For some months, the fledgling club drifted. Some of the Henchmen remained 
in awe of the Epitaph Riders and tried to join them, but the harsh treatment 
they received from members of the Riders while attempting to ingratiate 
themselves ensured they turned angrily against the club. Indeed, a fistfight 
was organised between the pro- and anti-Epitaph Riders factions of the 
Henchmen (Ferris, c1995: p.29). It was only after the anti-Rider faction won 
the fight that the young friends reconciled and again decided to build the 
Devil’s Henchmen Motorcycle Club. 
 
With its handful of members now all owning motorcycles, the young gang 
went on runs to the countryside, drank and partied. Former members of the 
Apostles, a patched gang that had been wiped out by the Riders, joined 
forces with the Henchmen. While the patched membership remained small, 
the group had a number of supporters and thus appeared bigger, certainly big 
enough to catch the eye of the Epitaph Riders. The Riders had claimed 
Christchurch as their exclusive turf and vowed that no other outlaw club would 
be allowed to set up there. They felt that their reputation within the Biker 
Federation rested on it. ‘Blu’, who became the Rider’s Sergeant at Arms 
during the war, told me in 2006: “We had something to prove to the rest of 
New Zealand, it wasn’t just [to] us we had to prove ourselves, it was other 
[Federation] clubs as well”. 
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Sometime in early 1974, the Henchmen were ambushed in the Carlton Hotel 
by the Riders. The members of the fledgling gang had known a showdown 
was inevitable and they were angry that they had been taken by surprise 
(Ferris, c1995: p.33). While the Henchmen plotted revenge, it is most likely 
the Riders thought little more about the group, simply expecting them to drop 
out of the scene like others before them. In fact, it was just the start of the 
conflict and beginning of New Zealand’s first gang war. 
 
Having collected numerous media articles, obtained a detailed confidential 
police report, an unpublished memoir written by one member of the Devil’s 
Henchmen, interviews with several club members, the police and others 
involved in the conflict, I am able to draw a detailed description of the war. 
Aside from being a fascinating snapshot of New Zealand gang history, the 
account that follows offers insight into how these wars escalated and why they 
drew such significant public and political concern. It also highlights changes 
that occur within gangs because of conflict, and the non-utilitarian nature of 
these battles, something that will become important to later discussions. 
 
The police, rather aptly, described the war between the Devil’s Henchmen 
and the Epitaph Riders as, “that of a young lion challenging the old lion for his 
domain” (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.4). The Riders were older, aged mostly 
in their early to mid-20s, while the Henchmen were all teenagers. The 
Henchmen had eight patched members; the Riders had 20 as well as 
connections around the country – via membership of the Biker Federation – a 
history of gang confrontations, and a well-deserved reputation for being 
295 
 
staunch. It was a group of wild youths attempting to stare down a club of 
battle hardened young men.  
 
The Devil’s Henchmen knew that in an all-in confrontation (something 
proposed by the Riders) they would be easily defeated (Ferris, c1995: p.33). 
So, inspired by the tactics of the Viet Cong and the IRA that they saw in the 
news media, they decided to fight the Riders with guerrilla attacks, or when 
opportunity meant they had sufficient numbers to be successful. Their 
preparations included collecting firearms and experimenting with Molotov 
cocktails (Ferris, c1995: p.33).  
 
On 24 August 1974, members of the Henchmen attacked two Riders with 
some success. Elated by their victory, the group then went to Cathedral 
Square and fought a group of soldiers, on leave from their base at Burnham, 
before gate crashing a party, where they destroyed property and assaulted 
the hosts (The Press 26.8.1974). The following day, the Riders, angered by 
the attack on their members the day before, raided the Henchmen’s 
headquarters in an effort to take the gang down once and for all. Steve Hollis, 
the president of the Riders, took a shotgun and fired off several rounds (The 
Press 26.8.1974). The outnumbered Henchmen escaped out of a back 
window, leaving the female supporters to fight back – which they did. 
Members of the Riders have told me that they derided the Henchmen as 
‘Henchwomen’ for a time after that. It was the first significant battle of the war, 
and the young outlaw club had not fared well. 
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Thankfully for them, the Henchmen’s hasty retreat was unknown to the press, 
but the media made a great deal of the raid by the Riders, the fight the 
Henchmen undertook with the soldiers, and the violence they engaged in at 
the party. The Henchmen were elated with the media attention, feeling they 
were being granted public recognition as a major gang in the city: 
 
At last we were centre stage, elated at what this publicity was 
achieving for us, instant notoriety! The name of the Devil’s Henchmen 
was printed many times over in nine newspaper articles that led up to 
the final sentencing of those that were involved (Ferris, c1995: p.43). 
 
The new gang was, quite literally, making a name for itself. The young men, 
now known as the Devil’s Henchmen, who hitherto had a marginalised 
existence, were suddenly an identity, and that made the members somebody 
and with this came tremendous feelings of worth and power: 
 
I had no job and didn’t care, I was wild and free. There were other 
feelings within me too. I could taste the power that we had a martial 
force and I had a sense of peace and joy in contention with hatred and 
anger… We were now truly rebels, having made ourselves outcasts, 
we moved in society, but made our own laws and to hell with anyone 
else (Ferris, c1995: pp.47-48). 
 
The media coverage of the war was important. As Klein (1971: p.15) has 
pointed out, gangs are “seldom seen” by most people and interaction with 
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them is rare, and thus the public is reliant on media to form their opinions. 
Equally important but less discussed, however, is the effect the media have 
on the gangs themselves. If one psychological factor that makes gang 
membership appealing is the desire for status (Carlie, 2002; A. K. Cohen, 
1955; Jankowski, 1991; Klein, 1995; W. B. Miller, 1958/1969; Short & 
Strodtbeck, 1965), then the media can play an important role in fulfilling this.  
 
Importantly, however, I believe that this occurs primarily in a gang’s early 
development. More mature gangs learn that media attention brings about 
police attention and therefore it is best avoided. Indeed, most, if not all, 
patched gangs in New Zealand have a rule that prohibits members from 
speaking with the media, although in rare instances this is relaxed if the use of 
the media is seen as efficacious; and examples of this will become evident. 
 
This ‘no media’ rule appears to have been customary within the established 
outlaw motorcycle clubs in New Zealand by the early 1970s, and the Epitaph 
Riders did not cooperate with the journalists at all30. Their young rivals, 
however, seeking media attention to achieve status, were often cited in 
newspapers. For the Epitaph Riders, the fact the Henchmen did this was 
further evidence that they lacked class (Blu 2006 pers. comm.). But despite 
this perception, the young group was proving to be an unexpectedly stubborn 
adversary. 
 
                                                
30 In the middle of the war the Epitaph Riders approached the editor of the Christchurch Star and 
requested the paper refer to the group as a ‘club’ and not a ‘gang’ (Jeffery, 1981). But at least until 
1973, the group diligently collected all media articles that mentioned them (Rutherford & McLennon, 
1973: p.18). 
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In early November 1974, after a further attack on one of their members, the 
Epitaph Riders launched another full-scale assault on the Henchmen’s 
headquarters. Although a firearm was presented, it was only used to strike a 
member of the Henchmen to the ground. Many of the Henchmen were woken 
from sleep and, unable to mount an effective defence, were beaten. Injuries 
included a dislocated shoulder, a broken arm, a badly injured leg and a gash 
to the head requiring 14 stitches (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.54). The 
Riders wrecked the house and damaged the motorcycles on the property. It 
was a decisive strike and the Henchmen felt they had to retaliate – not with an 
opportune attack, but a full counter offensive: “Our self respect as men, as a 
bike gang was in question if we had not taken immediate action” (Ferris, 
c1995: p.49).  
 
The Henchmen called a special meeting, a war council, whereby usual 
meeting rules31 were relaxed and prospects and supporters were invited to 
attend (Ferris, c1995: p.49). Because of the conflict, the Riders had fortified 
their headquarters with concrete posts, mesh fencing, and barbed wire. They 
had erected a guard tower that was manned 24 hours a day. The Henchmen 
therefore decided to attack a flat in Dunn Street where a number of Riders 
lived. They rounded up weapons including a .22 rifle, a shotgun and made a 
batch of Molotov cocktails (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.49). As proved 
common during significant attacks by outlaw motorcycle clubs throughout the 
country, motorcycles were seen as too vulnerable and impractical from which 
to launch a raid, so the Henchmen made the journey in three cars. Each 
                                                
31 Attendance at regular gang meetings is reserved for full members only – prospects are expected to be 
at the meeting premises, but are not involved in the meeting itself in any way unless called upon.  
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carload of people had a specific role: one group to go through the front door, 
one to go through the back door and the other group was to wreck 
motorcycles and firebomb the house when the raid was finished (Ferris, 
c1995: p.49).  
 
In the darkness of early morning, the raiders entered the front of the house in 
Dunn Street by kicking in the door, but the back door failed to open even 
when the handle was blasted with a shotgun. One Rider repelled an attacker 
and forced him to jump out a window where he had to be carried back to one 
of the cars injured (Ferris, c1995: p.50). The attack was not going smoothly. 
Perhaps panicked by his lack of support inside the house, one of the 
Henchmen opened fire with a .22 rifle. A member of the Epitaph Riders was 
shot in the head (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.59). As the Henchmen left, 
more shots were fired into the house and the Molotov Cocktails were thrown 
through the smashed windows. Despite being unable to enter the back of the 
house and the Molotov Cocktails failing to ignite, the raid was seen by the 
Henchmen as successful. The young gang had shown they were prepared 
and able to make significant attacks on their bigger rival. The shot man, Tony 
Eastmore, survived but lost an eye and his sense of balance forever. I have 
been told by many people that the bullet remains lodged near the top of his 
spine; too dangerously positioned to be removed.  
 
It was a well-planned attack but the subsequent escape plan was as basic as 
it was predictable and the police quickly rounded up the Henchmen as they 
made their way back to their headquarters (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.59). 
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Later that day the arrested Henchmen appeared in Christchurch District Court 
and the Riders were there to jeer at them and record their personal details 
with which to compile a dossier – something that was confirmed at a 
subsequent court trial (Star Sports and Magazine 21.6.1975). Such dossiers 
became common to warring gangs. Two that I have seen outline basic details 
of opposition members, including where they live, place of employment (if 
any), and descriptions and number plates of vehicles they drive. One of these 
included details of at least one police officer. 
 
At least four members or associates of the Devil’s Henchmen were found 
guilty on charges of unlawful assembly arising from the raid on Dunn Street 
(The Press, 21.2.1975), and the person who fired the bullet that hit Eastmore 
told me that he managed to escaped conviction on “serious” charges.  
 
Following the shooting, and reflecting the club’s immaturity, the Henchmen 
continued to oblige journalists. Sensational reports were aired in much of the 
media but particularly The Truth (12.11.1974) and the Star Sports and 
Magazine (23.11.1974); the latter covered bizarre rituals undertaken by the 
Henchmen that were full of wild stories made up by the gang for amusement 
(Ferris, c1995: p.51). As police attention became more acute, however, the 
Henchmen began to spurn the media, as well as modify other behaviour in 
order to conform to the code of outlaw club norms. During the war, members 
of the young gang appeared to have few qualms about speaking with police 
regarding issues or incidents between them and the Riders – even, on at least 
one occasion, testifying in court against members of the Epitaph Riders 
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(Christchurch Star 8.9.1975). Such actions were certainly in breach of the 
code developing within the gang scene whereby disputes between gangs 
were the business of the gangs only. Gangs seek out their own forms of 
retribution for offences made against them, and this does not involve the 
criminal justice system. It was a rule the Henchmen quickly learned and 
adopted, and, in an odd twist, was probably an instruction in outlaw club 
etiquette given to them by their adversary, the Epitaph Riders (New Zealand 
Police, 1975: p.97), almost certainly because they were unhappy about being 
prosecuted on the basis of the statements and testimonies of their rival’s.  
 
With numerous members up on police charges, the Epitaph Riders became 
more reluctant to engage in large-scale assaults, and they too adopted the 
tactic of attacking their enemy when they were alone or in small groups. On 
20 November 1974, they also attempted a covert operation to burn down the 
Henchmen’s headquarters (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.64). 
 
In an effort to stop the war, the police proposed a coming-together of the 
gangs to broker a truce. Sir Ron Scott, who was the chair of the 
Commonwealth Games organising committee, an event held in Christchurch 
in 1974, agreed to chair the meeting on 21 November 1974 at the Methodist 
City Mission (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.6). At the meeting, the Riders 
made it clear that they considered themselves the established club in 
Christchurch and that they had affiliations with other groups throughout New 
Zealand. They argued that this status gave them right to exclusivity as a 
patch-wearing club in the city. They were prepared to accept the Henchmen’s 
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presence only if they took off their patches. The Henchmen argued that they 
had the right to wear patches and would continue to do so. Police described 
the long discussion on this point as “bitter” (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.6). 
Ron Scott drew on his experiences in negotiating employer and union 
disputes, but concluded that such examples were scarcely relevant and his 
arguments were ultimately unheeded (Jeffery, 1985: p.40).  Both sides said 
they were going to continue to attack each other until one side acquiesced, 
although the four-hour meeting concluded with agreement on three points, 
which were recorded by police as: 
 
1. There be no further use of firearms in any gang clashes 
2. There would be no further wrecking of flats occupied by either gang 
3. No damage of individual gang vehicles (New Zealand Police, 1975: 
p.6). 
 
The agreement proved hollow. Within a week of the meeting, the Riders were 
in New Brighton tauntingly close to the Henchmen’s headquarters and the 
Henchmen confronted them. The young gang was disorganised in attack and 
its members leading the assault were beaten by the Riders and forced to 
abandon two of their bikes during the fight. The Riders smashed the 
headlights of the bikes and damaged their petrol tanks. The Henchmen 
reported to the police that the agreement had been broken but they refused to 
make any formal complaints, simply informing the police that they were no 
longer bound by the rules of engagement (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.7). 
Fortifications on both sides increased at their respective headquarters, and 
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the ‘pads’ went from places of party to places under siege. But despite the 
erection of palisades, the next telling battle was to occur far from both of their 
headquarters and indeed out of the city itself.  
 
On 22 December 1973, the Riders had taken a run to Ashley Gorge, 
approximately 60km out of Christchurch. On their return, one of their bikes 
had mechanical difficulty and fell behind the pack. The Rider, John ‘Hoppy’ 
Hopkins and his pillion were met by around 16 Henchmen and supporters 
who were also out for a ride that day. The Henchmen surrounded Hoppy’s 
motorcycle then slowed down so that he was eventually forced to pull over to 
the fringe of the motorway where he and his passenger were beaten badly 
enough to require hospital treatment (Press, 14.2.1975). However, the 
Henchmen did not just gain a small victory that day; they also rode away with 
an Epitaph Riders patch, which they had torn from Hoppy’s back. The back 
patch is the ultimate symbol of the gang, and to gain a set of opposition 
colours is therefore the ultimate trophy of war. Equally, to lose a patch is the 
greatest gang humiliation. The Epitaph Riders, who had vowed to rid the 
Devil’s Henchmen of their patches, had instead lost one of their own. It was a 
significant blow. 
 
The onus, initially at least, was on Hoppy to get his patch back. He and a 
couple of Riders attempted this by offering one-on-one fights with the 
Henchmen, but the young group was unwilling to risk losing such a valuable 
prize. Retrieval of the patch therefore became the business of the entire club. 
On Christmas Eve 1974, three Epitaph Riders went to the Henchmen’s 
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headquarters with a shotgun but it was full of members and even the gun – 
which was not discharged - was not enough to force entry to the house or the 
return of the patch. The Riders left empty-handed. That same day a patched 
Henchman and three supporters were in a car in Fitzgerald Ave when two 
Riders saw them. One of the Riders, Nigel Kerr, pulled out a knife. The 
Henchmen supporters ran but Greg Slack, the Henchmen member, stood his 
ground and fought with Kerr. During the fight, Slack was stabbed. He 
stumbled several metres to a nearby dairy where he collapsed and died 
(Ferris, c1995: p.56). 
 
Fuelled by grief, the Henchmen attempted to raid the fortified headquarters of 
the Riders but were repelled. In their haste, they had been unable to muster 
any significant weapons, and continual police raids had starved them of guns. 
At a Court hearing for Nigel Kerr, one of the Henchmen said to two Riders 
outside court, ‘You’ve gone too far this time’. They replied, ‘This is just the 
fuckin’ start’ (‘John’ 2003 pers. comm.). The animosity between the groups 
had escalated to extreme hatred, and in this a number of important elements 
stemming from gang wars can be highlighted.  
 
As members of both sides suffered physical assault, property damage or loss 
of face, the dispute became personalised and therefore more meaningful and 
serious. In this way, the abstract concept of an enemy or opposition is 
replaced by being genuinely aggrieved, creating an escalation of ill feeling 
and hostility: “The hatred and feelings of hostility just built up more and more 
and it just carried on” (‘John’ 2003 pers. comm.). 
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I have found that oftentimes these increasingly bitter feelings are exaggerated 
or compounded by narratives – which often exist in a gang’s folklore for years 
– that stem from such conflicts. One’s own side is seen as cunning for 
undertaking a surprise attack, whereas the other side is seen as treacherous 
for a similar initiative. One side’s shortcomings are glossed over, downplayed 
and forgotten, whereas the opposition’s are highlighted, replayed in 
anecdotes and seen as characteristic. Although in similar instances the 
enemy is portrayed as being soundly defeated, one’s own loss is put down to 
unfair numbers or bad luck and seen as atypical. In these ways a mythology is 
produced that exemplifies the nature of one’s own group.  
 
Therefore, battles, between groups with ostensibly similar attitudes and 
beliefs, that lack tangible utility, and to outsiders appear pointless, become 
steeped in meaning and to a great degree define a gang’s existence. The 
opposition becomes something of a yardstick upon which a group measures 
itself. 
 
Moreover, during the war between the Riders and the Henchmen, it is clear 
that the rigours of battle forged a deeper commitment in the membership of 
the clubs and helped define their internal cultures32. Both the advent and 
prospect of death and imprisonment serve to highlight this point.  
 
                                                
32 As discussed in Chapter Four, the theoretical underpinnings that conflict leads to cohesion has been 
outlined by, among others, Tannenbaum (1938), Thrasher (1927), and Klein (1996). 
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The Henchmen had a martyr. In Greg Slack, not only did they have a member 
prepared to live for the club, but also one who had died for it and it became 
paramount to honour his sacrifice, not just through retribution against those 
who killed him but also be staying loyal to his club. 
 
The night he was killed it was an awful shock. It was terrible. It was a 
real wake up call. This is serious business…I personally thought that it 
was an affront to drop my guts and bail out of it [the club] (‘John’ 2003 
pers. comm.). 
 
The death, then, did not dissuade membership, it worked to adhere it. Staying 
with the club became a deep obligation and therefore membership was seen 
as something greater than it previously had. 
 
Also stemming from the killing, the Riders lost one member, Nigel Kerr, to 
prison on a manslaughter charge and several others on various charges 
stemming from the war. The Henchmen had two patched members jailed. But 
far from prison being seen as a deterrent, serving jail time for the gang 
became seen something akin to a badge of honour (Jeffery, 1985: p.41), and 
this supports Klein’s idea (1996: p.208) that attacks by the justice system can 
be manipulated by gang culture to create cohesion. Certainly, it appears that 
prison, or the threat of it, was taken in their stride. One of the Epitaph Riders 
told me:  
 
307 
 
It [going to jail] is just a fact of life. If it happens, it happens, that’s 
basically it. A couple of stages we had more members in jail than out of 
jail. We still kept tight. There might have been half a dozen out and a 
dozen in jail, but the half dozen out were still very tight (Blu 2006 pers. 
comm.).  
 
Only those who can withstand the pressures of battle, the constant police 
attention, and the possibility or rigours of jail, maintain their membership; 
those that cannot, leave. Once again this is often supported by rhetoric, for 
example in the slogan, ‘Devil’s Henchmen Forever, Forever Devil’s 
Henchmen’ the club’s survival is directly linked to the commitment of its 
members33. By contrast, those that left were often labelled as ‘betraying’ the 
club and unworthy of association. Gang membership was becoming seen as a 
lifelong commitment. Similar rhetoric reported by Decker (1996: p.264) in the 
U.S., that the “only way to leave is to be killed” became common. The reality 
was often different, but the intra-gang bonds being formed during conflicts and 
wars were ensuring a tightness of brotherhood that meant many members 
remained in the outlaw clubs or street gangs for much longer periods than in 
the past.  
 
Consequently, the members that remained during the Rider/Henchmen war 
were, it appears, totally committed to their cause and their club. Similarly, it 
was only those who could withstand these pressures that joined such groups 
so that, somewhat organically, a staunch membership exponentially develops. 
                                                
33 Using their own name, all outlaw clubs in New Zealand use this catch cry. 
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Logically, therefore, such wars instil in gangs a strong and often aggressive 
collective mind set. This is one of the reasons why different gangs – or 
different chapters of the same gang – often uphold different internal cultures.  
 
This process of greater commitment to the gang and changing internal 
dynamics were reflected in, and aided by, a greater and more rigorous 
initiation process. By this time, both the Epitaph Riders and the Devil’s 
Henchmen, like all outlaw motorcycle clubs, had taken to ‘prospecting’ 
potential members. As previously outlined in Chapter Four, joining a club in 
the past was a simple and relatively quick affair, but by the mid-1970s, 
prospective members had to wait many months so that the existing members 
could fully vet them to ensure they had what it took to defend their patch and 
uphold the demands of gang life. But a recruitment decision is not just 
undertaken by the existing membership and requires a decision by the 
prospect too. A long prospecting period ensures a potential new member 
partakes in a formal process that allows for what Jankowski (1991: p.30) 
describes as a “calculated” decision to join a gang. It means that joining a 
gang is not a whim and allows both the prospect and existing membership to 
get a feel for whether or not the new recruit is a ‘fit’.  
 
In the mid-1970s, prospecting may have taken six months. In recent times, 
however, it is most likely to take more than a year, and often a 12-month 
minimum is a formal rule. Gang prospects wear partial colours – almost 
exclusively the bottom rocker – for what amounts as their trial period. Certain 
groups initiated rules whereby prospects that did not make the grade or 
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withdrew from the process were fined; the rationale being that the club had 
invested time in training them and that this needed to be compensated. In 
reality it was – and is – little more than a money-grab, or what became known 
as a ‘tax’34. Generally, a prospect requires a 100 percent vote from the gang’s 
existing membership; this ensures the group remains loyal, tight, and strong35. 
Moreover, it will be recalled from the definitions I have devised, that an 
exclusive membership is a key definitional component of a ‘gang’; a point to 
which I will return. 
 
Reflecting this growing primacy of the relationship between gang and gang 
member, the Henchmen, exhibiting a claim of ownership, tried to steal the 
body of Slack from the funeral home – to give it a “biker send off” – but failed 
(Ferris, c1995: p.58). Slack’s mother appealed for calm on the day of her 
son’s funeral saying, “When Gregory was alive he was with you, but now that 
he is dead I don’t want him to be used as a means of reprisals” (Star Sports 
and Magazine 28.12.1974). The plea was ignored – as was her wish that 
Slack’s back patch not be put in the ground with her son. The Henchmen 
waited until all of the other mourners had left and then filled in the hole, 
placing the dead youth’s colours on the coffin. On discovering this, his family 
was angered and there were suggestions of legal action (Sunday Times 
9.2.75). Such conflicts following a gang member’s death became common as 
relatives and gang members clashed over who had primacy of relationship; 
                                                
34 ‘Tax’ and ‘taxing’ are defined and explored in Chapter Eight. 
35 Patched street gangs also adopted this form of prospecting (with varying degrees of exactness), but 
certain chapters of the Mongrel Mob and Black Power transitioned into this by having ‘junior’ 
members – distinguished by ‘JNR’ on the back patch. When the JNR tag was removed by the gang, full 
membership was gained. Notwithstanding this, even now, in the street gangs it is not uncommon for 
this process to be scrapped and patches given out if a person is deemed to be particularly worthy. 
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reflecting gang member belief that the gang was the primary association of its 
members. Within the gang scene generally, this change was becoming 
evident; the fictive kin relationships between gang members were seen as 
superseding those of true kin or other forms of familial relations.  
 
The Riders were ruthless in maintaining the pressure on their rivals; taunting 
the Henchmen as they grieved at their headquarters on the day of the Slack’s 
funeral. And then, on 8 and 13 January 1975, attempts were made to burn 
down the Henchmen’s pad (The Press, 14.1.1975). The final effort caused 
extensive damage and was enough to force the gang to move their 
headquarters from Covey Street to Havelock Street in Phillipstown. Also, 
opportune strikes against members of both sides continued. 
 
On one occasion, the Henchmen ambushed a couple of Riders and managed 
to knock one member off his bike. By cruel luck, once again it was John 
Hopkins. In the space of a month, this Rider was twice treated in hospital and 
twice lost his patch. I have been told that Hoppy never asked for or received 
another one; although he remained an associate of the club. Critically, the 
Henchmen now had two sets of Epitaph Riders’ colours. Of the second attack 
on Hoppy, one Henchman told me: 
 
When that guy got done over and lost his colours for the second time 
there wasn’t much sympathy for him, he got a hell-of-a beating. Just 
left in the middle of the road in a hell-of-a state. Fuck you, mate, you 
know (‘John’ 2003 pers. comm.). 
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On 25 January 1975, another incident occurred at the Lion Tavern on Lincoln 
Road when the Henchmen raided a small group of Riders who were drinking 
there:  
 
We stopped and went over and the Epitaph Riders were lined up at the 
front of the pub. And the guys started charging and I stopped to pick up 
a hunk of wood. And the next minute they bolted as we got quite close. 
And I thought, ‘ah, we’ve got the upper hand here’. And then I looked 
and the guys ahead of me were running back with somewhat worried 
looks on their faces. And I saw this big, bearded, solid looking guy with 
a Three-O [303 calibre rifle] yelling expletives and I thought, ‘Oh shit’. 
Then I heard the shots. And I thought ‘bugger this’ and I legged it 
across the road. Now I’m a pretty small guy, but I was trying to make a 
small target even smaller as I leapt over that fence. I was expecting to 
get a bullet up my arse and I thought why the hell did I get involved in 
this [laughs] (‘John’ 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
The ‘big, bearded, solid looking guy’ was Bob James, a Vietnam War veteran 
who fired shots in the air and then severely beat a Henchman who had been 
on the back of a bike with a broken leg. The crippled biker could make no 
escape and was beaten with his own crutches as he lay on the ground (The 
Press 8.2.1975). In a change of fortune, Hoppy was at the pub and, taking his 
chance for revenge, he attacked the prone Henchman and removed his patch. 
After the Henchmen regrouped, they came back to rescue their felled member 
but were met with more shots. This time a bullet ricocheted off the ground and 
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struck a Henchman in the lower back. He survived but had to have part of his 
bowel removed (The Press 27.1.1975). 
 
After this incident, the police upped their pressure on the clubs further, 
undertaking an operation called ‘Bikewatch’, which meant the headquarters of 
both gangs were under constant surveillance from police cars parked outside 
the gate and the groups were trailed from Friday to Sunday when they went 
on runs (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.36). The attention led to a number of 
arrests for offences such as breaches of probation and obscene language, but 
their real purpose was to deter conflict between the groups (George 
Twentyman 2003 pers. comm.). The pressure certainly stifled the groups’ 
activities and added to the burdens brought about by the war.  
 
While the police upped the pressure on the groups, the judiciary was not, as 
far as the police were concerned, backing up these efforts, and bail was 
regularly given to the outlaw club members despite strong opposition (New 
Zealand Police, 1975: p.30). Consequently, gang members on bail committed 
many of the offences undertaken during the latter part of the war. Police also 
questioned the appropriateness of sentences being handed down. When, in 
the incident described above, Bob James fired off several shots in the Lion 
Tavern car park, severely wounding a man and risking the lives of passersby, 
he was sentenced to just 3 months in prison, increased to 9 months after 
prosecutors appealed (Christchurch Star 23.4.1975).  
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In a confidential report, the Christchurch Police were careful to avoid being 
directly critical of members of the judiciary but did opine that bail, delays in 
sentencing, lenient sentencing, and concurrent sentences allowed the war to 
continue and escalate (New Zealand Police, 1975: p.32). The then District 
Commander, and the report’s author, George Twentyman told me he was 
frustrated by the judiciary but never criticised the judges openly, seeing that 
as “bad form”. Years after the events, however, he was more forthcoming: 
 
We were arresting them and they were getting out on bail. And we 
were re-arresting them and they were getting out on bail. And the 
whole judicial system was slow and, I believe, ineffective… They [the 
judges] slowly changed. They couldn’t help but read all the media and 
realise they’ve got a serious situation here. [But initially t]hey were out 
of touch. They were a poor group of magistrates. I mean how do you 
say that in a report? (George Twentyman 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
As previously mentioned, initially at least, prison was proving no significant 
deterrent to stopping the war, but it was from within jail that efforts toward 
peace were made in earnest. In early 1975, members from both sides, 
including the two vice presidents, were in the same prison wing of 
Christchurch’s Paparua prison. The jailed members agreed to leave the war at 
the prison gates, and in close contact during prison work detail, certain 
members became friendly. Facilitated by Cos Jeffery, a detached youth 
worker employed by the Presbyterian Church to work with biker groups, 
members of both clubs met for weekly workshops while in jail (Cos Jeffery 
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2008 pers. comm.). These workshops led to another attempt at brokering a 
peace agreement. The incarcerated members drew up two proposals, and the 
war would be over if either one could be passed by both clubs. The first 
proposal was that the Henchmen patch-over and become a new chapter of 
the Epitaph Riders. The second was more watered down and suggested the 
Henchmen keep their name but officially become a chapter of the Riders.  
 
Both incarcerated Henchmen (who had been pro-Epitaph Riders in the initial 
internal Henchmen dispute mentioned earlier) put their votes in favour of 
either proposal but members on the outside rejected both deals (Ferris, 
c1995: p.65). The Henchmen were unwilling to concede in any way, and their 
tenacity was rewarded. In October 1975, a final peace was brokered with the 
continuing assistance of Cos Jeffery. The Riders conceded. The rigours of the 
war had taken a toll and worn the Riders down. The Henchmen had fought for 
the right to exist and had won. The patches taken by both sides were 
returned. It was agreed that the chosen hotels of each side were exclusive 
territory, and with obligatory handshakes, after more than a year of fighting, 
the war was over. The superior strength of the Riders had failed to stop the 
new outlaw club.  
 
Despite the truce, the bitterness from the war endured for years and the 
Henchmen never achieved friendly status with the Epitaph Riders or any of 
the other Biker Federation clubs around the country. Indeed, they became 
something of a lone force in the gang scene, but despite this, they grew. By 
the early 1990s, the Henchmen had two chapters in Christchurch and well as 
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chapters in Timaru and Invercargill, around which time they formed an 
alliance with Mothers and the Tyrants. Moreover, in Christchurch, neither the 
Henchmen nor the Epitaph Riders were able to stop the migration or 
emergence of other groups to the city. By the 1990s, three other outlaw 
motorcycle clubs – the Highway 61, the Templars36, and the Road Knights – 
had bases there, as well as chapters of the big two street gangs, the Mongrel 
Mob and Black Power. Although the war that occurred in Christchurch in 1974 
and 1975 heightened public and political concern regarding gangs, it was just 
the first of many such conflicts and therefore such concern only increased. 
The gangs were evolving due to the wars, but so too was the public response. 
 
The Hell’s Angels: From Prison to Profit 
In 1975, the same year the war in Christchurch ceased, ongoing conflict 
between the Hell’s Angels and the Highway 61 Motorcycle Club in Auckland 
culminated in a high profile killing of Highway 61 member Bradley Haora and 
the incarceration of nine members or associates of the Hell’s Angels. As 
noted above, in Christchurch, the short jail sentences given to warring club 
members had the unforeseen consequence of a brokered truce, but in 
Auckland the long lags in the maximum security prison at Paremoremo had 
the unintended outcome of providing the bikers with a nefarious education as 
they were introduced to some of New Zealand’s most hardened criminals, 
including many of the county’s biggest drug dealers. 
 
                                                
36 The Epitaph Riders did exert a certain influence over the Templars, however, forcing a name change 
from the Templeton Riders because both might be referred to as ‘The Riders’ and that was seen by the 
Epitaph as a street-form of copyright infringement. 
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The Auckland conflict began toward the end of 1975, when tensions between 
the Hell’s Angels and the Highway 61 were becoming more intense. In 
December of that year, a Mt Eden house that was rented by two female 
associates of the Hell’s Angels was firebombed. The firebombed property had 
also been the scene of an attack by the Highway 61 on members of the Hell’s 
Angels earlier in the month (R v Hartley – [1978] 2 NZLR 199). The Hell’s 
Angels held Highway 61 responsible for the firebombing, and at a war council 
meeting, plans were made to attack a house in Onehunga, thought to be their 
rival’s headquarters.  
 
On 29 December, the Hell’s Angels rounded up a number of weapons, 
including a shotgun and a .22 Winchester repeater rifle. The club’s patched 
members and a number of supporters then pulled on masks to disguise 
themselves as they pulled up to the house in Onehunga (NZ Herald 
9.6.1976). The group split in two, and half of the group entered the back of the 
house while the other half stormed the front. Although aware that the Hell’s 
Angels may attack (NZ Herald 17.3.1976), the residents were seemingly 
unprepared and were woken from sleep and assaulted. Highway 61 member, 
Bradley Haora, was given a beating before a shotgun blast tore into his head 
from close range as he lay on the floor.  
 
Twelve members or associates of the Hell’s Angels were charged with 
Haora’s murder, including the man who fired the shotgun, Chris Hartley. At 
the time, it was New Zealand’s largest murder trial and the High Court in 
Auckland had to be modified to accommodate the number of defendants (NZ 
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Herald 9.6.1976). The Hell’s Angels defence argued that there was no intent 
to kill, that the firearms were carried only to scare the victims and that the 
shotgun was only discharged accidentally, something repeated to me many 
years later by one of the Hell’s Angels who took part in the attack (Richard 
Dalhousie 2008 pers. comm.). The defence was plausible, given that the raid 
was not sparked by an incident that would have led to murderous retaliation 
and that execution style killings were completely unheard of in the gang scene 
at that time.  
 
After a four-week trial, the jury found nine of the accused guilty of 
manslaughter and sentenced each to between 7 and 10 years (NZ Herald, 
24.7.1976)37. Their fate appears to have been aided by the fact that some of 
Hell’s Angel members gave detailed statements to the police. That a few 
talked with police investigators suggests, perhaps, they were shaken by both 
the killing itself and the prospect of its consequences, and also that the 
predominately young group (most of those convicted were in their early 20s) 
had yet to establish the underworld savvy of not cooperating with authorities. 
At least four of the sentenced men spent much of their sentences at the newly 
constructed maximum-security prison at Paremoremo, North of Auckland.  
 
The convictions meant that a significant portion of the club, including the 
president ‘Bunny’ Batt-Brown, was incarcerated. But the club’s situation was 
further compounded as the seriousness of the incident and fear of reprisals 
from Highway 61, also resulted in a number people moving away from the 
                                                
37 In August the conviction against one of the group was quashed because of “a serious breach of the 
spirit and purpose of the Judges’ Rules in a police interview” and seven others had their sentences 
reduced (NZ Herald, 6.8.1977). 
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club, leaving only a hardened core of patched members (Sunday News 
30.4.1978). As previously noted, in times of conflict this is a common 
occurrence within gangs, leaving groups smaller but tighter and more 
committed, and consequently more mature.  
 
Perhaps one sign that the outlaw motorcycle clubs were maturing was their 
efforts to legitimise their clubs. In 1977, Petar Vitali took over the reins as 
president of the Hell’s Angels, and in a public relations effort in the wake of 
the Haora killing, posed for a Sunday News photographer and told one of the 
paper’s journalists that the club was turning away from violent, anti-social 
activities and making a fresh start38 (Sunday News 30.4.1978). The Hell’s 
Angels became an incorporated society39 on 18 October 1978, and their 
constitution outlined the organisation’s primary objective: “To promote 
motorcycle interests in general and in particular to promote and encourage 
riding of motorcycles”. It was a rather prosaic goal; however, other events 
were set to determine certain activities of its members and the public’s 
perception of the club. 
 
As New Zealand’s only maximum security prison, many of the less than 200 
inmates at Paremoremo were among the country’s criminal elite, including 
some of the country’s top drug dealers. Some of the jailed Hell’s Angels 
members became involved in the black economy of the prison, dealing drugs 
and bookmaking, and they gained contacts with, and the confidence of, many 
                                                
38 I am informed that Vitali was removed as president for his comments to the media. He was later 
ejected from the club in bad standing. 
39 The Hell’s Angels in Auckland were not the first to become and incorporated society. The Epitaph 
Rider had registered in 1975, and was almost certainly the first outlaw club to do so. The Riders had 
done so to apply for community grants to help expand their club house (Jeffery, 1985).  
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underworld figures. The criminal code within Paremoremo at that time was 
particularly strong (Newbold, 1989b), and by the time the Hell’s Angels 
members were released from prison they had learned and adopted it. One 
inmate from Paremoremo, who ran a book making operation in the prison with 
one of the Angels told me, “With the exception of one, who I met later on…he 
really changed – they all learnt how to be criminals, proper criminals”. Along 
with the many practicalities involved in undertaking criminal endeavours, the 
lessons learned within Paremoremo ensured the gang always upheld criminal 
sub-cultural values, which have been well detailed by Newbold (1989a). In 
fact, their strict adherence to this criminal code ensured that from this time 
they gained the mantle of being New Zealand’s most elite outlaw club; tight, 
uncompromising, and well organised. This title is widely recognised by both 
gang and police fraternities alike. Moreover, the adoption of a criminal code 
was the final evolutionary shift that signalled the shift from ‘incipient gang’ to 
‘gang’ – as I have defined them in this thesis – by ensuring such groups 
developed formal rules that superseded the rules of the state. This adoption of 
the criminal code was a critical – literally, the defining – element of this 
transition. 
 
Although the incarceration of the Hell’s Angels offers an acute example of this 
transition, it was one that was occurring throughout the country in the 1970s 
as gangs were increasingly targeted by police and thereby introduced to the 
criminal justice system. An increasing sense of rebellion was being reinforced 
through a process of ‘differential association’ (Sutherland, 1947) whereby 
criminal codes were being transferred from older existing criminals to the 
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young rebel gang members; and in turn it spread throughout the gang scene. 
The Hell’s Angels education, however, was perhaps the most concentrated 
and elite and aligns with the findings of Cloward and Ohlin (1960: p.163) that 
different gangs are defined by the distinct criminal communities with which 
they have the opportunity to interact. 
 
While the confines of prison, then, were impacting on the imprisoned Hell’s 
Angels, influences far from New Zealand shores were simultaneously having 
an effect on the outlaw club. As outlined in Chapter Four, after Jim Carrico left 
both the club and New Zealand in 1961, contact between the Auckland Hell’s 
Angels and their U.S. counterparts ceased. Indeed, as the Hell’s Angels 
expanded out of California and began establishing chapters throughout 
America and many parts of the world, the New Zealand chapter was forgotten. 
 
As will be recalled from Chapter Four, New Zealand members had helped 
establish the Hell’s Angels in Australia in the late 1960s, but the club’s official 
charter is recorded as 1973 (Veno, 2003: p. 31) or 1975 (Lavigne, 1993: 
p.62). Contact between the Australasian chapters was evident – an Australian 
member was said to be present, though never charged, during the Haora 
killing40 (NZ Herald 24.6.1976) – and it was in fact the Australians who alerted 
the Auckland Angels to the first world meeting of the Hell’s Angels in Oakland 
in 1977. 
 
                                                
40 Although this was denied to me by a member of the Angels changed in relation to the killing, he 
acknowledged some Australasian contacts were occurring. 
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Bill Sorby, a half Fijian member, was sent to represent the Auckland club. At 
first glance, given Sorby’s ancestry, it appears a strange selection as 
internationally the Hell’s Angels evinced racist tendencies (Lavigne, 1993: 
p.65), and it is said they have been reluctant to ‘patch-over’ clubs with black 
members (T. Thompson, 1995: p.159). Realistically, the Auckland Angels had 
few options; club numbers were depleted due to the incarcerations related to 
the Haora killing and there were difficulties obtaining a visa to the U.S. for a 
person with convictions. Reluctant to discuss the trip, Bill Sorby’s only 
comment to me in 2006 was that the visit went “well”. However, I have been 
told by other members of the club that he participated in numerous fights that 
gained him respect. Sorby also stated the case for Auckland’s official 
(re)inclusion into the Hell’s Angels organisation. Sometime after the world 
conference, the records of the Hell’s Angels were amended so that the 
Auckland club became recognised as the first chapter outside of California 
and the fourth anywhere in the world (Lavigne, 1993: p.62).  Apart from 
correcting the history books, the trip proved crucial to the Auckland Hell’s 
Angel’s development.  
 
Back in the international fold, the Auckland Angels were now connected to 
chapters around the world and representatives attended world meetings and 
participate in international runs. Like its individual chapters, the Hell’s Angels 
as a whole was, and remains, a particularly democratic organisation, and this 
is the outlaw motorcycle club norm (Veno, 2003: p. 88). Internationally, I have 
been told that Hell’s Angels votes for and against any motions are counted 
individually (rather than each chapter having a single vote), and the decisions 
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of these votes are then disseminated back to all chapters, with such decisions 
being binding. Similarly, information, for example, how to best run a 
motorcycling event, can be passed from one to all chapters to assist or inform. 
Of course, interaction between the groups also established informal channels 
of communication. In the 1970s, some members of the Hell’s Angels in the 
U.S. were making a great deal of money from the manufacture and sale of 
illicit drugs (Wethern & Colnett, 1978)  and in 1980 a member of the 
Melbourne Hell’s Angels went to America and secured instructions on how to 
produce methamphetamine (Noble, 1989: p.89-108).  
 
It is unknown whether or not international connections gave members of the 
Auckland Angels tuition in the drug’s production, but in 1982 the Auckland 
Drug Squad received information from a “reliable source” that a senior 
member of the Hell’s Angels (who I will not name) was purchasing one-
kilogram lots of red phosphorus. This I have confirmed with the named 
person. A noting on the police database made available to me said that he 
had been doing so for “some time”. Enquires by the police to the Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) drew a blank, and they advised 
that it was not an ingredient of any known drug. Confused, the police 
surmised that the gang was making moves into the sex industry and that the 
red phosphorus was going be used to make smoke bombs. The smoke 
bombs, they assumed, would be used to set off alarms in massage parlours to 
create panic while causing little real damage and thus allowing the Angels to 
muscle in on a slice of the action. It is unclear when police, and the DSIR, 
discovered that red phosphorous is an ingredient in one of three methods 
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used to illegally manufacture methamphetamine (Anonymous, 2006: p.241). 
The purchase of the red phosphorus tells us two things: one, Hell’s Angels 
members were becoming involved in the drug trade; and two, that police 
intelligence is not always accurate. 
 
The timing of both the jailing of a number of Hell’s Angels members and their 
reintroduction to Hell’s Angels chapters around the world was somewhat 
opportune. During the 1970s, a drug culture that had tentatively emerged in 
the late 1960s became more significant. From 1970 to 1973 reported drug 
crimes almost quadrupled (Newbold, 2004: p.56). Aware of the trend, police 
established a National Drug Intelligence Bureau in 1972. Initially, marijuana 
was the only drug on the scene, but as the 70s progressed, the use of LSD 
became more popular and by the mid-1970s, substantial heroin use was also 
apparent. In a few short years, New Zealand had joined the list of Western 
countries with an obvious drug culture and with this, of course, a significant 
underground economy. Petar Vitali’s insistence that the club was making a 
fresh start was quite true, the overt anti-social activities of the group largely 
ceased as some of its members engaged in profit driven crime. Once again, 
the Hell’s Angels were forging a path that, in time, other gangs would follow; 
something I will return to in Chapter Nine. 
 
Politics and Social Changes: Rob Muldoon and Denis O’Reilly 
High profile gang conflicts, like those described in the previous two sections, 
allowed National Party to continually remind Labour of their failure to fulfil their 
1972 pre-election promise to ‘take the bikes off the bikies’ (for example, 
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NZPD, vol.383, 1973: p.1025; NZPD, vol.385, 1973: p.3197; NZPD, vol.390, 
1974: p.1201; NZPD, vol.398, 1975: p.3369). Although this gained the 
opposition political mileage, the economic problems that beset the country 
were what truly shook the government. The golden economic period New 
Zealand had enjoyed in the period since World War II was ending, and this 
had significant consequences for both the Labour government and for the 
country’s gang scene. 
 
At the forefront of economic concerns were a number of international 
developments that greatly influenced the New Zealand economy. In 1973, 
Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC). New Zealand was 
suddenly not the ‘farm of Britain’ and thus lost privileged access to its most 
important export market. Although Britain’s intentions had been known since 
the early 1960s (Hawke, 1992: p.436), New Zealand was poorly prepared for 
the economic realities that followed. Despite some modest and temporary 
special arrangements put in place until 1977, New Zealand had to reform its 
economy and find new markets. The outcomes of these changes were painful 
and enduring. 
 
The same year that Britain joined the EEC, the first of the oil shocks occurred 
when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to 
halt all oil exports to countries that supported Israel. Petrol prices skyrocketed; 
quadrupling in a matter of months. At the same time, the price of wool 
collapsed, inflation was increasing, and the large balance of payments surplus 
enjoyed in 1973 had, by 1975, turned into a deficit of some $1,300,000,000 
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(Sinclair, 1991: p.312). New Zealand was heading for its greatest economic 
crisis since the depression of the 1930s. 
 
Prime Minister Kirk died in office in August 1974, and his replacement, Bill 
Rowling, did not have his predecessor’s kudos or political abilities. With the 
economy looking dire, the electorate turned its back on Labour and sought the 
comfort of the party it knew best. Under the strong leadership of Rob 
Muldoon, the National party reversed the heavy defeat of 1972 and in 1975, 
with a 23-seat majority, was once again elected to power, where it remained 
until 1984. The new government, however, failed to counter the effects of the 
economic situation and the country continued to flounder. Toward the end of 
the decade, the problems that had been identified by Muldoon as priorities of 
his new government in 1976 remained: high inflation, large balance of 
payments and budget deficits, low levels of savings, and rising unemployment 
(McRobie, 1992: p.395).  
 
While some of the economic indices were abstract concepts to many New 
Zealanders, the lack of jobs was a harsh and unfamiliar reality of the 
economic downturn. Unemployment, which had been negligible in the early 
1970s, reached 26,889 by the end of 1979 (Statistics New Zealand, 1980: 
p777). While that number indicates a sharp downturn in the labour market, the 
actual situation was worse than this but was masked by temporary 
employment schemes. The government sought to pick up the slack created by 
falling employment levels and put more than 21,000 people to work through 
government departments, subsidised work with local authorities, and 
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subsidising private sector job creation programmes. Despite these initiatives, 
unemployment continued to increase. To further compound matters, a second 
oil shock in 1979 put further pressure on the fragile economy.  
 
Clustered in the semi- and unskilled workforce, Maori and Pacific Peoples 
were the most affected by the economic downturn and unemployment soon 
became systemic in many Maori and Pacific communities: the seeds of an 
underclass, seen as so crucial to gang maturation and increased criminality 
(Hagedorn, 1988; Klein, 1995; Short, 1990), were being sown. The ease of 
finding work, a significant factor that had meant gang membership was a 
temporary youthful dalliance, was no longer on offer, and the growth of 
Polynesian gangs meant they overtook the outlaw motorcycle clubs as the 
county’s principal gang concern, and importantly this occurred during a period 
of growing racial unrest.  
 
For migrants from the Pacific, who had been encouraged to move to New 
Zealand during the boom times, their welcome was over. And in 1976 and 
1977 there was a controversial crackdown and early morning ‘dawn raids’ on 
Pacific families who were thought to have among them people who had 
overstayed entry permits or ignored conditions about not working (Belich, 
2001: p.535). Despite Pacific Peoples compromising a minority of 
overstayers, they were an easily identifiable target and thus made up the 
majority of arrests (Belich, 2001: p.535).  
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Further unsettling New Zealand’s apparent racial harmony was the rise of 
Maori protest movements, themselves a part of a widespread cultural 
renaissance. Maori public figures and academics like Ranginui Walker, Syd 
and Hana Jackson and Tipene O’Regan began to speak out about the 
injustices surrounding Maori in a forceful manner not previously seen (King, 
2003: p.481). Nga Tamatoa, a Maori protest group grew out of Auckland 
University in 1970. Whina Cooper led a land march to parliament buildings in 
1975 and in that same year, the Waitangi Tribunal was established to 
investigate Treaty of Waitangi breaches. In 1977, the Bastion Point land 
occupation began and did not end for over a year when 800 members of the 
police and the army forcibly removed the protesters.  
 
The relationship with the maturing Maori protest movement and predominantly 
Maori street gangs was both fluid and fraught. On one hand, many educated 
Maori saw the gangs as a sharp and tangible consequence brought about by 
the rigors and racism of colonisation, but on the other hand publicity around 
highlighting their extremely negative anti-social stance brought disrepute to 
Maori as they were, undoubtedly, seen by many Pakeha as indicative of a 
primitive culture.  
 
Despite the reservations of some kaumatua, within this environment of 
cultural rebellion and resurgence, the gangs’ anti-social outlook was 
undoubtedly bolstered in similar ways as the protest and hippie movements 
bolstered outlaw clubs in the late 1960s, as described in Chapter Three. 
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Within this environment of unease, the gangs’ anti-social outlook was 
undoubtedly bolstered, in similar ways as the protest and hippie movements 
bolstered outlaw clubs in the late 1960s, as described in Chapter Four. The 
Polynesian gangs, however, were, with few isolated exceptions, distinctly 
apolitical.41 Although, as will become clear, the threat such groups may 
become politicised, anti-social forces became a concern toward the end of the 
decade. During most of the 1970s, however, such gangs remained an issue of 
law and order that was dealt with when the need arose. 
 
This law and order approach, however, was becoming increasingly common 
as conflicts escalated between the major street gangs, primarily the various 
chapters of the Black Power and Mongrel Mob, which were, probably due to 
their use of back patches, often misreported in the media as ‘bikie gangs’ (for 
example, NZ Herald, 10.2.1976; Evening Post, 30.3.1976; Sunday News, 
3.9.1978). However, along with the Haora killing of 1975, it was a conflict 
between police and the Mongrel Mob that sparked a specific political 
response. In January 1976, in the small King Country town of Taumarunui, 
Daniel Houpapa was shot dead when he brandished a shotgun at police as he 
and fellow Mob members attempted to storm a police station to free two of 
their members who had been arrested (NZ Herald 5.1.1976). 
 
Having berated the previous Labour government for its lack of action to 
address the gangs, specifically their promise to confiscate vehicles, the new 
government moved quickly. In 1976, the National government introduced and 
                                                
41 For example, some gang members had involvement with a fledgling Black Panther political group in 
the 1970s, and certain street gang members were evident in the 1981 South African rugby tour protests.  
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passed an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act, which empowered the 
courts to confiscate an offender’s vehicle if it had been used in the 
commission of a crime. Moreover, in an attempt to stymie activities taking 
place within gang headquarters, the Police Offences Act was amended so 
that it became an offence when three or more persons with a recent history of 
criminal activity behaved in a way on any private premises that on reasonable 
grounds could give rise to fear that violence or disorder could take place. 
Further amendments to the Police Offences Act increased police powers to 
stop and search people suspected of carrying weapons and made it illegal to 
print or distribute documents that depicted the method or manufacture of 
explosive devices or unlawful weapons. And so began what would become a 
long trend of ever increasing suppressive legal measures targeting gangs. 
 
Although clearly intended to target gang gatherings and violence, the new 
laws did not discern between gang and non-gang citizens, and some of the 
measures drew the ire of critics who believed they were too vague, that the 
state was creeping into the privacy of people’s homes and that what the police 
may consider weapons could, in fact, be legitimate tools of work. Such 
detractors, including the New Zealand Law Society and a liberal orientated 
National party ginger group called Pol-Link, had little time to influence the 
legislation, as the public submission process was open for just two weeks. 
Muldoon brushed away any concerns, saying that if there were any problems 
with the laws the “courts can make their displeasure known” (NZ Herald 
26.3.1976). It was a reflection of, what some contemporaries considered to 
be, Muldoon’s dictatorial style. 
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While Muldoon pursued legislative measures and continued with his rhetoric 
of ‘cracking down’ on the gangs, in the face of numerous incidents of violence, 
this approach was as much to appease a nervous public, and particularly the 
conservative membership base of the National party, as it was to control 
gangs. Indeed, his most significant measures were social initiatives targeting 
such groups, particularly in relation to the Black Power. Unpublished letters 
show that Muldoon and Black Power member Denis O’Reilly were building a 
close relationship and there is little doubt that O’Reilly influenced the Prime 
Minister’s views on gangs. The conservative but enigmatic Prime Minister was 
becoming entwined with the liberal activists and thinkers of the day. Muldoon 
had a number of meetings with O’Reilly, Rei Harris and others from Black 
Power. This in itself is quite remarkable – that a much maligned group could 
solicit such an audience. It is perhaps even more remarkable because 
Muldoon, who had few sympathies with the emerging Maori protest movement 
and historian Keith Sinclair argues was at his most “insensitive” regarding 
issues of race relations (Sinclair, 1991: p.317), became the vanguard for 
social action targeting predominantly Maori gangs.  
 
In early November 1976, Muldoon met 20 or 30 Black Power members in the 
Royal Tiger Tavern in Wellington. Being a short man, it is possible that the 
hotel’s management did not know the Prime Minister was present because 
members of the gang obscured him (Gustafson, 2000: p.206). But if 
management did know, it was not enough to convince them that such a large 
contingent of gang members was not going to destroy their hotel, and so they 
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stopped serving alcohol and called the police. On arriving, the police, not 
surprisingly, refused to believe the Prime Minister was there until he emerged 
from the pack and asked them what they wanted. Despite the fact the group 
was causing no trouble, Muldoon and the Black Power members moved on 
from the tavern and adjourned to a gang address to finish their discussion and 
drinks. One member of the gang began flicking beer at Muldoon. The Prime 
Minister ignored this taunt until he came to the end of his whisky, at which 
point he threw the dregs at his young assailant. The Black Power members 
were impressed. Not only did the Prime Minister enjoy a drink, but he was 
also prepared to stand up for himself, two attributes the gang admired (Denis 
O’Reilly pers. comm.). 
 
Following this unusual meeting, Muldoon found accommodation for the gang 
to use as their headquarters and therefore “obviate the necessity for members 
congregating in hotel bars with consequent possible disorder” (NZPD, vol.407 
1976: p.3763). It is important to note that the motivation was clearly not to 
destroy the gangs, but to mitigate their anti-social elements.  
 
Furthermore, in February 1977, the Minister of Recreation and Sport, at 
Muldoon’s request, approved a salary for an individual worker doing 
“innovative social work” with a gang of Maori youths (Henley, 1980: p.1). That 
worker was Denis O’Reilly. O’Reilly became the government’s first funded 
detached youth worker – although at least two had existed independent of 
government previous to that. J. R. Grimes had been employed by the 
Auckland City Mission (later called Anglican-Methodist Social Services) to 
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work with young street gangs in Auckland between 1970 and 1974 and Cos 
Jeffery was employed by Presbyterian Social Support Services to work with 
the Epitaph Riders in Christchurch in 197442 (Donnell, 1976). Though funded 
by the government, O’Reilly reported to a trust established by a church 
because the scheme’s aims were thought to be better achieved if the social 
worker was not seen to be connected to the state, and thus “undertaken by 
non-governmental agencies and local authorities” (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 1983: p.10). 
 
Detached youth work was seen as a somewhat radical form of social work 
that had found favour in the U.S. in dealing with urban social problems – often 
gangs. Such workers attempted to break down ‘them’ and ‘us’ barriers by 
working closely with gangs at a street level. Detached youth workers 
commonly formed close bonds with gangs, advocated on their behalves, and 
offered support and direction to members in what has been called “curbside 
counselling” (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993: p.164). Needless to say, detached 
youth work was a product of liberal influences stemming from the 1960s and 
70s. The philosophical framework within which the social workers tended to 
exist was one where gangs were not seen as wholly negative, and indeed that 
the group could positively assist the lives of its members (Spergel, 1995: 
p.174).  
 
By mid-1977, the Ministry of Recreation and Sport had funded three detached 
youth workers and by the early 1980s the schemes had expanded rapidly. 
                                                
42 Jeffery was actually employed to work with both the Devil’s Henchmen and the Epitaph Riders but 
found it impossible to work with two warring clubs at the same time (Jeffery, 1985: p.39). 
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National’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Alan Highet, reflected the government’s 
enthusiasm about detached youth work: 
 
The Detached Youth Worker approach appears to have a number of 
significant advantages over more conventional forms of social work. It 
affords the youth worker, freed from normal social work agency 
constraints, a degree of freedom and flexibility which if used effectively, 
can enable the worker to get alongside certain groups of young people 
who are for the most part unresponsive to the approaches of social 
workers attached to government agencies (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 1983: p.10) 
 
One important task of the detached youth worker was to engage the gangs in 
temporary employment programmes that the government was initiating to 
absorb the increasing number of unemployed. Denis O’Reilly and Black 
Power had already established a work cooperative – through Walton House 
and the Te Kaha Trust –  in Wellington, and it was these types of initiatives 
that Muldoon saw as a way to turn gangs into positive organisations. Muldoon 
argued that: “It’s far more constructive if these young people can do this kind 
of work, earn some money, and gradually build their organisation into a club, 
rather than a gang” (NZPD, vol.407, 1976: p.3764). It was also a remarkable 
turnaround from the man who, earlier in the decade, had called for the 
banishment of young ‘Maori louts’ to the countryside (Kelsey & Young, 1982: 
p.102). 
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Although the Wellington Black Power work trust, established by O’Reilly, 
received some praise (Dominion, 18.8.1978; Evening Post 25.10.1978), and 
Muldoon’s social initiatives appeased those who saw gangs as a 
consequence of social conditions, the Prime Minister was harangued by 
conservative elements who saw the approach as pandering to anti-social 
groups. Throughout the latter half of the 1970s, the Truth tabloid newspaper 
ran a campaign calling for a hard line police approach to counter what had 
become known as the ‘gang problem’ with editorial headlines such as; “Stamp 
on Bikies” (20.1.1976), “Misguided Charity for a Gang of Bludgers” 
(29.6.1976), “Gangs Must be Smashed” (12.12.1978), “Vicious ‘em Now” 
(25.1.1979), “Get the Kid Gloves Off” (30.1.1979), “Yes, Police are Too Soft” 
(6.2.1979), and “Gang menace: Stop These Creatures” (13.2.1979), the 
newspaper also often published pages of letters from outraged New 
Zealanders supporting calls for tougher action. 
 
But Muldoon, pugnacious as ever, was steadfast in the face of criticism, 
saying his government had made it easier for police to control gangs through 
changes to legislation but that prison was not the answer to the problem. He 
said, “these men will come out of prison again and be little different from what 
they were when they went in” and that detached social workers and work 
programmes are “turning the gang psychology to constructive effort” and 
therefore the government “will not be diverted from its two pronged policy” 
(Dominion, 26.1.1979). But of this two pronged policy, it was the government’s 
social initiatives that were to be more greatly bolstered following an incident in 
the small Northland town of Moerewa. It was an incident of such violence that 
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it led to a widespread belief that significant social action was urgently 
required. 
 
The Moerewa Incident: The Second Pivot Point 
As noted, significant gang conflicts had increased throughout the 1970s – and 
largely dominated by patched street gangs – as they fought to mark out their 
territory, leading one Auckland judge, Justice Mills, to remark that, “the gravity 
of many of the offences by members of gangs and what had become known 
as ‘gang warfare’ was a great concern to everyone” (NZ Herald 7.9.1978). 
This ‘great concern’ reached its zenith in August 1979 in the small North 
Island town of Moerewa, where an incident of such severity occurred that it 
can be seen to mark the second pivot point in New Zealand gang history. This 
incident greatly influenced the response to gangs for most of the 1980s by 
giving tremendous impetus to the social initiatives being undertaken at the 
bequest of Prime Minister Muldoon. 
 
The incident that occurred in Moerewa perhaps had its genesis in Auckland in 
October 1978 when an estimated 350 members from the country’s Black 
Power chapters converged on Otara to hold a convention. The local 
Stormtroopers considered Otara to be part of their turf, and local and outside 
chapters of the gang gathered peacefully outside the weekend-long meeting 
to show their displeasure at the Black Power’s intrusion into their territory 
(Auckland Star 21.10.1978). The gangs engaged in several conflicts in early 
1979, but it was an assault by a Northland Black Power member on an 
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Auckland Stormtrooper, in either late July or very early August 1979, that 
sparked the drive for a showdown (Kelsey & Young, 1982: p.27).  
 
Regarding battles such as these between gangs, one Black Power leader, 
Mane Adams, told me  
 
Basically it was tit for tat. If you went and did a tit, you were waiting for 
the tat and if the tat didn’t come back, well you know you won that 
battle sort of thing. It worked like that, sort of thing, eh, tit tat, tit tat. But 
tit tat leads to very serious consequences, if you don’t get on top of it 
(2003 pers. comm.). 
 
On 3 August 1979, Stormtroopers from Auckland travelled north and joined 
members from Moerewa to find the local Black Power members in order to 
seek revenge. Initially unsuccessful in their search, many of the Auckland 
members returned home, leaving 40 or 50 primarily local Stormtroopers to 
drive to the Okaihau Hotel in further search of Black Power. Failing again to 
find the enemy, they set about drinking and then, in what the bar’s publican 
described as an abrupt 60-second outburst of destruction, the members 
uprooted pool tables and threw bottles through windows and a stool at the 
jukebox (NZ Herald 6.8.1979). Leaving the hotel and travelling through 
Ohaewai on their return to Moerewa, the gang was confronted by two 
members of the police, who were forced to retreat by the advancing gang. A 
warning shot fired by one of the officers was not enough to save the police car 
from extensive damage as the gang set about attacking it. The Stormtroopers 
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then went on to the Moerewa Hotel where more police were called. Angered 
by their fruitless search for Black Power, the gang’s collective and alcohol 
fuelled frustration turned toward the only enemy they could find – the police. 
Kelsey and Young (1982: pp.27 & 56-57) suggest that the animosity toward 
the police was bred from aggressive police tactics by Team Policing Units in 
South Auckland in late 1978 and early 1979 and, without elaborating, they 
reported a “strong suggestion” that the gang members themselves had called 
the authorities, presumably in an effort to provoke a confrontation. Similarly, 
O’Hara (1986: p.133) says that one of the gang encouraged a younger 
member to break a shop window, “so that the cops’ll come and then we’ll do 
them!” Be this as it may, the publican is almost certain to have made a frantic 
call to authorities, and the two officers under siege at Ohaewai would also 
have raised the alarm with their colleagues. 
 
Police were called in from throughout the region, but some were diverted to 
an unconnected armed robbery in Whangarei (NZ Herald 6.8.1979). Those 
who could respond immediately were heavily outnumbered, and attempts to 
persuade the gang to disperse were fruitless. Indeed, the efforts by the police 
to confront the gang were described by one gang member as “suicidal” 
(O'Hara, 1986: p.136). The police were attacked with an assortment of 
makeshift missiles and weapons (NZ Herald 6.8.1979). Offering insight into 
the loyalty and adherence to the gang leaders’ commands, one of the 
Stormtroopers said later, “when we are told to hit, we hit” (NZ Herald, 
20.11.1979).  
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In the melee, the police officers became separated and were beaten. One 
described being held against a fence and kicked and punched by as many six 
gang members, but others fared even worse. A police van was set alight and 
several Stormtroopers attempted to throw Senior Sergeant Charles O’Hara, 
who was already injured, into the fire yelling, “Burn the bastard”. As the Senior 
Sergeant cried out, “Mercy, mercy” (NZ Herald, 6.9.1979), he was rescued by 
battered colleagues and fire fighters (Kelsey & Young, 1982: p.28). During 
another offensive surge, the gang members began chanting, “Kill, kill”, and 
Sergeant Walter Douglas retrieved a .38 revolver from his glove box and fired 
several warning shots before shooting a gang member in the thigh (NZ 
Herald, 31.8.1979). Despite this, in different pockets of the hotel car park the 
battle continued, and one gang member raided a fire truck and handed out the 
fire axes to use as weapons (NZ Herald 31.8.1979). Constable Ralph Davis 
was beaten to the ground and kicked unconscious. Constable Arthur Turton 
went to his rescue and found him choking on his own blood, but in his first 
attempt at rescue he was driven off by Stormtroopers with whom he pleaded: 
“I yelled at them that they had killed a cop and to let me help him” (NZ Herald, 
29.8.1979). Despite being hit with a steel rod, he and another police officer 
managed to drag the severely injured constable to safety. Davis did not regain 
consciousness for 48 hours and suffered depressed and linear fractures of the 
skull, a fractured cheekbone and the loss of eight teeth. Without medical 
treatment, his injuries were life threatening. 
 
Sergeant Walter Douglas attempted to reason with the gang’s leader to call a 
halt to the attack, but it is believed, by one witness at least, that a series of 
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shotgun blasts from a local resident, alarmed by the lawlessness, signalled an 
end to the violence (O'Hara, 1986: p.135). Supported by an influx of 
reinforcements, police were able to arrest 28 members of the gang. Following 
two trials, 25 members were convicted on various charges and received jails 
terms of between four months and eight years, but not before the arrested 
men were taken to the Whangarei police station cells, where one member of 
the police told me they were made to walk a “gauntlet” of officers and given a 
beating as they went through. The police were incensed by the attack on them 
and were unprepared to let the courts monopolise the gang members’ 
punishment. Interestingly, unlike much of the police activity complained about 
by gang members, it is likely that this gauntlet beating would have been seen 
by most as a ‘fair cop’. In numerous dealings with gang members – and in 
listening to scores of different stories – it has become quite clear that as a 
general observation, if gang members feel they have overstepped the mark 
then they are quite prepared for the consequences; a point on which I will 
elaborate later in this thesis. 
 
Kelsey and Young (1982) argue that the media reporting around the Moerewa 
riot and the subsequent political response was one of ‘moral panic’. Although 
they make the case for moral panic strongly, I do not agree that the political 
response was as confined to ‘criminalising’ gangs, as much of their primary 
thesis contends. Certainly, two laws were introduced, which I will outline 
shortly, and police around the country were thereafter issued with riot 
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equipment43 but, as will become clear, following Moerewa there was a 
significant amount of commentary suggesting the gangs were not just a 
problem of law and order and that social policies targeting the causes of gang 
violence were desirable; indeed necessary. In fact, the incident at Moerewa, I 
argue, was a pivot point that sparked a concerted drive of socially orientated 
policy to combat the problems surrounding gangs. This outcome, however, 
although starting immediately, did not become fully clear until the 1980s – 
after Kelsey and Young had reached their conclusions. 
 
In response to the incident at Moerewa, parliament adjourned for an urgent 
debate on the matter. Certainly concerns surrounding law and order and 
protecting police officers were evident in the debate. In fact, there was a good 
deal of breast beating on both sides of the house, and one National MP, Ben 
Couch, mused about the possible return of corporal and capital punishment 
(NZPD, vol.474, 1979: p.2080). Equally, however, both National and Labour 
MPs acknowledged that long-term solutions were not to be found in law and 
order legislation or suppressive police tactics.  
 
The leader of the Labour Opposition, Bill Rowling, said that he agreed with an 
editorial from The Press newspaper that a “sudden whiplash reaction of 
bashing back is not going to solve the problem” (NZPD, vol.424, 1979: 
p.2072). Furthermore, he said, “Parliament must examine closely the social, 
economic, and community climate that breeds and fosters the kind of 
                                                
43 Interestingly, one of those pieces of equipment was the long PR24 batons, which were being 
informally demonstrated in New Zealand at the time of the Moerewa riot by John Ball, a crime novelist 
and reservist member of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, while he was researching a 
book (O'Hara, 1986: p.136).  
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alienation and brutal desperation – one cannot describe it any other way – 
that we saw last weekend. I stress that I am not talking about apportioning 
blame. I suppose that, in some ways, we can all take a share of that” (NZPD, 
vol.424, 1979: p.2073). He saluted work cooperatives being undertaken by 
some gangs and, like many other MPs, identified the problem of burgeoning 
unemployment: “They must have work. We will never get decent citizens from 
an element of young people who feel that they have no stake in the country” 
(NZPD, vol.424, 1979: p.2073). 
 
The Minister of Justice, the young and idealistic Jim McLay, agreed saying, 
the “problem will not be solved by throwing a law at it” and that the issue 
required a community approach (NZPD, vol.424, 1979: p.2078). Furthermore, 
he highlighted the initiatives being supported by the Prime Minister, who was 
overseas at the time:  
 
“I believe that the type of work being done by the detached youth 
workers represents a positive long-term contribution to solving the 
gang problem. The notion of the work co-operative – something that I 
might tell the house is now attracting international attention – is working 
in a viable way to solve the problems of alienation, lack of job 
opportunities…and above all, the feeling that society offers nothing and 
gives nothing to these young people” (NZPD, vol.424, 1979: p.2078) . 
 
In the wake of Moerewa, parliament passed two pieces of legislation toward 
the end of 1979: the Police Offences Amendment Act, which gave police the 
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power to stop and search any vehicle should they have reasonable grounds to 
suspect it is carrying weapons, and the Sale of Liquor Amendment Act, which 
gave publicans the right to ban gang patches from drinking establishments. 
However, as will become clear in the following chapter, the government’s 
expansion of the detached youth worker schemes, and work programmes 
were its most significant undertakings. 
 
Calls for the gang problem to not just be seen as one of law and order but one 
that required social initiatives, were becoming more common even before the 
incident at Moerewa. In January 1979, the research officer of the New 
Zealand Police Association, Graham Butterworth, formerly a lecturer 
specialising in Maori history, opined that Maori gang warfare was akin to the 
“hapu rivalries” of the 1860s. Looking ahead, he said, “Police can no more 
solve the social and economic problems of the 1980s than the military could 
solve the problems of the 1860s” (Butterworth, 1979: pp.2-3). Noticing his 
long and considered piece in the Police Association newsletter, the New 
Zealand Herald (20.1.1979) interviewed Butterworth and also Maori 
academic, Dr. Patrick Hohepa. Both men agreed that repressive tactics from 
the police would only make the situation worse, although the article’s front-
page headline was particularly misleading: “Police Claim Gangs Are Now 
Beyond Their Control”.  
 
As a reaction to the headline, rather than the content of his argument, Deputy 
Police Commissioner, Ken Thompson responded by saying that Butterworth’s 
ideas were not the “official police view” (NZ Herald 24.1.1979). The official 
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police view was, however, expounded by the Commissioner of Police Bob 
Walton in the annual report of the New Zealand Police in 1979, which was 
tabled before parliament several days after the Moerewa incident. In it, he 
supported the ideas of Butterworth, saying, “as advocated by some, the gang 
problem cannot be eliminated by force. Whatever short-term gains that may 
accrue, the long-term results would be greater disorder…It must never be 
overlooked that any group can assemble providing it acts within the law” 
(AJHR, G.6, 1979: p.4). His sentiments were quoted in the major newspapers 
(for example, Evening Post, 10.8.1979; NZ Herald 11.8.1979; The Press, 
11.8.1979), and this gave further credibility to the idea that the gang problem 
required social redress. The liberal agenda had taken ascendancy even within 
important elements of the police, although just how prevalent they were 
among the rank and file must surely be questioned in a largely conservative 
institution. 
 
Furthermore, concerns were surfacing that the radical political environment 
could create a potentially volatile situation. Commissioner Walton further 
argued that, “Harassment [by the police] could also convert a gang problem 
into a racial one and there are some who would exploit the situation to their 
own ends” (AJHR, G.6, 1979: p.4). Walton was clearly influenced by concerns 
that Maori gangs could turn – or be turned – into aggressive political bodies. It 
was a similar concern held by some civic leaders in the U.S. in the late 1960s 
(Jacobs, 1977: p.139). The idea that gangs could become politicised in New 
Zealand appears to have been first raised in 1971 by Dr. Ranginui Walker 
(1971: p.43), who cautioned that Polynesian gangs could turn militant and 
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racist if hijacked by radical political groups using Black Panther and Marxist 
literature to stir them into action. Such concerns were reignited in the late 
1970s. In 1978, a “senior Auckland policeman” told the New Zealand Herald 
(30.9.1978) that gangs would emerge as ‘urban guerrillas’, and in January 
1979, Doug Sinclair, the leader of Te Matakite O Aotearoa, a Maori land 
group, said he was going to turn gangs into “forces for the eventual 
independence of New Zealand” (Daily News 23.1.1979).  
 
Such claims of gang politicisation proved to be fanciful, but the sober 1979 
annual report of the Race Relations Conciliator, Harry Dansey, said, “Maori 
gang violence…[is] a catalyst for deteriorating Maori/pakeha [sic] relations”, 
and as such his office was working on eliminating gang violence (AJHR, E.17, 
1979: p.20). Almost certainly, the links between gangs and racial tensions 
added to the environment of political concern, and therefore they gave 
urgency to the agenda of social initiatives. At a time of increasing Maori 
activism, the concern was that gangs might not just attack the police in an 
unorganised orgy of violence as they had in Moerewa, but start systematically 
doing so as an attack on the state. The thinking seems to have been, that if 
police hard line tactics were used exclusively, it may hasten the advance of 
this perceived threat. 
 
In fact, immediately following Moerewa, proactive steps were undertaken by 
the government to counter gang violence before it became an issue for the 
police. The Minister of Maori Affairs, Ben Couch, arranged for the leaders of 
Black Power, the Mongrel Mob, the Head Hunters, and the Stormtroopers to 
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come to the Beehive for a meeting to work out a truce. This meeting had the 
appearance of success as the Black Power and the Stormtroopers agreed to 
stop warring (NZ Herald, 17.8.1979). The same meeting organised an arms 
amnesty that rounded up a number of weapons, including firearms, from the 
gangs (Auckland Star, 17.8.1979; NZ Herald, 21.8.1979). Couch said that he 
was not soft on gangs and that law should always be upheld and he was 
undertaking the approach personally because, “Gangs see the police as 
representing the community coming at them” and without such efforts the 
country faced the risk of “race riots” (NZ Herald, 1.9.1979). Even the Truth 
(21.8.1979) newspaper momentarily halted its campaign calling for strong 
police action and applauded his efforts.  
 
While many police, and much of the wider population, remained sceptical of 
an approach that they considered showed gangs too much respect, the policy 
drive toward social initiatives was widely supported by those in power. 
Interestingly, the detractors had a point. Following their violent actions, the 
gangs were rewarded with a top-level meeting and more respect from figures 
in authority than most of their members had ever experienced. Arguably, this 
aided gang cohesion as the mana of the groups involved increased. 
Moreover, the truce agreements made in the Beehive all proved to be hollow. 
However, the fact that these attempts were made at all demonstrates the 
degree to which the government sought to remove gangs from a purely law 
and order context. 
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The perceived efficacy of this social policy drive was bolstered further by the 
findings of the Select Committee of Violence (1979). Initially proposed as a 
general investigation of violence in New Zealand, the select committee’s 
research was almost complete when the incident at Moerewa occurred and so 
the government extended its deadline to allow a specific examination of the 
gang issue. Its final report found that “the gang organisation can provide a 
constructive and productive means of drawing people, mostly young, whose 
loss of identity through migration to urban areas, absence of family or tribal 
influence, socio-economic disadvantage, unemployment or resort to alcohol or 
drugs cause them to fail to fit into accepted social environments” (Select 
Committee of Inquiry into Violent Offending, 1979: p.35). However, the report 
went on to say that violent confrontations were of concern to the public, and 
although it said there was no need for increased police powers, it added that 
efforts should be made to dissolve gangs and reintegrate members back into 
the community. The report largely confirmed the prevalent political feeling that 
gangs were a problem requiring social solutions, but, as will become clear, it 
was another more important report, commissioned in 1981, that led to the 
development of a concerted social policy agenda targeting gangs. 
 
Conclusion 
In the 1970s, New Zealand first witnessed significant gang warfare as gangs 
battled over territory, real or perceived slights, and attacks made against them 
by rivals. The occasional ‘big knuckles’ discussed by Levett (1959: p.2) in the 
late 1950s had transformed into large scale conflicts that increasingly involved 
weapons, including firearms. Although retaliation from opposition gangs was 
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the primary threat stemming from warfare, acute police attention and the 
increased chance of being arrested and jailed were also pressures brought to 
bear on warring gang members. These factors often served to strengthen the 
gangs. Certainly, weaker members left during times of serious dispute, but 
those who remained appear to have forged closer bonds and greater group 
commitment. Ironically, this may have been aided by member imprisonment 
as criminal codes were learned and adopted inside jails. These criminal codes 
became infused within gang culture and the gangs thus gangs became more 
criminally savvy. Combined with the introduction of prospecting and therefore 
a more exclusive form of membership, the patched groups in the 1970s were 
clearly ‘gangs’ as defined by this thesis. Despite certain indications, on-the-
whole, however, the scene was not involved in significant profit driven criminal 
enterprise. Indeed, the wars of the 1970s were remarkable for their lack of 
utility, and were fought for reason imbedded in gang culture and largely 
foreign to outsiders. 
 
As the decade progressed, Polynesian street gangs began to overwhelmingly 
dominate the gang scene, and this occurred at a time of increasing ethnic 
tensions, and led to concerns that such gangs may become, or be 
manipulated by, radical political bodies. These large street gangs also came 
about during a period of increasing economic troubles, and unemployment 
meant that youths were maintaining gang membership for longer as they were 
unable to shift easily into work.  
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Within this cauldron of increasing ethnic and economic tensions, the Moerewa 
riot happened. What occurred in the small Northland town was the most 
serious incident of gang violence that the country had experienced. 
Nevertheless, similar violence was becoming increasingly common. Perhaps 
what most distinguished Moerewa from other conflicts were the injuries to 
police and fire fighters. Although there was public concern when the gangs 
were maiming and killing each other, when the violence was directed at police 
and emergency services personnel the levels of community anxiety increased, 
and in the wake of racial concerns, the gang threat appeared more immediate 
and urgent.  
 
The riot at Moerewa was the second pivot point in the history of gangs in New 
Zealand. In the aftermath of Moerewa, issues around gangs gained a focus – 
these groups were a significant social problem that appeared to have 
permanency and consequently needed to be dealt with in new ways. Tough 
policing had proven ineffective and it was, perhaps, desperation as much as 
anything that allowed social policies to be given primacy in the 1980s. As will 
become clear, however, the urgency of social action was arguably a decade 
too late. The horse, as they say, had bolted. 
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 Chapter	  Seven.	  	  
 
 
7. The Rise and Fall of the Social Agenda: 1980-1990 
 
Introduction 
During the 1980s, New Zealand’s first and only concerted policy drive 
targeting gangs as social phenomena occurred. This social policy agenda 
sought to put gangs to work in an effort to alleviate the growing problem of 
gang violence by ensuring gang members were not further alienated from 
mainstream society by being locked out of the labour market, which by that 
time had become anaemic. Up until August 1986, the social policy agenda 
was heralded as a success, but following this, in the midst of a dramatically 
changing political and economic environment, it became controversial and its 
end was swift. 
 
This chapter will look at the formation of the Group Employment Liaison 
Service, the primary vehicle of the government’s social policy agenda, and 
plot the positive reviews of the work it coordinated. It will then examine the 
radical changes occurring in New Zealand’s economic and political 
environments, and the importance of these to the changing attitudes toward 
gangs. Three major issues and events will then be explored, which on their 
own may have been of little consequence but, because they collectively 
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occurred in the space of a few months, created a ‘perfect storm’ of 
controversy that led to the demise the social policy agenda.  
 
A Social Experiment – The Group Employment Liaison 
Service (GELS) 
As will be recalled, following the Moerewa riot in 1979, a consensus formed 
that gangs were a social problem requiring specific social redress, and a 
‘Committee on Gangs’, established by Muldoon’s Cabinet in early 1981, 
further confirmed this view. As the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, National MP Ken Comber chaired the committee, 
which was made up of high-ranking public servants, including the Deputy 
Commissioner of the New Zealand Police. The Report of the Committee on 
Gangs became commonly referred to as the Comber Report. 
 
The committee’s terms of reference were to outline the existing gang 
situation, examine the efficacy and relevance of policies targeting gangs, 
explore the social conditions that give rise to gangs, and provide a report to 
the Prime Minister. It was a significant undertaking, given that the committee 
had just one month to complete its work (Committee on Gangs, 1981: p.i). It 
was a further example of a hurried inquiry into the matter of gangs, although 
this time there was no obvious reason for the haste. In spite of the tight 
timeframe, the committee interviewed and received submissions from 
numerous people “directly involved with the gang situation” including the 
police, detached youth workers and a small number of gang members 
(Committee on Gangs, 1981: p.i). A number of different issues were explored, 
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including: education, employment, law enforcement and penal policy, 
community and recreation issues as well as media coverage of gangs.  
 
The committee said that gangs “will probably always exist since they arise 
from a particular set of social and economic conditions” and that it did not 
object to gangs but only gang violence (Committee on Gangs, 1981: p.6). 
Among the social and economic conditions identified by the committee were 
housing problems, unemployment, cultural change, education failure and 
family breakdown (Committee on Gangs, 1981: pp.1, 10 & 12). These 
findings, therefore, are similar to those in the gang report of the Investigating 
Committee of 1970, discussed in Chapter Five, and numerous international 
researchers discussed in chapters One and Two. 
 
One lasting contribution made by the Comber Report was the tripartite 
categorisation of gangs into ‘Bikie’, ‘Ethnic’ and ‘Other European’ gangs 
(Committee on Gangs, 1981: pp.4-5). Based on police statistics, the report 
said there were about 630 members in 20 bikie gangs in New Zealand, the 
largest of which were the Devil’s Henchmen and Highway 61. Ethnic gangs 
were much larger, numbering 1,650 members in 57 gangs, with the largest 
being Black Power and the Mongrel Mob. Total gang numbers were estimated 
at 2,300. The remaining grouping, Other European’, was acknowledged by 
the committee as being new and few gangs of this type were evident, but, as 
will become clear, such gangs, primarily skinhead groups, grew in number 
and significance in the 1990s. 
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Although they are still used, there are a number of problems with these 
categories. By ‘ethnic’ gangs, the committee meant ‘ethnic minority’ gangs, 
but no ‘ethnic’ street gangs specifically excluded Pakeha members and most 
had a small percentage of them. Also, while ‘bikie’ gangs are predominantly 
Pakeha, and many, like most of the Biker Federation clubs, had or continue to 
have racist tendencies, certain groups, like the Hell’s Angels, are open to all 
ethnicities, and others, like the Tribesmen and Highway 61, are largely made 
of Maori and Pacific members. Furthermore, ‘other European’ gangs 
sometimes have ethnic minority (most often Maori) membership, even in self-
proclaimed white supremacist groups, like the Fourth Reich. It is for these 
reasons that I have not utilised the Comber categorisations in this thesis, 
preferring encompassing definitions and specific categories including: outlaw 
motorcycle clubs, patched street gangs, skinhead gangs etc.  
 
Although the committee recognised the need to uphold law and order, it also 
pointed out that the much trumpeted measure enacted to counter the gang 
problem, the confiscation of gang vehicles (‘take the bikes off the bikies’) first 
proposed by Norman Kirk and discussed in the last chapter, had been used 
no more than seven times since 1977 (Committee on Gangs, 1981: p.40). In 
short, the populist law was an unmitigated failure that had little or no impact 
on the gang scene. 
 
Indeed, the most significant outcome of the Comber Report was the 
acknowledgement of gangs as a social problem requiring social redress – 
and, more particularly, a focus on the need for a coordinated approach to 
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deliver existing social programmes. In doing so, the Comber Report affirmed 
political thinking of the time that law enforcement measures should be 
superseded by a social agenda targeting the problem of gangs.  
 
The Comber Report had a significant impact on government agencies. The 
report, as well a faltering economy, were said to have been “major influences” 
on the Department of Internal Affairs in the early 1980s, “particularly in the 
area of alternative employment” (Church, 1990: p.45). Similarly, the Comber 
Report spurred the Department of Education to launch the Community 
Education Initiative Scheme (CEIS). The CEIS provided funding for at “risk 
youth” (The Alternative Employment Programme Evaluation Working Party, 
1991: p.59) and aimed to reduce gang recruitment by “responding positively 
to the needs of underachieving students who had difficulty moving from 
school to employment” (Bellamy, 2009). 
 
The major policy outcome of the Comber Report, however, was the 
establishment of the Group Employment Liaison Scheme (later, Service), 
known as GELS, in early 1982. Although set up primarily to target them, 
political expediency was presumably behind the fact that the terms of 
reference for GELS, as outlined by the Cabinet Committee on State Services 
(SS(81)140), did not specifically mention gangs. In fact, the organisation did 
target other groups, like those in small rural towns affected by job losses and 
urban ‘street kids’. In other words, GELS also targeted groups who “often 
possess similar characteristics of gangs but may not have the same public 
profile (ie patches)” (Plunkett, Hynes, & Crossan, 1986: p.14). 
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As an extension of the work undertaken by the detached youth worker 
program that, it will be recalled, the government began in the mid-1970s, the 
role of GELS was to engage with gangs to encourage members to seek either 
training or employment to transform gangs into positive entities. The primary 
driver for getting the gangs into employment was the work schemes that were 
introduced by Prime Minister Rob Muldoon’s interventionist National 
government (1975-1984) to combat rising unemployment. Government 
funding was available to start small businesses with the aim of making them 
self sufficient, but mostly the schemes were community-based work initiatives 
funded by the state. 
 
Government funded community work had begun in the mid-1970s. As 
previously discussed, unemployment was on the rise, but it was seen as a 
temporary aberration and full employment was a key government priority. 
However, the economy began to seriously falter as the 1970s progressed, 
unemployment grew and the various work schemes expanded under the title 
of the Project Employment Programme (PEP). These schemes usually 
involved work of manual labour using basic tools. By 1987, a survey of the 
long-term unemployed reported that of all the people who had accessed any 
government work schemes, over 50 percent had used PEP (Gill, 1989) 
 
PEP schemes did not just benefit the unemployed; they also benefited the 
wider community by creating an “auxiliary workforce” that served local 
community needs (Spoonley, 1993: p.15), a point that will become important 
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in later discussions. These schemes enabled community organisations and 
city councils to have work undertaken at the government’s expense. Such 
work included the maintenance of parks, gardens and cemeteries, the 
creation or renovation of existing facilities like walkways and trails, 
beautification work such as clearing streams or planting native tress, and 
upgrading maraes (Department of Labour, c1983). 
 
In 1986, Denis O’Reilly completed a remarkable transition from Black Power 
member (a membership he maintained advertised advisedly), to detached 
youth worker, to GELS field officer, to GELS Chief Executive. He described 
the PEP schemes to me thus: 
 
Classically ‘make work’, eh. An invention of work. An example would 
be that hill of unsightly gorse on the periphery of the town belt, or 
something. Or MOTAT [Museum of Transport and Technology], laying 
railway line – all that stuff done at MOTAT was done on PEP. The 
whole development of MOTAT. And there will be lots of examples 
around the country – and some marvellous stuff – just like was done in 
the depression, you know (Denis O’Reilly 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
Despite some wider community benefit coming from them, the work schemes 
were not linked to the country’s economic production and thus created no 
wealth. The reasoning behind the schemes was that keeping people in 
employment would stop the growth of social ills – unemployment would create 
idleness, which would in turn create social problems like gang violence and, 
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among other things, impair people’s ability to readjust to permanent work 
when that became available.  
 
GELS was initially staffed by two head office workers based in Wellington, 
and ten field workers around New Zealand, but positive reviews led to a 
significant staffing increase in 1983 to 25 fieldworkers and three head office 
positions (Plunkett et al., 1986: p.9). In order to gain access to the gangs, 
many of the field workers were current or former gang members. Interestingly, 
hiring gang members to work for GELS does not appear to have been 
controversial, but the gang members themselves faced scepticism from their 
peers. One GELS worker and Nomad gang member, Dave ‘Skull’ Williams, 
initially thought it was somebody’s idea of a “bad joke” when he was 
approached to work for GELS. But after realising it was a bona fide offer, he 
had to overcome his gang’s scepticism. Williams told me in 2003:  
 
My own people have their own views and it’s a major compromise on 
its own going in on a salary that is provided yet that same salary 
provides the police with their salary. Everybody comes from the same 
salary. At the end of the day, there is a general belief that if you come 
out of that chequebook you are somebody who has sold out. 
 
In the end, the Nomads put it to a vote and allowed Williams to work for 
GELS, seeing benefit in having a member close to work scheme funding. 
Other gangs that had members working for GELS included Black Power, the 
Mongrel Mob, Highway 61, and the Road Knights (Denis O’Reilly 2006, pers. 
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comm.). Given that the idea of GELS was to reconnect alienated gang 
members with mainstream society, these appointments provided a direct link. 
Williams told me: 
 
The only way it [the gang problem] will ever be acknowledged, 
respected and understood and seriously addressed with some sort of 
common sense and logic is when scum like me – that’s what they 
would call me – actually get to be in those positions. 
 
It was acknowledged at its inception that GELS was an independent body, 
despite being responsible to, and funded by, the Department of Labour. 
GELS’ first Chief Executive, Tony Johns, made it clear from the outset that he 
saw the organisation having a role in policy development (Auckland Star 11-8-
1982). One such policy initiative was to mediate in inter-gang disputes. Given 
that GELS officers were largely following the lead that had been provided by 
detached youth workers, this role was not surprising. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, detached youth worker Cos Jeffery was crucial in ending 
the hostilities between the Devil’s Henchmen and the Epitaph Riders in the 
mid-1970s. Moreover, because GELS often employed active or former gang 
members, and thus insider status, they generally had the respect of members 
of clashing gangs. O’Reilly says the role was vital: 
 
The whole idea was to engage the people on the periphery, you know. 
That was the whole idea. So in order to fuckin’ do that you better have 
some people who related with them and if they related with them when 
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some shit hit the fan then – you can’t be starting up your work contacts 
or whatever if you’re having to fight a war. It was apparent that we 
needed to resolve these things (Denis O’Reilly 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
Dispute resolution was not an officially sanctioned part of GELS work and 
their success in this area was rarely publicised. However, I have spoken to 
members of warring gangs from the 1980s who found the mediation, in certain 
circumstances, to be of value in stopping conflicts and preventing the 
escalation of wars through retaliation.  
 
A further, and ultimately controversial, policy development devised by GELS 
was the Contract Work Scheme. The Contract Work Scheme was created for 
two reasons: firstly, to target people who would be more easily integrated into 
the work force if they were able to work in a group (i.e. gangs) and, secondly, 
as a pragmatic solution to the ongoing problem of gang members not turning 
up to work when employed on PEP projects. The heavy drinking, partying and 
impulsive life of a gang member often meant that attendance at work was 
intermittent. This unpredictability caused significant administrative stress and 
in response, GELS devised the idea of contracting the work to registered 
trusts established by the gangs themselves.  
 
For example, instead of hiring six gang members to work for 40 hours per 
week for a month, the overall labour cost of the project was calculated by 
Labour Department officials – it is important to note this was not a 
responsibility of GELS workers – and the gang’s trust was paid at the 
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successful completion of the job. Some intermediate payments were often 
made, but only to the amount equating to the percentage of the job 
completed. Therefore, it was up to the gang members how they managed 
their time. In theory, at least, the idea was a good one, but as will become 
clear, it was open to abuse. But before this was realised, as the following 
examples will show, both inside and outside the gangs, many were lauding 
GELS and the work schemes as a resounding success. 
 
In Auckland in 1982, seven King Cobras were laying curbing and erecting a 
fence for the Auckland City Council under the PEP scheme. Asked why the 
gang sought to work, one member of the gang, Teina Temeamea, said, “To 
keep us going. If you sit in the gutter for a long time you get lazy”. The 
project’s supervisor, Trevor Bennett, said that the group would be “work-
ready” and able to take up permanent jobs when they were found. But the 
gang thought the chance of that happening was low and hoped that the 
council work would become permanent (NZ Herald 18.12.1982). 
 
Similarly, in 1983, it was reported that four Mongrel Mob members “toiled to 
make a five-year-old dream of the Auckland Sheltered Workshop come true”. 
The gang members had built a 600-metre concrete footpath for “the mentally 
retarded people who…had to walk through mud and puddles daily during 
winter” (NZ Herald 30.9.1983).  
 
Prime Minister Muldoon said he was pleased with the outcomes of the work 
being done by GELS as he thought work trusts established by the gangs to 
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gain government funding had calmed them down and resulted in decreased 
gang conflict (Evening Post 11.5.1983). He was not alone. In May 1983, The 
Evening Post reported that gangs in Wellington had matured in “recent times”, 
were starting families, and settling down. The manager of one work scheme 
being undertaken by Black Power was effusive, he said the gang members 
were doing “beauty [excellent] work” and that the schemes had stabilised their 
lives. A member of the Nomad’s Wellington chapter said, “It’s nothing like it 
used to be, it’s a lot mellower these days. It’s not that we’re going soft or 
anything, there’s just more opportunity for work and there’s co-operation with 
the public” (Evening Post 11.5.1983). 
 
The secretary for the Ministry of Maori Affairs, Kara Puketapu, also supported 
work and training schemes, suggesting their success flew in the face of those 
seeking harsher penalties for gangs in the wake of the Moerewa riot 
(Dominion 16.5.1983). Even the police were acknowledging the benefits of 
putting the gangs to work. The Commissioner of Police, Bob Walton, told MPs 
in 1983 that while gang violence remained a serious concern, particularly the 
use of firearms in disputes; work schemes were having some success in 
turning gang members away from anti-social behaviour. He said: 
 
Several larger gangs, notably Black Power ‘chapters’ in Auckland and 
Wellington have become committed to work schemes and as a result 
some decrease in the level of offending by their members is apparent 
(Dominion 18.8.1983). 
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That same year, Black Power national president, Rei Harris, said that 
previously the police may have been correct in needing to crack down on his 
gang, but that had all turned around: “At that time our members were out of 
work and seemed to spend their time drinking and brawling. Today all that has 
changed”. He said serious offences in his gang had dropped off over the past 
two years (NZ Herald 23.7.1983). Similar sentiments were echoed by the 
‘Gold Coast’ (an area on the Kapiti coast just north of Wellington) chapter of 
the Mongrel Mob, which established a farming operation with the help of 
grants from the Department of Labour. After telling a reporter that the group 
had named each of their first litter of pigs after members of the local 
constabulary, the president said that since the gang had been farming, his 
members had attracted very little attention from the police. Employment, he 
said, meant members “kept out of trouble” (Auckland Star 23.10.1984). 
 
The efforts made by gang leaders to encourage their members to work were 
not, it seems, lost on certain members of the judiciary either. In 1984, Judge 
Robert Kerr decided not to jail Mongrel Mob member Colan Latoa for the 
destruction of an Auckland bar because he was the spokesperson for the 
gang and he organised work for his members. Latoa said, he “couldn’t believe 
it. I thought I was looking at nine months (jail) at least” (Sunday News 
8.7.1984).  
 
Smaller communities also reported a drop in anti-social and criminal 
behaviour. Below the headline, “Fear No Longer Stalks Wairoa” it was said 
that the Mongrel Mob, which had had “a hold on the town” for a year, had 
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established the Triple M Trust (the three ‘M’s standing for ‘Mighty Mongrel 
Mob’) in an effort to gain government grants to put the gang to work. Gang 
member and trust vice president, Rangi Tamati, was happy with the 
achievement: “We have managed to keep eight or nine boys out of jail. Before 
we were lucky to have two or so out at one time” (NZ Herald 28.6.1985). 
 
In Dargaville in 1986, a town that used to be “terrorised by gang bravado”, the 
chairman of the Dargaville Borough Council said that as PEP schemes took 
hold, the town’s social problems had fallen away. He said, “When people are 
not working, they have got all day to sleep and all night to play up” (NZ Herald 
8.9.1986).  
 
Up until 1986, then, putting gangs to work was producing widespread positive 
publicity and to many people it appeared that a solution, at least in part, to the 
gang problem had been found. However, this positive publicity was soon 
replaced by controversy and the concept of providing government funding to 
gangs quickly became a political liability. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, this transpired during a time of dramatic political change. 
 
Political and Economic Change 
The controversy that was set to erupt around gangs receiving government 
funding occurred against a backdrop of great economic and political change, 
which proved crucial in changing attitudes toward government funded work 
programmes. In 1984, Muldoon’s National government was ousted from office 
in a landslide election defeat. Having taken the leadership role from Bill 
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Rowling in 1982, David Lange, a former lawyer with tremendous oratory skills, 
led Labour to a 17 seat parliamentary majority. The new government 
dramatically transformed the political, economic and social landscapes of New 
Zealand, and in doing so impacted on the gang scene in two important ways: 
the first was latent and long-term, and was a consequence of policies that 
proved to have a negative effect on marginalised groups and communities; 
the second was more immediate and deliberate, that being the slaying of 
Muldoon’s social policy agenda. 
 
As will become clear, the ideological outlook of the new government could 
scarcely have been more different from the one it replaced. In an effort to 
counter the economic problems that flowed out of the 1970s, Muldoon, as 
both Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, had intervened in the New 
Zealand economy to an unprecedented level. In 1982, he ordered a price and 
wage freeze to rein in inflation that was at nearly 20 percent. While these 
measures did in fact tame inflation, they also created “serious economic 
distortions”, but Muldoon was seemingly unfazed; when the price and wage 
freeze failed to drop interest rates to his satisfaction, he stepped in and 
directly regulated interest rates for home mortgages (McRobie, 1992: p.399). 
 
Furthermore, Muldoon imposed subsidies on anything from electricity to lamb 
prices, and the government funded work schemes, which gangs were being 
encouraged to use, were further expanded, to counter rapidly rising 
unemployment. Despite these efforts, in one decade the unemployment rate 
more than trebled – in 1976 those seeking work numbered just less than 
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26,000 or 2.1 percent of the workforce, in 1981 these had increased to just 
over 60,000, or 4.2 percent of the workforce, and by 1986, by which time 
Muldoon was out of office, they had increased further still to just under 
109,000, or 6.8 percent of the workforce (Department of Statistics, 1987: 
p.338).  
 
To create economic growth, jobs, and counter the effects of the oil shocks, 
Muldoon had devised a grandiose policy called ‘Think Big’ that saw the state 
fund enormous projects to tap into New Zealand’s natural resources, including 
the construction of the Clive Hydroelectric Dam and the expansion of the 
Marsden Point oil refinery.  
 
The cost of Muldoon’s intervention was enormous; in his last year of office 
overseas debt ballooned to $8,266m, the budget deficit was $3,100m, and the 
trade deficit was about $1b (Sinclair, 1991: p.319). With the economy in a 
shambles, and Muldoon’s leadership style becoming increasingly 
authoritarian, the New Zealand public responded by voting him out and giving 
Labour the country’s helm.  
 
Labour quickly began to radically reshape the New Zealand economy, an 
effort dubbed ‘Rogernomics’ after the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. 
Only the most zealous reformers, and indeed only the most hopeful among 
them, could have foreseen the breadth and speed of the changes that were to 
occur – and fewer still would have thought it possible from a party of the Left.  
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Rogernomics was based on a market liberal philosophy, and the new 
government quickly set about dismantling the regulations and restriction that 
entangled the New Zealand economy. In quick measure, New Zealand went 
from having one of the most protected economies in the world, to one of the 
most open. The dollar was floated; controls on interest rates were removed; 
tariffs and subsidies scrapped; and competition was encouraged in parts of 
the economy previously monopolised by the government. Further to this, the 
top personal tax rate was slashed from 66 cents to 33 cents in the dollar and 
a tax goods and services was introduced, a move that disproportionately 
affected the poor (Belich, 2001: p.409).  
 
Striving for full employment, which had been a key policy of all New Zealand 
governments since the depression of the 1930s, was abandoned in pursuit of 
the government’s new drivers: equity, efficiency and accountability (Rice, 
1992: p.488). The public sector, perceived to be bloated with workers 
(Sinclair, 1991: p.323), was radically reorganised. Government departments 
that were deemed to have commercial potential, such as the Post Office and 
the Ministries of Forestry and Railways, were transformed into State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and instructed to operate on a commercial basis. This 
marked the beginning of a two-stage process; subsequently, a number of the 
new SOEs were sold into private ownership, partly due to the new ideological 
drive for greater efficiency and partly to repay the country’s burgeoning 
overseas debt (Sinclair, 1991: p.324). Government departments that were not 
deemed to be commercial were instructed to adopt management principles 
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used in private enterprise. The government no longer funded programs, it 
purchased outputs (Hawke, 1992: p.440).  
 
Some 80,000 workers lost their jobs in the state sector in the wake of the 
reforms (Belich, 2001: p.410). Moreover, the removal of tariffs and subsidies 
led to job losses in the private sector too, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector, which was a major employer of un- and semi- skilled workers. By 
1991, census data show that total unemployment reached just less than 
164,000 or 10.5 percent; nearly one in four Maori and slightly more than one 
in five Pacific Peoples were unemployed (Department of Statistics, 1993: 
p.272). Many became structurally unemployed and their “disadvantage or 
excluded status…transferred to future generations” (Spoonley, 1993: p.5). It 
signalled the formation of underclass in certain state housing ‘enclaves’, 
described and forewarned of in Chapter Six, and this became critical to future 
gang developments; something I will return to as the thesis proceeds.  
 
Several years later, Douglas said that the rapidity of the reforms was essential 
in order to outpace the inevitable public backlash (Douglas, 1993). And 
certainly there was a backlash as the economic reforms impacted large 
swathes of the community and resulted in unemployment within working class 
communities. This ‘attack’ on Labour’s traditional support base eventually saw 
the government’s hierarchy disintegrate and their electoral support plummet.  
 
As will become clear, and as outlined in similar situations in the U.S. by the 
likes of Jankowski (1991), Moore (1991), and Taylor (1989), the economic 
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policies that were creating hardship in poor communities contributed to social 
conditions that fed and affected the gangs in New Zealand. But of immediate 
importance to the gang scene was that the new government’s laissez faire 
ideals were incongruent with – and perhaps the antithesis of – the make-work 
schemes that had been the bedrock of the social policy agenda targeting 
gangs.  
 
Indeed, it was the political and not economic environment that proved more 
immediately significant for the gang scene with regard to the social policy 
agenda, as one of the central tenets of the Labour government’s reforms was 
a market orientated approach and the desire to eliminate unproductive state 
spending. Within this ethos, the government believed that “the state provision 
of employment through work schemes (and benefits) produced a dependency 
on the state and discouraged independent paid employment” (Spoonley, 
1993: p.12). As was foreshadowed in its 1985 budget, Labour phased out the 
PEP schemes by the end of 1986, and a greater emphasis was placed on 
training programmes (AJHR, G.1, 1986: p.48).  
 
Perhaps due to the Department of Labour’s belief in the successes being 
achieved by GELS (AJHR, G.1, 1984: pp.31-34) and the media reporting 
positive stories of gangs in work, the Contract Work Schemes remained in 
place. However, the future of a make-work policy specifically favouring gangs 
within a political framework disdainful of interventionist strategies, and at a 
time of high unemployment and hardship for many, was undoubtedly fragile at 
best. Therefore, when the positive publicity being generated by gang 
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involvement in such schemes turned negative in late 1986 and early 1987, 
their demise was all but assured. 
 
Controversy Begins: Black Power’s Short-Lived Success  
Given that their original chapter in Wellington had formed a work cooperative 
not long after its inception in the mid-1970s, it is unsurprising that Black 
Power, with Denis O’Reilly as a member, proved to be the most successful 
gang in obtaining government funding through work schemes. Although it may 
have ebbed and flowed, within the influential Black Power leadership there 
had always been a commitment to get the gang’s members into work.  
 
In the 1980s, under the leadership of Abe Wharewaka, the Black Power 
‘Sindi’ (short for Syndicate) chapter in South Auckland adopted the original 
Wellington chapter’s work ethic and achieved unprecedented – albeit short-
lived – success. Brought to Auckland city as a child during the early part of the 
post World War II urban drift, Wharewaka was raised in a large family – he 
was the oldest of 14 children – and in a reflection of their poverty, he left 
school after form two44 because his family could not afford to buy him a school 
uniform (Sunday Star Times, 11.4.2010). Despite this, Wharewaka, by 
anyone’s standards, went on to display obvious ambition and business 
acumen. The skills that could have seen him succeed in any area of 
mainstream business were dedicated to Black Power, a gang he joined in 
1977 after stints in other gangs, borstal and prison (Walker, 1990: p.261). 
After being jailed following a gang brawl with the Head Hunters in 1979, 
                                                
44 Form two is now called Year 8. 
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Wharewaka emerged from prison in the early 1980s determined to turn his 
gang chapter around. Making use of government funded schemes; he put his 
gang to work and created, in appearance at least, a strikingly successful 
business in the mid-1980s. 
 
The first evidence of this success became public in August 1986, when a 
Cadillac Limousine was seen cruising the streets of South Auckland (Evening 
Post, 15.8.86). It was a particularly obvious show of wealth in the generally 
poor suburbs. The stretched limousine – fitted with a television, bar and 
telephone – was stopped by police, who found the driver was escorting an 
out-of-town Black Power member to the airport (NZ Herald 21.8.1986). The 
police arrested the driver for outstanding fines, and discovered the car was 
owned by Black Power. The thought of a gang affording such luxury must 
have been galling to police. In fact, the Cadillac was just one vehicle imported 
from the U.S. by Tatau Te Iwi,45 a Black Power Sindi Trust chaired by 
Wharewaka. The other vehicles included a Lincoln Continental and 18 Harley 
Davidson motorcycles. These displays of opulence were enough to attract 
political interest and the National Party, now in opposition, raised the issue in 
parliament, demanding to know how much government money was used to 
purchase the vehicles (NZPD, vol.474, 1986: pp.4502, 4503 & 5232) 
 
The vehicles were the most public example of Wharewaka’s expanding 
empire. Tatau Te Iwi built and owned a complex known as the ‘Factory’ that 
served as Black Power’s headquarters in Auckland, as well as being the base 
                                                
45 Translated as ‘We The People’. 
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for its business activities. The Factory contained a large bar, a dance floor, a 
kitchen and eating area, pool tables, electronic ‘space invader’ games and 
living quarters. Wharewaka’s office was fitted with a computer (rare at the 
time), a television and video and it was reported that a spa bath and sauna 
were being installed (Sunday Star 17.8.1986). The ceiling of the Factory was 
painted royal blue and decorated with glitter, which Wharewaka, who had an 
interest in astrology, said was to remind people of the night sky (NZ Herald 
15.11.86). To Wharewaka, the examples of wealth were “signs of success” 
that served to motivate members of his gang (NZ Herald 15.11.86). They 
certainly motivated the police, media, and public officials to question how 
much of this ‘success’ was being funded by the state.  
 
Following reports of the luxury car and motorcycle importation, the National 
Party called for a review into government funding of gang work schemes 
(Evening Post 18.8.86). Consequently, the Labour Department publicly 
released the amounts being paid to gangs via government funded work 
schemes, and these created stark headlines, including “$600,000 paid out to 
gang projects” (Dominion 19.8.1986) and “Gangs Given $241,000” (NZ Herald 
3.10.1986). The luxury vehicles were not just raising public interest cruising 
through the streets; they were also drawing public scrutiny. 
 
Black Power’s then national president, Rei Harris, told me in 1999 that the car 
and motorcycle importation controversy was a beat-up:  
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It’s like going to the $2 shop in the States; you’re picking up a limo for 
five grand. So, if you work it out, you don’t have to be a mathematician, 
it only cost 10 grand to get the container to New Zealand. They bought 
cheap bikes they were picking up for $250, $500 max, so they were 
able to cover their costs and deliver all the junk from America. So, 
when you look at it in those terms, we never had a lot of money. That’s 
the end of the deal. 
 
But to Denis O’Reilly: 
 
That was dumb. The boys are dumb. And they’d done some fantastic 
things but – it was like the precursor of fuckin’ hip-hop or something. It 
was the ‘bling-bling’ … and all that sort of stuff…If it had have been 
something else there may have been great praise, but it was stretch 
limos …And that’s what makes them gangsters. They’re in for the fun 
of the moment rather than some deep investment in the future (Denis 
O’Reilly 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
In many ways, the purchases reflected certain elements of New Zealand 
society in the mid-1980s prior to the stock market crash of 1987. While many 
people were suffering job losses, others were doing well out of the post-1984 
reforms and the freed up economy had made some people very wealthy. 
Those in consumer goods, property, and financial services did particularly well 
(Belich, 2001: p.406), and the stock market went on an unprecedented rise, 
tripling in value between 1984 and 1987. Ostentatious displays of wealth 
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among ‘yuppies’ (young upwardly-mobile professionals) were common place. 
Certainly, the gang members were not yuppies by common understanding, 
but their move into luxury goods signalled a significant shift in certain parts of 
the gang scene whereby some members were no longer prepared to ‘drop 
out’ of society but were instead wanting to enjoy its consumerist fruits. Just as 
the liberal social environment beginning in the 1960s, discussed in Chapter 
Four, and the Maori cultural resurgence and protest, outlined in Chapter Six, 
had certain demonstrable impacts – in varying degrees – on gang behaviour, 
so too, I contend, did excessive consumption and desire for wealth that 
symbolised much of the 1980s.  
 
Although Black Power’s growing asset base was obvious, less obvious was 
the fact that they were sinking heavily into debt. Banks refused to lend to the 
gang and thus they were forced to borrow from ‘loan sharks’ to build the 
Factory at interest rates of 39 percent, increasing to 49 percent for late 
payments (Walker, 1990: p.262). These debts eventually led to the demise of 
the gang’s initial flirt with profit driven enterprises and the Factory was sold in 
1989 at a mortgagee auction, leaving a $450,000 shortfall to one Christchurch 
lender (Dominion 26.5.1989). But in late 1986, the gang was still on the rise 
and a national meeting of the gang’s leaders was called in November 1986 to 
encourage those chapters not already doing so to become involved in the 
Contract Work Schemes (Evening Post 28.10.1986).  
 
As Black Power was looking to expand, however, the flashy spending by the 
Sindi chapter cast a deep suspicion over government programmes. The intent 
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of the schemes had been to aid gang members into manual labour work and 
keep them occupied and not, as it appeared was happening in Auckland, to 
make them – in appearance, at least – rich. At a time when so many New 
Zealanders were losing their jobs, the fact that Black Power was a recipient of 
apparent government largesse did not sit well with the public. 
 
The Role of the Police in Changing Public Policy 
Serendipitously, in the weeks before the media reports of Black Power gaining 
significant profit from the Contract Work Schemes and other government 
programmes, four police districts in the South Island had commissioned 
research to investigate gangs in their areas. Operation ‘Gang Strategy’ was a 
broad intelligence effort, but it was its findings on gang funding that became 
its major focus and played a significant part in the downfall of the social policy 
agenda. 
 
Operation Gang Strategy was devised by the police district commanders from 
Christchurch, Timaru, Dunedin and Invercargill, and an investigating team 
made up of one police officer from each district was charged with assessing 
the gang scene and making recommendations. The investigating team, 
headed by Sergeant Mark Penn of Christchurch, completed its first report (the 
‘Penn Report’) in July 1986. 
 
Marked as ‘confidential’, the Penn Report covered a wide range of issues 
relating to gangs including gang fortifications, police surveillance of gangs, the 
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use of informants, the need for better police/gang liaison, and the need to 
keep the public sympathetic to police action against gangs.  
 
The latter point was given significant attention, perhaps in light of the fatal 
police fatally shooting of Mongrel Mob member Paul Chase in Wellington in 
1983. A police Armed Offenders Squad had raided Chase’s flat more than a 
day after Chase and two other Mob members had discharged a firearm in the 
Hutt Park Hotel, a bar regarded as the territory of Black Power. As police 
burst into the flat dressed in black in the dim light of early morning, Chase 
thought the police were Black Power members and sought to defend himself 
with an exercise bar (Nicholson, 1983). Mistaking the bar as a firearm, police 
shot him dead. A report into the incident, undertaken by C. M. Nicholson QC, 
exonerated the police involved of any wrongdoing but nevertheless raised 
questions around certain police actions during the incident, which included the 
necessity of the early morning raid, a possible failure of the officers to 
adequately identify themselves as police, and the attitude of some officers 
involved (Nicholson, 1983). Similar concerns were reported in the media, and 
the controversy was said to have set back police gang relations by ten years 
(Evening Post 20.4.1983). Many years later, a police officer of that time wrote 
that the police handling of the situation was seriously flawed and 
unnecessarily confrontational (Forbes, 1997: p.155-157).  
 
Following this controversy, Penn and his team of gang investigators were 
clearly aware of the need to keep the public onside, but he could not have 
foreseen that his report was to spark events that superseded the Chase killing 
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as the most significant police activity relating to the New Zealand gang scene 
in the 1980s. 
 
One of the numerous findings of the Penn investigation was that some South 
Island gangs were gaining income through various means including, “drugs, 
burglary/receiving, liquor, prostitution and frauds” as well as “income derived 
from the State” (Penn, 1986b: p.1). Consequently, one of its many 
recommendations was the establishment of an “investigation into the funding 
of gangs from all sources” (emphasis in original) (Penn, 1986b: p.2). 
 
Finished at the end of July 1986, the report was almost certainly under 
consideration by South Island police chiefs in August when publicity 
surrounding Black Power’s apparent wealth in Auckland was growing. One 
can only speculate on the influence this had, but it was gang income derived 
from the state that now became the police focus. A second report was then 
requested from Penn, looking exclusively at the funding gangs received from 
the government through Contract Work Schemes. 
 
The second Penn Report was completed in early October 1986 and found that 
since April 1985, many South Island gangs, including a number of outlaw 
motorcycle clubs, had been using Contract Work Schemes, and that in total 
they had earned about $1.5 million (Penn, 1986a: p.3) with the “lion’s share 
going to the Black Power gang and ex Black Power members” (Penn, 1986a: 
p.9). The report made it clear that many of the trusts were operating contracts 
for ex-gang members, but its conclusions did not distinguish between these 
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and other gang member orientated trusts. This is both interesting and 
important insomuch as the report was critical of money going to gangs, but it 
was equally critical of money spent on former gang members; people who had 
broken their primary gang connections – something that may have been seen 
as positive. As will become clear, this distinction was missed when the report 
was made public. 
 
Indeed, of the contract jobs highlighted by Penn, the one that raised the 
greatest concern was being undertaken by ex- Black Power members who 
were employed to erect a 327-metre boundary fence and remove a number of 
trees at the Nga Hau E Wha Marae in Christchurch. The total labour cost of 
the contract was just over $55,000, but an independent contractor 
approached by the police estimated the cost of the fencing at just $810 (Penn, 
1986a: p.3). Appendix two of the report makes it clear that the independent 
fencing contractor would have used a mechanical digger to do the work, but 
even allowing for this, and the fact the ex-gang members were “unskilled 
workers”, the report concluded that “there is no way that this fence should 
have cost the amount it did” (Penn, 1986a: ap.2). As will be outlined later, this 
contention was later challenged, but costing estimates by Labour Department 
officials for Contract Work Schemes jobs became a significant issue of 
concern – not just for gangs but all groups using the Contract Work Scheme. 
 
Overall, the second Penn Report (1986a: p.11) noted, “[m]illions of dollars are 
involved and it is clear that huge amounts of public money have been wasted, 
if not misappropriated or stolen, in the South Island”. The report concluded 
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that, “Because of the enormous amounts of money involved, it is our strong 
suspicion that frauds, thefts, extortion and corruption would be revealed in an 
in-depth enquiry” (Penn, 1986a: p.11). 
 
Consequently, led by Detective Senior Sergeant White, an investigation into 
these criminal allegations was launched. White’s findings were detailed in his 
report (the ‘White Report’) dated 19 December 1986. White examined a 
number of cases in Christchurch, where, in monetary value, around three 
quarters of the Contract Work Schemes jobs highlighted by Penn had been 
undertaken. His investigation tracked payments made to the gangs by 
laboriously following paper trails, and in one instance he was aided by 
detailed financial and other records belonging to Black Power’s Christchurch 
chapter, which had been seized by the police in an unrelated gang homicide 
inquiry (White, 1986: p.20). A significant part of White’s investigation, 
however, focused on the organisations directly benefiting from the work 
undertaken at the government’s expense, including the Christchurch City 
Council and the Nga Hau E Wha Marae, and in particular two high-ranking 
city officials who had aided the gangs in getting contract work, in an attempt to 
alleviate gang violence (White, 1986: p.6). 
 
Despite White reporting that both GELS officers and Labour Department 
officials had been uncooperative “to the point of obstruction”, this did not 
“unduly prejudice the enquiry”, which found: “There is no evidence as to the 
commission of any criminal offence by any person in relation to these 
schemes” (White, 1986: pp.19 & 20).  
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Given the lack of criminality, police involvement in the issue would ordinarily 
have stopped there. However, the Invercargill police district commander, 
Superintendent Tommy Thompson, leaked the reports to the media in 
January 1987, an action for which he was later censured by the 
Commissioner of Police, Mal Churches, who “made it very clear to him that he 
had erred in duty and judgement” (NZ Herald, 13.3.1987). A high-ranking 
police officer at the time of the leak told me that the four South Island district 
commanders had decided to release the reports to the media in an effort to 
generate a public backlash against the schemes, and that Superintendent 
Thompson volunteered to do it as he was close to retirement and his career 
would not be greatly affected. My source, however, did add that, “He probably 
didn’t expect the fallout [the censure]; he was a pretty well respected guy”. It 
is certainly clear from the reports that the police involved in the inquiries were 
strongly opposed to the schemes and the large amounts of money that the 
gangs – and others – were gaining from them.  
 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that in the wake of the Moerewa 
riot, then Commissioner of Police Bob Walton supported calls for social 
initiatives to counter the problems of gangs, and as highlighted earlier in this 
chapter he was of the opinion that work schemes had helped temper the anti-
social activities of gangs involved in them. Even the first Penn Report (1986b: 
p.1) stated that unemployment was the “root cause” of the gang problem, but 
gangs having an easy source of income clearly became a concern to the 
police.  
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Remarking on Contract Work Scheme policy, the second Penn Report stated 
that over-costing meant that gangs were effectively being paid to do nothing: 
“It appears that we have reached a stage where we are paying criminals not 
to commit crime because it is cheaper than sending them to jail” (Penn, 
1986a: p.10). It also reported the possibility that, “gang numbers will swell 
because among the unemployed they seem to be the only people able to 
obtain well paid employment” (Penn, 1986a: p.10).  
 
Similarly, the White Report said that the “current political attitude toward 
minority groups” that included “‘falling over backwards’ to assist the 
disadvantaged or the alienated” and “special concern for the Maori Gangs” 
guaranteed government assistance (White, 1986: p.20). Furthermore, it 
stated, “It is repugnant to the average working law abiding citizen to see that 
gangs of persons with known criminal backgrounds are receiving massive 
social welfare handouts, but without obvious criminality evident, then the issue 
is solely political” (White, 1986: pp.20-21).  
 
But when the reports were given to the media, the police findings entered the 
political realm. The most sensational extracts from the confidential documents 
were reported widely, and in effect, certain elements within the police 
became, for all intent and purpose, a lobby group opposing a government 
policy. As will be outlined, the damning headlines and media reports created 
by the leaked documents in late January and early February 1987 were a 
significant influence on public and political support for the Contract Work 
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Schemes evaporating. Although the upper echelons of the police hierarchy 
had initially supported the social agenda, a number of senior police officers 
were influential in its demise, and with that, it will become clear, law 
enforcement became the primary solution to the problem of gangs – a 
situation, it will be recalled from the previous chapter, the police had 
previously believed was untenable. 
 
The Mongrel Mob and the Ambury Park Rape: The Third Pivot 
Point 
The strains on the social policy agenda were building toward the end of 1986; 
the perception that Black Power was on the end of state largesse was causing 
public disquiet, and the government had been informed by police that 
enquiries were raising concerns about the Contract Work Schemes (NZPD, 
vol.474, 1987: p.6691). But it was a violent incident by the Mongrel Mob that 
most alarmed New Zealanders and further contributed to the swift fall of the 
social agenda targeting gangs and established a severe backlash against 
such groups. In fact, the effect of this incident was such that it can be seen as 
marking the third pivot point in New Zealand gang history.  
 
As outlined in Chapter Five, despite striking similarities between the gangs, 
Black Power’s early development had included certain positive influences that 
were in contrast to the Mongrel Mob who were, and remained, a highly 
negative and maverick group. 
 
The Mob was fiercely proud of its reputation as the ‘worst of the worst’, and 
the majority of their membership deliberately rejected any attempts made to 
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change them. An article in the September 1985 issue of Metro magazine, said 
that gangs in Auckland had quietened down (in part due to work schemes) but 
the Mongrel Mob, with their adherence to ‘mongrelism’ explained in Chapter 
Five, was an obvious exception, continuing its public displays of anti-social 
behaviour and activities (Claydon, 1985). 
 
For the Mongrel Mob, their anti-social attitude had become integral to their 
sense of identity, and it was for this reason that the gang rarely participated in 
government work schemes, even when there was a clear monetary 
advantage. Although GELS hired Mongrel Mob members as field workers, the 
organisation was closely associated with Denis O’Reilly whose Black Power 
membership was well known to the Mob, and a number of Mob members 
have told me this caused many in the gang to shun GELS on principle. In 
short, many in the Mob thought the schemes were a ‘Black Power thing’ 
(Winter, 1998: p.248). 
 
There were, however, exceptions to this, including the ‘Gold Coast’ and 
Wairoa Mongrel Mob chapters’ activities noted earlier. But the most notable 
exception was evident in Dunedin where, under the guidance of Mob member 
and GELS field officer Harry Tam, that city’s Mongrel Mob chapter gained 
work using the Contract Work Schemes, and a total of around $95,000 was 
believed to have been paid to the gang or its associates from mid-1985 to late 
1986 (Penn, 1986a: p.10). During this period, that gang claimed to have 
avoided trouble, and Tam said that since participating in work contracts none 
of their members had been jailed (NZ Times, 8.3.1987).  
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One Mongrel Mob member who wanted to replicate this success and change 
the gang’s overall attitude to government funded work was the King Country 
chapter president, Tuhoe ‘Bruno’ Isaac. Isaac established the Nga Kuri Rohe 
Potae46 Trust, and had some success in gaining work contracts for his chapter 
(Isaac, 2007: p.80). Although at the time, the gang denied they were copying 
Black Power’s lead (NZ Herald 11.10.1986), many years later Isaac (2007: 
p.81) said that it was indeed the example being set by Black Power that had 
inspired him. 
 
But gaining work and profit for the gang were not Isaac’s only ambitions. He 
felt that the Mongrel Mob needed national structure and leadership – again, 
like that of Black Power – and he wished to establish himself as the Mob’s 
national president. As noted previously, the Mongrel Mob had a national 
committee, made up of the different chapter presidents, but, unlike Black 
Power, it had nobody at its head and the different chapters were largely 
autonomous. With this autonomy came varying rules between chapters, and 
Isaac hoped that a national president would give greater consistency and 
order to the gang and better position them to seek income from government 
sources. After gaining support from a handful of chapters, Isaac planned to 
raise the idea of a national presidency at the Mongrel Mob’s 1986 convention 
that he was hosting in Auckland.  
 
                                                
46 Translated as ‘The Dog Territory’. 
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Both the nationwide patched street gangs, the Mongrel Mob and Black Power, 
held conventions since the 1970s47. Annual events, they drew the country’s 
chapters together to party, play games of rugby league, and give chapter 
presidents a time to discuss gang business and decide on common policy.  
 
Isaac intended the 1986 Mongrel Mob’s convention to be the place where he 
became the Mob’s first national president and to provide a showcase whereby 
the gang could gain public favour. He hoped that this would show 
organisations and city councils that they could employ the Mob using Contract 
Work Schemes and other state assistance with confidence. 
 
The man who gave rise to the idea of a national president was the secretary 
of the Nga Kuri Rohe Potae Trust, and one of Isaac’s right hand men, an 
Egyptian immigrant named George Mamfredos. Always well groomed and 
dressed, Mamfredos did not look like a stereotypical Mob member, but he was 
no saint, having done time for manslaughter after stabbing his brother-in-law 
to death in 1982 (Du Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.142). Indeed, it was in jail that 
Isaac first met Mamfredos and, impressed by his business acumen, decided 
to patch him up after his release, despite describing his fitting in with the gang 
being akin to “a square peg in a round hole” (Isaac, 2007: p.79). Although 
strict rules around prospecting existed in most chapters of the street gangs, 
the Mongrel Mob were, and remain, inclined to give patches out at the 
discretion of the president if he sees it is in the gang’s (or his) best interests, 
something I have often heard discussed among Mob members. In one 
                                                
47 For a lively description of the Black Power convention of 1980, see O’Reilly (1981). 
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instance during the mid-1980s, this included – embarrassingly, for the gang - 
giving a patch to an undercover police officer who was operating in the lower 
North Island (Former undercover police officer 2007 pers. comm.). 
 
Mamfredos rarely wore his patch and as the person charged with gaining 
employment opportunities via work schemes, this was seen as sensible. He 
was often the ‘respectable’ front for his and Isaac’s plans. Chef Inspector 
Gerry Hugglestone, who had dealings with Mamfredos, said, “Some would 
say he had a certain charm. I would call it an oily smarminess” (Jones, 1987: 
p.25). Despite Mamfredos’s pronouncements at the time that his involvement 
with the gang was to steer it away from anti-social and destructive activities, it 
is likely his motives were to turn the Mob into a vehicle for obtaining money 
and power. Inspector Hugglestone told me in 2005 that he felt Mamfredos 
was only involved with the gang for his own ends. Some members of the Mob 
told me similar things; namely, that Mamfredos saw the Mongrel Mob as a 
force that could be turned into vast money making organisation – either 
through legal or illegal means.  
 
Although he was promising much, Mamfredos’ involvement sat uneasily with 
many within the gang – despite being patched, he was seen as something of 
an outsider involved in Mob affairs. A number of members have told me they 
had never heard of Mamfredos before he appeared in the media prior to the 
convention of 1986, when he was speaking on the gang’s behalf. At a time 
when leadership was largely earned by exploits proven during inter (or intra) 
gang conflict, it did not rest well with many.  
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Ahead of the conference, Mamfredos was energetically pursuing a Mongrel 
Mob public relations campaign: “We are taking the opportunity [of this 
convention] to better ourselves as a whole rather than a token few” (NZ 
Herald 11.10.1986). “We really want to change our ways and become a 
positive social force, something that will benefit the community and the 
economy” (NZ Herald 27.10.1986). Although he portrayed an upbeat vision for 
the gang, he also reinforced this with less than veiled threats. Mamfredos 
warned that without government assistance, the fears of police would be 
realised and the Mob would become urban terrorists (NZ Herald 27.10.1986).  
 
In an effort to ensure that things went to plan, Isaac and Mamfredos 
proclaimed a moratorium on violence during the convention. Mamfredos also 
announced that the Mob had banned women from the event; something he 
said was a “practical” measure because after three days smoking and 
drinking, members could become “a bit amorous” (Dominion 12.12.1986). 
Indeed, Mob members had become ‘a bit amorous’ during the 1985 
convention, after which six members had been convicted of rape.  
 
After being approached by the gang, the Auckland Regional Authority (ARA) 
granted the Mob use of part of a 160-hectare farm called Ambury Park in 
South Auckland – despite complaints from locals who felt they had not been 
consulted. The chair of the ARA’s Reserves Committee, Alan Brewster, said 
the park was open for any groups to use “as long as they were not disruptive 
to nearby residents” (NZ Herald 11.12.1986). 
386 
 
 
The major force behind gang work schemes, former Prime Minister Rob 
Muldoon, walked around the convention on its first day, the 12th of December 
1986. Just two weeks before, he had told the Royal Police College that gangs 
could be turned away from violence and toward constructive work “in spite of 
the cynicism of many of the public and indeed the police” (Evening Post 
27.11.1986).  
 
Two days after Muldoon’s stroll among the gang members, and on the third 
and final morning of the convention, the day on which Isaac was going to 
press for the creation of a national president, a woman went to the police 
saying she had been raped at Ambury Park. Surrounded by police, the 
woman sought to identify the men she said had attacked her in what Justice 
Tomkins later described as “a series of the most gross and brutal conduct it is 
possible to imagine” (Du Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.156). But before exploring 
the details and outcomes of the rape, it is important to consider the sexual 
dynamics of gangs in the 1980s. 
 
Women in Gangs 
Although some changes have occurred since and women began to play a 
greater role within gangs, in the 1980s females in the gang scene were 
afforded little regard. As Jankowski (1991: p.146) found in his U.S. based 
research, “women were considered a form of property”. Notwithstanding a few 
exceptions during both the outlaw clubs’ and patched street gangs’ formative 
stages, women were, and are, denied membership to these gangs. As with 
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the findings of Veno (2003) and Wolf (1991) different status was given to 
women depending on their relationship to a member of the gang. But even the 
partners of gang members, who had the highest status among gang women, 
were generally viewed as instruments to be used for traditional domestic 
duties and sexual favours (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: pp.88-91). In 1981, a 
Highway 61 president in Auckland, when asked about girlfriends or wives of 
members said simply, “They take second place to the club” (Williams, 1981: 
p.43). But there were clear rules around partners of gang member, who were 
off limits to the other members, particularly in outlaw clubs: “You’d never 
touch another patched member’s woman or another member’s woman or a 
prospect's woman – I’ve never seen that happen” (Blu 2006 pers. comm.). 
 
For those females unattached to a gang member, their roles were primarily to 
provide sexual services to various members. Often this took the form of 
‘blocking’ - group sex consensually or through rape, referred to by some 
gangs in the U.S. as ‘pulling the train’ (J. W. Moore, Vigil, & Levy, 1995: p.32). 
The reasons why women often accepted this sexual treatment are both 
psychological and social and are discussed in detail in Dennehy and Newbold 
(2001). 
 
One Mongrel Mob member described blocking like this: 
 
After waiting hours for my turn I entered the room to find a young 
woman – unwashed, covered in semen, blood and sexual juices, and 
reeking of sexual aroma and alcohol – waiting for the next taker. The 
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sex was forceful and impersonal, anything went and there was only 
one rule: no names were ever to be spoken. Guys would slap your 
backside to urge you on as they stood around watching the spectacle. 
If the woman didn’t perform for whatever reason – inebriation or being 
wasted on drugs – it was nothing a punch in the head or a black eye 
wouldn’t fix. It was considered cool to be involved in a block but weak 
for it to become loving or intimate. This form of sex – whether you want 
to call it a ‘block’ or a rape – was the norm to us (Isaac, 2007: p.37). 
 
By the 1980s, certain outlaw motorcycle clubs were passing specific ‘no rape’ 
policies, but perhaps the first gang to do so was the Black Power that passed 
a decree banning rape in 1978 at their convention in Tokoroa (Rei Harris, 
1999 pers. comm.). The man who championed the ban, Black Power’s 
National President, Rei Harris, was not there to see his policy pass – at the 
time, he was in jail for raping a prostitute. Many years later, he told me the 
charge was a fix-up. Certainly, he appeared sincere in his ‘no rape’ rule. In 
1990, Harris said that raping women used to occur “on a weekly basis” but 
since the rule was in place, “there have only been three convictions for rape – 
none of them gang rape” (Stirling, 1990: p.11).  
 
The veracity of the claim is unclear. It appears that rape involving Black 
Power members did occur, but did not make it to court. The Black Power 
hierarchy dealt with some instances internally through quasi-traditional Maori 
methods on marae, involving a form of restorative justice using shame and 
financial compensation (Consedine, 1995: p.86). In 1999, Harris told me that 
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the last depatching for rape happened in 1994, “and that was a president so 
he got it real hard”.  
 
In the gang realm, the act of rape has been clouded in ambiguity due to gang 
dynamics and logic. For some, if a woman was at a gang address, then the 
implicit understanding was that she knew the rules and should expect what 
she got. As King Cobra leader, Nari Felix Meleisea said, 
 
In the King Cobras we used to do that all the time but we were lucky, in 
those days they didn’t report us. When a Sheila came she knew what 
was going to happen, she was going to be blocked, gang raped (cited 
in Payne & Quinn, 1997: p.109). 
 
Similarly, one Mongrel Mob leader told me: 
 
I mean, fuck! If a woman comes back to the fuckin’ pad what does she 
fuckin’ expect, eh. Assume the fuckin’ position, bitch (Dennis Makalio 
2004 pers. comm.) 
 
Certainly, many women familiar with the gang scene knew what was expected 
of them and were complicit in blocks. An entry in ‘Jane’s’ diary, from 
sometime around the late 1970s, reads, “The Black Power disco [regularly 
held on Saturday nights in the Aro Valley Hall] turned out to be pretty heavy. 
Four girls got blocked – the same ones as usual” (cited in Desmond, 2009: 
p.181). One Black Power leader, in speaking of blocking during the 1980s 
390 
 
said, “It wasn’t rape…at the end of the day some girls came wanting to have 
fun. They want to be part of the scene”. 
 
In recent times – even though such activities have become much less 
common – I have witnessed women actively engaging in public sexual acts 
with gang members and at certain times more than one member at a time. 
Many gang members and gang women I have spoken to, however, give 
numerous scenarios when a consensual block has led to a rape complaint. 
These scenarios include: feeling regret once the effect of alcohol or drugs has 
worn off; being unable to explain signs of sexual intercourse to a boyfriend; 
being willing to have sex with one or even several members of a gang but 
balking when more joined the queue; or being disrespected or beaten during 
or after sex. One member of the Devil’s Henchmen motorcycle club put it like 
this: 
 
There were women who would love it and go from one guy to another – 
for the fun and excitement of it all, as long as it wasn’t too extreme. 
There are some girls out there. But I tell you this, of all the “rapes” I’ve 
seen, 99% of them will take it sweet. No problem at all as long as they 
are treated well. If you send a prospect home with them to give them a 
cuddle it never becomes rape. It only becomes rape when they get 
fucked off – their bags rifled through, clothes thrown on the fire, 
chucked out of the clubhouse naked, that sort of thing (Woody 2006 
pers. comm.) 
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One police officer described a case in Wellington where a woman had been 
taken from a gang hotel to an empty section next to the pad and raped. The 
“drunken, foul mouthed young lass” was unconcerned by the sexual activity, 
but furious that the gang had cut her clothing off with a knife (Forbes, 1997: 
p.166).  
 
Although blocking was becoming synonymous with gangs by the 1980s, and 
in one gang rape trial the defence suggested it was a part of gang culture 
(Evening Post, 15.3.1986), as Ritchie and Ritchie (1990: p.55) pointed out in 
1990, “all multiple rape is not committed by gangs. It occurred throughout 
history long before modern gangs emerged. It is a sad fact of bad male 
behaviour in groups”. Be this as it may, rape was perceived, correctly, as a 
significant gang activity since the 1970s and had attracted much media 
interest and attention. Notable cases included, the Biker Federation clubs at 
Silverstream blocking a 19 year old waitress during Queen’s Birthday 
Weekend in 1975 (Truth 23.9.1975), and an attack by members of the Head 
Hunters – although wrongly identified in some media as the Mongrel Mob – 
who took a 14-year old girl from an Auckland city pub back to their pad, 
undressed, raped and beat her, before throwing her out of a moving car (NZ 
Herald 8.9.1978). But no case received the degree of attention of the Ambury 
Park rape in 1986.  
 
The Rape and the Beginnings of a Backlash 
Indeed, it was the lurid accounts of the rape that created such significant 
public repulsion and ensured that whatever public sympathy existed toward 
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gangs turned to anger. The following accounts, then, are important to 
contextualise the backlash against the social agenda as well as the 
subsequent turn toward gangs being seen solely as an issue of law and order.  
 
The sexual assault at Ambury Park was reported immediately and widely, but 
during the trial of those accused of the rape the episode was relived, and at 
the conclusion of the trial both the Listener and Metro magazines reported the 
rape in detail that horrified the public. 
 
In describing her ordeal, the woman said that she had had a fight with her 
boyfriend and had gone out drinking on her own. On returning from the pub, 
she found her boyfriend was not home and so she decided to take his dog for 
a walk in the vicinity of the convention at Ambury Park. It was an unusual 
decision given that the woman was not naive about the Mob, she had a 
relation in the gang and therefore knew what they were capable of (Du 
Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.134). It was after 9.30pm, possibly as late as 11pm 
– the woman’s story varied (Du Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.144) – when she 
said a dark car cruised up beside her and a man asked her for directions. Not 
quite hearing him, she moved closer and the man reached out and snatched 
her cardigan and dragged her through the car window. Mob members that I 
have spoken to dispute this, saying she came to the convention of her own 
volition – something whispered about around the courthouse but never raised 
during the rape trials (Jones, 1987: p.29). Either way, she was soon in the 
midst of 400-500 Mongrel Mob members. Initially, some of the members 
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offered her a drink and a smoke and some teased and jostled her, but the 
horseplay soon became rougher: 
 
All I can remember is being mucked about on the grass. Bit by bit they 
were taking my clothes off… First they ripped off my cardigan and took 
my purse and hand bag. Then they threw me on the ground and ripped 
my jeans and tank top off. I was screaming but nobody took any 
notice…One of them ripped my knickers off. They weren’t kissing me, 
they were feeling my breasts and all that… we were near some 
bushes, there were some cars around. I was stumbling along, trying to 
get away and they were pushing me between them, grabbing at me, 
trying to feel me up, hitting me in the face, pulling at my hair a lot. And 
then this guy raped me (Du Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.136). 
 
More men followed. In the gaps between being raped the woman tried to 
escape but “when I ran away they caught me again and lay me down on the 
ground and started putting their hands all over me again. Putting their fingers 
in my vagina and all that…” (Du Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.137). After another 
sustained period of abuse, she managed to free herself and fled toward the 
stage on which a band had been playing. She thought that if she was in the 
brighter light somebody would come and help her. Despite the presence of a 
number of Maori wardens, none came to her assistance (Du Chateau & 
Roger, 1987: p.154). One Mobster approached the naked woman. He says he 
asked her, “What are you doing here?” and that she replied she had been 
raped and that she had only come to the convention to look for a friend. He 
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said, “You were stupid to come here at all” (Jones, 1987: p.23). He told her 
that he felt sorry for her and covered her with a blanket or sleeping bag and 
took her away from the stage: 
 
He held my hand and led me over to a white van which was parked 
near the stage. I went with this man because I hoped he would take me 
home” (Jones, 1987: p.23). 
 
The van was not to be a vehicle to safety. The Mobster had in fact led her to 
the place where the worst of the abuse would take place. Mobsters crowded 
around the open back door of the van, from where they would hold her legs 
open. When those in the van had finished with her, they would leave through 
the side door and one of those standing at the back door would step in and 
take his place. In the 45 minutes that one of the gang was there, he said the 
woman was raped ten times or more (Jones, 1987: p.24). The abuse lasted 
for hours. 
 
She pleaded for help. “I remember one man leaving…I grabbed him by the 
back of his jacket…I asked him to help, but he just looked at me and crawled 
out of the van” (Jones, 1987: p.24). She had a torch and a beer bottle inserted 
in her vagina, and the mobsters called her a bitch and a slut. More men raped 
her and forced her to perform oral sex:  
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One guy put his penis in my mouth and told me to suck it. He was 
getting really angry and yelling at me to ‘suck, suck’ (Du Chateau & 
Roger, 1987: p.137). 
 
She tried to elicit sympathy from the men by telling them she had a son, but 
the Mobsters just mocked her. All the while the hard floor of the van was 
rubbing her back raw: 
 
I asked for a mattress because I was getting sore. They got one and 
stuck it under me. They kept raping me in turn. I was always held by 
people inside the van while others took their turn. There was always 
somebody holding my legs up. It was later when the gang members got 
tired…They stopped holding me for a while and got restless. There was 
actually no one raping me and I jumped out and tried to run away. I 
was very sore and I couldn’t run very fast. I didn’t even know which 
way I was running. I knew I was running towards some bushes. One of 
the gang members chased me and grabbed me. Several of them 
carried me back to the van. They started pouring things on me. I could 
smell petrol. One poured beer on me, and I looked up, saw this big fat 
man and he urinated on me. After they did this, they picked me up and 
threw me back in the van. They started to rape me again (Jones, 1987: 
p.24). 
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The sun was coming up over Ambury Park before she finally got away. 
Naked, she ran past tired Mobsters milling around, some yelled and whistled 
at her but none bothered with her, the gang had decided their fun was over.  
 
The lurid details of the Ambury Park rape, as they unfolded before the 
Auckland High Court in June 1987, had a significant effect on public and 
political attitudes toward the social agenda. Even before the full details were 
to emerge, the Ambury Park rape added volatile fuel to the debate brewing 
over gang work schemes. The ARA, in the sights of angry residents for 
allowing Ambury Park to be used for the convention, were told that 
“somebody would hang” for allowing the Mongrel Mob to camp at Ambury 
Park (NZ Herald 15.12.1986). The ARA responded rather meekly by saying it 
would reconsider employing gang work trusts (NZ Herald 16.12.1986). This 
view was almost certainly given impetus several days later by media reports 
that a vehicle owned by a Mongrel Mob trust – and bought with government 
funds – was used in the robbery of a Post Office in Albany North of Auckland 
(NZ Herald 8.1.1987). The Mob denied involvement, claiming the vehicle had 
been sold before the robbery, although the vehicle’s ownership papers had 
not been changed (NZ Herald 15.1.1987). On its own, the story of the robbery 
would almost certainly have created significant disquiet, but after the events of 
Ambury Park, the rape was the prime media focus. 
 
As the police began to investigate the rape complaint, Mamfredos publicly 
declared that the perpetrators of the attack would be ‘depatched’ and brought 
to justice (NZ Herald 16.12.1986), despite the fact that he had no authority 
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within the Mob to bring this about. The man brought into the gang for his 
business acumen was acutely aware of the public relations nightmare 
unfolding, and in a desperate attempt to regain focus on his message, 
Mamfredos attempted to link the rape to the Mob’s lack of access to work 
training schemes (Dominion 16.12.1986). Isaac, too, wanted to regain control 
of the situation. 
 
As the police swarmed around Ambury Park on the final morning of the 
convention, the meeting in which Isaac was going to argue for a national 
president was cancelled, but he was yet to abandon hope that he could show 
leadership. He too sought to bring those responsible to criminal, and not 
gang, justice and in doing so he and Mamfredos cooperated with the police 
(Evening Post 20.12.1986) – the ultimate gang sin. At that point, Mamfredos’ 
association with the gang was effectively over and within a month he had 
resigned from the Nga Kuri Rohe Potae Trust (NZ Herald 4.2.1987). At a 
meeting of all Mongrel Mob presidents called in the wake of Ambury Park, 
Isaac was fronted and forced to hand over his patch and was lucky, he says, 
not to “get taken out or at least given the bash” (Isaac, 2007: p.93). A strong 
and previously well-respected leader, his ambition had clouded his judgment 
badly. In trying to gain a position at the head of the Mongrel Mob, he had lost 
his membership, which in his mind was all that he had. Isaac (2007: p.89) 
said, “I was stupid to think the Mob mentality could change. I was trying to 
instill a little bit of positivity into something that has been steeped in negativity 
since its inception”. 
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On the morning the rape complainant was taken back to Ambury Park by 
police, the victim was only able to identify two of the perpetrators. Many of the 
Mobsters had already left the park but twelve more arrests were made in the 
days and weeks after the convention. Some were arrested after being 
identified by the woman in police line-ups, and others from photos from the 99 
rolls of film used at the convention by the gang and confiscated by police (Du 
Chateau & Roger, 1987: p.152), some of which contained images of the 
woman being raped.  
 
The fact that the Mobsters took any photos of the rape suggests either a 
terrible lack of forethought – exacerbated by drugs and alcohol – or an 
ambivalence to consequence, both are possible, but equally likely is the 
possibility that the gang members involved were not expecting a complaint to 
be laid. Despite, or perhaps in defiance of, Mamfredos’ instruction barring 
females, two Mongrel Mob members have told me that the gang blocked a 
few women that night. None of the others laid complaints, and I have been 
told by Mob members that all were willing participants. 
 
Eventually eleven Mob members were brought before the courts in connection 
with the attack on the woman at Ambury Park, after charges against three 
were dropped due to insufficient evidence. Eventually, nine pleaded guilty or 
were found guilty of rape and/or sexual violation, and two were found not 
guilty. Those found guilty received jail terms of between five and seven-and-a 
half years (Du Chateau & Roger, 1987: pp.150 & 156). 
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The 1986 convention, which was meant to be herald a change for the Mongrel 
Mob, proved to be a public relations disaster. Never before had the gang’s 
negative activities been so publicly and thoroughly exposed. It was, however, 
an important changing event, as it marked the third pivot point in the history of 
New Zealand gangs. The rape, occurring at a time when the Mob had 
promised the public it was changing for the better, meant any remaining 
positive public sentiment held about gangs and sympathy toward government 
funded work schemes evaporated. Although it was a Mongrel Mob rape, it 
became a wider gang issue to a public unable or unwilling to distinguish one 
gang from another. Already precariously placed within a radically changing 
political environment, the social policy agenda that had dominated political 
thinking since 1979 was effectively over. And as the details of the rape were 
fully exposed during and after the trial, calls for a forceful approach toward 
gangs only became louder.  
 
The Demise of the Social Agenda 
In review, then, in the short period between mid-August 1986 and late 
January 1987, a ‘perfect storm’ of controversy emerged surrounding the social 
policy agenda. Minister of Employment, Kerry Burke, following media 
revelations in August 1986 of Black Power’s perceived profiteering and 
informed by the police that the Penn investigations were uncovering 
significant concerns a month later, instructed an audit team to examine the 
administration of the Contract Work Schemes (NZPD, vol.474, 1987: p.6691). 
Before the audit was completed, the Ambury Park rape occurred on 
December 14. 
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Submitted to Burke on December 22, the audit report found that gangs were 
not doing anything illegal and that many of the police examples of ‘rip-offs’ 
cited in the second Penn report had been taken out of context, including the 
work undertaken at the Nga Hau E Wha national marae (Cave, Glover, & 
Fisher, 1986). However, it did conclude that the schemes suffered from 
administrative laxity on the part of labour department officials, or what the 
Department of Labour later reported as “serious inadequacies” (AJHR, G.1, 
1987: p.44).  
 
It became clear that in certain instances, some gangs had manipulated the 
Contract Work Schemes in at least two different ways: one was to employ 
contractors to undertake the work at a lesser rate than the gang was being 
paid; another was to use mechanical equipment for jobs quoted on the basis 
on manual labour (NZ Herald 23.1.1987). In these ways, gangs were gaining 
income without putting in the work; and thereby defeating the purpose of the 
work schemes.  
 
However, it was not just the gangs who took advantage of the schemes. The 
Department of Labour’s Employment Services Director, Sam Jamieson, said 
that numerous groups had formed trusts and used the Contract Work 
Schemes and that only a quarter of all contracts approved were undertaken 
by gangs (Evening Post, 4.2.1987). The Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, 
said that the amount of money involved in funding gangs was “peanuts” 
compared with other abuses of the schemes – particularly those done by 
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public bodies. He argued that local authorities had been using government-
paid workers to do jobs they should have been financing themselves, or 
should not have been doing at all. “It is my guess that city councils and so on 
have done far better out of these schemes than gangs ever have” (NZ Herald 
3.2.1987). Nevertheless, the gangs were the sole focus of negative media and 
public attention. 
 
In response to the audit report, Burke imposed a moratorium on the Contract 
Work Schemes to take effect from 12 January 1987 (NZPD, vol.474, 1987: 
p.6690). Less than two weeks later, police reports stemming from the Penn 
and White investigations, discussed earlier, were made available to the 
media, further fuelling a new wave of damning publicity.  
 
Despite the schemes being introduced while they had held power, the 
National Party now attacked the government, calling on Burke to resign (NZ 
Herald 24.1.1987). National MP Bruce Townsend said the government had 
been “buying peace with the gangs, using hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
taxpayers’ money” (NZ Herald 24.1.1987). Denis O’Reilly pointed out that, in 
many ways, this was in fact the purpose of the schemes (NZ Herald 
28.1.1987) but the tide of public and political opinion was now against him and 
other exponents of the social agenda. Under extreme political pressure, in 
early February 1987, the Labour government abruptly axed the Contract Work 
Schemes. 
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At least two media commentators, Murray McLaughlin, political editor of the 
New Zealand Times (8.2.1987), and David Beatson, editor of the Listener 
(21.2.1987), pointed out that the axing of the Contract Work Schemes was a 
knee-jerk reaction suggesting the positives of the schemes needed to be 
exemplified and the obvious administrative problems fixed. It was an 
interesting, but ultimately overlooked, view as pragmatism made way for 
politics. 
 
The New Zealand Committee of Inquiry into Violence offered a further sober 
reflection, and its report (the ‘Roper Report’, so named after the chair of the 
committee, Justice Sir Clinton Roper) was submitted in March 1987. It stated 
that, while having “no desire” to become involved in “the present controversy 
concerning gang work schemes”, it felt “bound to say that on the evidence 
produced to us, many of those schemes had positive results in reducing 
offending and anti-social behaviour of those who participated in them” 
(Committee of Inquiry into Violence, 1987: p.88). Furthermore, the committee 
gave its assessment of the gang situation, stating that, “There is probably no 
subject in the field of law and order that can provoke more selective and 
distorted coverage from the media, or a more emotive, an often ill-informed, 
rhetoric from those in authority, than gangs” (Committee of Inquiry into 
Violence, 1987: p.87).  
 
Its most stinging criticism, however, was reserved for the New Zealand Police, 
whose submission to the committee gave its members “real cause for 
concern” (Committee of Inquiry into Violence, 1987: p.88). Acknowledging it 
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was rare to criticise any submission, the committee lambasted the police for 
their completely negative attitude toward gangs that was not supported by 
facts and that activities or actions of certain gang members were seen as a 
reflection of all gangs and their members, something the committee said it 
“cannot accept”. They recommended that “the Police review their whole 
attitude to the question of gangs” (Committee of Inquiry into Violence, 1987: 
pp.88-91).  The committee pointed out that, despite the grave concern held by 
police, in 1981, they said gang membership numbered 2,300 (Committee on 
Gangs, 1981: p.6) and in 1987 they supplied the Roper committee with figures 
of 2,200 – including ‘prospects’ and ‘associates’ (Committee of Inquiry into 
Violence, 1987: p.89), suggesting that gang numbers remained stable. 
However, given the methodological problems often involved in gaining gang 
numbers (Covey, 2003: p.25; Maxson & Klein, 1996), these data were 
perhaps not necessarily an accurate reflection of the gang scene.  
 
The report concluded that, “despite the attention periodically given them, 
gangs are one of the least of this country’s worries and, indeed, to some 
extent, they are a result of those more serious concerns” (Committee of 
Inquiry into Violence, 1987: p.88). 
 
Reflecting the dogged and uncompromising manner that contributed to his 
downfall as Prime Minister, the major champion of putting gangs to work, 
Muldoon, now the opposition MP for Tamaki, lamented the government 
“suddenly and hastily” abandoning the Contract Work Schemes simply 
“because of public outcry” (NZPD, vol.477, 1987: p.6712). He acknowledged 
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the “shocking rape” at Ambury Park but pointed out that the Mongrel Mob was 
wanting to change, and work schemes were the only way to enable that to 
happen. He also dismissed concerns around gangs gaining contracts to do 
manual labour and instead hiring mechanical equipment to complete them, 
saying it “showed some initiative” (NZPD, vol.477, 1987: p.6712). But 
Muldoon was a lone voice in defending the schemes and the National Party, 
with an eye on the August election, was on the offensive. In unison, its MPs 
played to the gallery of public opinion, and in a supercharged and emotive 
environment, populist policy came to the fore. Few questioned what the gangs 
would do now that there was less opportunity for members to work.  
 
Before the Roper Report was submitted, the National Opposition began to 
publicly reframe the gang issue. In mid-February 1987, National’s leader Jim 
Bolger, released his party’s law and order policy and said if it were 
government it would not use “kid gloves” in dealing with gangs (NZ Herald 
18.2.1987). Laws against criminal consorting, removing gang “fortresses”, 
enabling greater use of electronic surveillance, and increasing the maximum 
penalty for rape were key features of their policy (New Zealand National 
Party, 1987). Although it subsequently lost the 1987 election, National had 
signalled the changing political attitude toward gangs; no longer were gangs 
viewed as a wider social problem, but as problem of law and order. As the 
shocking details of the Ambury Park rape case were widely reported during 
and after the June 1987 trial, the tough approach undoubtedly reflected public 
opinion and the Roper Report was quickly forgotten.  
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One further factor in this changing attitude toward gangs may have come from 
the fact the membership of such groups was maturing, a point I will expand on 
in the following chapter. Dover Samuels, the Maori representative on the 
Labour Party Council, summed up this point of view by saying, “They can no 
longer be classified as irresponsible teenagers” (NZ Herald 16-12-1986). 
 
Following a portfolio reshuffle after the 1987 election, the new Minister of 
Police, Peter Tapsell, a highly conservative Maori Labour MP, outlined the 
Labour government’s stance toward gangs. In speaking to Pacific Islands 
Monthly (October 1987) magazine, he said, “We have had a gutful of mindless 
thuggery of some gang members, and I am determined that it will be stopped 
in its tracks” and that lawlessness would be “dealt with immediately and 
severely”.  
 
It was the beginning of a cycle of political rhetoric, as both the National and 
Labour parties battled to position themselves as the party taking the toughest 
line on gangs. In 1988, National MP Ross Meurant, the former head of the 
infamous police ‘Red Squad’ that had battled anti-tour protestors with shields 
and batons in the civil unrest during the 1981 South African rugby tour, began 
to posit strong police action, saying, “The only thing these gang members 
understand is the long end of an aluminium police PR24 baton” (NZ Herald 
13.10.1988). Meurant, in a style reminiscent of Gideon Tait, said that if he 
were the Minister of Police he would take a team policing unit, give its 
leadership to an ex-Red Squad commander, and “tour the country 
systematically mopping up the element who intimidate and terrify people in 
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the malls and streets of our small towns and cities” (NZPD, 1988, vol.494: 
p,8233). It heralded the return to ascendancy of those favouring law and order 
as the primary response to gangs. 
 
In a sign of things to come in the 1990s, the government embarked on 
legislative measures to combat the gangs. In 1987, Amendments to the 
Violent Offences Act allowed for greater powers of surveillance, such as 
electronic ‘bugging’. And at the same time, changes were made to Section 
695A of the Local Government Act giving powers to remove gang 
fortifications. The interception or ‘bugging’ law enabled the police to apply to a 
High Court Judge for warrants to intercept private communications by an 
“organised criminal enterprise” (NZ Herald 1-5-1987). The Committee on 
Violence was unconvinced by the need for greater bugging laws, but they did 
think fortifications were “quite unacceptable and that not only did they pose 
very real problems” and that they “surely heighten the feelings of isolation of 
the occupants” (Committee of Inquiry into Violence, 1987: p.91-2). Heightened 
feelings of isolation were not a concern shared by those inside the palisades. 
In fact, of all the legislative measures hitherto targeting gangs, attempts to 
remove their fortifications were the ones most fiercely objected to.  
 
As an indication of their increasing organisation, many outlaw motorcycle 
clubs participated in the select committee process. The Tribesmen drew up a 
petition, signed by their neighbours, in support of their fence (Dominion 
16.1.1988), at least one chapter of the Highway 61 lobbied their local 
government (Evening Post 20.5.1987), while representatives from Galgoffa, 
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Hell’s Angels, Outlaws, Satan’s Slaves, and Sinn Fein all made submissions 
to the select committee examining the proposed law change (NZ Herald 
4.6.1987). Although the legislation was passed by parliament, it quickly ran 
into legal difficulties. Any definition of the target problem tended to omit 
certain gang fortifications or include some common house fences. 
Subsequently, police applications to remove fortifications simply got bogged 
down by gang appeals and a Ministerial Report (1989) late in the decade 
concluded that the law was unworkable.  
 
Despite this failure, more laws were forthcoming. In 1989, changes to the 
Criminal Justice Act allowed courts to impose non-association orders on 
convicted persons, while amendments to the Summary Offences Act 
empowered the police to disperse groups of people threatening the public 
order. The laws were clearly targeting gangs and their anti-social activities, 
but it appears neither has been widely used. 
 
Within this new political environment that favoured a suppressive approach, 
despite a positive review of their operations in September 1986 (Plunkett et 
al., 1986) and ongoing positive remarks in the Labour Department’s annual 
reports (AJHR, G.1, 1987: p.54; AJHR, G.1, 1988; p.34), GELS was 
disestablished in 1989 and the social policy agenda targeting gangs was 
officially over.  
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Conclusion 
The social policy agenda that dominated thinking around gangs for much of 
the 1980s was a unique period in New Zealand’s gang history. During this 
period, gangs were seen as a social problem that required social redress. 
Despite this acceptance, however, the scope of the social policies targeting 
gangs was extremely limited, and primarily focused on the issue of 
unemployment. As has been outlined in the earlier theory chapters of this 
thesis, however, gang researchers have found that the issues around gang 
formation and maturation are complex and comprise a multitude of different 
social factors. Despite some rhetorical political flourishes and the conclusions 
of the Comber Report in 1981 acknowledging the complexity of the issue, it 
was unemployment that took primacy in New Zealand. In this way, the root 
causes of gang formation were rarely challenged, and indeed, as outlined in 
the previous chapter, influenced by people like Denis O’Reilly, Prime Minister 
Muldoon – who formed a unique relationship with the gangs – made it clear 
that he was not seeking to disband the gangs but redirect them into positive 
organisations. With this in mind, the Contract Work Schemes were 
established so that the gangs could undertake work as collectives, thus 
providing employment to gangs without seeking to reduce gang numbers.    
 
Given this, the social agenda targeting gangs could not have, and indeed 
never sought to, rid New Zealand of gangs. Measures of its success, 
therefore, can only be judged against its goals to mitigate gang violence and 
to ensure that gang members did not become further alienated from society, 
primarily by engaging them in work. Without specific measures, a judgement 
on this cannot be definitively stated, but certainly at the time, as expressed by 
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numerous commentaries noted above, and including that of the Roper Report, 
in these areas GELS and the work schemes were seen as successful.  
 
The demise of the social agenda, then, came about not because of a 
perceived lack of effectiveness but due to a radical changing political 
environment suspicious of interventionist policies and a ‘perfect storm’ of 
controversy, which included several high profile issues, that sapped political 
and public support from the measures targeting gangs. 
 
Clearly, a negative factor related to the social policy agenda was the         
administrative deficiencies and serious flaws of the Contract Work Schemes, 
brought to political – and, in turn, public – attention by the police, which 
allowed gangs, in certain instances, to profiteer from them. Gangs being seen 
to afford luxury vehicles at a time when unemployment and hardship were rife, 
was never going to engender in the public anything but distain. As was noted 
by some commentators, however, these deficiencies could have been fixed, 
and the schemes putting gangs to work maintained – the original PEP 
schemes, for example, did not allow for abuse –, but the backlash from the 
‘perfect storm’ proved politically irresistible to a government with a free market 
agenda and little appetite interventionist work schemes. 
 
Most critically, however, it was not just work programmes targeting gangs that 
were destroyed when the Contract work Schemes were axed, gone too was 
any real acknowledgement that gangs are a consequence of negative social 
conditions, and with this the demise of GELS. Without a policy drive to put 
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gangs to work, a vacuum of solutions to the problem of gangs was created 
and this was filled by political commentary about ‘getting tough’ on gangs. 
And here can be found the significance of the Ambury Park rape. The assault 
at Ambury Park was not atypical of gangs at the time, but its timing, when 
elements within the Mongrel Mob were publicly espousing that the gang was 
changing for the better, and, importantly, the graphic nature of the media 
coverage, meant a tough suppressive response, and not social policy 
adjustment, was what the public demanded.  
 
As will become clear in the following chapters, within the new milieu of 
political and public thought, gangs shifted from being a symptom of wider 
social problems to being seen as a distinct problem that were the cause of 
social ills. It was a significant change in perception. Gangs no longer required 
social redress, but strong repressive action. In many ways the gangs had not 
changed; the society around them had. 
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8. An Evolutionary Shift: - c1990s 
 
Introduction 
As the final decade of the 20th century dawned, New Zealand’s economy was 
in dire shape and in many areas hardship was rife. Both directly and indirectly, 
the anaemic economy significantly influenced new developments in the gang 
scene. One such development was the advent of different forms of gangs, 
namely white power – predominantly skinhead – groups. 
 
Although not occurring in isolation, the economic situation also affected the 
patched gang scene in important ways. The most publicly recognisable of 
these changes was a move into profit driven criminal enterprise – the focus of 
the chapter to follow – but this move was just part of an important evolutionary 
shift whereby, with different degrees of advancement, patched gangs became 
sophisticated ‘grey organisations’ deeply embedded within certain 
communities.  
 
This chapter will examine the political changes occurring in the early 1990s 
and the continuing deterioration of the economy, and linking these structural 
factors to gang changes and maturation. It will explore the aging nature of 
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gang membership and the growing sophistication evident within patched 
gangs. It will also highlight the gang/community balance – forged from an 
acceptance of gang permanence – that had evolved by the 1990s and a 
successful template employed by police to quell gang behaviour that 
breached what communities were prepared to tolerate. 
 
Political and Economic Influences on Gang Formation and 
Change 
As the country went to the polls for the general election in October 1990, 
widespread disillusionment with the radical policies adopted by the Fourth 
Labour Government was overwhelming. Led by the conservative Jim Bolger, 
whose staid personality added credibility to a more moderate approach, the 
National Party made a pre-election promise of a return to a “decent society” 
(New Zealand National Party, 1990) The party won the election in an 
unprecedented landslide, claiming 67 of the 97 seats on offer. 
 
The change of government, however, did not adjust the direction of the 
country; in fact, it confirmed it. The new Minister of Finance, Ruth Richardson, 
adopted the same monetarist policies championed by Labour’s Roger 
Douglas. Despite the new government making significantly fewer economic 
changes than the last (Belich, 2001: p.410), neo-liberalism or the New Right 
was confirmed as a bipartisan philosophy.  
 
The National Government continued the previous government’s policy of 
asset sales and privatisation. Doing business was made easier as compulsory 
unionism was axed and the Employment Contracts Act (1991) was 
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introduced. The latter removed penal rates and other employment provisions, 
reducing the ability of workers to collectively negotiate wages and other 
employment conditions. The changes cut costs for businesses but came at 
the expense of workers. Those dependent on social welfare fared worse. In 
1991, the government slashed benefit payments, equating to a drop in income 
for beneficiaries of between 2.9 and 24.7 percent (Dalziel & Lattimore, 1996: 
p.90). Further affecting many on welfare or low incomes was the decision to 
charge market rents for state housing. Unsurprisingly, the difference between 
the rich and poor was widening, and the poor were becoming poorer; between 
1987 and 1993, the real spending power of the wealthiest 20 percent of New 
Zealanders increased by seven percent, while the poorest quintile dropped by 
nearly three percent (Kelsey, 1995: p.258). A change of government had not 
brought respite for those most affected by the dramatic reforms of the 1980s; 
it had, in fact, brought greater hardship. And thus the social conditions readily 
identified by international researchers as important to gang formation and 
maturation (for example Hagedorn, 1988; Jankowski, 1991; Short, 1996a; 
Taylor, 1989; Vigil, 2002) were enhanced.  
 
Despite the promise that the post-1984 reforms would make the economy 
stronger, the New Zealand economy went into recession during 1991 and 
1992. As noted in the last chapter, total unemployment soared and eventually 
peaked at between 10 and 11 percent, and one in four Maori were 
unemployed (Department of Statistics, 1993: p.272). New Zealand was 
experiencing the most significant rise in unemployment since the Great 
Depression (Massey, 1995: p.161).  
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With no apparent return to a ‘decent society’, and with many people feeling 
betrayed by its continuation of monetarist policies, National’s support 
plummeted in the 1993 election, but they clung to power with 50 of the 99 
seats on offer. Widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s political situation 
was reflected in a poll from 1992 that showed just four percent of people 
trusted politicians (King, 2003: p.493) and this distrust was to have significant 
implications. In a referendum held alongside the general election of 1993, 
New Zealanders chose to adopt proportional representation via a Mixed 
Member Proportional System (MMP), effectively removing unbridled power 
from the two, traditionally dominate parties. As will be shown in Chapter Nine, 
these political changes impacted on the gang scene in the run up to the 1996 
election, but it was the country’s economic situation that was initially more 
significant.  
 
The failing economy and high levels of unemployment proved important to the 
patched gangs’ evolutionary development within the decade, but they also 
aided the formation of new types of gangs. One such development that 
became particularly obvious in the 1990s was the rise of Pakeha street gangs, 
often with neo-fascist and white power tendencies, the most easily identifiable 
of which were skinheads.  
 
Skinheads 
Following overseas trends (Addison, 1996; Hamm, 1993; Jefferson, 1976) 
skinhead groups had been in New Zealand since the late 1970s and in 
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Wellington in the early 1980s, a skinhead band was established called the 
Knives of West Eleven who were said to be “quite serious about their neo-
fascism” (Spoonley, 1987: p.105). Similarly, in Christchurch, the small 
skinhead music scene thrived in the early 1980s with the advent of bands like 
Desperate Measures, Unauthorised, Aryan Army, and Johnnies (Addison, 
1996: p.93) and three skinhead gangs soon formed; the Christchurch Skins, 
the United Skinheads (known as the ‘Uniteds’) and the Firm. These were not 
the only skinhead groups in the city. Other less formal groups were simply 
known by the suburb from which they came; for instance, Papanui skins or 
Linwood skins (Addison, 1996: p.101), many of whom were not overtly racist 
(Chapman 1997 pers. comm.). These few examples of incipient skinhead 
gangs, however, faded away in rather short measure and it was not until the 
1990s that skinhead and white power groups surged to national attention, in 
large part as a result of the adverse economic conditions and increasing 
levels of Asian immigration.  
 
When the economy deteriorated in the 1980s, those communities worst 
affected tended to be lower socioeconomic. Given that these areas were 
predominately made-up of Maori and Pacific peoples, it is of little surprise that 
gangs of this ethnic makeup became the most common. However, as the 
economic conditions worsened in the early 1990s, and spread to impact a 
wider section of the population, large tracts of urban Pakeha were also 
severely affected. Unemployment and a bleak social and economic outlook 
fostered a sense of alienation within many Pakeha youth. Perhaps ignorant of 
the true genesis of their plight, they lashed out at ethnic minorities who they 
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felt were saturating the job market or challenging their perceived status as the 
dominant ethnic group.  
 
Although the anaemic economy provided a foundation for these groups, as 
was the case with early development of the patched gangs, they were given 
direction and impetus by other developments. In the early 1990s, there was a 
surge of white supremacist or reactionary groups around the world and the 
advent of the internet meant that their literature was easily spread (Dennehy & 
Newbold, 2001: p.188). In New Zealand, a book – largely a photo essay – on 
New Zealand gangs by Bill Payne (1997) called Staunch featured a section on 
skinheads, and this gave the movement a “minor shot in the arm” (Addison, 
1996: p.103). But perhaps the most significant pop-culture influence came in 
1992, when an Australian film depicting the struggles of a group of skinheads 
called Romper Stomper was released. It became a cult classic for many 
youths who identified with the characters and sought to mimic their beliefs and 
lifestyle. The film had a major impact in shaping the skinhead scene in New 
Zealand (Addison, 1996: p.102-3; Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.188). 
Certainly, the skinhead movement gained greater momentum and wider 
appeal. Many predominately Pakeha motorcycle gangs, particularly those in 
the South Island, went through a dramatic visual change as their traditionally 
shaggy appearance gave way to close cropped or shaved heads. Indeed, 
many skinhead gangs had close links with the predominantly Pakeha outlaw 
motorcycle clubs, particularly the South Island clubs (with the exception of 
Highway 61) and the Satan’s Slaves in the North Island. Perhaps the most 
significant group to emerge from the white power ranks was Christchurch’s 
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Harris Gang, at the core of which were four brothers; Daryl, Ricky, Paul and 
Russell Harris. 
 
Initially the brothers were associates of the Epitaph Riders who aspired to 
prospect for the gang, but I have been told that they were rejected by the 
outlaw club for being too dangerous and quick to attract police attention. 
Striking out on their own they established a clubhouse and a staunch group of 
followers. Their association with the Epitaph Riders had given them a first 
class training in the requirements of being a gang, and they quickly gained 
reputation as a fearsome group, involving themselves in numerous criminal 
activities (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.188). In October 1990, the Harris 
Gang were involved in an ongoing war with Highway 61 and twelve members 
of the group were convicted for shooting – non-fatally – two Highway 61 
members at the Brisbane Street periodic detention centre (NZ Herald 
2.12.1991). Although only one member pulled the gun’s trigger, none of the 
group would say who. The group’s leader, Daryl Harris, told me in 2005 that 
the fact that everyone stuck tight was a source of pride among the gang and 
proof of their commitment. Those outsiders who did testify against the gang 
were terrorised and several houses were bombed or set alight. One woman 
who testified against the group, and another man, were marched out of the 
woman’s house at gunpoint by two masked men who then proceeded to set it 
on fire (NZ Herald 2.12.1991; The Press 23.9.1992). Although the groups 
looked capable of achieving longevity on its own, in 1993, fulfilling their outlaw 
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club ambitions48, the Harris Gang became the Christchurch chapter of the 
Road Knights. 
 
By this time, the Road Knights in Invercargill and Timaru were being bolstered 
by a young, staunchly white power orientated skinhead gang called the 
Bandenkrieg49. Also informally known as the Germans of Young Germans, the 
groups acted as a feeder club to the Road Knights and were at least partially 
under the outlaw club’s control.  
 
Another notable group was the Fourth Reich. The Fourth Reich, which formed 
in Christchurch’s Paparua Prison50 in the early 1990s, was a small but 
hardcore gang who controlled the East Wing of Paparoa Prison as well as 
much of the jail in Invercargill. During the mid-1990s, it was said that any skin 
who was sent to East Wing would be stood over by the Fourth Reich and told 
“he must join them, grow his hair back, or ‘go West’ [to the protection wing]” 
(Addison, 1996: p.197). Although formidable within the prison, the Fourth 
Reich struggled to maintain strong numbers outside of jail, but nevertheless 
did develop a presence in Christchurch, Nelson, Greymouth, Timaru and 
Dunedin (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.189).  
 
In 1991, two members of the Fourth Reich killed Hemi Huntley a Greymouth 
Maori, in a racially motivated murder. Ironically, one of the killers. Neihana 
Foster, was himself part-Maori. This seemingly anomalous situation 
                                                
48 Sometime before this, the group either had, or were seeking to, form an outlaw club called the ‘Last 
Rebels’. Many years later, I saw the back patch that they had designed for this purpose. 
49 Translated from German means ‘gang war’. 
50 Officially known as Christchurch Men’s Prison. 
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highlighted the often special – though seldom explicitly discussed – status 
given to Maori in skinhead gangs, as exhibited by their occasional inclusion to 
such groups. It is unclear, however, why this status did not extend to the 
Maori victim. Such a paradox highlights the lack of ideological or philosophical 
rigor evident within most skinhead groups51. The killing was not the only time 
the Fourth Reich came to national attention.  
 
In 1997, a member of the gang – who described himself as having the rank of 
‘private’ – had his finger cut off. The victim told the Christchurch High Court he 
was punished for wanting to leave the group (NZ Herald 8-5-1998) but it is 
widely known to those close to the gang that the punishment was for the theft 
of the gang’s drug supply. Then, in 1998, a conflict between the gang and the 
Lost Breed of Nelson was exposed when a Lost Breed member was nearly 
killed in an attack in Paparua Prison. According to a prison officer, the Fourth 
Reich member said, “something to the effect that this will teach you for 
crossing us” (The Press 3-4-1999).  
 
One response to the growing problem, and in recognition of the damaging 
publicity to the city at the centre of skinhead activity, the Christchurch City 
Council helped fund the New Way Trust in 1994. Established by Kyle 
Chapman, the Trust’s objectives were:   
 
                                                
51 Prominent skinhead leader, Kyle Chapman, using the words of Robert Mathews – the leader of an 
American white nationalist group called ‘The Order’ – put it to me thus:”If it looks white, acts white, 
and fights white, then it is white”. For his part, Foster told police that his father was white and his heart 
was white (Sunday Star Times 29.6.2008). 
420 
 
a) To enable and assist young people alienated from Mainstream [sic] 
society (particularly those known as Skinheads) to participate in 
rehabilitation programmes 
b) To assist young people who are unemployed to increase their skills 
and obtain useful employment (New Way Trust, 1994: p.1). 
 
In 1995, an evaluation of the Trust’s work commissioned by the Christchurch 
City Council and the police Crime Prevention Unit gave a largely positive view 
of the work being undertaken (see Addison, 1995). Nevertheless, the Trust 
quickly became controversial when Chapman confessed to numerous historic 
race-based crimes he had undertaken as a skinhead in Invercargill, including 
the firebombing of a marae. Chapman said the confession was to “ensure he 
paid his debt to society” (NZ Herald 11-1-1995). Chapman told me in 2007 
that the confessions were part of an Alcoholics Anonymous pledge that he 
had taken after giving up drugs and alcohol and becoming a Christian. 
Despite the seriousness of the crimes, Chapman escaped a jail sentence, 
largely due to his positive work at the New Way Trust. The Trust’s chairperson 
and Christchurch City Councillor, David Close, said he admired Chapman’s 
courage in confessing, something he took “as evidence of his commitment to 
a new way of life” (NZ Herald 11-1-1995).  
 
However, in 1997, Chapman again created headlines when he was linked to 
the distribution of racist literature, a copy of which I have obtained, which 
called on “Young patriots…for the formation of a fascist youth group”. The 
pamphlets, which were distributed to many Christchurch mailboxes, carried a 
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picture of a paramilitary figure and implored: “If you love your race and nation 
and have the courage to fight for your homeland…Join Now!” 
 
Chapman’s desire to help motivate disillusioned Pakeha youth had clearly 
taken a more radical path. His association with the Trust became untenable 
and he left to establish a new skinhead gang – the Hammerskins. The 
Hammerskins became a chapter of an international skinhead movement, 
which for a short time became quite prominent in different parts of the 
country52. Under Chapman’s leadership the group shunned drugs, 
encouraged only moderate use of liquor and promoted general wellbeing 
because “your better fitness may be the deciding factor in battle” (New 
Zealand Hammerskins, c2003). 
 
Overall, the most obvious skinhead and white power activities were reserved 
for the South Island where there are smaller populations of Maori and Pacific 
peoples. One notable exception to this was the rise of a group called Unit 8853 
in West Auckland. The group formed under the guidance of long time fascist, 
Colin Ansell (also known as Colin King-Ansell), who had established the New 
Zealand Nazi party in the 1960s and was also a founding member of the New 
Zealand Fascist Union. Unit 88 was overtly racist and established a base in 
an industrial area in Henderson, Auckland. The group soon received 
significant attention in the media – simply for their brash appearance in the 
heart of an area with a significant Maori and Pacific population. A co-founder 
of Unit 88, Karl Warlock, said that attacks on black families had led the public 
                                                
52 For more on the Hammerskins internationally see www.hammerskins.net 
53 The name is derived from the letter H being the 8th letter of the alphabet, and so 88 is HH which in 
turn is a contraction of Heil Hitler. 
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to believe Christchurch was the main centre for white power activities, but 
“[y]ou might be surprised how many skinheads there are in the Auckland 
district” (NZ Herald 17-11-1997). The gang began printing and distributing 
white supremacist leaflets and the Race Relations Conciliator, Rajen Prasad, 
said he would look to take legal action against the gang as their material 
“incites racial disharmony and breaches our anti-discrimination laws” (NZ 
Herald 19-11-1997). The gang also elicited comment in parliament with 
Opposition MPs calling for race-hate laws. Minister of Justice Doug Graham 
responded that he was satisfied existing legislation was adequate and that the 
Race Relations Conciliator would act as necessary (NZPD, 1997, vol.565: 
p.4545). But Rajen Prasad was saved any such action as a more immediate 
deterrent to the gang came from both the Black Power and the Head Hunters 
who stated that Unit 88 would not be tolerated and that they would be 
subjected to “street justice” (NZ Herald 20-11-1997). The threats were not 
hollow and following “visits” from both gangs, Unit 88 vacated their clubhouse 
(NZ Herald 21-11-1997) and quickly petered out. 
 
The sudden rise and fall of Unit 88 is perhaps a reflective microcosm of 
skinhead gangs generally. While the movement flared significantly in the early 
and mid-1990s, it began to fade by the end of the decade. Even in the 
stronghold city of Christchurch, the street prominence of skinheads all but 
disappeared. The wider skinhead fashion had ebbed, and with it the skinhead 
gangs. Unlike the patched gangs, they were unable to achieve significant 
longevity. Many of these groups lacked the organisational structure of the 
patched gangs, and although some skinheads held onto their ideals, the 
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improving economy and lower unemployment – particularly among Pakeha – 
robbed the scene of recruits. A further explanation for the moribund was the 
markedly different social folkways evident within the 1990s compared to the 
1970s and 80s. As earlier chapters have shown, the majority of the 
established gangs were born in a period in the 1960s and 70s that prided 
itself on shunning private material possessions and a culture of sharing. 
However, the skinheads were of a time when individualism and self-
attainment were at the fore, and such an ethos was not as conducive to 
successfully forming the bonds – or achieving a physical base, such as a club 
house – that had previously gelled the patched gangs together.   
 
Although not a focus of this research, these forms of gang are in need of 
systematic study, not least to confirm the tentative findings I have presented 
above, but also to underscore the idea that gang formation is a consequence 
of social conditions and not ethnicity. While ethnic minorities may face 
‘multiple marginality’ (Vigil, 1988) and therefore be more susceptible to gang 
formation, the establishment of gangs by a dominant ethnic group is achieved 
when the necessary conditions present themselves. 
 
Changes in the Patched Gang Scene 
But while skinhead and white power gangs sparked concern around the 
country for a short period, the focus of political leaders generally remained on 
the significantly more prevalent patched gangs. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, the political rhetoric around ‘cracking down’ on the gangs through 
punitive measures increased with the demise of the social policy agenda in 
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the late 1980s. One person to talk tough about the gangs while in opposition 
was the National Party’s police spokesperson, John Banks. A confrontational 
and deeply conservative man, Banks’ own troubled upbringing did not hold 
him back from a successful career in business and, perhaps because of that, 
he had little time for those who he saw as apologising for the faults of the 
poor. Never short of colourful diatribe, Banks variously described gang 
members as “sewer rats”, “useless”, “cowards”, and “depraved mongrels in 
every sense of the word” (Newbold, 2000: p.218). He also declared that if in 
office, he would use the “commandos from the armed forces” to deal with out 
of control gangs. Despite the fact New Zealand’s armed forces do not have 
‘commandos’ as such, Banks was resolute, “That”, he said, “is a promise” 
(NZPD, vol. 496, 1989: p.9742). He also said that if National were to gain 
power in the 1990 election he would introduce legislation to make the country 
safe for “decent law abiding citizens” and “make [gang members’] lives a 
misery” (NZ Herald 28.10.1989). Following National’s 1990 election victory, 
Banks became the Minister of Police. Seemingly eager to tackle the gang 
problem, he did not have to wait long before he was put to the test, as will 
become clear in a section below. But the gangs confronting Banks and others 
were significantly different to what they had been in the past. 
 
By the 1990s, New Zealand patched gangs had evolved greatly and had 
become what Hagedorn (2005b) has elsewhere described as 
‘institutionalised’. Hagedorn says that a gang has institutionalised when it 
persists despite changes to leadership, it has organisation complex enough to 
sustain multiple roles for its members, can adapt to changing environments 
425 
 
without dissolving, fulfils some needs of the community, and organises a 
distinct outlook for its members (Hagedorn, 2005b: p.162). 
 
As highlighted in earlier chapters, many of the facets outlined by Hagedorn – 
for example an ability to survive leadership turnover and the formation of a 
distinct outlook for members – were evident in the formation of New Zealand 
gangs and thus are not necessarily a reflection of them having become 
‘institutionalised’. Key elements of gang institutionalisation having occurred in 
New Zealand, therefore, can be identified as the longevity of membership 
(and how this influenced gang development), the increasingly sophisticated 
social roles the gang fulfilled, and an acceptance by the community of a gang 
presence, or what I term the gang/community balance. And these factors, 
upon which I will expand, can all be linked – to greater or lesser degrees – to 
the fractured economy. 
 
The Maturation of Gang Membership 
Arguably the most important development within the New Zealand patched 
gang scene in the 1980s and increasingly obvious in the 1990s was the 
advancing age of many gang members and subsequently the maturity of the 
gangs generally. No longer were gangs the fleeting dalliance of youth that 
they had been prior to the 1980s. 
 
The changing age demographic of New Zealand’s gangs is evident in 
observations made by the Comber and Roper reports discussed in the 
previous chapter. The 1981 Comber Report had found that the gangs were 
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“almost universally made up of adolescent males” (Committee on Gangs, 
1981: p.10). Six years later, however, the Roper Report had concluded that, 
“There now seem to be many older members, with families of their own” 
(Committee of Inquiry into Violence, 1987: p.88). Indeed, a great many of the 
gang members observed and interviewed for this research first became 
involved in the gang scene in the 1970s and 1980s, and many of them remain 
in gangs today.  
 
Given that this shift occurred during the time of the social policy agenda, it is 
important to consider whether the relationship was causal. Certain U.S. 
researchers, most notably Klein (1971: pp.136-139; 1995: p.81), have stated 
that poorly directed government programmes – like some detached youth 
work programmes – aid gang cohesion and gang organisational development 
by giving gangs specific recognition. Critically, however, unlike Klein’s gangs, 
gangs in New Zealand, as argued previously, had already implemented formal 
structures and rules, and thus were clearly defined organisations before being 
targeted by social programmes. This was evident in the definitional shift 
between ‘incipient gang’ and ‘gang’. Nevertheless, the fact that New 
Zealand’s social policies, primarily via the Contract Work Schemes, sought to 
transform gangs into positive groups rather than disband them, means that it 
is likely they contributed, in some cases, to members staying in the gangs for 
longer as state-funded programmes provided opportunities to earn income.  
 
But the increasing length of gang membership appears to have been 
universal to all New Zealand gangs and not just those partaking in 
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government funded work programmes. Therefore, an arguably more important 
contributing factor to gang maturation was the negative economic 
environment that New Zealand was experiencing in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Whyte’s (1943/1981) study in Boston, that began during the midst of the Great 
Depression, found that during the economic downturn, gangs stayed together 
due to the that fact members were able to achieve more as a group in hard 
times than they could as individuals. As such, membership was older. 
Similarly, Moore found that when a negative economic environment affected 
the barrios of Los Angeles in the 1980s, gang membership grew older as 
there were fewer opportunities for those who joined gangs to cut loose their 
adolescent ties (J. W. Moore, 1991: p.23). As noted in previous chapters, the 
abundance of high paying, semi- or unskilled jobs up until the late 1970s was 
a critical factor in gang members being able to freely exit the gangs as they 
grew older and matured out of the scene. From the 1980s onward, significant 
levels of permanent unemployment effectively closed this exit door. 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Six, the increased camaraderie that 
occurred during gang warfare created rhetoric that portrayed leaving the gang 
as ‘betrayal’ and this caused members to consider gang membership as a 
long-term proposition, an ideal that was actively instilled into prospective 
members. In short, then, the influence that the work schemes had on the 
increasing longevity of gang membership was matched, perhaps superseded, 
by societal factors – particularly the bleak economic environment – and 
important internal gang dynamics that existed anyway.  
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This increased maturity began to modify the gangs in fundamental ways. 
Although one physical manifestation of this was the abandonment of ‘ridgies’ 
for a more conservative look, underlying this sartorial transformation were 
more important changes. New Zealand gangs no longer resembled what 
Thrasher (1927) described as ‘interstitial play groups’ that existed between 
youth and adulthood. In many ways they were beginning to act like quite 
sophisticated organisations. For the outlaw motorcycle clubs, these trends 
were consistent with developments seen around the world (Veno, 2003; Wolf, 
1991), and the large patched street gangs in New Zealand began to resemble 
the ‘supergangs’ that emerged in the U.S. in the 1960s (see for example 
Brotherton, 2007; Brotherton & Barrios, 2004; Spergel, 1995). 
 
A key element of this transformation was the move into profit driven crime, at 
least partially driven by the lack of legitimate work opportunities in the poor 
economic environment. This component of gang activity will be covered in 
detail in the following chapter, but it is just one of the important changes 
occurring within the gang scene that gave the gangs a significant ‘pull’ to 
prospective members and further encouraged existing members to remain 
within the gang realm.  
 
Evolution and Gang Development – ‘Grey Organisations’ 
In Chapters Four and Five, I argued that formal organisational structures and 
rules adopted as standard by New Zealand patched gangs were a significant 
factor in such groups achieving a durable existence. As the membership of 
the groups matured, the organisational structure leant itself to the adoption of 
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a greater number of rules, which developed and sustained intra-gang 
uniformity and discipline. Furthermore, as the groups became increasingly 
sophisticated in the 1990s, the functions that the gangs provided to their 
members began to expand and become more obvious. Moreover, though not 
widely acknowledged, the gangs began to provide certain community benefits 
too. 
 
The fact that New Zealand’s patched gangs became, and remain, so highly 
regulated is perhaps, on first appearance, counter-intuitive. As ‘anti-social’ 
groups, typically made up of rebellious men, one might expect gangs to be 
anarchistic. In fact, the reverse is true; because of the non-conformist nature 
of gang members, the ever present threat of police action, and risks posed by 
opposition groups, gangs are particularly reliant on stringent rules to function 
effectively. As with most community organisations or businesses, the gangs’ 
foremost priority is their immediate and long-term survival and viability. 
 
Certain rules appear universal to all patched gangs, although the specific 
details may vary somewhat. All gangs appear to have formal rules concerning 
the wearing of the gang’s patch or insignia, the requirements for gaining 
membership, the responsibilities of different hierarchical positions within the 
gang (i.e. prospect, member, office holder), and concerning how members 
interact with the police. 
 
As well as formal rules, patched gangs create and maintain numerous 
informal codes of conduct. In many instances these were no less important 
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than formal rules and therefore a perceived breach of them would invoke 
punishment, which might include such things as censures, fines, beatings, 
and suspensions or expulsions from the gang. Informal codes often outlined 
specific rules, but ones that are best not formalised or written down – 
concerning illegal behaviour, for example. But largely the informal codes of 
conduct tend to be broad prescriptions of acceptable behaviour, and typically 
they focus on maintaining group cohesion and integrity. 
 
These informal codes, I have discovered, are often based around universally 
admired qualities, such as honesty, dependability and loyalty, similar to those 
qualities exhibited in criminal subcultures, as first uncovered by Irwin and 
Cressey (1962) in the 1960s and explored in a New Zealand context by 
Newbold (1989a) in the late 1980s. Importantly, these informal codes are 
primarily judged within the gang sphere. For example, while gangs will 
generally be nonplussed if one of the members steals a stranger’s car, a 
member would face severe sanction – almost certainly expulsion – if he stole 
even a small amount from the clubhouse bar. Similarly, a member can miss 
an important family event, but if he fails to show up for his night on duty at the 
clubhouse54, he will be punished. And, again, a member can constantly cheat 
on his wife or partner without raising the concern of the gang, but if he is 
caught cheating with another member’s wife or girlfriend, then gang reaction 
is assured. In these ways, then, the gangs are not instilling universally held 
principles of morality, but principles of pragmatism, which seek to uphold the 
integrity of the organisation by curtailing activities that threaten it.  
                                                
54 Gangs schedule duty nights to ensure the clubhouse is always manned. This is to dissuade, or deal 
with, attacks by opposition groups and also to ensure the bar is available to the group’s associates. 
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Generally, while gang members are highly regulated within the gang realm 
they are able to do as they please in their own time. However, there are 
certain limits to this freedom. Most gangs do place some caveats on the 
outside behaviour of members to ensure that individuals do not act in a way 
that could undermine or reflect poorly on the gang. Two of numerous such 
rules include the banning of rape and the use of particular drugs.  
 
From my research, I have found that the banning of rape, discussed in the 
previous chapter, was based on a number of factors. For many gangs there 
was undoubtedly a moral component in their decision to implement a ban; as 
members aged they naturally matured and changed their attitudes, perhaps 
influenced in many cases by finding a wife or partner and having children, 
particularly daughters. Equally important, were pragmatic considerations as 
the crime of rape was beginning to threaten the gangs in several ways. 
Increasingly longer prison sentences for the crime of rape may have been a 
successful example of deterrence (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.185) and the 
threat of several members doing a long stretch in jail could threaten the 
survival of smaller gangs or gang chapters. Also, rape increasingly caused 
significant abhorrence in the community and so upset the gang/community 
balance, a concept I will discuss in detail below.  
 
New Zealand's patched gangs made a similarly pragmatic decision 
concerning banning the use of certain ‘hard’ drugs; particularly the use of 
heroin, a drug that gained prominence in New Zealand in the 1970s 
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(Newbold, 2004). Within the outlaw club scene, it is widely known that heroin 
led to the destruction and eventual fall of a previously powerful outlaw 
motorcycle club in Auckland called the Grim Reapers in the late 1970s. And 
by the mid-1980s, New Zealand’s patched gangs had universally banned the 
drug, seeing addiction as a threat to the gang and the brotherhood that 
upholds it.  
 
Almost certainly, the first New Zealand gang to ban the drug was the Hell’s 
Angels who inherited the world-wide Hell’s Angels ban when they re-
established their international links in the late 1970s. The club informed the 
media of the ban in the mid-1980s as evidence for their claims they were not 
a lawless organisation during an immigration dispute that stopped many 
international members entering the country to celebrate the local chapter’s 
25th anniversary (NZ Herald 7.7.1986). Another drug to be banned by many 
gangs was the prescription sedative Rohypnol, pills of which were commonly 
called ‘Rollies’. I have been told by a number of members of the Mongrel Mob 
that certain chapters of that gang put a ban on Rollies, saying ‘we don’t want 
no pill-grims’. Heavy use of the drug was creating out-of-control gang 
members, and even within the mercurial Mongrel Mob the outcomes were 
seen as dangerous. Reflecting their greater degree of organisation, Black 
Power were able to put a national ban on the drug. Rei Harris publicly 
bemoaned the fact that it was too easy for gang members to get prescription 
drugs. He said that using pills while drinking was “endemic” among many 
younger gang members: “We are trying to educate them out of it – it is one of 
the biggest issues the gang faces” (NZ Herald 10.9.1988). The drug rules and 
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the consequences for their breach were simple, and Tribesmen member 
Vincent George put it succinctly: “No hard drugs, no needles, no pills or else 
you’re out” (Dominion 16.1.1988). As will become clear, however, 
methamphetamine was or became an exception to most gangs’ anti-hard drug 
rules. 
 
Internationally, certain gangs, for example the Chicano gangs studied by 
Moore (1978, 1991), did not prohibit the use of heroin up until the early 1990s, 
at least. One possible explanation for this is the lack of organisational 
sophistication evident with barrio gangs in Los Angeles (Jankowski, 1991; J. 
W. Moore, 1978, 1991; Vigil, 1988). In New Zealand, regular gang meetings 
and formal voting processes ensure that any perceived organisational threats 
are easily raised and discussed. Furthermore, a majority vote binds all 
members meaning that compliance is assured. The overall sophistication of 
New Zealand gangs, therefore, means they were adept at not only identifying 
risks, but also at eradicating them.  
 
The creation and enforcement of numerous rules and informal codes of 
behaviour not only served to protect the gangs, but also ensured that the 
gangs became powerful socialising agents. The ‘street socialisation’ 
described by Vigil (1988, 2002) may be perceived as negative in that it 
supersedes community rules and laws, but for particularly maladjusted 
individuals, with few or any ties to mainstream social mores, gang 
membership may in fact positively modify certain anti-social tendencies.  
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One important function of gang rules and informal codes of behaviour is the 
protection of camaraderie and the fictive kin relationships that have always 
been, and remain, at the heart of gang membership. That gangs continued to 
survive over time is evidence in itself that such groups provided positive 
function to their membership; and primarily these are the social/psychological 
factors described by Carlie (2002) and others in Chapter One, the primary 
expression of which is universally described by New Zealand gang members 
as ‘brotherhood’.  
 
In Whyte’s (1943/1981) early study of gangs in Boston, he identified what he 
referred to as a strong espirit de corps. In more recent times, however, Short 
(1996a) has concluded that although many “members often speak of gangs in 
family terms...for many, the gang proves to be an undependable form of 
human association”. In New Zealand, I have found that gangs are most often 
highly dependable and that the rules created by the groups are often set up to 
protect the integrity of familial-type relations that members actively seek to 
protect; if members stick to the rules, the gang will stick by them. 
 
The internal bonds within the gangs were made clear to the Roper committee 
(1987: p.91) in the mid-1980s, which was told by an undercover police officer 
that he felt the gangs were “not completely negative” and that he “was 
impressed with their loyalty”. In 2008, a former undercover policeman who 
infiltrated gangs, told me that he was surprised by the level of brotherhood the 
gangs uphold, something that ran contrary to the one-sided and negative 
public perceptions formed around gang life: 
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I am just a person who just grew up in society. We are constantly 
bombarded with negative information by the media about gangs, you 
know, like umm... I guess one of those myths I had bought into 
throughout my growing up and had been hammered into me in the 
police, I guess a lot of those myths were broken away… so I found… 
that aspect [brotherhood] of gang life to be quite sort of appealing – or 
agreeable, yeah. 
 
The fact that brotherhood is noted by outsiders is not surprising, given its 
centrality to gang existence. The current president of the Auckland Hell’s 
Angels’, Doug Jay, speaks of brotherhood thus: 
 
Firstly, brotherhood isn’t an idea it’s a real thing. It’s a feeling of trust 
and respect and it’s really a fine feeling when you know that you can go 
to virtually any country in the world now and ah walk into a certain 
address and everyone there will call you their brother – and they will 
mean it too, because it is true…You know, it instils a lot of confidence 
in each other – that knowledge – in certain situations whatever they 
might be. You know you can count on that person to do the right thing 
under those circumstances – whatever the situation is. You know, it’s 
just having respect and learning to live with the fact that you may not all 
get on, you know, and that’s impossible really. You may not even like 
some of them – or one or two of them – but you still respect them as a 
brother and a Hell’s Angel and that’s important (2006 pers. comm.). 
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Of international outlaw motorcycle club members, Veno said that, “When 
members call each other ‘brother’ they actually mean it. For many, the club 
becomes their family, particularly if they’ve come from dysfunctional homes” 
(Veno, 2003: p.112). In 2007, Vic Faulkner, the past president of the Lost 
Legion, an outlaw club based in Blenheim, told me that his club existed on a 
“brotherhood feeling” because in “most cases the members and associates on 
the fringe did not have families, so to speak, so the club was the only family 
they had. Myself included”. Indeed, I believe one of the reasons that intra-
gang bonds are so strong is that many members are attempting to create 
common family attachments that they never experienced, have lost or found 
unsatisfactory. 
 
This, and the depth and importance of brotherhood among gang members, is 
particularly well evinced by the actions of Black Power member Eugene 
Ryder. Ryder first joined the gang in the early 1980s after a long spell in 
prison in his late teens and an unhappy adolescence, throughout which he 
shifted around between different foster families. Ryder considers Black Power 
his family. In the late 1990s, Ryder was doing youth work for Mokai Kainga, a 
community organisation based in Wellington, when his funding was cut by the 
government once MPs became aware he was a gang member. The Associate 
Minister of Social Welfare, Nick Smith said, “this is part of a wider 
Government policy of zero tolerance for gangs…The aim is to try to ensure 
funds appropriated for community organisations cannot by siphoned off in any 
way to support gang culture” (NZ Herald 24.7.1998). Clearly it is a 
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fundamental turnaround from political attitudes of the 1980s, but it reflected 
the new and politically bi-partisan approach of the 1990s. 
 
Ryder told me that he was approached by the Minister with an offer that the 
funding being reinstated if he would publicly renounce his membership of the 
gang: 
 
It wasn’t until they found out that I was still a member of the Black 
Power and they realised, ‘oh my God, we’re funding a gang member’. 
And the day I found out was the day I lost all funding. Basically the 
media caught up on it and they wanted to do a story. It was funny 
because when they were doing the story I got a note from the Minister 
of the time that if I go on camera denouncing the Black Power and 
handing my patch in they’ll give the funding back. Which was 
$180,000, what he was willing to pay for my patch type of thing. I was 
looking at it and thinking, ohhh yeah, I’ll do that if you go on TV and 
denounce your brother and your mother and everyone you hold dearly 
to you - I’ll do that if you do that. He just thought I was an idiot for 
saying that, and I thought he was an idiot for asking. 
 
For Ryder, Black Power stood by him when he needed them – they were not 
something that one could simply leave. As far as Ryder was concerned, the 
Minister had asked him to leave his family, and few people, he argued, would 
be asked to do that. Ryder never left the gang, and his commitment provides 
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an example of just how strong and meaningful the fictive kin ties with gangs 
can be. 
 
The social/psychological benefits that gangs provide to members, 
encapsulated by the idea of brotherhood, remain the core pull for gang 
membership, but as the gangs matured into more sophisticated entities they 
began to provide a greater array of social and physical benefits for their 
members. Although I will draw on a number of examples to highlight these 
developments, it is important to note that the gangs evolved in very different 
ways. I will make a number of generalisations about this shift – and there are 
many common components – but it is important to note that significant 
differences between the gangs were evident, not only between the patched 
street gangs and the outlaw motorcycle clubs, but also within these groups as 
well. It is with this important caution in mind that I proceed. 
 
Generally, and throughout the country, gang clubhouses and bars became 
large and well run. Many gangs in the late 1980s and into the 1990s had 
abandoned public drinking establishments and retreated into their own 
clubhouses to avoid undue police attention, something, it seems, that was 
initially encouraged by some in the police, as they said it would help avoid 
public disruption caused by gang violence (NZ Herald 17.1.1977). With 
facilities that usually included a pool table, a dartboard, gym equipment, and, 
when it came about in 1987, pay-for-view ‘Sky’ television gang clubhouses 
became centres for gang members to pass free time. In these ways they were 
similar to university fraternities or sports clubs, providing access to resources 
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that members could not provide for themselves. These physical amenities 
increased the attractiveness of gang membership, but importantly also 
provided benefits to others in the community.  
 
Aided by liquor licensing laws that required public bars to shut at 10pm and on 
Sundays (legal provisions not relaxed until 1989), gang bars, as illegal 
operations that were open all hours, became frequented by increasing 
numbers of outsiders, and thus provided a community function. Consequently, 
bar sales proved very profitable for the gangs. In the mid-1980s, the Black 
Power Sindis’ bar was hosting two or three hundred people “most nights” 
(Claydon, 1985: p.51) and accounts seized by police showed that over one 
four-week period, the bar turned over around $10,000 per week in liquor sales 
(NZ Herald 15.11.1986). Although gangs tend to be seen as marginalised 
groups, significant numbers of people, or ‘associates’, frequented gang 
facilities. In this way, the clubhouse and the gang became the centre of many 
people’s social lives. The clubhouse bars competed with other community 
facilities – largely, local drinking establishments – but had the competitive 
advantage of not abiding by licensing hours and other legal considerations; 
drugs that were approved of by the gang could be openly consumed, for 
example. At a time when many people were faced with a difficult social 
environment, due largely to the struggling economy, the gangs were offering a 
significant benefit to members – and others as well. 
 
However, regularly attracting people meant certain adjustments needed to be 
made to the gang lifestyle. This was reflected in meeting minutes that I have 
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seen from the early 1980s of the Galgoffa, an outlaw motorcycle club based in 
Wanganui, which read, “To get more people we need more women. To get 
more women, members will have to stop acting like dogs”. It is early evidence 
of the more mature approach to gang life that defined the 1990s. Not unlike 
other member based community clubs, to gain entry to gang functions, or 
indeed, the clubhouse at any time, male visitors – the rule appears to have 
been more relaxed for women – must be known to a member or a close friend 
and that person is responsible for the guest. Importantly, only members or 
prospects are able to let anybody in or out of a gang’s gates. 
 
While the clubhouse played a central role in providing for many of the social 
needs of gang members and some members of the community, the gangs, in 
particular the outlaw motorcycle clubs, began to organise other community 
events. In 1982, the Magogs hosted their first bi-annual motorcycle show, 
which became and remains a significant social event in New Plymouth. 
Similarly, the Mothers’ ‘Race Day’ (Palmerston North) and the Devil’s 
Henchmen’s ‘Devil’s Day’ (Christchurch), for example, became popular motor 
sport events participated in by other outlaw clubs – provided the groups had 
friendly associations – and members of the wider motorcycling community.  
 
Something that became universal to the outlaw motorcycle scene, were ‘poker 
runs’, events that combine riding to various pubs and the card game of poker. 
The Auckland Hell’s Angels held their first poker run in 1992, but it soon 
became so big that they could no longer start it from their clubhouse. In the 
two years that I attended the poker run, 2007 and 2008, it attracted around 
441 
 
250 motorcyclists each year, only a fraction of whom were outlaw club 
members, and thousands of dollars worth of prizes from companies 
sponsoring the event.  
 
These types of events – with the endorsement and support of businesses via 
sponsorship – gave credibility to the idea that outlaw motorcycle clubs were 
legitimate community organisations and were also used as a point of 
difference between the outlaw clubs and the patched street gangs: 
 
We consider ourselves legitimate motorcycle clubs. A lot of our clubs 
are registered, incorporated societies. The Mongrel Mob, Black Power, 
whatever you want to call them, are generally ethnic street gangs. They 
are not recognised motorcycle clubs. We do not associate with them 
(Neil Lockward, Magog, in NZ Herald 4-6-1987) 
 
But it was not just the outlaw clubs who were expanding their activities 
beyond the clubhouse doors. Beginning in the 1980s, many chapters of the 
patched street gangs formed rugby league teams in order to play other 
chapters of their gang, but often within local competitions as well (Payne & 
Quinn, 1997). In Hawkes Bay, the Taradale Black Power chapter formed the 
backbone of the Taradale Eagles, which went on to “the longest ever 
championship holding team in HB Rugby League history” (O'Reilly, 2010). It is 
one way in which the gangs were providing increasing opportunities for their 
members. Another notable – and ambitious – initiative arose in Dunedin. 
Under the guidance of long-time member and former GELS officer, Harry 
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Tam, the Mongrel Mob had devised a ‘$100 housing scheme’. The scheme 
started with loans from Maori Affairs, the Housing Corporation and the Labour 
Department. This funding was then used to buy and renovate an old house 
that was subsequently on-sold to purchase a block of land. The chapter’s trust 
then negotiated a deal with a kitset home company, Colonial Homes, whereby 
members could construct the housing themselves and pay the trust $100 per 
week to cover the mortgage, rates and insurance (Winter, 1998: p.254). 
Another chapter on the east coast of the North Island had a fishing quota and 
boat that provided employment for its members (Winter, 1998: p.255). It was 
these types of initiatives that Tam wanted to see occurring nationwide. In 
1992, the gang established the Mob Advisory Panel which divided the country 
into six regions: Northern, King Country, Hawkes Bay, Bay of Plenty, Lower 
North Island, and South Island. These regions were overseen by six elected 
representatives of the gang who were trained, supported and given direction 
by Tam as National Coordinator (Mob Advisory Panel, c1996: p.4)55.  
 
But perhaps the boldest and most significant gang initiative was undertaken in 
1994 by the Magog, an outlaw motorcycle based in New Plymouth. Already 
running a motorcycle show, noted above, that was growing in popularity, the 
Magog – under the leadership of Russell ‘Shagger’ Gilmer – decided to 
celebrate their 20th anniversary in style. An imposing but intelligent and 
considered man, Gilmer told me in 2004, “We wanted to present an event that 
would be totally enjoyable for the public and totally memorable for the club”. 
                                                
55 Having constructed one house, the $100 housing scheme feel away as Harry Tam moved to 
Wellington. MAP too did not survive long. Following a MAP leader, Edge Te Whaiti being convicted 
for dealing LSD in 1996, Tam – controversially – got a job at the Ministry of Youth Affairs as a policy 
analyst. 
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Their first idea was to get the Rolling Stones to perform but in the end, they 
successfully negotiated with another British rock band, Jethro Tull, to come to 
New Zealand. So successful was the club’s promotion of the concert, they 
ended up putting on two sold-out shows.  
 
The concerts were a boon to the Magog. Not only did they provide a 
significant financial windfall, they also dramatically raised the club’s profile. 
The bikers appeared on numerous television news programmes – replete with 
cell phones that were rare at that time – and spoke articulately about their 
venture. Rex Moore, the public relations and marketing manager of the New 
Plymouth District Council said, “The Magog and President Russell ‘Shagger’ 
Gilmer should be congratulated on their creativity and initiative in staging the 
event” (Daily News 1.3.1994). The editorial of the local newspaper was 
equally effusive: “The Magog entrepreneurial skills should be applauded. To 
have a dream and translate that vision into reality is a tribute to Shagger and 
his team” (Daily News 1.3.1994). 
 
As noted, many of these gang events were enjoyed by a wide range of 
people, but some groups received direct benefit from them. A number of 
outlaw clubs donated the proceeds of these types of events to charitable 
organisations. In the 1970s and 1980s, such undertakings almost certainly 
would have been applauded as efforts at gangs conforming, but in the 1990s 
– under a banner of zero tolerance – they were seen by many officals as 
simply an exercise in public relations. 
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Labour MP Mark Peck reflected this view in 1997 when he spoke about the 
efforts by some groups to raise funds for charity: “I am not fooled when gang 
members talk about their little bike trips to raise money for child cancer. What 
a load of gratuitous claptrap! They do that to curry favour with a certain group 
of the electorate, but they have absolutely no desire to give away their 
lawlessness” (NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5552). Similarly, in 2007, one senior 
police officer told me: “It’s like a motorcycle [gang] can do – can get publicity 
because they do a teddy bear run or something for children or a hospital or 
whatever. The media love it, they get great publicity and people think, oh, 
these are good old boys. The public is quite gullible in that sense”. 
 
The political rhetoric that became all encompassing following the demise of 
the social policy agenda seemingly argued that all positive activities 
undertaken by the gang were simply a cover for sinister endeavours. Such 
black-and-white thinking, however, masks a truer, more complex, picture and 
creates a misleading duality between ‘good’ and ‘bad’.  
 
While one cannot dismiss an element of public relations, I believe a better 
explanation is this: a charitable agenda is a way of attracting greater public 
participation to an event to ensure its success, thereby making it more 
enjoyable for members while also ensuring the club gains a sense of status by 
signalling a display of class. These actions may, therefore, still be motivated 
by self interest but it is not simply an issue of public relations. The Hell’s 
Angels in Auckland, for example, take a low key approach to giving annual 
donations from their poker run to the Auckland Spinal Rehabilitation Unit, 
445 
 
something incongruent with public relations. Moreover, they also show a 
genuine commitment to their donor organisation, and a degree of altruism 
cannot be denied. In 2007, the spinal unit’s operations manager, Marianne 
Cox, told me: 
 
We have very little to do with them, they just come once a year [and 
donate]. They know when the subscription [for Sky television] is up and 
they just renew it. Sometimes they have more funds and ask what else 
they can do... They’ve an opportunity, to do it with a fit of a flourish, but 
they don’t. We have some donors who bring the press with them and 
we do that [to help them promote their donation] but they [the Hell’s 
Angels] are very quiet and unassuming. They don’t ask for plaques or 
anything like that. One year they built us outdoor tables – very practical 
and hands on - which gave a bit of their time and effort. It’s easy to give 
a bit of money but they went further and built us something…It’s very 
genuine when they go that extra effort to make the money go further. 
 
Long-time member of the club, Phil Shubert, told me that the Hell’s Angels 
association with the spinal unit began in the 1970s when one of their numbers 
was involved in a motorcycle accident and broke his back: “We never forgot 
what they did, and also you never know when we might be providing their next 
patient”. 
 
While members of the public – and on occasion charities – benefited from 
gang activities, some businesses were also finding a relationship with the 
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gangs beneficial in the 1990s. As noted above, a number of businesses 
sponsored gang events, but others found more direct benefits could be 
derived from gangs, and certain individuals and businesses began to employ 
gangs or gang members to collect outstanding debts (Local Government New 
Zealand, 1997; New Zealand Police, 1996).  
 
Similarly, members of the Hell’s Angels had provided security to a number of 
travelling rock bands and drag races (NZ Herald 27-7-1999) during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, and in 1995 the Nomads and Black Power were used by 
protest organisers as security during the 79-day Maori land occupation at 
Moutoa Gardens in Wanganui (NZ Herald 10.3.1995; 11.5.1995).  
 
In a variety of different ways, then, the gangs were not just providing social 
and economic functions for members, but were fulfilling certain community 
needs as well. Either in toto by some people, or selectively by others, the 
gangs were being used as ‘ordinary’ community organisations. On the other 
hand, they were not widely viewed as legitimate because they remained 
‘lawless’, to use Mark Peck’s jargon.  Nonetheless, the gangs were not 
lawless as such; they simply created and adhered to their own rules – a 
situation that I believe made them ‘grey organisations’ that can neither be 
viewed as fully illegitimate nor fully legitimate, and this I contend 
acknowledges the gang situation as being much more nuanced than political 
leaders during the 1990s were prepared to appreciate; or at least publically 
espouse. At this discussion's heart, perhaps, is what I describe as the 
gang/community balance. 
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The Gang/Community Balance 
Despite the political shift that occurred in the late 1980s, resulting in calls for a 
tough law and order approach, in the communities where gangs had existed 
for many years and had become institutionalised a gang/community balance 
had been achieved. For a number of reasons, not least of which was a tacit 
acceptance that gangs were permanent entities, the communities within which 
gangs existed learned to live with these groups. This balance between gang 
and community, however, was not fixed and required maintenance from both 
sides and, when this failed, intervention by the police. 
 
As they relate to gangs, I believe the community can be divided into three 
general categories or Weberian (1904/1949: p.90) ‘ideal types’. The first of 
these categories incorporates those people who freely and directly involve 
themselves with the gang; the ‘associates’ mentioned earlier. These people 
tend to range from those who have extremely close associations with a 
particular gang to others who may on occasion – or at specific gang events – 
enjoy the alternative social and moral environments provided by the gang. 
Associates are positively disposed toward gang and its activities. 
 
The second category, which I will call ‘incidental associates’, is comprised of 
those who live within the immediate geographic environs of the gang and 
have some unintentional contact with the gang because of where they live or 
work. Because by the 1990s, most gangs had become, or had the 
appearance of, permanent community organisations, this category of people 
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had accepted the gangs as an inevitable part of their neighbourhoods. 
Moreover, for many of these incidental associates, their minor contacts with 
gangs reveal to them that gang members are, more often than not, rather 
‘ordinary’ people, something that came as a surprise to me, and both of the 
undercover police officers I have interviewed, during my research. Indeed, 
many of these people are aware of the disconnect between the common 
perception of gang members and the reality; something I will further explore 
below and in the following chapter. 
 
Generally, however, it appears that the reasons for this acceptance – 
particularly in areas with a large gang presence – are embedded in the 
communities within which gangs rise and exist. By the 1990s, in streets where 
gangs had clubhouses, and in surrounding areas, the presence of the gang 
became normalised. In some communities with large Black Power or Mongrel 
Mob chapters, the degrees of separation between the gang and the 
community are small. As one resident in the Poriura suburb of Cannon’s 
Creek told me, “Everybody knows the Mob somehow, you know, a relative or 
a neighbour. It’s just the way it is”. Contacts such as these were made evident 
in 1988 when the son of prominent Maori leader, Sir Graham Latimer, joined 
Black Power (NZ Herald 6.5.1988). The fact that, in many instances, gangs 
were so intricately woven within the fabric of communities lends them a sense 
of inevitability, as many people cannot reject that gang without rejecting 
people close to them.  
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Moreover, if we accept the broad premise put forth by Miller’s (1958/1969) 
working class thesis - that being that gangs embody values of lower class 
culture, as discussed in Chapter One - then gang behaviour and activities are 
oftentimes not abnormal to those within the communities where the gangs 
exist. This is undoubtedly why, for example, the Mongrel Mob in Porirua 
maintains its clubhouse in the lower socioeconomic area of Cannon’s Creek 
and not the nearby middle class area of Whitby. But while those within the 
gang’s immediate environment may, to varying degrees, have accepted the 
presence of a gang, this acceptance can be upset and it requires mutual 
understanding and, oftentimes, maintenance. 
 
In New York, Jankowski (1991) observed that gangs required a certain level 
of community acceptance in order to function. This acceptance is not 
immutable and a gang incident that that upsets the community will result in a 
period of unrest whereby people in the area may be more liable to complain to 
authorities or media and cause disruption or threat to the gang by way of 
police or political interference. In New Zealand, one example of a gang’s 
management of this balance occurred in 1988 when out-of-town members of 
the Black Power attending a Labour weekend party at the gang’s Wellington 
headquarters robbed dairy owner Dinesh Bulsara. Wellington and National 
Black Power president, Rei Harris, invited Dinesh and his family to the pad 
where he apologised and presented them with a koha: “If you can’t trust your 
neighbour” he said, “who can you trust?” (Auckland Star 14.11.1988). It is 
maintenance on the gang/community balance that aids community 
acceptance. As one undercover police officer, who wishes to remain 
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anonymous, told me in 2005, “If you speak to most residents around gang 
pads [they] will only have positive things to say about these guys”.  
 
Conversely, this balance also requires the community – via the incidental 
associates – to accept certain behaviours of the gang. A complaint or 
intrusion by neighbours into acceptable gang behaviour (i.e. behaviour that 
the majority within the immediate environment are prepared to tolerate) runs 
the risk that gang action being taken against them. For example, an outlaw 
motorcycle club experienced trouble in the early 1990s with a nearby 
neighbour – new to the street – making “unreasonable” complaints about 
noise; something that others in the street had learned to accept. One of the 
club’s members said that the complainant and his family had “terrible luck” 
when they returned from one weekend away to find “they had left plugs in 
their bath and kitchen sinks and the taps turned on”. The family moved out 
and the gang/community balance was restored. Importantly, the gang’s 
intervention was enough to solve the problem without escalating community 
concern. If the gang had physically attacked the people, they would almost 
certainly have invoked a backlash. Such a backlash would in all likelihood 
mean significant police and media attention and cause more trouble for the 
gang. Although gangs have significant strength within their realms and within 
the underworld, they are aware that the community – via state agencies like 
the police – is much more powerful. Indeed, because attacks against 
outsiders are so risky, such moves are very rare and gangs largely rely on 
reputation – and the perception of threat – to uphold their interests when 
dealing with outsiders; an issue I will canvas in the chapter to follow.  
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Indeed, when the gang undertakes activities that arouse significant concern, it 
often alerts the third category of community, what is easily termed the ‘wider 
public’. This third category involves the vast majority of people who have no 
dealings with gangs and do not have gangs in their immediate communities; a 
category of people which only hear about gangs when they are in the media – 
and from these portrayals form their views. Because the media coverage is 
most often negative,56 I have found the wider public tend to have the most 
negative feelings toward gangs; despite the fact – perhaps because of the fact 
– they are the most removed from the gangs themselves.  When this category 
of the community becomes significantly concerned by gang behaviour, a 
police and political reaction becomes inevitable, not least because this group 
is the largest – and so the most politically important – and also because it 
includes those who are wealthy and influential. This level of concern has 
previously been evident in the examples of the Moerewa riot (Chapter Six) 
and following the Ambury Park rape (Chapter Seven), and, although not 
reaching so significantly into national significance as those cases, I will 
highlight two notable occasions in the 1990s where the wider community/gang 
balance was upset. Such imbalances occurred in Timaru in early 1990s and in 
Foxton in mid-1990s and these examples illustrate different ways in which the 
gang/community balance can be disturbed while highlighting police tactics 
that proved successful in restoring its equilibrium. 
                                                
56 Numerous international studies have looked out how media portrayals lead to a distorted public 
perception of gangs, for example Covey (2003: p.29), and it will be recalled from Chapter Seven that 
the Roper Report concluded that, “There is probably no subject in the field of law and order that can 
provoke more selective and distorted coverage from the media… than gangs” (Committee of Inquiry 
into Violence, 1987: p.87).  
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Examples of Imbalance 
In 1989, the Devil’s Henchmen incorporated, or ‘patched-over’, the Damned of 
Invercargill. In doing so, they inherited the war between the Damned and the 
Road Knights. Following the patch-over, hostilities reignited between the 
traditional rivals in Timaru, where both clubs had been since the late 1970s, 
though they had not been in significant conflict since the mid-1980s. I have 
been told that the trouble in Timaru began in November 1990 when a 
Henchmen prospect stabbed to death a White Power gang leader associated 
with the Road Knights at the city’s periodic detention centre (Timaru Herald 
23.11.1990). The Road Knights then went on the offensive with a series of 
raids against the Devil’s Henchmen and their supporters. It was the beginning 
of a new war. Patches were banned at the Timaru courthouse in an attempt 
order to defuse tensions there, but tit-for-tat skirmishes became increasingly 
common.  
 
In August 1991, a group of Henchmen went to look at a visiting Australian 
warship at the port in Timaru. While away from their vehicle, five sticks of 
Powergel (an explosive often used on farms) were strapped to the car’s 
exhaust. When the Henchmen returned to the vehicle, they drove around for 
some time before the explosives were noticed and safely defused (Timaru 
Herald 31.8.1991). In 2007, Senior Sergeant Bill Gregory explained it to me: 
 
They drove up the loop road and right down the main street – 3 o’clock 
on Friday afternoon – right down the main street…and then the guy got 
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out of his car…and he noticed his exhaust pipe was hanging down a bit 
low and he had a look underneath, and ‘oh shit, Powergel’. According 
to our bomb guy, if that had have detonated in the main street, it would 
have turned the car into a 360 degree fragmentation bomb. The people 
in it wouldn’t have existed anymore and…the shop windows would 
have blown in sending a shower of glass going through each of the 
shops within 50 or 60 metres of the blast. 
 
In late October 1991, a Henchmen member was rammed while in his car (The 
Press 9.11.1991), and I have been told by Henchmen members that at that 
point they made the Knights aware that if attacks on them continued, then 
significant reprisals would occur. Undeterred, the Road Knights planned and 
executed an audacious and violent attack. On the 7th of November at 5:00am, 
the time of the police changeover of shifts – meaning no officers were likely to 
be on the street – the Road Knights attacked a number of the Henchmen’s 
homes with firearms. One of the Henchmen, Peter ‘Wingnut’ Hellford, awoke 
to discover his car had been firebombed. He rushed outside to douse the 
flames and was shot twice – in the back and the arm – with a .22 calibre rifle. 
In 2006, he told me: 
 
I felt a whack! whack! and thought, ‘Fuck me, I’ve been shot’. I 
managed to get inside and went to the kitchen because I didn’t want to 
get blood on the carpet. It sounds a bit crazy now, but at the time that’s 
what was worrying me.  
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Following the attack there were some ominous statements made by a 
member of the Henchmen, Craig Gilcrest, who said, “They [the Road Knights] 
can’t sit back and relax now” (TV One News 9.11.1991)…“Some close friends 
of Peter (Hellford, the man who was shot) are very angry” (The Press 
10.11.1991). As the war had progressed, the leaders of the groups had 
remained in communication. When hostilities reached a crescendo, however, 
the Henchmen turned to the media to speak to their enemy. Similar tactics 
were identified by Jankowski (1991: p.306) in his research, whereby certain 
New York gangs used the media to communicate foreboding messages to 
rivals. 
 
The reaction from the Henchmen was swift. Less than 24 hours after the 
Henchmen member was shot, the Hilton Haulage truck yard in Timaru burst 
into flames and four trucks were destroyed at an estimated cost of $280,000. 
The truck yard was targeted because one member of the Road Knights 
owned a long haul truck and worked for Hilton Haulage. Following the fire, his 
contract was terminated (Timaru Herald 9.11.1991).  
 
Police from Christchurch were immediately called in to bolster Timaru’s police 
numbers. Indeed, the heavy police presence meant the next few days were 
quiet, but the police were nevertheless conscious that the situation remained 
unstable. Senior Sergeant Bill Gregory said, “We believe the return to some 
sort of normality over the weekend was significant; that’s certainly what we 
hope but we have no idea what is going to happen next” (Timaru Herald 
12.11.1991).  
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The Road Knights’ attacks had escalated the conflict, not so much because of 
the increased level of violence, but because they had targeted the homes of 
members. As Moore (1978: p.40) found in her study of Barrio gangs in Los 
Angeles, there are tacit understandings among gangs that seek to place 
boundaries around hostile engagements. In New Zealand, one such code, 
commonly described to me, is that family homes are off limits during disputes 
so as not to endanger families. Given this breach of code, the Road Knights 
would have known that the firebombing of Hilton Haulage was merely a 
stopgap reprisal and that more significant retribution was to come.  
 
The escalation of the war, however, had not only breached gang rules, it had 
also upset the gang/community balance. In December 1991, a month after the 
shootings and subsequent arson attack involving the Road Knights and the 
Devil’s Henchmen, around 1,000 people attended a public meeting at the 
local community hall at Caroline Bay. Angry at the gang warfare and lack of 
subsequent arrests, it was the police who came under fire as the people of 
Timaru demanded that stronger action be taken against the gangs. Timaru 
Mayor Archie Houston appealed for 20 new police officers to be appointed to 
the town (Timaru Herald 11.12.1991). Police were stung by the community 
criticism, and were acutely aware of the need to restore public confidence. 
Some within the police, however, including Senior Sergeant Bill Gregory, felt 
the criticism was not without merit. He told me: 
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I think some of the criticisms were justified, to be honest with you. In 
hindsight, I think the police reaction to the gang situation in Timaru – 
they didn’t come to grips with the situation… I may sound a bit overly 
critical of my colleagues in Timaru, but I think there was some bad 
decisions made in the several years leading up to [the conflict] (2007 
pers.comm.).  
 
While Gregory began to formulate a plan to tackle the problem, the war 
continued. In February 1992, a bomb containing a kilo and a half of explosives 
and surrounded by 18 kilos of nuts and bolts was found at a motorcycle show 
put on by the Road Knights in Dunedin. The bomb’s centimetre-per-second 
fuse had burnt itself out within a metre of the bomb’s core (Sunday News 
23.2.1992). Following the bomb’s failure, the Henchmen decided on a more 
direct approach. On the 28th of March 1992, a stolen red Holden was parked 
near the Excelsior Hotel, the bar favoured by the Road Knights. As a group of 
Road Knights left the bar, the car pulled up and from one of its windows came 
a spray of shotgun pellets, which fanned out and hit three members of the 
gang. All three survived but none made complaints to the police (Timaru 
Herald 29.3.1992). Of particular concern to police was the fact that on one 
side of the bar there was a busy movie theatre and on the other a popular 
restaurant – the risk to innocent people was significant (Bill Gregory pers. 
comm.). It appears clear that inter-gang attacks may spark a certain – 
occasionally high – degree of community concern, but actions that potentially 
endanger members of the wider public are almost certain to intensify such 
anxieties. 
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After proclaiming from the National Opposition benches that he would end the 
gangs’ ‘reign of terror’, John Banks, Minister of Police since the 1990 election, 
was compelled to travelled to Timaru to assess the problem himself. Zita 
Tumai, of the Aoraki Whanau Awhina Support Against Violence Group, 
organised a march to coincide with Banks’ visit, she said “All we hear from 
people like Banks, Mr Bolger [then Prime Minister] and other MPs are a lot of 
empty words when we’ve asked them to do something about Timaru’s gang 
problems” (Timaru Herald 1.4.1992). Similarly, Terry Kennedy of the Timaru 
Business Association told the Holmes (1.4.1992) current affairs show that 
night: 
 
The Minister of Police, when he was in opposition, made several 
statements about what he would do if the National government was put 
in office. The National government has been put in office, the minister 
has made several speeches but so far there has been no action. 
 
Banks was also coming under pressure in Parliament, as the Labour Party 
reminded him of his promise to bring in the army – ‘commandoes’ as he called 
them – to control gangs. A now more circumspect Banks replied that, “At this 
point police have absolute control in dealing with the gangs. There is no need 
at this stage for any military support whatsoever in dealing with gangs” 
(NZPD, vol.524, 1992: p.8344). As had been the case with Norman Kirk two 
decades previously, populist rhetoric in opposition is often not followed 
through when the realities of governing prevail. Although Timaru police were 
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not bolstered by the military, Banks did ensure that they temporarily gained 
five uniformed officers and one detective, who were transferred from 
Christchurch, to launch ‘Operation Shovel’.  
 
Devised by Gregory, Operation Shovel, which he told me he had formed from 
various ideas of police officers around the country, was a systematic targeting 
of gang members and their associates. In Timaru, the police drew a line in the 
sand: 
 
The people have had enough. In the past we have said this is not 
solely a police problem. It’s a community problem that’s been here for 
some time. We’re going to stand up and accept this as our problem on 
behalf of the community (Timaru Herald 6.4.1992).  
 
Operation Shovel worked by using constant police pressure. Police officers in 
Timaru followed up every lead, reinvestigated past complaints, and brought 
charges when they found any infraction of the law. At a basic level, the stifling 
nature of the police presence meant that the warring groups were unable to 
execute attacks on one another due to the overwhelming police attention. 
More generally, the pressure created by the police had a real and constant 
impact on the lives of all of the gang members, and they were unable to enjoy 
many of the activities and liberties they ordinarily took for granted – both legal 
and illegal. Life for both Timaru’s gangs became difficult. Even simple 
activities like traveling through the town or enjoying a group motorcycle run 
were seldom undertaken without police interruption. It was a situation that 
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prevented ongoing hostilities through the punitive effects of criminal sanctions, 
and the removal of everyday freedoms that members normally enjoyed. 
 
Since starting in May 1992, Operation Shovel boasted significant results. By 
December of that year, police reportedly made 444 arrests, executed 261 
search warrants and laid 647 charges. The charges, laid were: possession of 
cannabis (70), theft (46), burglary (45), receiving (33), Excess Breath Alcohol 
(drink driving) (27), possession of drug instruments (21), cultivation of 
cannabis (19), possession of cannabis seed (18), disqualified driving (18), 
intentional damage (17), social welfare fraud (16), possession of offensive 
weapons (16), breach of bail (16), assault (15), unlawful possession of firearm 
(15), disorderly behavior (15), possession of cannabis for supply (11), 
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle (11), supply and importation of LSD (11), 
fighting (7), intimidation (5), unlawful possession of a pistol (5), and 
threatening to kill (4) (Timaru Herald 23.12.1992). Although the operation 
targeted the two outlaw clubs, it was not exclusive to them and many of the 
charges were not directly related to gangs, and were a latent outcome of 
increased police numbers. Given this degree of intense policing, one would 
expect increases in crime data, but police reported, as a consequence of 
Operation Shovel, an overall reduction in Timaru’s crime statistics of 14.2 
percent in 1992 (New Zealand Police, 1993: p.1).  
 
Notably, among the list of charges, there are none for operating an unlicensed 
premises – even though both gangs were running illegal bars at their 
clubhouses. Both Senior Sergeant Bill Gregory and District Commander Mark 
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Lammas deny to me that this was part of a deliberate policy to keep the gangs 
in their clubhouses and away from public drinking establishments. Indeed, 
both men say that the gang-operated bars helped build a power base for the 
gangs and were a place where gangs could influence members of the 
community – though both agreed that turning a blind eye to the clubhouse 
bars might have been informal police policy in the past.  
 
Although the police pressure was uncomfortable for the gangs, Gregory told 
me that he felt the war was becoming so dangerous that their intervention was 
partially welcomed: 
 
It got to the stage where it was Wild West stuff. They were shooting at 
each other like bloody cowboys. They were going around to houses – 
you’d see around windows bloody burn marks where the Molotovs had 
missed the window. People had mesh over their windows, you know, it 
got out of hand. More than out of hand, it was like bloody warfare…It 
got to the end of 1991 and the gangs were completely out of control, 
and I think, on their part, they were getting concerned about the level of 
violence too. A number of unwritten rules had been broken, they were 
attacking homes – that’s an unwritten rule in gang warfare, you don’t 
touch the missus and the kids, you know, you leave the home alone…it 
got out of hand. The problem with the gangs is that it’s very difficult for 
one of them to back down against the other, but if the police come 
down the middle and hammer both, then there’s no dishonour in 
backing down then. 
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It is, I believe, a valid argument. Numerous gang members have told me that 
war is an uncomfortable time that takes a toll on members' nerves, and as 
outlined in Chapter Six, weaker members may leave the scene during such 
times. Although the remaining members are those that are the most 
committed to upholding the group’s status, few I believe are unhappy when a 
war concludes in a way that maintains the honor of the gang.  
 
The discomfort experienced during such conflicts was highlighted by an 
outlaw club member during a long war between the Damned and the Road 
Knights in Invercargill in the mid-1980s. The Damned president, Mike Fincher, 
told reporter Michael Brown in an interview on Midweek in 198657 that, “I 
wouldn’t mind getting on my bike and riding around like it used to be, [but you 
can’t now because] you’re thinking about it [the war and being attacked] all 
the time, you know...Who knows where it will lead?” For Fincher, the war 
ended abruptly in 1990 when he was killed by a single stab wound to the 
chest. 
 
Operation Shovel lasted eighteen months, but before its official end, the extra 
police given by Banks for the project were withdrawn. Long before that time 
police had managed to quell the gang conflict through a process of 
suffocation. Although the operation required significant police resources and 
was unsustainable in the long term, it showed both gangs what the level of 
response would be should trouble arise again. Before exploring the role of 
                                                
57 The footage I have obtained, from a gang source, cannot be more accurately referenced.  
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police in rectifying the gang/communality balance another, slightly different, 
example offers further insight.   
 
As order in Timaru was restored, another small town was gaining the 
unwanted label of a ‘gang town’. National attention became focused on the 
North Island community of Foxton, where the local chapter of the Nomads 
was becoming increasingly lawless. Within gang circles, the Nomads, who – it 
will be recalled from Chapter Five were an offshoot of Black Power - had 
chapters in the Wellington, Horowhenua and Wairarapa regions, as well as a 
brief presence in Auckland, were both feared and respected. Much of their 
reputation was inspired by the gang's boss Dennis ‘Mossie” Hines, under 
whose leadership the gang actively strived to gain the reputation as being one 
of the toughest in the country. On 60 Minutes in March 199658, onetime 
Nomad deputy Rex Rimene said, “Our aim was to make the Nomads the most 
fearsome gang, the toughest gang out”. In the same programme, Nomads 
leader ‘Skull’ Williams said the Nomads were “the ultimate”, while the 
journalist called them “outlaw kings”. However, ‘outlaw kings’ was a rather 
prosaic description of a gang, renowned for its brutal violence. I have been 
told by a senior member of the gang that in Wellington they used to 
deliberately set off shop alarms so they could attack the responding police. 
Rimene also told a story of Hines badly beating up an “old man” in a pub 
because he had said something negative about the gang. Another much-told 
story – the veracity of which is unknown to me – is of Hines’ girlfriend being 
                                                
58 The footage I have obtained, from a gang source, cannot be more accurately referenced.  
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fatally injured in a car crash and Hines kicking the dying woman as 
punishment for wrecking his car.  
 
Once again, however, it was an incident involving persons outside of the gang 
realm, this time a home invasion, robbery and a rape attributed to the gang, 
which upset the gang/community balance; a situation the Nomads desperately 
attempted to address. In October 1993, the home of elderly Foxton doctor, 
Howard Teppett, was raided.  Dr Teppett was beaten to death with an iron bar 
and his 78-year-old sister brutally raped (NZ Herald 3.3.1994). The crime 
shocked New Zealanders and hit the small community hard. Because at least 
one of the perpetrators of the crimes was linked to the Nomads, the people of 
Foxton had a target for their wrath. Unabashedly hardened villains as the 
Nomads were, the crime had no ‘class’ and they vehemently denied 
involvement. The normally private Hines and several members of the gang 
took the unprecedented move of going on television59 to publicly distance 
themselves from the crime. Hines – a man more articulate with his fists than 
his voice – said, “Look, I’m not saying we’re any angels, I don’t believe I’m 
going to Heaven” but he denied the gang had any involvement in the crime. 
Another Nomad said, “We aren’t no granny molesterers”.  
 
With the knowledge that such community outrage would lead to significant 
police pressure, it was in the gang’s interests to distance itself from the 
crimes, but Hine’s unprecedented use of the media may simply reflect the 
possibility that the crimes were not gang related in any meaningful way.  I 
                                                
59 The footage I have obtained, from a gang source, cannot be more accurately referenced.  
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have found that it is common for the media to label incidents ‘gang crimes’ 
when links to gangs are tenuous. In this case, the perpetrators of the crimes 
were not patched members of the gang but associates, and no evidence was 
presented to suggest that the robbery, let alone the murder or rape, were 
undertaken at the bequest of the gang. Indeed, I would argue that in this 
instance it is near inconceivable that the murder and rape were commissioned 
by the gang. Nevertheless, in the minds of the general public, the gang and 
the crime were linked. This important issue of gang crimes versus individual 
crimes will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
But if doubt can be cast over the gang’s direct involvement in the burglary 
turned rape/murder, no doubt exists over their involvement in a brutal attack, 
just three months later, in January 1994, at the Mountain Rock Music Festival, 
where Hines cut the throat of the Tyrants’ president, Tony Nightingale. The 
incident occurred after two members of the Tyrants, an outlaw motorcycle 
club with chapters in Levin and Pahiatua, had attacked an associate of the 
Nomads. The beaten man asked the Nomads for back-up and consequently 
they went looking for members of the motorcycle club. Attending he concert 
with the Tyrants were two associate outlaw clubs, the Mothers of Palmerston 
North and the Templars of Christchurch, but a Tyrants member has told me 
that the associated biker clubs had already left the concert when the 
marauding Nomads found Nightingale. The group quickly set upon the 
Tyrants’ president and beat him. During the melee, Nightingale became 
entangled in a fence, whereby Hines drew a knife and slashed the man 
across the face and then across the throat before cleaning his knife by 
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repeatedly jabbing it into the ground (NZ Herald 15.2.1996; NZ Herald 
16.2.1996; NZ Herald 31.10.1996).  
 
Despite the brazen nature of the attack, witnesses were initially unwilling to 
come forward. One person who did make a statement to the police was 
Nightingale, who survived the attack. This breach of the gang code – in 
making a statement to police – shocked the Tyrants who, I am told, expelled 
Nightingale from the club. Hines too would have been surprised by the 
statement made by his rival, and certainly it made him vulnerable to 
conviction. The Nomad leader looked to bolster his increasingly tenuous 
position by garnering false alibis from associates, a fact that was ascertained 
by police via electronic surveillance (NZ Herald 16.2.1996), and led to at least 
one conviction (R v Harris [1998] 1 NZLR: p.405). But the pressure being felt 
by Hines was soon to be felt by the whole gang. The Nomads’ acute period of 
lawlessness had unsettled the gang/community balance and they became the 
target of a police crackdown. 
 
As previously mentioned, District Commander for Timaru, Mark Lammas, 
oversaw much of Operation Shovel before he was transferred to the North 
Island as District Commander for Palmerston North. Seeing the Nomads’ 
increasingly lawless behaviour, he launched Operation Damon (Nomad spelt 
backwards), based on tactics he had found successful in Timaru. He told me 
that, 
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Damon had many similarities to Shovel, but the nature of the beast, so 
to speak, that was being policed – Damon was one gang - the Nomads 
- it wasn’t inter-gang issues [like in Timaru]. It was one gang who, to a 
large extent, had the community cowered down...[so it was] a different 
situation, but addressed in a very similar way. You had the same 
goals…to ensure that overt offending ceased and the public regained 
confidence (2007, pers. comm.). 
 
Operation Damon was launched during 1994 and led to arrests for ‘taxing’ (a 
gang practice described in the following chapter) and numerous other crimes. 
During one trial in April 1996, nine Nomad gang members and associates 
were facing  43 different charges including robbery, drugs and threatening to 
kill (NZ Herald 4.4.1996). All nine were convicted for up to five years and in 
one fell swoop, a large portion of the Foxton Nomads were behind bars, 
including Hines who received two years (NZ Herald 27.4.1996). As in Timaru, 
police pressure was exerted at even basic levels. On one day, police arrested 
one patched member and two of the gang’s prospects for driving offences (NZ 
Herald 17.6.1994) and during one trial a gang member left court to find his car 
had been wheel-clamped and was about to be towed for unpaid fines (NZ 
Herald 4.4.1996).  
 
Despite a senior Nomads member, Skull Williams, suggesting that the 
crackdown on the gang just increased their publicity and mana (NZ Herald 
16.6.1994), the resulting convictions largely wiped out the street presence of 
the gang, as its membership went to ground. Hines had to issue a statement 
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from prison denying reports that his Wairarapa chapter had closed down (NZ 
Herald 17.1.1996) after 26 arrests were made in that area (NZ Herald 
18.10.1995). Operation Damon, like Shovel before it, had shown that strong, 
targeted and deliberate police action can severely dent a gang’s strength and 
curtail its activities by incarcerating and stifling the lives of its members. And 
again, the operation highlighted to the gang the likely consequences if their 
activities went beyond what the community was prepared to tolerate.  
 
On face value, the techniques employed during Operations Shovel and 
Damon may not appear new, and some similarities can be seen with the 
controversial Police Task Force techniques of the 1970s, noted in Chapter 
Six. It would be inaccurate, however, to say they are comparable. Unlike the 
Task Force techniques, this new approach was shorter in duration, more 
sophisticated and relied less on physical confrontation, it was specifically 
targeted toward individual groups, and, perhaps most critically, there was a 
specific reason for the police operations – rather than an arbitrary crack down 
– so the gangs knew why they were being targeted. In Foxton, Lammas met 
with the Nomads leaders and told them why the operation was occurring and 
what they could expect. Again, this was based on what occurred in Timaru. 
Bill Gregory explains: 
 
Both gangs thought we were bastards, but we were open and up front 
with them and we were professional in what we did, and that was the 
key to that operation. I went  to each gang and addressed them – had 
a meeting with them and I told them what was going to happen, and 
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why it was happening and what they could do to go back to, you know, 
normal (2007, pers. comm.). 
 
In short, the operations were not seen to be without cause, and one gang was 
not being targeted because of the actions of another. This meant that the 
gangs – albeit begrudgingly – accepted that they were the cause of the 
situation by undertaking activities that dramatically exceeded what the 
community was prepared to tolerate, and thus did not feel unfairly or arbitrarily 
attacked by police, something that only tends to engender a siege mentality, 
bitterness and increased gang cohesion, as outlined in Chapter Five. 
 
Although most gang members that I have been involved with during the 
course of this research have harbored ill feeling toward police and seen them 
as an enemy – often due to specific negative experiences – most gang 
members are prepared to accept police action if it is deemed fair and 
reasonable; even in instances where the execution is unlawful. Prominent 
gang leader Daryl Harris of the Harris Gang and then Christchurch Road 
Knights put it succinctly to me when he said, “We have our job to do and they 
[the police] have their job to do. It’s a game and within that everybody accepts 
sometimes you might lose. Fair enough”. Furthermore, he said, “Look, if you 
hit a cop you can expect to be given a hiding [by the police] at the station. It’s 
seen as fair ‘cause that’s expected”. Similarly, the Roper Report found that 
the gangs had respect for police who were “tough but fair” (Committee of 
Inquiry into Violence, 1987: p.91). Likewise a former police officer and 
undercover operative, described it to me thus:   
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That’s the way I’ve found gang members or villains in general, you 
know, even as a uniform or a detective, you treat them with a bit of 
courtesy, you treat them with a bit of professionalism and they don’t 
really actually begrudge what you’re doing because they realise it’s just 
a job. It’s part of the game we all play. They do bad things, we catch 
them for it – occupational hazard, you know. 
 
Although Lammas was adamant that pressure needed to be maintained on 
the gangs after both operations, he was realistic as to the timeframe of the 
operations themselves. He told me: “To be effective they need to be long-term 
– idealistically [sic], but it is unachievable, [we] say the operation should have 
no end, but of course that’s almost impossible…Police resources are finite, 
both operations took a lot of resource and a lot of energy”. Bill Gregory 
agreed:  
 
One of the problems you have…is you rob Peter to pay Paul. You take 
resources from your front line reactive staff and put them toward a 
special operation, which then leaves your front line unable to cope with 
things that happen and the level of 24hr policing goes down – it’s 
actually a false economy, that (2007, pers. comm.). 
 
But the finite nature of police resources is perhaps not the only reason why 
such an approach could not be used on gangs indefinitely in an effort to 
eradicate them entirely. The consensus among numerous international gang 
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researchers is that a suppressive approach is not only costly but that gains 
are merely short term (Sherman in Howell, 1998a). On its own, in fact, 
suppression has proven perhaps the least successful of all forms of gang 
interventions (Decker, 2002; Klein, 1996; Spergel & Curry, 1990). And as has 
been highlighted in previous chapters, suppression can even have a negative 
impact as members convert stigmatisation into a symbol of status (Klein, 
1995: p.186). Gangs under constant pressure would still operate in the long 
term; they would simply adjust to the situation that confronted them. 
 
Such operations, therefore, are necessarily short-term but in New Zealand 
they have proved to be successful, and Operations Shovel and Damon can be 
seen as something of a template for targeting and addressing acute gang 
problems that flare up and upset the gang/community balance. Neither 
operation destroyed or eliminated the gangs they were targeting, however, 
even the police acknowledged to me that this was never their purpose; 
suggesting a tacit understanding by the police that the gangs were permanent 
fixtures in those communities and that achieving and maintaining 
gang/community equilibrium is the only realistic goal – despite political 
rhetoric to the contrary.  
 
In Timaru during 1991, John Banks said, “if we can’t put an end to this 
nonsense which has gone on far too long then we may as well fold our tents. 
But I think I know who will be folding their tents first” (Timaru Herald 
4.4.1992). In 1999, Banks retired from parliament and his government was 
ousted from power. At the north end of Timaru, the Devil’s Henchmen still 
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existed behind their heavily fortified walls, and at the south end of the town 
the Road Knights maintained their power base. Indeed, little had changed, but 
the community/gang balance had been restored. 
 
Conclusion 
During the 1990s, it became clear that the gang scene in New Zealand had 
changed in important ways. Although new developments such as skinhead 
gangs flared for a period, it was within the traditional realm of patched gangs 
that a slow but dramatic maturation had occurred. There is no doubt these 
changes can be largely understood by looking at the context in which they 
occurred – a bleak economic environment that impacted hard on lower 
socioeconomic sectors. It is no coincidence that as unemployment was 
peaking at double digit levels in the early 1990s, skinhead gangs – typically 
comprised of poor urban Pakeha – became so prominent. Similarly, for the 
traditional gangs, the rising unemployment rate, in combination with other 
factors, meant that the door that had previously been open for those wanting 
to leave these gangs was – if not closed – at least squeezing shut.  
  
With lengthier – and consequently an aging – membership, New Zealand’s 
patched gangs matured, with differing degrees of exactness, into increasingly 
sophisticated organisations. And with this, their activities began to expand to 
provide for the wider needs of their members in ways that extended beyond 
the ubiquitous fictive kin relationships.  
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Given what is known, the patched gangs can be seen as being neither fully 
legitimate nor fully illegitimate and thus they became what I have called ‘grey 
organisations’; generally viewed by most as negative, while also providing 
benefits or functions to members, as well as others in the community too. 
Also, the longevity of gang membership led to an increasing feeling of gang 
permanence. And the fact that such groups were deeply embedded within 
many communities meant that a gang/community balance was achieved. The 
gang/community balance, although enduring, requires maintenance and, in 
extreme cases, police intervention. While this chapter has highlighted two 
examples of the gang/community balance being disrupted by the traditional 
problems of gang violence, it was new developments evident within the 1990s 
that came to define the entire patched gang scene; and these are the focus of 
the chapter to follow. 
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Chapter	  Nine.	  	  
 
 
9. Profit Driven Crime: – c1990s 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explained how by the 1990s gangs had evolved 
significantly. Although this evolutionary shift was broad and multifaceted, it 
was changes relating to criminal undertakings that became the primary focus 
of mainstream attention and concern. Indeed, during this period, gangs 
became synonymous with organised criminal activities; primarily through an 
involvement in the drug trade, but also in relation to ‘taxing’, and perverting 
the course of justice. 
 
This chapter will evaluate these activities, and examine the extent to which 
gangs were engaged in them as well as discussing the important, though 
often overlooked, differentiation between gang crime and crime committed by 
individual gang members. Furthermore, it will contextualise these issues and 
offer explanations as to how and why gangs or gang members became 
involved in such activities. It will also outline how gangs gained a form of 
legitimate authority within the criminal underworld and why this power did not 
fully translate when dealing with those outside the criminal sphere; and the 
outcomes when attempts to do so were made. 
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Gangs and the Drug Trade 
Following overseas trends, the rise of recreational drug use, and therefore a 
black economy relating to drugs, was evident in New Zealand long before 
gangs became synonymous with the trade in the 1990s (see, for example, 
Booth, 1980; Hall, 1981; McFerran, 1973; New Zealand Board of Health 
Committee, 1970; Newbold, 2000, 2004; Yska, 1990). In fact, the most 
successful know drug enterprise in New Zealand history was the 1970s ‘Mr 
Asia’ syndicate, which had nothing whatsoever to do with patched gangs 
(Hall, 1981). Where there is financial opportunity, be it legal or illegal, there is 
likely to be entrepreneurial persons who will be keen to exploit it. But while 
such an entrepreneurial ambition is undoubtedly a significant factor to gang 
involvement in the drug scene, once again the economic environment is 
important context to explore – particularly as it relates the patched street 
gangs largely made up of Maori and Pacific Peoples; those ethnic groups 
most negatively affected by the post 1984 reforms. 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined how the floundering economy was a 
component in longevity of membership and the flow-on effects that had on 
gang evolution. But a further, more demonstrable, impact of unemployment 
was gang involvement in the drug economy. Structural economic changes 
that negatively impacted on semi- and un-skilled labour forces in U.S. cities 
have been identified as directly influencing gang involvement in drug dealing 
(Hagedorn, 2002; J. W. Moore, 1991; Taylor, 1989) because when the “formal 
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economy falters, the informal steps in” (Hagedorn, 2005b: p.160). In this way, 
the drug trade offered the gangs economic opportunities that were 
nonexistent in more traditional, or legal, trades.   
 
As outlined in chapters Seven and Eight, the post-1984 economic reforms in 
New Zealand, via such things as the radical reorganisation of the state sector 
(Sinclair, 1991: p.323), tax changes (Belich, 2001: p.409), and benefit cuts 
(Dalziel & Lattimore, 1996: p.90), negatively impacted on the poor (Kelsey, 
1995: p.258) and led to the beginnings of structural unemployment (Spoonley, 
1993: p.5). To make the link between unemployment and gang entry into the 
drug trade, then, we would expect to see the gangs’ growing prominence in 
the underground economy correlating with the post 1984 reforms; or, more 
importantly, when the effects of the economic restructuring were greatest felt 
and unemployment became structural. And, indeed, we do. 
 
Despite some early entrepreneurialism by the likes of certain Hell’s Angels (as 
outlined in Chapter Seven) and undoubtedly others as well, gang involvement 
in the drug dealing became noticeable in the latter half of the 1980s before 
becoming much more widespread in the 1990s.  
 
In 1987, gang connections to profit driven crime were enough for one 
Auckland newspaper, which listed several examples, to proclaim in a 
headline, “NZ gangs take on mantle of Mafia” (The Auckland Star 11.1.1987). 
Leaving aside the fact that even an elementary comparison between the 
Mafia and, for example, the Mongrel Mob would quickly ascertain that the 
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headline was more media sensationalism than accurate journalism, few 
others were reaching such a conclusion. A report of South Island gang activity 
written by police in July 1986 – the first Penn report, outlined in Chapter 
Seven – was more focused on the problems of inter gang conflict, anti-social 
behaviour, and violence than profit driven activity – and the major concern in 
the area of gang finance, as will be recalled, was government funded work 
schemes. In fact, moves into the drug trade were almost certainly slowed by 
these schemes as they provided the gangs with employment opportunities 
within the gang sphere – and it was only with the schemes’ demise that the 
gangs looked toward the underground drug economy for employment in 
earnest. 
 
That gang involvement in the drug trade was not widespread in the late 1980s 
is evinced in the passing of the Proceeds of Crime Act (1991). Introduced by 
the fourth Labour government in September 1990, just prior to their ousting in 
the general election of that year, the Proceeds of Crime Act was eventually 
passed by the National government in November 1991. The Act provided – 
following a conviction – for forfeiture to the Crown of assets that had been 
used in the commission of a crime, obtained from crime, or purchased from 
the proceeds of crime. The legislation was proposed to comply with United 
Nations conventions and to counter the perceived threat drug dealers and the 
nefarious activities of white collar criminals.  
 
It is particularly telling that New Zealand’s traditional gangs played the 
smallest part possible in the debates surrounding the passing of the 
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legislation; particularly as politicians had generally shown little restraint in 
attacking the gangs in the past. Indeed, when first introduced to parliament by 
Labour, the then Minister of Police, Richard Prebble, noted that “bikie gangs” 
overseas had entered the drug trade and said, “That could happen here” 
(NZPD, vol. 510, 1990:  p.4306). Although opposition MP, John Carter, 
interjected saying “It’s already started” (ibid), the fact that the discussion was 
equivocal – and that it was the only mention of gangs in all three readings of 
the Bill – highlights the fact that gang problems before the 1990s were still 
those of violence and disorder, and not of profit driven crime. But by the late 
1990s, as will become clear, the Act was proving an important fillip to drug 
crime related to patched gangs, which by that time had become much more 
pronounced. 
 
Researchers in the U.S. have largely examined gang involvement in drugs as 
it is situated in urban ghettos, but in New Zealand it is important also to 
consider rural areas. Some 80,000 workers lost their jobs in the state sector in 
the wake of the post 1984 reforms (Belich, 2001: p.410) and many of these 
were in the areas controlled by the Ministries of Forestry and Railways, which 
greatly affected the workforce in rural communities. In the early 1990s, the 
Gisborne and Bay of Plenty regions, reflecting national trends, had 
unemployment levels of around 10 percent, but the smaller communities in 
those areas had unemployment levels much higher. For example, the small 
town of Ruatoria, had an unemployment rate around 80 percent and was said 
to be ravaged by gang problems (NZ Herald 15.12.1990).  
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As early as 1988, the police expressed concern at the growing number of 
gang members in country towns, which they suggested were beyond the 
control of small community police forces (AJHR, G.6, 1988: p.5). Both Black 
Power and the Mongrel Mob began to take advantage of the large black 
market economy that was thriving in smaller communities experiencing 
significant hardship. Primarily this took the form of cultivating marijuana 
plantations, a practice that by the latter half of the 1990s the police were 
directly linking to gangs (AJHR, G.6, 1997: p.4). Although the police belief that 
gangs dominate the practice of cannabis cultivation is overstated (Wilkins & 
Casswell, 2003), certainly the large street gangs either grew plants 
themselves or purchased the drug and then used their networks within the 
cities to distribute it.  
 
For New Zealand gangs, selling marijuana came to be seen as both legitimate 
and pragmatic. Then National Black Power present, Rei Harris, told me in 
1999: “Black Power’s not into [dealing] A class [drugs], we’re into something 
that’s grown naturally…”. Another Black Power leader, Mane Adams, told me 
in 2003 that drug dealing was about a need: “With so many of our members 
unemployed, it’s a natural way to turn”. A senior Mongrel Mob member, 
‘Sundown’, told me in 2003 that, “If we had jobs then crime would just be part 
time, you know”. Sundown’s assessment is prescient; perhaps regardless of 
the economy or the end of government funded work schemes, gangs would 
have entered the drug economy to some extent because their rebellious 
nature did not condemn such activities. However, given that the rise of profit 
driven crime within the gang scene positively correlates with the economic 
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downturn of the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, there can be little 
doubt that the significant economic problems of this period added primacy and 
motivation to such endeavours; particularly as many gang members were 
locked out of the legitimate economy as part of what Hagedorn (1988), Short 
(1990) and others have call the “underclass” and what Silver (1994) and 
others have termed the “socially excluded”. 
 
A snapshot of Mongrel Mob members in 1993 highlights just how excluded 
many gang members had become from the formal economy. A survey of the 
Mob’s ‘Northern Region’ members, affiliates and partners found that: 95 
percent were unemployed; 93 percent of whom were long-term unemployed 
(out of work for six months or longer); 87 percent had been unemployed for 
six years or longer; and ten percent had been unemployed for over ten years. 
Almost 90 percent of those surveyed had no educational qualifications and/or 
vocational skills and 82 percent of the men and 66 percent of the women had 
left school at age 15 or under (Winter, 1998: p.255). Statistics such as these 
for Maori gang members, as well as issues relating to health, literacy, housing 
and poverty, led the New Zealand Maori Council (1996: p.1) to conclude in 
1996 that mainstream institutions “may no longer be able to deal with 
these...people”. Unskilled, uneducated, and unwanted by a transformed 
economy, for many gang members and their families, the black economy was 
not just an attractive choice; for all intents and purposes, it was their only 
choice. 
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But just because many members sought profit from the drug trade or other 
criminal endeavours, does not automatically mean that they were good at it. 
Many gang members were as ill suited to underworld occupations as they 
were legitimate ones; and the many bumbling efforts at criminal undertakings 
by gang members is testimony to this. Notwithstanding that, however, many 
leaders and certain individuals showed considerable abilities, and these were 
often promoted within the gangs’ organisational model. 
 
Indeed, a further influence that aided New Zealand gangs’ entry into, and 
success in, the drug economy was the formal organisation structure that they 
had adopted early in their development. A greater degree of organisation and 
formal hierarchical leadership is said to be conducive and adaptive to efficient 
drug dealing (Jankowski, 1991; Taylor, 1989). This hierarchical structure 
allowed gangs to formulate plans and delegate responsibilities; to function, as 
it were, like a business. 
 
Moreover, with either multiple chapters across the country, or alliances like 
those that existed between different groups of outlaw motorcycle clubs, such 
as the Biker Federation60 discussed in Chapter Six, the gangs had ready-
made distribution networks through which to supply drugs. For many, then, 
the drug trade became an easy and natural evolutionary progression. Not all 
gangs were involved in drug dealing as collectives and certainly not all gang 
members became drug dealers. But with significant networks to both source 
                                                
60 Other than the Biker Federation, later renamed the A Team, another unmade alliance had been 
formed by the end of the 1990s between the Mothers, the Templars (who later became another chapter 
of the Devil’s Henchmen), the Devil’s Henchmen, and the Tyrants. A further, and again unnamed, 
coalition of groups consisted of the Hell’s Angels, the Road Knights, the Head Hunters, and the Filthy 
Few. 
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and supply drugs, and the fact that gangs offer protection against rip-offs, a 
conducive platform is formed for those who seek the opportunities drug 
dealing can provide. This offers some explanation as to why international 
research has shown that gang members are more prevalent than non-gang 
members in dealing drugs (Esbensen et al., 2002). Although in a chicken-and-
egg scenario, it is unclear whether gangs facilitate members to trade in drugs, 
or that drug dealers are drawn toward gang membership (ibid).   
 
Notwithstanding this, it is important to examine the nature of gang 
involvement in the drug trade in New Zealand. An important distinction needs 
to be made between ‘gang crime’ and crime undertaken by individual 
members. As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, I have defined a ‘criminal 
gang’ as a structured group that maintains both an exclusive membership 
marked by common identifiers, formal rules that supersede the rules of the 
state, and an organisational focus on profit through crime. This definition is 
devised to capture those groups whose members operate as a collective in 
profit driven criminal enterprise. Evidence of these  patched ‘criminal gangs’, I 
argue, is scant in recent times, something I will address later in this thesis, but 
from my research, particularly in talking with current and ex-gang members 
and reviewing police intelligence on drug busts in the 1990s, I believe that it 
was much more common then – although by no means universal.  
 
Certain gangs simply viewed such profit crime as not being the business of 
the gang as a collective. Other gangs – or gang chapters – chose not to 
engage in criminal activity as a group due to the risks associated with doing 
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so. In smaller gangs or chapters, a bust that implicated numerous, or all, 
members was too great a threat to the organisation’s survival. While a small 
gang might be able to survive one or two members being incarcerated, if the 
majority of the gang were convicted and jailed at one time, the gang could not 
expect to survive.  
 
A further reason why certain gangs did not become criminal gangs is that the 
members wishing to pursue criminal activity did not wish to share their profits 
with the whole group when others were unwilling – through laziness or 
prudence – to do their share of the work. In all these cases, any profit driven 
criminal enterprises that were linked to such gangs were the business of 
individual members, rather than of the gang collective. 
 
Moreover, certain gangs move in and out of collective criminal enterprise. 
Driven by a need to raise funds quickly for an event or a common asset 
purchase, a gang may agree to engage in some illegal money-making 
venture, often the drug trade, but once the goal is obtained, the criminal 
activity stops. Indeed, it is important to my definition of ‘criminal gang’ that this 
designated status is not fixed. Although in many instances it is a significant 
and total evolutionary transition from gang to criminal gang, a criminal gang 
can return to ‘gang’ status; and this, I suggest many have done since the 
1990s. One reason for this switch is the Proceeds of Crime Act, something I 
will address in further detail shortly. 
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Perhaps the most remarkable development in the supply of drugs – primarily 
marijuana – in the 1990s was the advent of ‘tinnie houses’; a concept reported 
by one newspaper to have been devised in Auckland by the predominantly 
Polynesian outlaw club, the Tribesmen (NZ Herald 19.4.2005). It was an 
innovation quickly embraced by many of the larger gangs. Tinnie houses, 
sometimes called ‘drug supermarkets’, were so labelled because they 
distributed ‘tinnies’, also known as ‘bullets’ or ‘foils’ – small amounts of 
marijuana (perhaps two or three cannabis cigarettes worth) – wrapped in 
tinfoil. Tinnie houses were usually established in suburban homes, although 
occasionally, as will be shown, similar drug operations were run from gang 
clubhouses as well. In many instances, the trade occurred through an open 
window, while others were slightly more sophisticated. A tinnie house in Hutt 
Valley run by a chapter of Highway 61 in the early 1990s had a small hole cut 
in the fence through which money and drugs were be exchanged. A buzzer 
was set up on the fence so the dealer could be alerted to a sale (NZ Herald 
2.2.1994). With remarkable business diligence, tinnie houses often operated 
around the clock.  
 
Successful tinnie houses were extremely well patronised, and a steady 
stream of people coming and going from a property was often a telltale sign of 
a drug supermarket. The success of this form of drug dealing meant that 
tinnie houses soon spread throughout the country and, as will become clear, 
proved highly profitable for many gangs and often opened up employment 
opportunities for their membership. 
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The police said that during 1995, Highway 61 in Christchurch was selling 
tinnies to up to 72 people per day from their Vagues Road headquarters (The 
Press 8.4.1997). In 2007, a former member of that chapter told me that the 
number was often as high as 200 tinnies per day61. Also in Christchurch at 
around the same time, the local Black Power chapter was said by police to be 
selling similar amounts (The Press 5.9.97). In Auckland, some tinnie house 
were seeing 100 customers per day and police estimated that a core of about 
a dozen tinnie houses had a collective turnover of $2m a year (NZ Herald 
28.1.1998).  
 
Not all gangs ran tinnie houses, but for those that did, it appears there was no 
set template as to how they operated. Some arrangements were quite formal. 
One Black Power leader told me in 2005 that in the earlier days drugs were all 
sold to profit the gang, but over time, the individuals actually selling the drugs 
were paid one tinnie (in cash or kind) for every four they sold. Three people 
were usually charged with running the tinnie house and they worked in 
rotating shifts. I was told by the same source that in one tinnie house a gym 
was set up for entertainment and food was provided by the gang. In contrast, 
other operations were much less structured. One tinnie house operated by a 
Mongrel Mob chapter in the lower North Island, for example, was informally 
organised. If any of the membership wanted to sell (or organise others to sell 
on their behalf), then they simply turned up and staffed it themselves. In 2006, 
one member of the chapter told me: “It’s first up, best dressed”.  
 
                                                
61 The discrepancy is likely due to certain customers buying more than one tinnie at a time. 
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Because of their public nature, tinnie houses were easily identified by police, 
but they were often equally difficult to close down. Because gangs engaged a 
significant number of people – members, prospects and associates – to run 
such ventures, following a police raid there were often others prepared to step 
up and quickly restart the operations. Black Power’s Wellington headquarters 
was a renowned tinnie house in the early 1990s. A police surveillance 
operation undertaken during 1993 found buyers saying ‘shop’ to the sentry 
before a transaction was made. During the trial stemming from the operation, 
police said that despite the arrests, the ‘shop’ was still operating (NZ Herald 
12.11.1993). The following January, the clubhouse was raided again. One day 
later it was up and running again – and subsequently raided once more (NZ 
Herald 29.1.1994). This irrepressible nature was not unique. On Auckland’s 
North Shore, police said many ‘bullet houses’ closed by police had reopened 
in new premises within an hour (NZ Herald 2.11.1995). Clearly there was no 
shortage of people wanting work – and equally there was significant demand. 
 
For much of the 1990s, Black Power occupied a number of properties 
clustered together in Rotorua. In early 1997, as the gang members partied in 
one house, police quietly searched an adjacent property. During the search, 
plainclothes officers were “swamped” with people calling in to buy drugs. 
Detective Sergeant Dennis Murphy said, “It was like a supermarket checkout, 
with people practically queued up outside” (NZ Herald 22.3.1997). Police 
arrested all those who turned up to buy drugs – approximately one customer 
every three minutes – but had to stop after half an hour because they ran out 
of handcuffs and room to hold those being arrested. It was a rare case when 
486 
 
buyers of the drug rather than the suppliers were apprehended at a tinnie 
house, despite the fact that it was demand for the drug that drove the trade.  
 
And demand was considerable. In 1998, a survey of drug use in New Zealand 
showed that just over half of people aged 15-45 years had tried marijuana, a 
nine percent increase since 1990 (Field & Casswell, 1999a: p.20). Moreover, 
the survey found that ‘current users’ of the drug had risen from 13 percent to 
17 percent in the same period. Of the current users just three percent grew all 
or most of their own supply of marijuana (Field & Casswell, 1999b: p.29), 
meaning the vast majority were reliant on drug dealers, guaranteeing a 
market for the tinnie house operators, and ensuring their ongoing success. It 
was a situation not unlike that which occurred around the distribution of liquor 
– via speakeasies – during the prohibition era in the U.S. 
 
The public nature of tinnie houses did not just make them vulnerable to police 
raids, but also to attacks by drug trade competitors or other underworld 
figures. Given this, any sole traders operating tinnie houses took a 
considerable risk. Non-affiliated operations that emerged within the territory of 
a gang were likely to be stood over for a fee or face being forcibly closed 
down by constantly being robbed, something I have often been told by 
numerous gang members and once witnessed. 
 
With the numbers to run them, and the reputation of strength to maintain 
them, the patched street gangs – and larger outlaw clubs like the Highway 61 
and the Tribesmen – were ideally suited to operating tinnie houses. Such 
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enterprises were the most obvious example of gang involvement in organised 
drug dealing – particularly when, as clearly occurred on occasion, clubhouses 
were used as the distribution point. In fact, it was the brashness of those 
operating from behind gang walls that led police to believe that gang 
palisades instilled in gang members a feeling of protection where they felt 
they were insulated from the law (Justice and Law Reform Committee, 1997). 
As will be highlighted, these beliefs, along with concerns about the imposing 
nature of gang house fortifications, led to renewed calls for their removal.   
 
Following the development and growth of tinnie houses, the second significant 
development that occurred in the drug trade during the 1990s was the rise in 
the popularity of methamphetamine. Though evident in the outlaw motorcycle 
club scene on a minor scale since the early 1980s, the drug did not become 
significant enough to rate a mention in police reports until 1991 (Newbold, 
2004: p.61). 
 
Known as ‘speed’ and, at that time, most commonly ingested via nasal 
insufflation, methamphetamine drew something of a line between the patched 
street gangs and the outlaw motorcycle clubs. While both types of gang were 
involved in the cannabis trade, in the 1990s methamphetamine was much 
more common within motorcycle clubs, some of whom, it will be shown, 
became variously involved in the drug’s manufacture, importation and supply.  
 
In March 1994, customs staff intercepted New Zealand’s then largest haul of 
speed. The operation centred on members and associates of the Satan’s 
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Slaves, an outlaw club based in Wellington, and netted 4kg of cannabis, 1000 
capsules (‘caps’) of cannabis oil, and 110 caps of a “white powder”. Forty 
arrests were made (NZ Herald 24.5.1994). Police estimated the street value 
of the imported speed to be between $180,000 and $250,000. At the 
subsequent trial, Justice Heron formed the opinion, based on this case as well 
as others, that the activities of the Satan’s Slaves Motorcycle Club were illegal 
drug trafficking and motorbikes – in that order (NZ Herald 25.11.1995).  
 
In 1998, police launched Operation Asphalt, a two-month covert operation 
targeting Highway 61. Asphalt was part of an investigation that uncovered 
what was claimed to be the “biggest drug-making operation in New Zealand 
history” (NZ Herald 18.11.1998). William Wallace, an industrial chemist, his 
wife, and two others were caught with more than $270,000 in cash, up to 
$900,000 worth of methamphetamine, and the chemicals to make millions of 
dollars worth of the drug. In the 20 months prior to the bust, the chemist had 
just over one million dollars of unexplained income (NZ Herald 11.11.1998). 
Highway 61 was the national distributor of the drug; at the conclusion of 
Operation Asphalt, police swooped during the gang’s fortieth anniversary 
celebration and arrested 20 members and associates of the gang, uncovering 
methamphetamine manufacturing laboratories as well as hydroponics 
cannabis plots and a three kilogram bag of cannabis heads (NZ Herald 
23.11.1998).  
 
A further bust involving a member of an outlaw club occurred in 1999, when 
Terry Jones, a member of the Auckland-based Forty Five, was jailed after 
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being caught with methamphetamine and drug manufacturing equipment as 
well as 112 cannabis plants, a list of drug sales worth $45,000, and a bag 
containing $20,000 cash that he had thrown from his car while being pursued 
by police (NZ Herald 18.4.2005). 
 
The apparent escalation of methamphetamine dealing was not unnoticed. At 
the sentencing of William Wallace, Crown Solicitor Ross Burns said that 
methamphetamine use and manufacture had “only recently begun to take off 
in this country” and was a new social evil (NZ Herald 18.11.1998). It was an 
insightful observation. A comprehensive drug survey published in 1999 
showed that in 1998, four percent of the population were using stimulant 
drugs such as speed, up from just one percent in 1990 (Field & Casswell, 
1999a). As will become clear in Chapter Eleven, however, the manufacture 
and use of methamphetamine was only beginning to gain momentum and in 
the new millennium, the drug became seen as an endemic problem in New 
Zealand by the public, and by many within the gang scene as well. 
 
As previously noted, in the early 1980s there was evidence that a member of 
the Hell’s Angels was manufacturing methamphetamine, and since that time 
police, as often told to me, have been convinced the outlaw club was a major 
player in the drug scene. Nearly 20 years later they believed they had 
discovered the proof they needed. During 1997, police began Operation 
Shovel (not to be confused with the operation of the same name that had 
targeted the Road Knights and Devil’s Henchmen in Timaru), a surveillance 
operation targeting renowned Auckland villain and leader of a criminal group 
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popularly labelled the ‘hole-in-the-wall’ gang, Simon Allan Kerr. Police failed to 
find enough evidence to charge Kerr with any crime, but what they uncovered 
during their surveillance gave them cause to focus on the Hell’s Angels, and 
specifically Angels’ member Andrew Sisson.  
 
Known as ‘Ses’, the senior member of the Hell’s Angels enjoyed a hard-man 
reputation befitting his then rank of Sergeant-at-Arms. Considered and 
articulate, Sisson is also an intelligent man, and police at that time believed he 
was the best methamphetamine cook in the country (NZ Herald 6.12.1999). 
Sisson was first implicated in the drug trade in 1993, when he was convicted 
of importing 448 grams of methamphetamine and sentenced to six years six 
months imprisonment (R v Sisson, Unreported, Court of Appeal, Auckland, 
Anderson J, July 1999). Upon his release police believed he began 
manufacturing and supplying the drug, and after bugging his house in 1997, 
police swooped; arresting him, his wife, three other members of the Hell’s 
Angels, and six associates of the outlaw club. On his farm, police found 
$92,000 in cash and a recipe for methamphetamine, while $18,000 turned up 
in his wife’s rented house along with 49 grams of speed (NZ Herald 
18.4.2005).  
 
Those arrested faced numerous charges including manufacturing 
methamphetamine, and supplying and conspiracy to supply the drug. During 
the second trial at the High Court in Auckland in early 1999, the case took a 
dramatic twist when the judge, just days before the three week trial was due 
to end, sequestered the jury for fear that outside influences may exert 
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pressure on them. The judge did not make clear what information had 
become known, except to say that he was satisfied the risk was real (NZ 
Herald 26.2.1999). The then head of the Organised Crime Unit, Detective 
Sergeant Daryl Brazier, would not comment on the details of the information 
received by police, but told me 2007: 
 
What I can tell you, information was received – and very reliable 
information was received – that led us to have a hearing with the judge 
and express our concerns about the jury. As a result of what we told 
him, he then made the decision to sequester the jury for the rest of the 
trial. 
 
Brazier was, however, prepared to speak hypothetically about the problems 
that could arise in such cases; pointing to the fact that any defence team has 
a right to lists of the jurists including their names, addresses and occupations:  
 
As far as gangs are concerned, I mean what the hell have they got to 
lose by intimidating one or two members of the jury, I mean it’s easy – 
they know where they live. Someone…knocks on the door and says, 
‘we know where you live, you’ve got to do the right thing’. I mean, how 
difficult is it? We’d be kidding ourselves if we thought that hadn’t gone 
on in the past (Daryl Brazier 2007 pers. comm.). 
 
Attempts at perverting the course of justice in relation to gangs will be 
discussed in a following section, but in this instance, members of the Hell’s 
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Angels categorically denied to me any involvement in trying to influence the 
jury. Indeed, they say the police raised fears of jury intimidation to bolster 
what they saw as a flimsy case against some of those accused. Brazier 
dismissed that accusation. Whatever the case, ultimately all of the accused 
were acquitted, except for Sisson and his wife, who were convicted of 
conspiracy to supply methamphetamine and money laundering and 
sentenced to eight and three years imprisonment respectively; sentences they 
unsuccessfully appealed (R v Sisson, Unreported, Court of Appeal, Auckland, 
Anderson J, July 1999). No charges were ever laid in relation to jury 
intimidation. Despite the lack of a conviction for manufacturing, for the police it 
was long awaited confirmation of the involvement of the Hell’s Angels in drug 
production:  
 
Absolutely [it was confirmation], this is a man who was a very, very 
high profile and high powered gang member. I mean he was the world 
secretary of the Hell’s Angels. You know, that’s the most powerful gang 
in the world (Daryl Brazier 2007 pers. comm.).  
 
According the Angels, Sisson has never been the world secretary of the club, 
but he has certainly travelled to Hell’s Angels’ meetings and events around 
the world. Although his supposed international rank – commonly talked about 
within police circles, and published at least once in the media (New Zealand 
Herald 18.4.2005) – is untrue, there is little doubt that he was a significant 
catch for police, although it was not enough to prove the outlaw club was a 
criminal gang by my definition.  
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Proceeds of Crime 
Although sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence, imprisonment was not 
Sisson’s only concern. Incarcerated in Mount Eden Prison, Sisson’s lodgings 
were a long way from the comforts of home. Aside from his three hectare 
lifestyle block north of Auckland, Sisson and his wife owned two Harley 
Davidson Motorcycles, a Holden Executive Club Sport car, an Isuzu Bighorn 
SUV, a truck, and two jet skis (NZ Herald 18.4.2005). Threatened with the 
Proceeds of Crime Act, Sisson struck a deal with the Crown and gave up one 
of the motorcycles, the Bighorn, and $108,000 in cash (NZ Herald 18.4.2005). 
He was not alone in facing forfeiture under the Act. In July 1999, William 
Wallace, the Highway 61 methamphetamine cook mentioned earlier, had 
$1.5m in property and assets taken from him, the largest confiscation under 
the Act at that time (NZ Herald 5.7.1999).  
 
The Proceeds of Crime Act not only affected the individual drug dealers within 
gangs, it also affected those gangs undertaking criminal activity as a 
collective. In Christchurch, Highway 61 had their Vagues Road clubhouse 
confiscated because it had been used as a tinnie house. It was one of three 
Christchurch properties taken under the Act during 1997 and 1998 (Newbold, 
2000: p.220). This threat was enough for many of the gangs that were doing 
so, to stop dealing drugs as a collective, and certainly meant – with a couple 
of rare exceptions noted later in this thesis – the practice of using clubhouses 
as drug supermarkets ended. Tinnie house operations did not stop, however, 
but those who ran them were careful to use rental properties to front their 
operations, thereby protecting their assets. Detective Inspector Cam Ronald 
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said, “Gangs especially and people selling drugs in city areas are using rented 
properties as they can’t be forfeited [under the act]” (NZ Herald 5.7.1999). 
 
Although property seizures under the Act were initially slow, they increased 
throughout the 1990s as police became more familiar with the powers. From 
January 1994 to May 1998, police successfully seized $3.4 million worth of 
criminals’ property, and $2 million of that occurred after 1996. According to 
police, 1998 was set to be a “vintage year” and the head of the police unit 
dealing with the proceeds of crime, Detective Sergeant Greg Heath, told the 
Police Association magazine that, “This year [1998] is shaping up to be 
another successful year. We’re quicker at the procedures now than a few 
years ago so we can churn through the work” (Ten-One, 15.5.1998). By July 
1999, police had seized $11.6 million worth of cash and assets under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act (NZ Herald 5.7.1999). Just how much of this came 
specifically from gang activity is unclear, as the data do not distinguish 
between gang and non-gang forfeitures, but it is believed “the law had been 
used almost exclusively against gang members and drug dealers” (Newbold, 
2000: p.220). 
 
Buoyed by these successes, police sought greater legislative power to seize 
assets. This possibility was raised just before the general election of 1999 
when the National Government’s Minister of Justice, Tony Ryall, told a Police 
Association conference that the government would review the legislation and 
put the burden of proof onto “criminals” to show how they had gained their 
assets (NZ Herald 14.10.1999). However, as will be shown, it was almost ten 
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years before the idea was given serious consideration. By that time, many of 
the gangs that could have been identified as ‘criminal gangs’ in the 1990s had 
pulled back from collective illegal endeavours. As noted in Chapter Eight, with 
their organisational structure and relative sophistication, New Zealand gangs 
are adept at identifying and mitigating risk to their organisational survival. The 
Proceeds of Crime Act, though not specifically formed to target patched 
gangs, had proven itself a useful tool against gang related drug crime, and it 
had a significant effect on gang behaviour. It did not reduce the number of 
gangs, or even the level of drug offending, but it did deter collective criminal 
enterprise and thus reduced the number of gangs who could be defined as 
‘criminal’ and thereby ensuring they did not form a powerful financial base. 
 
The Criminal Underworld – Gangs and ‘Taxing’ 
A further development in the 1990s that emerged within the gang realm was 
‘taxing’. Taxing is a form of extortion, whereby people are stood-over for 
payments regarding real or perceived debts owed to the gang. Often acts of 
taxing are little more than crude robberies, but at other times they exemplify 
the unique culture and rules that intersect gang and criminal life. Examples of 
taxing include, taking a criminal’s illegal earnings or taking money or goods 
from people who have somehow disrespected or displeased gangs or gang 
members. Like drug dealing, the degree to which gangs are involved in taxing 
varies greatly. It is clear, however, that certain groups did become heavily 
involved in the practice in the 1990s.  
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Within criminal fraternities, redress of disputes is not readily available via the 
process of law. Either due to an allegiance to criminal codes of behaviour (see 
Newbold, 1989a) that forbids them from complaining to police, or through fear 
that a complaint to police will draw attention to one’s own criminal 
undertakings, criminals are unlikely to seek the traditional law and order 
avenues available to most members of society. Generally speaking, those 
involved in criminal activity exist in a world where the strong can govern the 
weak. In communities where a gang has dominant strength, the gang will 
often regulate or exploit crime undertaken in the area through taking the 
earnings of local criminals, or seeking a percentage of their earnings.  
 
Within the criminal world, then, the gangs have gained a form of underworld 
authority whereby their strength allows them to create rules. Within strong 
gang communities, criminals – primarily drug dealers – would often have to 
negotiate with this authority in order to trade; not entirely dissimilar from the 
way legitimate businesses need to deal with regulatory hurdles of different city 
councils or government agencies. Without seeking approval, and most often 
paying a fee, to undertake certain activities, criminals open themselves up to 
be taxed. Because such activities are, by their very nature, secretive, most 
forms of taxing occur with little public knowledge and therefore most often 
only come to light when the police become involved. 
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Indeed, the act of taxing largely dissolves once the authorities are involved. 
The lack of corruption in the New Zealand Police62 is a key element in 
ensuring that taxing is generally confined to the criminal underworld, which is 
resistant to police intervention. Those who are able and likely to seek 
protection from the law, the vast majority of the general population, will not be 
targeted as the significant risk of prosecution outweighs the potential benefits 
of the ’earn’. 
 
During the early 1990s, the Nomads were one gang that gained a reputation 
for taxing, particularly in the town of Foxton where they told one victim that 
they “owned the town and everything in it” (NZ Herald 4.4.1996). During the 
trial of several Nomad members, a jury was told that the gang took property 
from people who owed them debts, sold stolen goods back to their owners, 
and took a cut of people’s welfare benefit money (NZ Herald 16.1.1996). It 
was due, in part, to these activities that police launched Operation Damon, 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
After uncovering an early taxing operation in Foxton during 1994, police said 
that the activity was “quite blasé” and no attempts were made to conceal the 
offenders’ identities and gang patches were worn (NZ Herald 7.5.1994). In 
fact, unlike many crimes, taxing was reliant on people knowing the offender – 
intimidation being an important component of successful taxing. Reflecting the 
                                                
62 Although no specific research has been done in this area, it is widely acknowledge among the 
criminal fraternity that the New Zealand police are remarkably incorruptible. They may well break the 
law in order to secure conviction, but they are very unlikely to break the law to the benefit of criminals. 
Support for this view is reflected in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which 
consistently rates New Zealand as one of the least corrupt countries in the world (see 
www.transparency.org). 
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nature of much taxing, the police explained, “A lot of people on the fringe of 
criminal activity themselves are getting taxed and are too scared to complain” 
(NZ Herald 7.5.1994).  
 
In 1995, a number of Nomads members, including the gang’s boss, Dennis 
“Mossie” Hines, awoke a woman in Foxton and demanded her boyfriend’s 
marijuana stash. After the drugs were retrieved, Hines threatened to kill the 
woman in an effort to scare her into silence. However, the threat did not work 
and the victim went to police. At the depositions hearing in the case against 
Hines, the court was introduced to this hitherto publically unfamiliar term of 
taxing – which was explained to them as a form of stealing property (NZ 
Herald 5.4.1995). That same year, police seized four cars that had been taxed 
by the gang over a six-month period (NZ Herald 30.9.1995). In April 1996, 
nine Nomads members were convicted of various charges stemming from the 
taxing of drug dealers and others in the community using what Justice Heron 
described as “mafia tactics” (NZ Herald 27.4.1996). 
 
Another case of taxing in 1996 involved Mongrel Mob members raiding a 
tinnie house in Palmerston North, and taking drugs and cash. Although the 
occupants were “terrified”, they complained to the police and those involved 
were prosecuted (NZ Herald 6.3.1996). In 1997, another group of Mongrel 
Mob members stole a car from an Auckland man before contacting him and 
demanding $2,000 for the car’s return. It was reported that threats were made 
against his family to keep him quiet. Indeed, the man did remain quiet and 
ended up paying the gang $1,500 (Sunday Star Times 13.5.1997). What 
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relationship the man had with the gang is unclear, but it is unlikely, given the 
nature of taxing, that he had no connections at all.  
 
Another gang that gained a reputation for taxing was the Head Hunters (NZ 
Herald 12.7.1999). Few members of the Head Hunters had qualms about 
claiming cash or property from people who had slighted the gang in some 
way. Most often the victims accepted their fate – either knowing they had 
breached a gang law, or unwilling to stand up to the gang. Without complaints 
being made, police were powerless to stop the practice. Then leader of 
Auckland’s Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Unit, Detective Sergeant Cam Stokes 
told me in 2003: 
 
Certainly a lot of people have been ordered to get up to the Head 
Hunters’ clubhouse with their motorbikes and ownership papers and 
hand them over because of a comment they have made about one of 
the members…This is unreported crime…[and] very common. 
 
Prominent Head Hunter leader, Wayne Doyle, who along with several of his 
members, was convicted of murdering King Cobra member, Anthony Evalu, in 
April 1985, is rather open about the practice. When asked about his gang’s 
reputation for taxing in the 1990s he told me in 2009: “That’s a fair 
assessment for everybody… Like everybody else there was a fair bit of that 
going on… We couldn’t deny that; everybody was doing it”. In speaking about 
taxing generally, Doyle told me that it usually involves those within the 
underworld or as he put it, “hood on hood”, whereby those with strength take 
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from those who show weakness, suggesting it is an easy way for a “lazy man 
to make an earn”. It is, he said, “The law of the jungle”. 
 
In 2003, Cam Stokes described to me one incident involving the Head 
Hunters: 
 
The central police did an electronic job on [a car thief] and during the 
course of the operation they found out that he was scoring his drugs 
from a gang member. So they did a spin-off operation and the drugs 
squad picked up and ran [an operation] on the gang member dealing 
drugs and caught him, and he got some jail for it. The gang member 
said to this car thief, ‘The cops caught me ‘cause of you, if it wasn’t for 
you I’d never have been caught’ – even though he was the one being 
loose on the phone, it was someone else’s fault. So [gang member] 
said you owe me for my lawyer’s bills and some time in jail – and he 
was given a bill [believed to be $50,000]. 
 
However, not all taxing operations go smoothly – even when confined to 
underworld figures. On one occasion, in August 2000, ex-Hell’s Angels 
president Petar Vitali was targeted to be taxed for his aluminium runabout 
boat and his restored Mustang car. It is believed that Vitali’s crime, in the eyes 
of the Head Hunters, was a supposed boast he made about stabbing a Head 
Hunters’ member many years previously when the Hell’s Angels were doing 
security work at a music concert. Certainly, the stabbing incident occurred, but 
the boast, the Head Hunters decided, was disrespectful and required that a 
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tax be paid. In many ways, Vitali was a typical tax victim. He was a ‘principled’ 
villain and thus unlikely to violate gang code and lay a complaint with police, 
and he was also, by that stage, a lone operator and as such, the Head 
Hunters would have presumed that he was unlikely to be able repel or avenge 
the tax. However, although Vitali was no longer a member of the Hell’s 
Angels, he had a significant reputation as a hard man.  
 
Six Head Hunters – the large number perhaps suggesting that they knew 
Vitali would not be an easy mark – were taking Vitali’s car and boat when he 
arrived home. Seeing what was occurring, Vitali drove his car into the Head 
Hunters’ vehicle. He then drew a pistol and fired at the gang – although the 
official record has him picking up a gun that was dropped by one of the Head 
Hunters as the cars collided. One member of the gang was shot in the 
stomach and I have been told that it was only the gun misfiring that saved 
another from a similar fate.  
 
A member of the Henderson Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) who 
investigated the incident told me: 
 
He got [Head Hunter] ‘Choc’ Te Awa in the gut, a couple of rounds 
went into his [Vitali’s] car and at least one went through his [Vitali’s] 
garage wall and we found it on the neighbour’s lawn behind it. We 
spoke to neighbours around the area and they reported seeing the 
other Heads leaping fences…I think from memory one neighbour was 
actually filming with a video camera and he caught them on tape. So 
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they ran helter skelter and one even dived into the mangrove swamp 
and hid there…. We all thought Vitali was just the bees knees for that… 
he wouldn't have had to pay for a drink all night if he'd come to the 
Henderson Police Bar. 
 
Although some in the police may have found humour in one of New Zealand’s 
toughest gangs having the tide turned on them, the Head Hunters had a man 
in hospital fighting for his life and a reputation that was equally damaged. If 
Vitali deserved to be taxed over a boast, it stands to reason that his latest 
escapade had him marked for far worse. Certainly, police expected the 
situation to escalate. Initially, Stokes had trouble locating Vitali. He told me:  
 
We couldn’t find him and we were obviously keen to get it sorted out. 
And I found a telephone number and spoke to him on the phone and 
tried to get him to come in and get it sorted out, and he obviously didn’t 
want to do that – be a sitting target. He said the only person who could 
sort it out for him would be one of the Head Hunters [leader Wayne 
Doyle] so we arranged for a conversation to take place between them. 
 
Exactly what was said between Vitali and Doyle, who at that time was in 
Waikeria Prison, is unclear, but the two decided it would be sorted out 
between them and, unsurprisingly, would not involve police: 
 
I think what’s happened is that they’ve decided that um whatever 
happened there’d be no complaints made to the cops about it, so they 
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were going to sort it out in their own way. Because after Vitali spoke 
with Doyle, Doyle wanted to speak with Te Awa [the shot man] in 
hospital, and we made that phone call happen as well, and there was 
no complaints coming out of them at all (Cam Stokes 2003 pers. 
comm.). 
 
In the end, the only conviction to come from the incident was against Vitali for 
recklessly discharging a firearm. It appears to have been his only sanction, as 
the Head Hunters did not go after him. Exactly what deal – if any – was 
struck, is unknown. Stokes believes that the Head Hunters became 
ambivalent to retribution: 
 
We heard a little bit back that the Heads management wasn’t that 
happy with what had gone on and they didn’t think it was a cool sort of 
taxing to do. So, if they weren’t comfortable with it there’s a chance that 
it could have been, ‘well he was only doing the right thing looking after 
himself’ and so [there was] no great come back from there (Cam 
Stokes 2003 pers. comm.). 
 
If this is so, potentially Vitali’s actions may have influenced the decision by the 
Head Hunters to take no further action. A source I spoke to in the Henderson 
CIB told me in 2006 that the fact that Vitali was willing to take the Head 
Hunters on may have influenced the gang’s thinking:  
 
504 
 
In the aftermath, Vitali was ringing the Heads pad and other people 
saying fuck them, they want to tax me, I’ll tax them! He was threatening 
to come after them and take the whole lot on. He’s not your average 
bad guy, he’s got the rep as being not only a hard man but a crazy 
man. He wasn’t afraid of them, didn't give a toss about their reputation, 
had access to firearms and had shown them he was more than 
prepared to pull them out in broad daylight and blaze away. The Heads 
might be prepared to kill but I doubt they're prepared to kill so 
nonchalantly as Vitali so obviously was, and that had to factor in their 
decision not to look for some payback. I think Vitali raised the game to 
a point where the Heads didn’t want to play. They’re bad, he’s a 
psychopath and I'd say at the end of the day this incident was a good 
example of how the truly bad will fear the truly mad. 
 
It is possible that a face-saving deal was struck that satisfied both sides, but 
whatever was actually decided, no overt retribution against Vitali appears to 
have occurred. Vitali himself would not talk about the incident with me. Doyle 
told me that he intervened in the dispute from prison, but says that he cannot 
recall the details of what was worked out; saying the issue was put on the 
“backburner” and that there remains significant ill feeling within his gang: “He 
[Vitali] is not the most popular person around here”. 
 
But if Petar Vitali became unpopular with the Head Hunters, one person who 
was not was multi-millionaire property developer Mark Lyons. In the early 
2000s, the maverick businessman became involved with the Head Hunters 
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socially and, I have been told by numerous sources, with some aspects of 
their business. The exact nature of the problems that Lyons had with the 
Head Hunters is unclear, but he was taxed heavily by the gang for goods 
estimated to be worth between $250,000 and $800,000 (NZ Herald 
10.1.2003). Although it is impossible to assess the accuracy of these figures, 
it seems likely that Lyons may have the dubious honour of being the most 
taxed individual in New Zealand gang history.  
 
Taxing does not just occur to those outside the gang. Members who fall foul of 
their own gang are likely to find themselves taxed, in particular, members who 
leave the gang in so-called ‘bad standing’ are often forced to hand over cash 
or possessions. Taxing is used to regain any property or money owed to the 
gang, often with significant injuries added, and may also be used to enforce a 
sanction against the former member. An outlaw motorcycle club member who 
is kicked out of the club is liable to be taxed of his motorcycle. The larger 
street gangs are equally disposed to seek redress from errant members in the 
form of taxing. Patched street gang members have offered numerous 
examples of this to me. In one incident, told to me by senior Mongrel Mob 
member, Ngavii Pekapo, in 2004, a member of his gang who had assaulted a 
female related to key Mob members was stripped of his patch and all of his 
possessions, and told to leave the Hawkes Bay area within 24 hours or face 
worse repercussions.  
 
Indeed how quickly, and often viciously, gangs turn against their own 
members when protocols are broken is quite remarkable, and something I 
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have witnessed numerous times. The high value placed on brotherhood 
means that any breach of trust is viewed, and treated, severely.  
 
While violence had been synonymous with patched gangs for many years, 
taxing became a profitable means by which to wield the power that a 
reputation for violence offered. But violence was not just used to benefit 
gangs through profit; it has also been used as a defensive mechanism to 
protect gang members from the law. 
 
Intimidation, Violence, and Justice 
For many gang members, intimidation of others is an important aspect of 
gang life. Not only does a gang’s imposing nature and reputation give 
members a feeling of power and status, as discussed in previous chapters, it 
can also be used as a tool to protect gang or gang member interests. As with 
taxing, most people who are purposely stood-over by gang members exist 
within the gang or criminal realms. However, during the latter half of the 
1990s, a spate of incidents that targeted people who were not by choice 
involved with gangs captured public attention, and some high profile instances 
of gang members avoiding justice resulted in a significant law change. 
 
Concerns that gang members were intimidating witnesses of gang crimes in 
order to escape justice were raised as early as 1975 during the war between 
the Devil’s Henchmen and the Epitaph Riders, detailed in Chapter Six (New 
Zealand Police, 1975: pp.91-98). But it was not until the 1990s that such 
concerns became significant enough to prompt serious reaction. Police 
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figures provided to the New Zealand Law Commission show that reported 
offences of obstruction or attempts to pervert justice increased from 112 in 
1993 to 169 in 1997 (New Zealand Law Commission, 1997a: p.3). Although 
cases specifically relating to gangs were not defined, as will become clear, a 
number of examples involving gangs brought the issue to public attention and, 
in turn, generated a political response. 
 
A window into the world of victim intimidation was opened in 1993. After 
making a complaint to police of multiple rapes by several Mongrel Mob 
members at the gang’s Rotorua clubhouse, the female complainant was 
forced by a member of the gang, Gillies Jacobs, to recant her initial police 
statement. Jacobs beat the complainant with a baseball bat and forced her to 
pose as his girlfriend while a witness watched her sign an affidavit clearing 
those who had been charged with the offence. Once this intimidation became 
known, Jacobs was convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice 
(NZ Herald 22.7.1993). Nine members of the gang were convicted on charges 
of rape and/or sexual violation and sentenced to between three years and 
nine months, and 12 years and six months imprisonment (NZ Herald 
24.7.1993).   
 
In 1995, the Mongrel Mob appear to have had more success in escaping 
justice after a 16 year-old hitchhiker was allegedly raped by two members of  
the gang’s Hastings chapter. Although the victim had already testified once, a 
jury complication meant that trial was aborted. Immediately before the second 
trial, police said the woman was approached in the courthouse corridor and 
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told not to give evidence against the gang members. Seemingly as a 
consequence, the woman refused to testify when put on the stand. Even after 
being placed in custody over the lunch break and told by the judge that she 
could be detained for seven days, the young woman still refused to take the 
stand and say anything more than, “I have nothing to say” (NZ Herald 
27.6.1995). Justice Ellis finally abandoned the trial, discharged the two 
accused gang members and told the jury, “You have witnessed, I suppose, a 
disaster” (NZ Herald 27.6.1995). 
 
In extreme circumstances, those giving testimony against a gang have been 
invited to enter the witness protection programme. These programmes usually 
required witnesses to be relocated and to assume another identity. Police 
refuse to comment on the programme publicly for fear that even general 
disclosures may put people at risk. But in 1997, the then Police Minister, John 
Luxton, told Parliament that 89 witnesses received formal protection between 
1993 and 1997 (NZPD, vol. 562, 1997: p.210). Nonetheless, the proportion 
that was specifically gang related remains unclear. It is clear, however, that 
these figures could easily have been much higher. For many people, 
adherence to the criminal code of silence, or the thought of living in fear of a 
gang may have outweighed their desire to testify. In other words, it is quite 
understandable that on considering the potential consequences, to reputation 
or self, many people chose not testify in a gang trial.  
 
One man who did choose to testify against a gang was Christopher Crean. In 
March 1996, a group of Black Power members had attacked a member of the 
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Mongrel Mob outside Crean’s house in the Taranaki. The incident was brutal. 
The Mob member’s face was slashed, and several of his fingers were severed 
with a tomahawk (NZ Herald 17.10.1997). Crean witnessed the attack and 
chose to testify against the attackers. Black Power threatened Crean and 
suggested that testifying would not be in his interests. Police offered witness 
protection, but Crean refused it. His refusal, while brave, ultimately proved 
fatal, as Black Power set about planning his murder.  
 
Since 1988, Black Power members from the Taranaki region had twice beaten 
murder charges. Crown prosecutor, Tim Brewer, felt that these cases had 
helped convince the gang that they were invincible (NZ Herald 17.10.1997). It 
is perhaps this feeling of invincibility that emboldened the gang. Crean, a 
street-preaching Christian, told his family that God would protect him. His 
family was less certain. His mother said, “I told him he was dealing with the 
real world, not the spiritual world. But he didn’t have any fear” (NZ Herald 
17.10.1997).  
 
Twice, on the last two Sundays of September 1996, the planned hit on Crean 
was abandoned – on the second of those nights, Crean was carrying his child 
and the would-be hit man felt compassion for the youngster (R v Manihera, 
Unreported, Court of Appeal, Richardson P, March 1998). On October 6, it 
was deemed that that the hit would proceed regardless of circumstance. That 
night, a gunman carrying a 30-30 Winchester lever-action rifle approached 
Crean’s house and knocked on the door. As Crean went to answer, a shot 
was fired. The glass panel in the door offered little resistance and the bullet 
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flew through it, entering Crean’s stomach and exiting out of his back. He died 
in hospital the next day (NZ Herald 17.10.1997). The use of a stomach shot 
was pre-planned as it was considered that a head shot through the door might 
miss (R v Manihera, Unreported, Court of Appeal, Richardson P, March 
1998). 
 
A Taranaki Black Power member said that the killing had sent a clear 
message to potential prosecution witnesses, “Oh, well they know now. 
Who…wants to get in the stand now?” (NZ Herald 23.7.1997). The 
implications that this killing had on the justice process are quite clear; if the 
gang escaped penalty, future testimony against gangs would certainly have 
been difficult to obtain. Given this, the police moved quickly to bring closure to 
the case. Despite the seeming confidence that the killing would deter further 
witnesses, it was from within the gang that crucial evidence was to come. The 
New Plymouth chapter’s president and the gang prospect who drove the 
getaway car both gave evidence against their own gang (R v Manihera, 
Unreported, Court of Appeal, Richardson P, March 1998). Four Black Power 
members were convicted of murdering Crean and given mandatory life 
sentences63.  
 
The fact that the Taranaki Black Power went after, what in the gang scene is 
often referred to as, a ‘baldhead’ or ‘citizen’ (meaning a person without gang 
or criminal associations), is highly unusual. In 2009, Crown Prosecutor Brewer 
told me,  
                                                
63 One of the men convicted, Dennis Luke, became the first person in New Zealand to be twice 
convicted of murder, the first coming in 1975 when he had been found guilty of kicking a man to death 
in Wellington. 
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At the time I was unaware of a precedent, and I’m not aware of one 
[other example] now. This guy [Crean] wasn’t in the gang milieu, he 
wasn’t in a gang, he was a bona fide member of the public – and it was 
a very big line for them to cross…they didn’t see themselves as the 
enemy of everybody – they saw themselves as the enemy of the police 
and the enemy of other gangs. This was stepping outside their ethos. 
 
Indeed, most gang members limit their violence to other gangs or gang 
associated people. Despite rhetoric about the pressing danger of gangs, 
throughout my fieldwork I have discovered that ordinary people, or ‘citizens’, 
have very little to fear from gang members. Indeed, this finding is supported – 
though not often publicly conveyed – by people who have had dealings with 
the gangs64. A former Detective Sergeant in charge of the police unit 
investigating outlaw motorcycle clubs in Auckland, Cam Stokes, told me 2003 
that, “Indirectly they cause harm to many people [via the drug trade and 
associated problems], but in terms of direct things, no, not a great deal of risk, 
unless you are involved somehow with them”. Similarly, an undercover police 
officer who infiltrated gangs during two operations in the North Island, told me 
in 2006, “The only people who I think have got anything to fear from gangs 
are people who are intimately connected to them in some manner. They don’t 
give a toss about the other bal’ heads and squares… I mean, you know, who 
are they to the gang? Nobody”. Another undercover police officer, who wants 
                                                
64 One caution to this general rule relates to white power or racist skinhead gangs. Because they foster 
an ideology of contempt and hate that stretches beyond gang realms, outsiders are often targeted for 
violence. An example of this is the three murders committed by Forth Reich members on the South 
Island’s West Coast; two, in 1991 and 2003, were racially motivated, and one, in 1999, occurred 
because the victim was homosexual. 
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to remain nameless, when asked by me in 2005 if gangs were a threat to the 
wider public, said: 
 
No, no I don’t think so. But if you have a debt with them or you have 
done something to one of their family members or you are 
exceptionally wealthy [and in their circles] and you flaunt that and they 
see you as an easy target, then yes you do. But your ‘average Joe’ 
blue collar worker who goes to work in a factory and goes home at 
night, no.  
 
This is in contrast to the fears that many people have of gangs and is, 
undoubtedly, a construct of media representations. This is not to say people 
have nothing to fear, but rather that the high levels of fear are unwarranted. 
 
Moreover, as noted earlier, through my research I have found that most gang 
members are willing to take a ‘fair rap’, as they see it as part of life.  And 
although I have heard of, and on three occasions been privy to, attempts to 
pervert the course of justice, none have involved people without some 
connection to the gangs. The fact that Black Power's New Plymouth president 
testified in the trial against the killers of Christopher Crean is some evidence 
that he, at least, thought the actions of his fellow gang members had crossed 
a line. 
 
As suggested by Huff (1990) it is often catalytic events that spur political 
action against gangs; and this was the case following the Crean murder. Then 
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Police Minister Jack Elder believed the verdict saved the judiciary from 
destruction, “I can’t stress enough the importance of this decision. If there 
weren’t convictions for this, I think the long-term future of the justice system 
was under some considerable threat” (NZ Herald 18.10.1997).  
 
Despite the subsequent convictions for those guilty of the murder of Crean, 
the fact remained that he had been killed for agreeing to testify in a gang trial, 
and the high publicity given to the killing meant others in a similar position 
were certainly feeling nervous. Aware of the fear and reluctance felt by many 
witnesses in the wake of the killing, police decided to counter the problem by 
keeping the identity of witnesses in gang trials secret. The test case for 
witness anonymity was the trial of Dennis Hines stemming from the attack at 
the Mountain Rock Music Festival, discussed in the previous chapter. While 
Hines was initially convicted, on August 15 1997 the Court of Appeal ruled 
that secret witnesses were unlawful and Hines’ conviction was quashed and a 
retrial ordered (R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529). The ruling proved to have 
serious ramifications for other prosecutions in which police had established 
cases reliant on secret witnesses.  
 
In Christchurch during the mid-1990s, it was well known that the Road 
Knights, with the Harris brothers at its core, had been intimidating numerous 
people in an effort to make the club’s members immune to successful 
prosecution. Just four days after the Court of Appeal ruling in relation to 
Hines, the Crown was forced to withdraw its case against seven members of 
the Road Knights because “nearly all” of the 27 witnesses were too scared to 
514 
 
testify after they learned that their identities could not remain secret (The 
Press 20.8.1997). Two months previously, three members of the same gang 
had been released after witnesses made it “patently clear” to police that they 
did not want to testify in court (The Press 13.7.1997). Christchurch-based 
opposition Labour MP Mike Moore, who became a leading anti-gang lobbyist 
in the latter half of the 1990s and whose sensationalist approach to the gang 
situation will be examined in the next chapter, said, “It’s anarchy, it’s 
organised crime and the bad guys are winning” (NZ Herald 20.8.1997).  
 
In the same city in September 1997, Max Shannon, a Black Power member, 
laughed as he walked from District Court after charges stemming from a clash 
with Highway 61 were withdrawn as witnesses to the incident refused to 
testify without anonymity (The Press 4.9.1997). Following this, Labour MP Phil 
Goff informed parliament that since the Court of Appeal ruling overturning the 
Hines conviction, 15 gang members had charges against them withdrawn and 
that the police said more withdrawals were likely (NZPD, vol.563, 1997: 
p.4340). Again, Mike Moore went public, saying, “I believe hundreds of cases 
do not get to court or are lost in court because of the terror and intimidation 
exerted by gangs” (NZ Herald 8.10.1997). As we shall see, however, Highway 
61 exacted their own justice on Shannon. 
 
Although the ruling on the use of anonymous witnesses against Hines 
appeared to be a failure for police, ultimately the reverse was true. 
Immediately after the Court of Appeal gave judgment in R v Hines, the 
Government said it would seek to change the law to overturn the decision 
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(New Zealand Law Commission, 1997b: p.9). The Evidence (Witness 
Anonymity) Amendment Act (1997) was quickly drafted to allow, in serious 
criminal cases, secret witnesses to be used; meaning a person could give 
evidence in court without disclosing their identity, even to the party against 
whom the evidence is given. The police, by forcing the issue in court had 
failed to get a conviction, but they had gained the prospect of a significant and 
powerful new legal weapon. If police had never brought charges against 
Hines using secret witnesses, the case – or lack thereof – would have 
received little publicity. But by pressing the issue, police had drawn a sharp 
public and political response. Unsurprisingly, the rhetoric surrounding the 
issue focused on the Hines case and other high profile cases previously 
outlined (NZPD, vol.564, 1997: pp.4957-4977). 
 
The issues behind the proposed law change were not insignificant (for a 
discussion on this see New Zealand Law Commission, 1997a: p.2). The right 
to know your accuser has been a foundation principle of justice systems 
throughout the western world; an openness that allows the accused to 
prepare a proper defense. To be accused of a crime and not know your 
accuser is what one newspaper reporter described as “the stuff of Kafkaesque 
nightmares” (Sunday Star Times 26.10.1997). However, to allow criminals to 
escape justice due to intimidation robs people of their right to the protections 
offered by the law. One may have expected a charged debate around the 
clash of these fundamental legal principles, but instead the law was fast-
tracked through parliament, despite the concerns expressed by numerous 
academics and members of the legal fraternity (Sunday Star Times 
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26.19.1997). The new law went from its conception, following the Court of 
Appeal case ruling in favour of Hines in August 1997, to its successful final 
reading on 9 December 1997, in less than four months. It appears that robust 
debate, and the ordinary parliamentary process, was superseded by the 
political desire to take swift action. 
 
On its own, the new law would have been the single most significant 
legislative change inspired by gangs in this country, but its passage coincided 
with a raft of measures already in motion through parliament. Consequently, 
and as will become clear, the secret witness legislation was to become just 
one of many anti-gang laws that were passed in the late 1990s.  
 
Conclusion 
There can be little doubt that the economic woes of the late 1980s and much 
of the 1990s, primarily through systemic unemployment, had a significant 
impact on gangs entering the drug trade and other profit seeking criminal 
activities. One cannot, however, be too economically deterministic, and it is 
likely that many gangs or gang members would have taken this path due to 
their permissive approach to such endeavours.  
 
But notwithstanding the causes, by the 1990s it was clear that the gangs were 
significant players in the drug trade and had taken advantage of their strength 
in the underworld to exploit others within this sphere; and in doing so brought 
the term of ‘taxing’ into the criminal sub-cultural lexicon. During this period, 
then, certain gangs had evolved to be what I have termed ‘criminal gangs’. 
This evolutionary development may have become more entrenched but was 
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mitigated by the Proceeds of Crime Act, which enabled the state to take 
assets gained through criminal activity. 
 
As has been previously outlined, many specifically targeted laws had proven 
of little use in reigning in the activities of gangs, so it is with a certain irony that 
this law was not initially devised with patched gangs in mind. Although the 
Proceeds of Crime Act did temper organised criminal activity undertaken by 
some gangs or gang chapters, its overall effect on, for example, the drug 
trade is less clear. Of those gangs that ceased acting as a collective in 
response to the threat posed by the law, certain individual members simply 
stepped up to take over. 
 
As gangs or gang members became more involved in profit driven crime, in 
the public mind gangs became synonymous with these activities, which in turn 
became seen as the gangs’ primary function, ignoring the fact that these 
groups had existed long before profit driven enterprise was connected to 
them. As has been made clear throughout this thesis, profit driven crime was 
never a basis for gang formation or the motivation for joining a gang. And in 
the 1990s, and is still the case today, profit driven crime cannot be seen as 
the raison d’être of patched gangs. 
 
Nevertheless, the reputation for violence and strength that gangs had actively 
fostered for years allowed them certain advantages. But while this reputation 
enabled gangs a certain authority within the gang sphere and criminal 
community, when this power extended beyond these realms, by means of 
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perverting justice, it brought a sharp political response. Within the criminal 
sub-culture, gang strength was accepted as inevitable, but when this began to 
encroach on, or affect, the lives of outsiders, it quickly drew the concern of 
media and politicians; and this was the case in the rather isolated, but 
dramatic, slaying of Christopher Crean. 
 
Overall, profit driven activities established the emergence of new evolutionary 
traits within the gang scene; and in doing so established the context for the 
significant political response that became evident in the latter half of the 
1990s, upon which the following chapter will focus. 
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10. Legislating Against the ‘Gang Menace’: 1996- 
 
Introduction 
By the 1990s, the territorial gang battles, which occurred between New 
Zealand gangs in the 1970s and 80s, were much less prevalent. During 1996, 
however, two unrelated gang wars in the South Island erupted – wars that 
were to provide the springboard for the most aggressive legislative thrust 
against gangs in New Zealand history. While the inter-gang violence of 1996 
were no more serious than past conflicts had been, they were seized upon by 
police and politicians and used to create widespread concern, generating 
what can be seen as a case of ‘moral panic’.  
 
This chapter will examine how public concern surrounding these disputes, 
promulgated by police and opposition MPs, merged with fears surrounding 
gangs as organised criminal groups and the issue became caught up in a 
wave of rhetoric that elevated the problem of gangs to one of pressing and 
dire concern. 
 
Ostensibly, the outcome of this moral panic was a raft of legislative measures, 
but the more important result was the complete reframing of the gang issue. 
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The perceptions created at this time have proven so important and enduring 
that the events leading up the passing of the legislation can be considered the 
fourth pivot point in New Zealand gang history.  
 
Rising Concern 
Nineteen-ninety-six was described by one national newspaper as a year of 
“unprecedented” gang warfare (Sunday Star Times 21.12.1996). While it was 
true that the year was punctuated by significant inter-gang violence, it was by 
no means without precedent. Moreover, it was the actions of the police and 
legislators that were to define the year, which could more accurately be 
described as one characterised by an unprecedented drive for gang 
legislation. It was no coincidence that this legislative drive occurred in 1996, a 
politically unique year in which the country was to elect its first Mixed Member 
Proportional (MMP) government that October. Under the new electoral 
system, a greater number of parties had a realistic chance of entering 
parliament. Both the National and Labour parties, which had dominated the 
New Zealand political landscape since the late 1930s, were aware that they 
needed to make a significant impression on the electorate in order to 
transfuse as few votes as possible to minor parties. Law and order issues are 
often seen as valuable election tools and they had played an important role in 
a number of New Zealand elections since 1949 (Havemann & Havemann, 
1995: p.229). In election year 1996, gangs provided an important 
electioneering plank for Labour, and the National government was forced to 
respond. 
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The genesis for this country’s most substantial anti-gang legislative effort 
were events in the South Island cities of Christchurch and Invercargill, where 
two gang wars, both involving the Road Knights, resulted in significant 
concern and media attention. In Christchurch, a new chapter of the Road 
Knights was at war with the Epitaph Riders and, in Invercargill, the Knights 
were attempting to stop the establishment of a Black Power chapter in that 
city. 
 
It is not surprising that these two conflicts occurred when new gang chapters 
attempted to form in areas already established as another gang’s territory. By 
the 1990s, the gang geography of New Zealand was well defined. As one 
gang member put it to me, the country was in ‘checkmate’ – there was little 
room left on the board to move. In the cities and towns where gangs existed, 
one gang had either claimed sufficient dominance in an area to make the 
establishment of a rival gang extremely difficult, or, where gangs did share 
space, these groups had generally – though often begrudgingly – accepted 
the presence of one another, making conflicts between them more often 
incidental than deliberate. When a new gang or new gang chapter attempted 
to set up in an area with an existing gang presence, violence was a likely 
outcome. Partially because of this geographic balance, large-scale territorial 
battles – and overt gang violence generally – were not as prevalent as they 
had been in the past. Therefore, when outbreaks of inter-gang warfare did 
occur, they caused significant alarm across the wider community, which had 
seemingly forgotten, or was unaware of, their past prevalence – hence the 
“unprecedented” newspaper headline cited above.  
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Tensions between the Epitaph Riders and the Road Knights – at one time 
both members of the Biker Federation, which the latter had joined in the 
1980s – began in earnest when the Road Knights established a chapter in 
Christchurch in 1993. In an undated letter that I have obtained, the Road 
Knights said they were prompted to move into Christchurch because of 
“strong business ties”, their having a significant prison population in 
Christchurch jails, and the fact that the club had members “living and working” 
in the city. The Road Knights said the move was “not out of malice or 
disrespect for the Riders but merely a step in the right direction for us”. 
However, establishing a chapter in a fellow Federation club’s area was in 
breach of Biker Federation covenants, and meant their membership of the 
alliance ceased. It also made conflict with the Epitaph Riders inevitable.  
 
Although their reputation had diminished somewhat by the 1990s, the Epitaph 
Riders remained a strong club in Christchurch, while the new Road Knight 
chapter – with the Harris brothers, mentioned previously in Chapter Eight, at 
its core – became widely recognised within the gang scene as one of the 
country’s most formidable and dangerous outlaw motorcycle chapters.  
 
In March 1996, members of the Road Knights fired at a car driven by an 
Epitaph Rider near the Riders’ headquarters in the Christchurch suburb of 
Addington, shattering its rear window (NZ Herald 20.3.1996). Less than two 
weeks later, the gangs were involved in another public shooting, this time in 
Riccarton (NZ Herald 27.3.1996). Although nobody was hurt, shots being fired 
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in residential suburbs raised considerable public and police concern, and 
upset the gang/community balance, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Christchurch's district police commander, Superintendent Paul Fitzharris said, 
“We are very concerned if such incidents spill out into the public arena” (NZ 
Herald 28.3.1996). Police acted quickly after both shootings and arrested 
seven members of the Road Knights (NZ Herald 28.3.1996). Although not 
seen as the aggressors in the war, the police also placed pressure on the 
Riders, serving a search warrant on the gang’s headquarters by crashing 
through the front wall with a front-end loader, although only one arrest – for 
possession of cannabis – resulted (NZ Herald 3.4.1996).  
 
The war continued and sporadic – often public – encounters were frequent, 
largely because the Road Knights regularly travelled past the Epitaph Riders’ 
Addington headquarters to get into the central city from their base in Halswell. 
However, the gang code of silence, which prevents gang members from 
laying complaints to police, meant that the majority of incidents went 
unreported. In March 1996, for example, a member of the Road Knights went 
to hospital to seek treatment for gunshot wounds to the face, but discharged 
himself before police arrived to question him (New Zealand Police, 1996: p.9).  
 
In April 1996, one of three occupants of a car owned by the Road Knights 
fired at a group of Epitaph Riders on their motorcycles at an intersection in 
Lincoln Road, Addington. The bullets missed their intended targets and 
instead hit a nearby car driven by a couple and their child – the man was 
injured by glass fragments while the woman was hit by a bullet that passed 
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through her arm and lodged in her chest (NZ Herald 29.4.1996). The public 
nature of the attacks and the serious injury of an innocent bystander disrupted 
the gang/community balance further by sparking even wider public concern; 
and thereby guaranteeing significant police and political reaction. It was, to 
use Huff’s (1990: p.312) phrase, a ‘catalytic event’ that helped gain political 
attention, not least because Ron Mark – an unsuccessful Labour party 
candidate in the 1993 election, who six months after the shooting was elected 
to parliament as a New Zealand First MP – had a family member unwittingly 
close to the danger: “But for 0.5 of a second either way, my daughter or her 
boyfriend could easily have been the person shot” (NZPD, vol.564, 1997: 
p.4969). Although, as discussed in Chapter Eight, a political reaction is 
expected when the gang/community balance is disturbed, the close 
involvement, albeit indirectly, of an MP meant that political concern was 
heightened as the problem felt closer to those in power.  
 
Intense policing in the wake of the shooting took a heavy toll on both outlaw 
clubs. Indeed, 23 members and associates of the Road Knights were sent to 
prison in the aftermath of the shootings (Dennehy & Newbold, 2001: p.186). 
Utilising the strategy undertaken by Operation Shovel, described in Chapter 
Eight, the gangs were pursued on even relatively minor matters, and a total of 
$13,000 traffic fines were issued to members and associates of the Road 
Knights during the police crackdown (Newbold, 2000: p.209). The greater 
targeting of the Road Knights is perhaps an indication that the police knew 
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that it was the Knights’ move to Christchurch that had sparked the war65. As 
could be expected, the constant police attention and significant incarceration 
rate quelled the war which went ‘cold’ by the middle of 1996, though it was not 
officially declared over by both sides until 2005 (I was with an associate of 
one of the gangs when a mobile phone text message was sent out informing 
the membership of the final truce). The political reaction that was sparked by 
the short sharp burst of violence in early 1996 was given further impetus by a 
gang war in Invercargill, which was equally fierce and, importantly, just as 
public.  
 
The gang composition of Invercargill was originally established by the break-
up of the a recreational group called the British Motorcycle Club, which in 
1983 splintered into two outlaw factions – the Damned and another chapter of 
the Road Knights. The Damned were initially the stronger of the two groups, 
but the Road Knights killed at least two Damned members in separate 
incidents and began to take charge. Even the Damned patching over to 
become a chapter of the Devil’s Henchmen in 1989 failed to stop their total 
collapse just a year later. Thus the Road Knights fought for and won 
Invercargill, giving them feelings of ownership and a right to exclusivity. This 
situation was maintained until the mid-1990s when Black Power attempted to 
establish a chapter in the city. For the Road Knights, an all-white club, the 
establishment of another gang was unacceptable, but a Maori/Polynesian 
gang was perhaps even more so. By 1996, the battle for gang control of 
                                                
65 The Harris Gang – the forerunner to the Christchurch Road Knight chapter – was also implicated in 
the 1991 bombing of the Sydenham Police Station, which may also have ensured police were eager to 
target the group at any opportunity. 
526 
 
Invercargill had commenced once again, but this time with significant political 
consequences. 
 
The Road Knights tried to end the war quickly by bombing Black Power’s 
headquarters in early 1996. However, while the bomb failed to explode, a 
series of shotgun blasts destroyed a car window at the address (NZ Herald 
7.3.1996). Further shootings occurred, causing local police to take up arms. 
Southland police district commander, Neville Cook, said, “If my staff are going 
to meet them we will do it on equal footing” (NZ Herald 6.3.1996). The 
numbers of both gangs swelled in the immediate aftermath of the initial 
conflict as out-of-town chapters came to lend support (NZ Herald 7.3.1996). 
The Road Knights and their supporters – most significantly a skinhead group 
called the Bandenkrieg – were making their presence felt with nightly 
appearances on the main streets (Midweek c199666). Black Power cars were 
rammed and members and associates of the gang were attacked on sight. 
The police delivered notices to gang leaders informing them that they would 
be charged with disorderly assembly if they gathered in groups causing 
people to fear violence (NZ Herald 6.3.1996).  
 
An editorial in The Southland Times (13.3.1996) pointed the finger at police, 
saying they should have stopped Black Power from establishing themselves 
in the area. Police, however, disputed that. In a letter to the editor the 
following day, the Southland district commander, Superintendent Neville Cook 
said, there was no law against gang membership and that, “police can do 
                                                
66 The footage I have obtained, from a gang source, cannot be more accurately referenced. 
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nothing if gangs behave, which the Black Power members have been careful 
to do up until now. Remember too who started this present round of 
violence…the Road Knights and their supporters, all of whom come from 
within this community” (Southland Times 14.3.1996).  
 
In choosing to write a Letter to the Editor, one can sense Superintendent 
Cook’s frustration at the Times' argument; and his aggravation was not 
unwarranted. In all reality, police had little ability to stop the formation of the 
Black Power chapter, particularly when the gang members were not 
committing any obvious crimes. Leaving aside the fact that gang formation is 
a complex social phenomena, which the police alone are ill-equipped to solve, 
there would have undoubtedly been complaints of harassment if police had 
moved on these individuals without cause; a sensitivity made acute by the fact 
that Black Power were made up predominately of Maori members in an 
overwhelmingly Pakeha city. Moreover, as the police pointed out, in the 
majority of attacks, the Road Knights were the perpetrators.  
 
For their part, the Road Knights claimed that Black Power had no right to 
establish a chapter in Invercargill and, therefore, their attacks were defensive. 
If there was no Black Power, they reasoned, there would be no trouble. As the 
conflict escalated, the Road Knights’ president in Invercargill, Grant Percy, 
agreed to a rare (and very brief) interview for a television’s 60 Minutes 
programme, in which he said, “Nobody’s got anything to fear. As long as 
Black Power packs up and goes home, everything will be sweet as. So it’s up 
to them, they’re the ones looking for trouble”. However, Black Power was 
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intent on staying, and with neither side willing to cede, the attacks continued. 
In April 1996, a member of Black Power was injured when he was shot in the 
head while driving near the Road Knights’ headquarters (NZ Herald 
18.4.1996). With public shootings occurring in both Invercargill and 
Christchurch in the early months of 1996, there was some cause for 
community concern, but it was the input of political figures, sensing there was 
political capital to be gained in the run-up to the election, that made gangs a 
national issue and, more importantly, opened the gate for a legislative drive. 
 
The Political Pivot Point  
As had proven the case in earlier gang violence of the 1990s, described in 
Chapter Eight, the problems in Christchurch and Invercargill were able to be 
successfully quelled by intensive policing using existing laws. As the 
crackdown was under way, the police in Invercargill said that they had 
adequate means to control the situation – something that proved to be true – 
but the city’s Mayor, David Harrington, was unconvinced. He declared that, 
“More power needs to be given to police to prevent more clashes occurring” 
and he started a petition calling for that to occur, which he presented to 
Parliament in April 1996 (NZ Herald 18.4.1996). This action was the beginning 
of a wave of political activity that became the fourth pivot point in New 
Zealand gang history, leading to wide-ranging legislative measures that were 
not based on research but rather on political hyperbole and rhetoric. 
Consequentially, they failed to have any meaningful effect. 
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This was certainly not the first time that gangs had become a highly politicised 
issue. As will be recalled from Chapter Six, gangs were first brought into the 
populist realm in 1973 when Norman Kirk promised to take the ‘bikes off the 
bikies’. But as the 1996 election loomed, never before had gangs been upheld 
as such an urgent and dire threat.   
 
Although it was violence that sparked public concern, the debate quickly 
widened to include, and then be dominated by, gangs as organised criminals; 
claims that the last chapter demonstrated were not without foundation, but, as 
will become clear, were greatly exaggerated. New Zealand Police Association 
president Greg O’Connor said the street violence was just the “tip of the 
iceberg” and that, “Gangs control crime in every major centre in New Zealand” 
and, as such, new powers were needed to combat them (NZ Herald 
30.4.1996). O’Connor became a leading voice calling for greater police 
powers – and police resources – to control gangs. Although many of his 
claims were not supported by evidence, he became extremely influential and 
gained high level support. A former Detective Inspector in the New Zealand 
Police, Dave Haslett, has suggested that “individual police…and police 
organizations readily highlight social issues in the mass media, which often 
precipitates forms of moral panic nationally or regionally” (Haslett, 2007: 
p.129). What happened in the lead up to the 1996 election gives support to 
that belief. 
 
Seizing the political opportunity, and reflecting the now common theme that it 
is from the safety of Opposition benches that the most radical suggestions 
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derive, Labour MP Mike Moore reinforced O’Connor’s views and quickly 
became the country’s most vocal anti-gang spokesperson. He proffered 
rhetoric and solutions that were akin to those previously associated with John 
Banks (when he was in opposition) nearly a decade before. In May 1996, 
Moore called for legal measures “at a level of intensity and vigour so that it’s 
just not worth being associated with these kinds of people” (NZ Herald 
1.5.1996).  
 
In contrast, the government’s initial response to the gang violence in 
Christchurch and Invercargill was circumspect. Responding to Moore’s calls 
for action, John Luxton, who had taken over from John Banks as the Minister 
of Police following the 1993 election, appealed for calm saying that police had 
the resources to combat gang violence. However, O’Connor lambasted those 
opinions: “For the Minister to claim that police have the problem under control 
when innocent bystanders are being shot, gang fortresses stand in most 
major population centres and teachers and police are intimidated by gang 
members shows a minister with poor information or judgment” (NZ Herald 
2.5.1996). 
 
The rebuke appears to have been effective. Just three days later, the 
government announced that the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee 
would begin an investigation into the issue of gangs beginning in June 1996 
(NZ Herald 9.5.1996). But if the political investigation was intended to enable 
National to take greater control of the issue, it failed. Labour put forward 
Moore as one of their members of the committee and the forum provided a 
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prime platform from which to continue his campaign. Although Moore said he 
would take full advantage of his position to investigate the issue, his ideas 
appear to have been predetermined. With a certainty that masked a lack of 
objective data, he said people had to realise that gangs dominated the drug 
trade and organised crime and that, “Alas, many New Zealanders and most 
MPs don’t understand the depth of the problem” (NZ Herald 6.6.1996). Moore 
was explicitly stating that he had privileged knowledge that few others did. 
 
Following discussions I had with Mike Moore in 2004, I was left with little 
doubt he had a genuine concern regarding gang activities and that he was 
responding to concerns from his constituients, but anybody who has ever 
worked with a politician is aware that any action undertaken – particularly in 
the build up to an election – is judged primarily for its vote gaining potential. 
And there is little doubt Moore was a skilled political operator. But these 
political skills belied the fact that Moore’s understandings of the gangs were 
shallow. 
 
Parliamentary debates prior to 1996 do not suggest that Moore had much 
interest in gangs and he had no obvious background experience, for example, 
within the police or as a lawyer. Despite this, he became New Zealand’s most 
public and prolific anti-gang commentator and activist; and in doing so, by 
default and by the strength of his convictions, he became for all intents and 
purposes New Zealand’s leading gang expert.  
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In 1971, academic and Maori activist, Ranginui Walker said of the gang issue 
that there was a need for “competent research by social scientists”. He 
warned that without it those lacking sufficient training or knowledge to 
understand the issue sufficiently, such as the police and politicians, would 
inform and define the gang issue (Walker, 1971: p.43). Walker’s comments 
proved to be prophetic, and the commentaries provided by Moore, which he 
told me came largely from police sources, which I will later question as to their 
accuracy, were carried in the media without question. 
 
With the wars in Christchurch and Invercargill having died down by June, from 
the beginning it was the Select Committee’s investigation that created more 
headlines than the gangs themselves. In Christchurch, the Committee sent a 
legal summons to Road Knights members Daryl and Ricky Harris and Darrin 
Baylis to appear before it (NZ Herald 8.6.1996). When they failed to do so, 
Moore was incensed, demanding that the men be charged with contempt. He 
was equally incensed when the committee decided not to pursue the matter. 
On a televised debate on Ralston Live in June 199667 with the committee’s 
chair, National’s Alec Neil, Moore said “the gangs are laughing at us…it’s a 
shameful day for parliament”. Neil responded by saying, “I’m not prepared for 
my select committee to be turned into a circus…The only thing I’m interested 
in is getting tough laws introduced into this parliament so that the people of 
New Zealand can be confident that police have the powers to deal strongly to 
gangs”. It is clear that in just a few weeks, the comments made by Police 
Minister Luxton that the situation was under control, were now superseded by 
                                                
67 The footage I have obtained, from a gang source, cannot be more accurately referenced. 
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an urgency to enact new laws. The political rhetoric of Moore and O’Connor 
had proven powerful, and the government was pushed to respond. 
 
In Invercargill, Black Power representatives did appear before the Select 
Committee and suggested that racism was at the root of the problem and the 
reason for Black Power’s rise. Local Black Power president Harry Katene 
said, “This town is racist, full stop. It’s activity that we’re sick of sitting around 
to take. We can’t even walk along the street by ourselves. Even young kids 
can’t walk the streets…because they’re getting harassed all the time or 
beaten up” (NZ Herald 6.6.1996). But members of the committee were 
unconvinced. Labour’s Phil Goff “fired a barrage of questions” at Katene 
claiming that racism was not the problem and that the problem was the gangs 
themselves (NZ Herald 6.6.1996). Mike Moore said that, “Claims of racism by 
Black Power are as outrageous as claims by members of the white Road 
Knights gang that they are genetically superior” (M. Moore, 1996: p.78). As 
noted in Chapter Eight, around this time skinhead gangs were prominent in 
the South Island, and Invercargill was a city where these groups had a 
significant presence. Moreover, groups like the Bandenkrieg had direct links68 
to the Road Knights, and it would be difficult to deny that an element of racism 
existed within the outlaw club69. Remembering that at least two U.S. studies 
have found that the most common reason for joining a gang is for protection 
(Decker & Van Winkle, 1996: p.73; Esbensen & Lynskey, 2001: p.104), it is 
possible that this surge in white power activity led some young Maori and 
Pacific youths to seek support within the ranks of Black Power.  
                                                
68 The Bandenkrieg acted as a feeder gang to the Road Knights throughout the South Island. 
69 These racist views became much less pronounced as they developed an association with the 
multicultural Hell’s Angels and Head Hunters. 
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But it was clear that Moore and Goff, at least, had little interest in the wider 
factors that give rise to gang formation and were instead focused solely on the 
gangs', real and assumed, criminal activities, and on giving police greater 
powers to combat them. It was a significant shift from the broad ranging 
approach of the 1970s and much of the 1980s when causation and 
intervention were of primary concern and there was a general acceptance that 
the police alone were unable to tackle an issue with such complex social 
foundations. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given it was in their cities that the wars that sparked concern 
occurred, both the Christchurch (1996) and Invercargill (1996) city councils 
made submissions to the Select Committee demanding that greater action be 
taken against the gangs. But the most sensational submission came from the 
new the Police Commissioner, Peter Doone, who was appointed in June 
1996. He said that New Zealand had just five years to destroy gangs or they 
would grow so large and powerful that they would be completely beyond 
control, comments that Moore described as a “powerful wake-up call” (NZ 
Herald 10.6.1996).  
 
Mike Moore took advantage of, and propelled, the wave of attention the 
committee brought to the gang issue. He was a constant media presence – 
and began writing large articles for publication in major daily newspapers. 
Moore claimed, again without any obvious supporting evidence and almost 
certainly reliant on police information, that gang leaders in Christchurch were 
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“infuriated” by the publicity generated by gang conflicts and wanted to 
negotiate peace, similar to the relatively quiet times in Auckland, so they could 
continue their organised criminal activities (NZ Herald 10.6.1996). Outside the 
Fort Street Police Station in Auckland in June 1996, Moore, with fellow Labour 
MP Phil Goff, told reporters that he wanted the Select Committee to travel 
further than just the South Island cities where violence had gained centre 
stage. The specific regional problems were being broadened, to make the 
issue one of national importance. Despite the city experiencing no serious 
overt gang problems at that time, Auckland, he said, was where the most 
serious problems existed: “What we have learned about Auckland is it’s more 
disciplined, it’s better organised” (NZ Herald 14.6.1996). It was a part of 
Moores’s belief that the gangs “are no longer groups of hoons who smash the 
occasional pub. They have graduated into serious organised crime” (NZ 
Herald 11.5.1996). This was a significant change of tact, and it led to a shift in 
the wider public's perception of the gangs as dominating profit driven crime in 
New Zealand. 
 
During the committee’s investigation, Moore brought media attention to the 
construction of a new clubhouse being built by the Devil’s Henchmen in 
Timaru. During 1996, Moore went on Ralston Live70, a current affairs 
programme, and questioned how the gang could afford to build it, intimating 
that the club must have been funding it through criminal activities. In fact, the 
club’s 20-odd members each contributed $500 and then raised a loan with 
South Canterbury Finance – because, as one member told me, “The banks 
                                                
70 The footage I have obtained, from a gang source, cannot be more accurately referenced. 
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wouldn’t touch us” – to purchase an investment property on Wai-iti Road. 
They then rented out the property for four or five years while renovating it, 
eventually making a $50,000 profit. That lump sum, as well as proceeds from 
the club’s firewood business and club membership fees, paid for materials to 
build the headquarters, while the club members, one of whom was a qualified 
builder, provided free labour. These facts were never made public, and 
suspicion over how the club managed to fund the building remained in the 
minds of the public. 
 
Furthermore, in June 1996, Moore tabled before parliament a leaked 
confidential police intelligence report titled, The ‘Fat Mexicans’ Are Coming71, 
which linked Highway 61 with the Bandidos, which formed in Texas in 1966, 
and since then had become a large outlaw club with numerous chapters, and 
thousands of members, around the world (Veno, 2003: p.64; Winterhalder, 
2007). During the 1990s, Highway 61 had grown to be the largest outlaw club 
in New Zealand with chapters in Whangarei, Auckland, Rotorua, Hastings, 
Wellington, and Christchurch. The club also became the only New Zealand 
gang to successfully migrate overseas, establishing two chapters in Australia; 
in Sydney and Brisbane72. In Australia, the club’s chapters had established 
friendly relations with the Bandidos, and in 1995 members of that gang 
travelled to New Zealand for a Highway 61 motorcycle show in Christchurch. 
                                                
71 ‘Fat Mexicans’ is a reference to the sombrero wearing cartoon figure on the Bandidos back patch.  
72 I am told that Black Power unsuccessfully attempted to establish a Sydney chapter in the 1980s. 
Certainly the Mongrel Mob briefly had a presence in Perth in 1989, but the city’s outlaw clubs, the 
Gypsy Jokers, Club Dero, the Coffin Cheaters and God’s Garbage, created an informal alliance to resist 
the gang (NZ Herald 28-11-1989). Following an explosion in a workshop employing a Mob member 
and the non-fatal groin shooting of one of its leaders, the chapter folded. Other alliances have been 
formed. In the 1990s the Devil’s Henchmen had close links to the Australian Outlaws (at that time 
unconnected to the international club of the same name), which was formal enough for both groups to 
don side patches highlighting their connection. And in more recent years the Tribesmen have been 
associating with the Rebels MC of Australia. 
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It was this trip to Christchurch by “office bearers and senior [Bandidos] 
members” as well as other “noted activity, rumours and…overseas trends”, 
which formed the view of at least one police intelligence officer that, “Highway 
61 MC New Zealand were being wooed as prospective members of the 
Bandidos MC international organisation” (New Zealand Police, 1995: p.3). 
The report rated the probability of a patch-over at 95%. Supporting this rating 
was “restricted A1 information from a highly confidential and totally reliable 
source in Queensland from within the Bandidos MC Australia”, which 
corroborated the assessment already made in New Zealand. The report 
concluded by saying, “negotiations were now almost complete on the “buying 
in” to the Bandidos World group through the Australian franchise, by the 
Highway 61 MC New Zealand” (italics in original) (New Zealand Police, 1995: 
p.3). Furthermore, the report said that there would be dire consequences of 
such a move in the form of gang warfare in New Zealand due to the 
international antagonism between the Bandidos and the Hell’s Angels.  
 
Several Highway 61 members have told me that no serious consideration was 
given to such a move and that the links between the groups were simply 
social – similar to the way different clubs had coalitions, without thoughts of 
merging, in New Zealand. In fact, even a cursory glance at the report 
suggests the evidence by which the assessment of a takeover was thin. 
Moreover, the report’s author does not appear to have consulted colleagues 
in the police best placed to assess the credibility of the information – New 
Zealand gang liaison officers. One leading gang liaison officer, who wishes to 
remain nameless, told me in 2006 that, “[the author of the report] was a bit of 
538 
 
a conspiracy theorist – I think he just got carried away. Certainly, me or 
anyone I knew [in the gang intelligence community] didn’t give him that 
information, so Christ knows where it came from”. Another senior police 
officer told me, “He [the report’s author] made two and two make six. It was 
hugely embarrassing. The information [he used] just didn’t stand up in the 
light of day”. Nevertheless, the report provided significant political capital. 
 
In tabling the report, Mike Moore successfully called for an urgent 
parliamentary debate, tying the discussion of the report to the pressing need 
for gang laws (NZPD, vol. 556, 1996: p.13350). Although Moore was most 
likely unaware of many of the report’s deficiencies, he was certainly aware 
that it was more than a year old and that during the Select Committee’s 
investigation the police had not raised any of the concerns mentioned within it, 
something that Alec Neil was quick to point out to parliament (NZPD, vol. 556, 
1996: p.13359). The Bandidos never merged with Highway 61, but 
nevertheless, the report and its content gained significant media attention. 
The campaign was not one of truth seeking, but of political point scoring; and 
in that regard, Moore was excelling. 
 
Moore also made a number of statements that were not supported by the 
report or any other evidence, including that the New Zealand Hell’s Angels 
wear ‘Filthy Few’73 badges to denote members who kill for the gang, and also 
that gang “villains” had better technology than the “good guys”, meaning the 
police (NZPD, vol. 556, 1996: pp.13352 & 13353). In my experience, the latter 
                                                
73 Not to be confused with the outlaw club called the Filthy Few based in the Bay of Plenty. 
539 
 
claim simply beggars belief, while the former has been denied to me by the 
Hell’s Angels; although Lavigne (2004: p. 54) believes it to be true its veracity 
has been questioned by Veno (2003: p.148). While there is no firm evidence 
that ‘Filthy Few’ badges denote a killer, there is actually evidence to the 
contrary. Richard Dalhousie, for example, who was one of those convicted in 
the 1975 killing of Bradley Haora, outlined in Chapter Six, is still a member of 
the club and does not wear a Filthy Few badge.  
 
Not to be outdone by his Labour Party colleague, Phil Goff made similarly 
sweeping statements, saying that, “We know that the gangs control machine 
guns, that they have military-style semi-automatics weapons” (NZPD, vol. 
556, 1996: p.13358), though he provided no evidence to support this claim. 
Throughout my research, I have not found any examples of machine guns or 
military style weapons being used to commit gang crimes at this time. That is 
not to say such weapons did not exist, but they were certainly not prevalent. 
Nevertheless, these types of claims and statements being made by Moore 
and Goff were building an exaggerated picture of gangs that went largely 
unchallenged. There was little reason for the wider public not to accept them 
as fact.  
 
One reason for the acceptance of these stories was the lack of response from 
the gangs. Apart from the appearance by Black Power at a Select Committee 
hearing in Invercargill (where they were roundly attacked), both patched 
gangs and the outlaw clubs failed to speak out publicly about these issues. 
Although journalists were undoubtedly excited by the sensationalist political 
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claims that made for great copy, even if they had sought to balance their 
reports, their ability to do so was somewhat limited. The gangs were generally 
ill equipped to deal with journalists enquiries and most had adopted strong 
rules banning talking with the media because of bad experiences with the 
press. Moreover, I believe the gangs had become somewhat immune to 
political attack and in the past had watched it flair up, die down and ultimately 
leave their gang life continue on as normal. Ever since the failure of 
Muldoon’s vehicle confiscation laws in the mid-1970s, little political change 
had had any real troubling effect. But this time, the political fire was much 
larger than it had ever been in the past and without a counterbalance it was 
able to proceed unhindered. 
 
Mike Moore’s use of the media was powerful and deliberate, and intended to 
gain public attention and support his calls for political action. In a remarkably 
frank admission, he told me that, 
 
Politicians respond to public opinion, respond to stories…I had a huge 
file on it, I was pumping it all the time, and the public was getting 
outraged …You’ve got to build it up and then get the Government to 
respond to it. 
 
The ‘outrage’ that Moore was deliberately invoking produced what Cohen 
(1972) famously called a ‘moral panic’. As outlined in Chapter One, Cohen 
believed that exaggeration and sensational media reports lead to an issue 
being inflated to such a degree that all sense of perspective becomes lost. 
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The media, as well as political figures, create ‘folk devils’ around which a 
mythology is produced. Cohen(1972: p.44) suggested that one element of a 
moral panic was that the threat, once suitably bolstered by sensational 
commentaries and media articles, is framed as a threat to the moral fabric of a 
society. As if scripted to conform to this theory, Moore told parliament that, 
“Gangs are a time bomb lodged against the heart of the nation…They are a 
threat to our democracy” (NZPD, vol. 556, 1996: p.13351). This claim he 
repeated in a long opinion piece in the New Zealand Herald (10.6.1996) to 
which he added, “We are engaged in a fundamental battle to preserve peace 
and civil order in New Zealand”. The rhetoric had reached a crescendo.  
 
During the parliamentary debate in which Moore first made these claims, the 
Justice Minister Doug Graham, a lawyer turned politician who enjoyed a level-
headed reputation, attempted to calm matters. Almost certainly aware that the 
issue was being blown out of proportion, he said that the subject was not new 
and that care needed to be taken in enacting new laws: “I am always reluctant 
to keep incrementally adding to the police powers. One never gets them back. 
So each year we give more, and we have to be very, very careful about that. I 
would need to be satisfied – and I am certain we all do – that what they [the 
police] seek is justified, that it will do some good…and that it is the proper 
thing to do as a Parliament” (NZPD, vol. 556, 1996: p.13367). He was 
supported by fellow National MP, and former police officer Ross Meurant, who 
said, “Overreaction just before election time results in silly legislation” (NZPD, 
vol. 556, 1996: p.13363).  
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But the drive for new legislation, and the creation of the gangs as a ‘folk devil’, 
had become politically irresistible for the government, and on 9 July 1996, 
with the general election just three months away, Doug Graham outlined the 
broad principles of proposed new measures that would be introduced in an 
effort to combat gangs. Then, on 20 August 1996, less than two months 
before the election, those measures were fleshed out in the form of the 
Harassment and Criminal Associations Bill, which was introduced to 
Parliament for its first reading. Not wanting to be usurped by opposition 
proposals (most notably a Private Member’s Bill drafted by Mike Moore), the 
changes outlined in the Bill would become the country’s most wide ranging 
deterrent and suppressive thrust aimed at gangs; and importantly they 
ensured the National Party did not look soft on the issue of gangs as the 
election loomed. 
 
As expected, the first MMP election in November 1996 failed to provide a 
clear majority for either of the two main parties, and the third placed New 
Zealand First, with Winston Peters at its helm, held enough seats to create 
either a centre-Right or centre-Left government. After protracted negotiations, 
New Zealand First joined forces with the National party, enabling them to 
remain in power. 
 
Police feared that the more representative parliament might slow the progress 
of the proposed laws, “and that the impetus achieved prior to the election may 
be lost” (NZ Herald 16.1.1997). The New Zealand Herald reported that, in a 
briefing paper to the new government, police “express concern about the now 
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well-established links between home-grown and internal gangs and their 
control over illegal activities and commodities” and that “to facilitate their 
criminal activities many gangs are attempting to lower their public profile” (NZ 
Herald 16.1.1997). The intent of the report was quite clear: to press home to 
the politicians that the new laws remained necessary and urgently required, 
and that the apparent quietening of the gang scene – a return to the 
gang/community balance – was no reason not to act. With the dominant 
discourse focusing on gangs as organised criminals, the lack of overt violence 
was a menacing development and not one to feel reassured by. 
 
Police fears that the proposed laws may stall were not without foundation. 
Given that the violent incidents in both Christchurch and Invercargill had long 
been quelled, the haste that had been so evident before the election slowed 
considerably and the new government was rather slow in reappointing 
members to the Justice and Law Reform Committee, which would consider 
the Harassment and Criminal Associations Bill. Ordinarily, as with moral 
panics generally, the issue may have died down naturally but as the proposed 
legislation had already been drafted, the subject was kept alive. And police 
concerns that the progress of the laws would falter were, eventually, allayed.  
 
Following the election, the reformed Justice and Law Reform Committee was 
made up of five National/New Zealand First MPs, three Labour MPs, with one 
MP each from Act and the Alliance parties. Former police officer and New 
Zealand First MP Rana Waitai was appointed the Chairperson. After 28 April 
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1997 – the closing date for submissions on the Bill – the committee 
considered the proposed legislation, and they had much to consider. 
 
The Proposed Law Changes 
Before examining reaction to the proposed law changes, and ultimately their 
effect, the following section provides a brief summary them. These measures 
were originally bundled together and moved through parliament and the 
Select Committee process as the Harassment and Criminal Associations Bill.  
When introduced into parliament for the final reading, however, they were split 
up into a series of new laws and amendments to existing laws.   
 
Harassment Bill (1997) 
The provisions in the Harassment Bill included both criminal and civil 
harassment, and recognised that “individual acts that may appear trivial or 
innocent on the surface may amount to harassment when viewed in context” 
(Harassment and Criminal Associations Bill 1997 No.215-2: p.iii). The law 
would make it an offence to “harass another person so that the person fears 
for his or her safety or the safety of members of his or her family” (ibid).  
 
The offence of criminal harassment was directed at more serious forms of 
harassment. Under this provision, a person would commit criminal 
harassment if they harassed another person causing the victim to fear for the 
safety of themselves or those with whom they share a family relationship. The 
act of harassment had to occur twice within a 12 month period.  
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Subjective/objective tests were proposed to judge what constituted 
harassment, as this “recognises that acts that may cause fear in an elderly 
person who lives alone may not instil fear in a different class of persons” 
(Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.21) 
 
Amendments to Crimes Act (1961) 
A number of amendments were sought in relation to the Crimes Act. One of 
these was a proposal to create a new offence of participation in a criminal 
gang. In order to be charged, a person would have to participate in a criminal 
gang, defined as three persons having previously commissioned or attempted 
to commission three or more serious offences on separate occasions, with the 
intention of promoting criminal conduct. The maximum penalty for 
participation in a criminal gang was set at three years imprisonment. Given 
there were many existing laws that targeted aiding and abetting criminal 
activity, this offence would be used when, “for some reason, a gang member 
is not able to be charged as a party to a specific offence” (Ministry of Justice, 
1997: p.47). The proposed changes also provided another option when 
sentencing a person for a different offence that did allow for a penalty of three 
years imprisonment, and thus could allow the courts the ability to impose a 
more severe sanction on gang members (Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.47).  
 
Provisions were also sought to extend police powers to intercept private 
communication by: 
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(a) Amending the definition of “organised criminal enterprise” to reduce 
the number of people who need to be involved in an enterprise from 
six to three; and 
(b) Making interception warrants available for- 
(i) The offence of money laundering by members of an organised 
criminal enterprise; 
(ii) Certain offences relating to perverting the course of justice; 
(iii) Serious violent offences punishable by 7 years imprisonment or 
more, in certain circumstances. 
 
A final amendment sought to extend powers relating to vehicles stopped 
under the Act by allowing the police to search vehicles in a wider range of 
situations; to require a person to supply his or her date of birth; and to arrest 
without warrant for breach of section.  
 
Amendments to Criminal Justice Act (1985)  
These amendments would give greater power to the court in issuing non-
association orders; primarily in giving judges the discretion to impose non-
association orders when sentencing offenders for periods of twelve months or 
less. Also, the court’s power to impose non-association orders would be 
increased so that non-associating conditions could last for longer periods 
(twelve months instead of six). This order would prohibit an offender from 
associating with a specified person or class of persons and may be imposed 
where:  
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(a) The person is convicted of an imprisonable offence; and  
(b) The court is satisfied that the order is reasonably necessary to ensure 
that the offender does not commit further offences punishable by 
imprisonment. Breach of an order is punishable by up to twelve months 
in prison. 
 
Amendments to Local Government Act (1974) 
This amendment sought to replace section 695A of the Local Government 
Act, a section dealing with gang fortifications74. The proposed changes, as 
well as broadening the grounds on which a removal orders could be made, 
aimed to make removing these structures quicker and more effective. 
Primarily this would be achieved through streamlining the procedure for 
making applications, and making general laws of evidence relevant in 
applications, for example establishing that a person had been convicted of an 
offence and thereby linking fortifications to criminal enterprise.  
 
Amendments to Misuse of Drugs Act (1975)  
Under the law as it existed at that time, police had the power to obtain an 
interception warrant if there were reasonable grounds for believing that a 
class A or B controlled drug offence was being, or was about to be, 
committed. This amendment would mean that interception warrants were 
available in a wider range of situations, and, most significantly, such warrants 
could be obtained in relation to dealing in or cultivating cannabis (a class C 
controlled drug). 
                                                
74 It will be recalled from Chapter Seven that this provision was originally created in 1987 but proved 
to be unworkable. 
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Amendments to Summary Offences Act (1981)  
Three main changes were to the Summary Offences Act were proposed. 
Firstly, two new offences would be created, based on an existing law that 
prohibits people from associating with convicted thieves. The new law would 
make it an offence for a person to habitually associate with violent or drug 
offenders when it could reasonably be inferred that the association would lead 
to the commission of a crime. For someone to be convicted of these offences, 
they would need to be given three warnings by police, and the drug/violent 
offender with which they were associating would have to have been convicted 
of two or more drug/violent offences. 
 
Secondly, under the existing law (Section 21) there was a range of behaviours 
that made certain acts, relating to intimidation, an offence. A new clause 
(Clause 88) would make two amendments: a) stopping, confronting, or 
accosting a person in a public place was added as a further category to the 
list of behaviour deemed to be intimidation; b) the mens rea was reduced so 
that the offender just had to be “reckless” as to whether or not their behaviour 
is intimidating. Therefore, offenders only need the knowledge that their 
behaviour is “likely to reasonably cause” a person to be frightened or 
intimidated. These changes were aimed at the intimidating nature of gang 
behaviour in public places that was seen to affect the public’s daily lives 
(Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.108). 
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The final significant amendment to the Act proposed to increase the level of 
fines for most of the offences that it incorporated. With few exceptions, 
penalties had not been amended since their original enactment in 1981. It was 
proposed that most penalties be doubled. 
 
Amendments to Telecommunications Act (1987)  
The main purpose of these amendments was to regulate the obtaining of call 
associated data – obtained through the use of telephone analysers or by other 
technology – by both the police and customs. This is not to be confused with 
interception communication, as the data under the Telecommunications Act 
does provide the content of calls, but only information on who people have 
been calling, and when these calls occurred.  
 
The Quiet Challenges and Political Resolve 
On face value at least, the measures outlined above were the most wide 
ranging legislative thrust aimed at gangs the country had ever attempted. As 
has been discussed, the measures were sparked by a number of serious 
gang incidents that created a strong political drive in the lead up to the 1996 
election. Away from the political spotlight, the laws were given sober analysis 
and scrutiny by a number of groups, and were questioned as to their need, 
their potential for efficacy and their impact on liberties and human rights. 
However, the Justice and Law Reform Committee – as a political body bound 
by the pre-election rhetoric, and chaired by a former police officer – was 
unmoved by such critiques and steadfast in its support of the proposed law 
changes.  
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Notwithstanding the significance of these new laws in toto, some of the 
provisions, for example, the changes relating to the Telecommunications Act, 
were uncontroversial. Similarly, changes to the Crimes Act that widened 
interception warrants to involve dealing in cannabis were largely seen as fair 
and reasonable. Equally uncontroversial were the proposed increases in 
certain penalties, for instance within the Summary Offences Act, where such 
penalties had not been reviewed since their inception in 1981. Other changes, 
however, were both more significant and more contentious.  
 
Several rights-based arguments were offered in relation to the proposed new 
offence, under the Crimes Act, of participating in a criminal gang, with fears 
they would undermine a fundamental freedom of living in a democratic society 
(Auckland Council For Civil Liberties, 1997), and diminish control over one’s 
own life (Privacy Commission, 1997a). The proposal was also questioned due 
to its “troubling” vagueness and uncertainty (Privacy Commission, 1997a: 
p.12); and because the policy behind the offence was unclear (Human Rights 
Commission, 1997).  
 
A rights-based argument was also offered against extending the powers of 
non-association orders, which were seen to give “wide discretion” enabling 
them to be used for quite different situations than those explicitly proposed 
(Human Rights Commission, 1997: p.3). The right to associate freely has long 
been recognised in human rights documents and the New Zealand Bill of 
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Rights Act 1990 (s17) seeks to protect such freedoms, stating that, “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of association”.  
 
Although few submissions expressed concern over increasing the variety of 
offences, the Privacy Commissioner (1997a), the Christchurch Community 
Law Centre (1997), and the Human Rights Commission (1997), were all 
concerned by the whittling away of the threshold that constitutes an organised 
criminal enterprise from six people to three. The Privacy Commissioner Bruce 
Slane said in his 1997 annual report that: “There is no ‘magic’ in the figure six 
and therefore it is difficult to offer a cogent case in favour of that figure as 
against the figure of three. However, I consider it is incumbent upon state 
authorities seeking to obtain extra powers of intrusive surveillance to make 
the case, and not for others to have to establish the reasonableness of the 
status quo” (Privacy Commission, 1997b). Such a low figure also appeared 
inconsistent with police assertions that high numbers of gang members were 
involved in criminal operations (Christchurch Community Law Centre, 1997a). 
 
The need for an extension of police powers to intercept private 
communication was also questioned, due to the proposed changes being “a 
major expansion of the powers to intercept private communications” (Privacy 
Commission, 1997b). When enacted in 1987, interception powers in Part XIA 
of the Crimes Act 1961 – phone tapping and premises bugging – were 
intended to be extraordinary powers for dealing with sophisticated criminal 
activity, influenced by the spectre of growing Asian organised criminal 
syndicates. At that time, the number of participants (six) was deliberately 
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framed to ensure it was targeting organised criminal groups, and thus 
reflecting Parliament's intent that such intrusive powers should not become an 
ordinary law enforcement tool (Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.60). Indeed, it has 
long been established by New Zealand courts that a warrant to intercept 
communication “is a step never to be lightly authorised in New Zealand 
society” (Privacy Commission, 1997a: p.1).  
 
Although academics were conspicuously absent during the submission 
process, at least one, Kevin Dawkins, a criminal law expert from the 
University of Otago, questioned some of the changes in the New Zealand Law 
Review. Specifically, he addressed the proposed new offence of criminal 
harassment. There already existed many provisions targeting types of 
harassment: threatening (Crimes Amendment Act 1961, ss 306, 194 and 196; 
Summary Offences Act 1981, s 21); intimidation (Summary Offences Act 
1981, s 21); intentionally or recklessly causing psychological harm or injury 
(Crimes Act, ss 188 and 189); making annoying, disturbing, or malicious 
phone calls (Telecommunications Act 1987, s 8); loitering and trespass 
(Summary Offences Act, ss 3, 4, 8, and 12); disorderly or offensive behaviour 
(Summary Offences Act, ss 3, 4, and 5); causing a criminal nuisance (Crimes 
Act 1961, s 145). There are also related provisions under the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995, Summary Proceedings Act 1957, the Human Rights Act 
1993, and even the Employment Contracts Act 1991. These considerations 
led Dawkins (1997: p.23) to conclude that, “the very idea that we need a 
charter on harassment is disputable”. 
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The necessity of creating new offences for associating with violent or drug 
offenders was also questioned. As previously noted, the new offences were 
based on existing law that made it illegal to associate with convicted thieves, 
but since the mid-1980s, there had only been two convictions for that offense. 
This extremely low rate of prosecution seemed anomalous with an extension 
of such powers. The Christchurch Community Law Centre was opposed to the 
changes saying: “Certainly it would be hard to say the equivalent offence of 
associating with convicted thieves has reduced the incidence of theft or 
receiving stolen property” (Christchurch Community Law Centre, 1997b: p.2). 
Indeed, of the seven submissions relating to the proposed offence, only the 
Police Association and the Invercargill City Council supported the change; 
those organisations not in support included the Human Rights Commission, 
Auckland Council for Civil Liberties, and the New Zealand Law Society.  
 
Concerns were also raised in relation to the proposed new power, outlined 
under the Crimes Act, to stop and search vehicles without a warrant. The 
Christchurch Community Law Centre felt that the police could simply use the 
laws to go on “fishing expeditions” without the restraints of the existing law 
provided via the prerequisite of warrants (Christchurch Community Law 
Centre, 1997a: p.3). The New Zealand Law Society felt that such fears could 
be mitigated by applying procedural requirements such as those required by 
the Misuse of Drugs Act (New Zealand Law Society, 1997). Similarly, the 
Legislation Advisory Committee thought that safeguards ought to be 
considered because the new provisions would be available for general law 
enforcement use and not merely in relation to criminal gangs (Legislation 
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Advisory Committee, 1997: p.4). This argument was particularly notable given 
that such measures were requested for general law enforcement by police in 
1988 (when a Select Committee examined search warrants) and in 1993 
(when the Crimes Act was amended); on both occasions such powers were 
deemed unnecessary by parliament, yet now, when proposed as gang laws, 
the measures gained favour. 
 
Indeed, the framing of the new laws as ‘gang laws’ served to inhibit greater 
public debate about them. Lost within the political rhetoric was the fact that 
the new laws, while ostensibly targeting gangs, were not formally restricted to 
such groups. Judge Steven Erber expressed this in relation to non-association 
orders when he said there was no doubt “that the primary target was gangs, 
but it is clear that an order may be made against a person who is not and has 
never been associated with a gang” (Police v Harris, Unreported, District 
Court, Christchurch, Erber S, July 1998). Regardless of the stated intent, once 
these measures were put into law, police could use them against anybody. 
How seriously this issues was regarded, is reflected by the fact that so many 
different groups – unconnected to gangs – made submissions opposing the 
laws.  
 
As was the case in the media flurry before the election, the gangs remained 
silent, as none chose to make submissions to the Select Committee. It will be 
recalled that in the late 1980s, certain groups did engage with the political 
process in relation to issues that affected them, and their failure to do so in 
the 1990s suggests a certain withdrawal from political engagement. I suspect 
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this reflects two things: firstly that the gangs were ignorant of the process or 
nonplussed by outcomes; and secondly, before the demise of the social 
agenda there was a government belief in the benefits of engaging with such 
groups, something that no longer existed in the 1990s era of ‘zero tolerance’.  
 
Predictably, police input into the proposals suggested that many of the 
measures did not go far enough. For example, police felt the number needed 
to form a criminal enterprise (in order to gain interception warrants) should be 
just two (Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.59); that only one warning should need to 
be given before a charge is brought against an individual for associating with 
a violent or drug offender (Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.104); and that the police 
should be able to apply for an order to remove a fortification – an order that 
could not be appealed – “even if it would infringe the respondents’ rights” 
(Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.96). Although these suggestions were rejected by 
the Select Committee, they did not attract the negative reaction that the 
Committee of Inquiry into Violence (1987) had expressed a decade before; 
and political views were now largely in line with those of the police. In fact, 
given Mike Moore was largely reliant on police information, the police were 
instrumental in the formation of political opinion; a point critical to later 
discussions. 
 
Where concerns were raised during the submission process, the committee 
either disagreed with the submitter and moved on, or made counter 
arguments to nullify such concerns. The latter was the case in relation to 
rights-based concerns. For example, the committee countered issues raised 
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in relation section 98A of the Crimes Act which sought to criminalise 
participation in a criminal gang. They asserted that the changes were 
consistent with the Bill of Rights because the proposed law had “a number of 
thresholds and was therefore properly targeted” (Justice and Law Reform 
Committee, 1997: p.vii).  
 
They were similarly resolute when countering concerns levelled at the 
changes to interception warrants. The committee acknowledged that 
interception powers should not be available for general law enforcement 
purposes and recognised concerns relating to the lowering of the threshold for 
the number of people constituting an organised criminal enterprise from six to 
three. However, they were ultimately persuaded by police concerns that the 
existing law’s definition was too restrictive and thus recommended that the 
“threshold of three persons be retained in the bill” (Justice and Law Reform 
Committee, 1997: p.viii).  
 
The committee also dismissed the concerns that were raised regarding the 
proposal to stop and search vehicles without a warrant. The committee again 
acknowledged the concerns, but were “satisfied the amendments…are 
justified and expect that Police will use the new powers in a reasonable way” 
(Justice and Law Reform Committee, 1997: p.xi). 
 
Similarly, the committee did not agree with those concerned about the 
doubtful efficacy of many of the measures, but in one instance at least, its 
belief wavered slightly. In relation to the extension of powers regarding non-
557 
 
association orders, the committee said, “We consider there is a lack of 
information to help assess how well orders are enforced, how often they are 
imposed and their overall effectiveness” (Justice and Law Reform Committee, 
1997: pp.xii). They did, however, conclude that the extended powers were 
“important and provide a means of enabling offenders to break their 
connections to the gang. In this way we see the orders as something which 
may be beneficial to the offender” (Justice and Law Reform Committee, 1997: 
pp.xii-xiii). This was a rare show of uncertainty, however, and the resolve of 
the committee was ultimately steadfast.  
 
This resolve, however, was not built upon a great deal of evidence. Although 
the Ministry of Justice felt it was “clear” that police and public concern about 
gangs had “some basis”, they conceded that “it is not possible to point to 
independent data or research that assesses the nature and level of gang 
involvement in organised crime or the extent of public concern about gang 
behaviour” (Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.3). It was a telling admission, and it 
points to the fact that rhetoric rather than research was the driver of the 
legislation; an issue I will elaborate on shortly. 
 
Having been the strongest proponents for legal change, largely through Mike 
Moore but also Phil Goff, the Labour Opposition endorsed the proposals as 
they returned to parliament from the Select Committee in an unusual show of 
political bipartisanship. Indeed, the only political advantage available to them 
was to argue that the legislation was not strong enough. Mike Moore 
welcomed the moves but suggested they only went “half-way” (NZ Herald 
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9.7.1996) and went further to propose that gang members should have any 
court sentence immediately doubled (NZ Herald 20.9.1996). With few 
exceptions, the debate in the House during the Bill’s readings reflected the 
politicking that had occurred leading up to the drafting of the laws as 
politicians sought to outdo each other and position themselves and their 
parties as suitably tough on gangs. With his early reticence clearly swept 
away by the tide of political opinion, the Minister of Justice, Doug Graham 
introduced the final reading of the Bill saying, “Society is no longer prepared 
to tolerate the activities of gangs and other criminal association. The time has 
come to get tough” (NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5532). His National Party 
colleague, Wayne Mapp, reinforced this view, “Undoubtedly, gangs are the 
great scourge of our times....It is clear that gangs are an evil force and that 
society must find a way to break them down” (NZPD, vol.565, 1997: pp.5549-
5550). Select Committee chair and member of the coalition Government, New 
Zealand First MP Rana Waitai said, “when we talk about gangs these days we 
are talking about organised crime…This Bill adds strength to the arsenal of 
the police to deal with crime and gangs on behalf of society” (NZPD, vol.565, 
1997: pp.5536-5537).  
 
Reflecting the fact that the gang problem had been redefined away from 
violence and disorder toward profit driven criminal enterprise, Phil Goff said, 
“When we talk about the gang problem today, we are not talking about the 
usual street violence and stand-over tactics that were once associated with 
gangs in New Zealand: we are talking about organised crime….It is important 
that the police have the powers we give them in this Bill” (NZPD, vol.565, 
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1997: pp.5534-5535). He was joined by his colleague George Hawkins who 
said, “this is a very, very important Bill…What is behind those fortifications? It 
is not a little fairyland; it is not where Father Christmas is, but it is where 
serious crime goes on. There are drugs, guns, distribution networks, 
computers, faxes, and everything. It’s sophisticated illegal business” (NZPD, 
vol.565, 1997: p.5542). He argued that the National/New Zealand First 
Government was “soft” in not making certain measures more severe, 
suggesting that the Bill was an improvement but “perhaps it does not go far 
enough” (NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5542). Fellow Labour MPs, Lianne Dalziel 
and Mark Peck were equally emphatic. Dalziel said, “It is important we are 
tough on the criminal element…They are the Business Roundtable of the 
underworld” (NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5549). While Mark Peck, in a rare 
acknowledgement of the type of behaviours that had actually sparked the law 
changes, said the laws were “sending a very clear message to the gangs not 
to expect any sympathy from this House because they will have none, and 
they deserve none. Their very reason for being is crime… The citizens of my 
city are entitled to safe streets. They are entitled to know they can go about 
their normal business without having to put up with these unsavoury 
characters, who would harass and intimidate them every step of the way” 
(NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5551-5552). 
 
The political bi-partisanship of the two main parties meant that any meaningful 
debate on the necessity or efficacy of the laws was lacking. Indeed, when 
members of the left wing Alliance Party questioned the measures, they were 
castigated. Alliance Justice Spokesperson, Matt Robson said, “In this Bill we 
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are actually perpetuating a fraud on the people of New Zealand. We are 
saying to them that when crime rises and when there is violence, we deal with 
that by taking already strong laws and punitive powers and strengthening 
them” (NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5538). In response, National’s Pansy Wong 
said, “I remind every individual out there who is fearful of intimidation by 
gangs, that the Alliance is against this Bill. I remind everybody who is 
frightened of gang activities and feels the police should be given more powers 
for community protection, that the Alliance is against the passage of this Bill” 
(NZPD, vol.565, 1997: p.5540). It reflected the extent to which the debate on 
gangs had swung toward a suppressive approach, that anybody seeking to 
offer alternatives was quickly dismissed as soft on crime.  
 
But, as evinced by many of the submissions to the Select Committee, the 
enthusiasm of politicians was not shared by everyone. Although the sober 
reflections of legal experts and other concerned bodies expressed during the 
submission process did not gain much – if any – media attention, the media 
did begin to carry alternative views as the proposals progressed through 
parliament. With moral panic long over, the media began to perform its ‘fourth 
estate’ duties.  
 
Perhaps sparking this turnaround was the research of an academic that 
challenged the prevailing knowledge of gangs. In 1997, prominent New 
Zealand sociologist Greg Newbold (1997) wrote a paper on organised crime 
in New Zealand for an American Journal. In that, and in turn publicly, he 
announced that, while the gangs were involved in profit drive crime, the 
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majority of New Zealand gangs were “guileless” and criminally “incompetent”, 
and that the threat they posed to the country was relatively minor (Newbold, 
1997: p.91). In stark contrast to the prevailing popular opinion, this academic 
view generated media interest in the basis of the laws, which were founded on 
the very idea that gangs dominated organised criminal activity and were a dire 
and pressing danger to the country. Newbold told the New Zealand Herald 
that the gangs were “disorganised” and if the Harassment and Criminal 
Associations Bill became law it would be “unlikely to have any significant 
effect on criminal gang activity” (NZ Herald 6.8.1997). Although, in the same 
article, these issues were disputed by the president of the Police Association, 
Greg O’Connor, others began to publicly voice concerns over the proposed 
legislation. 
 
Barry Wilson, the vice president of the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties, 
told media that the changes within the Harassment and Criminal Associations 
Bill were “clearly another attack by Government on basic civil liberties” and 
that that would not be limited to use against gang members (NZ Herald 
10.9.1997). Prominent Queen’s Council (QC) Peter Williams lamented the 
lack of effective opposition from the Left. He believed the lack of debate 
compounded a New Zealand tendency to accept police authority to the 
detriment of civil liberties: “The so called Labour party in this country has 
always been pretty right wing when it comes to penal matters. Instead of an 
active left wing acting as a sanction and reviewing such moves, people like 
Mike Moore and Phil Goff are in many ways trying to outdo the right wing by 
being even more draconian” (Sunday Star Times 26.10.1997). He also 
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expressed concerns about the reach of some of the legislation saying the 
general nature of the provisions could mean those with family members in 
gangs would find themselves caught up in the laws (Truth 19.12.1997). 
Auckland solicitor Chris Read said “many” lawyers were concerned by the 
proposals, but in highlighting his fears he demonstrated that strong rhetoric 
was not just the domain of the advocates of the legal provisions: “I find it 
offensive. It’s exactly the sort of thing Hitler did and it will be the poor and 
those with little knowledge of the law who will suffer most” (Truth 19.12.1997). 
 
Scott Optican, senior law lecturer at the University of Auckland, was more 
analytical but equally sceptical about the laws saying that, law makers needed 
to assess whether the gang problem was big enough to require new police 
powers and to ensure it was not simply a “knee-jerk political reaction” (NZ 
Herald 10.9.1997). He said: 
 
Whenever we look at creating new police powers because we’re 
worried about a certain class, or group of people or criminal conduct, 
we’d better make darn sure that the problem is big enough to warrant 
the powers and that the existing powers are inadequate…Laws which 
may look neutral on the face of it can end up being abused because of 
their application (NZ Herald 10.9.1997). 
 
Further to his earlier statements, Newbold was more blunt in his appraisal, “I 
think this bill is largely a sop to public opinion. I think it’s a political device to 
make people feel that something is being done about something that the 
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public has been encouraged to feel frightened about” (NZ Herald 10.9.1997). 
But these public critiques were not only rare, they came about after the 
debate had been framed and thus had little or no effect on the political 
discourse. By this time the passing of the laws was all but a fait accompli.  
 
Of significant interest was the transformation within the overall political 
discussion. Conspicuously missing in the discussions on gangs were the 
social considerations that had dominated thinking in the 1970s and 80s. This 
is not to say they were forgotten, more that they appear to have been ignored. 
The Ministry of Justice reported that: 
 
It became clear during the development of the bill that no single 
legislative initiative would achieve the desired result of reducing gang 
activity. A longer-term broader strategy to deal with gangs and their 
offending needs to be developed. This is likely to involve action a 
number of fronts and to include measures that will not require 
legislation (Ministry of Justice, 1997: p.3).  
 
Passing comments by politicians from both sides of the political spectrum 
made similar references. However, no such strategy was developed and 
arguments of this kind were conspicuously sidelined, further indicating that the 
issue was one of political expediency and not a serious attempt at truly 
countering the problems of gangs.  
 
564 
 
The new laws finally passed through their third reading in parliament in 
November 1997 and came into effect between January 1 and June 1, 1998. 
Of the six parties (and one independent member) in parliament, only the 
Alliance did not support the measures.  
 
The Outcomes – The Failure of the Political Promise 
Given their well-constructed lobby to push for the new laws, it was of little 
surprise that the police enthusiastically embraced their passing, and promised 
to use them to “crack down” on gangs. Assistant Commissioner Neville 
Trendle said the laws gave police more power to target the gangs and he 
thanked all those in the police who had contributed to getting the legislation 
passed, “I want to thank all staff who contributed and provided feedback and 
information. This has helped get legislation through that will make a big 
difference to our job” (Ten-One 19.12.1997). The head of the National Bureau 
of Criminal Intelligence, Detective Inspector Cam Ronald, said officers around 
the country were following a directive to “put police on the front foot” by using 
the new legislation (NZ Herald 8.7.1998). In Christchurch, where gang activity 
had helped spark the calls for legislative change, the police gang liaison 
officer, Detective Richard Neale, said the new laws gave police more “weight”, 
saying, “We’ll be stronger, we’ll be able to detect offences a lot more quickly 
and deal with them more appropriately then we have been able to do” (NZ 
Herald 8.7.1998). Indeed, it was in that city that most significant use of the 
new laws was to occur. 
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Following a gang-related brawl outside a bar in the Christchurch suburb of 
Hornby in May 1997, during which eight people were assaulted and two 
people stabbed, several members of the Road Knights were charged with, 
and convicted of, assault (NZ Herald 5.7.1998). Subsequent to the laws being 
passed and during the trial, police, under the new provision within the Criminal 
Justice Act, applied for non-association orders to be served on those 
members involved. Subsequently, six members or associates of the Road 
Knights, including three of the Harris brothers, were served with orders that 
banned all contact for twelve months between themselves and a number of 
other ‘named’ persons – members or associates of their gang. The case was 
a groundbreaking effort at splitting up a gang and was given further 
significance because it involved separating kin. Judge Erber was aware of the 
case’s significance and in making the order he recognised the right of free 
association, the public interest in keeping families together, and the “strong 
and genuine domestic bond” the Harris family exhibited (Police v Harris, 
Unreported, District Court, Christchurch, Erber S, July 1998). Despite these 
considerations, Erber was convinced that lawmakers had intended the law to 
be used in such circumstances. An appeal was made to the Christchurch High 
Court; however, the orders were upheld (Harris v Police (1998) 15 CRNZ 
632). In May 1999, Ricki Harris was found guilty of breaching the non-
association order by attending a family barbecue at Corsair Bay and was 
sentenced to four months periodic detention; a decision upheld on appeal 
(Harris v Police (1999) 22 TCL 42/8). Local police claimed the order had 
“crippled the gang’s power base” (Ten-One, 12.3.1999). But despite the 
claims of success, the measures have not been replicated, and no 
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subsequent non-association orders of this kind appear to have been issued 
against any gang or any gang members anywhere in New Zealand. In fact, 
data provided to me by the Ministry of Justice in 2009 did not record the 
orders used against the Road Knights; showing no orders had ever been 
made.  
 
In September and October 1998 respectively, police gained court orders to 
remove the fortifications of the Black Power and Highway 61 headquarters in 
Christchurch under the amended Local Government Act. In making his 
judgement on the Highway 61 property, Judge Graeme Noble said he was 
satisfied that the fences and associated structures (platforms and security 
cameras) were being used for the concealment of weapons and drug sales 
(Perry v Kingi, Unreported, District Court, Christchurch, Noble G, May 1999). 
Under the new legislation, the gangs had 30 days to remove the fences or 
appeal the judgment. If neither were undertaken successfully, police could 
forcibly remove the fortifications.  
 
Highway 61 actively fought the measures. Although their appeal was 
unsuccessful, ongoing legal uncertainties meant the fortification remained in 
place until July 1999 when, amid much media fanfare, it was destroyed using 
an excavator (The Press 21.7.1999). In the end, the new ‘streamlined’ 
measures had taken nearly a year to implement. Moreover, as soon as the 
original wall was removed by police, the gang replaced it with two metre high 
fence. Interestingly, the feelings of the gang’s neighbours were mixed. While 
one said, “I think it’s [pulling down the wall] a good idea” another said, “I think 
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it’s disgusting. It’s not as high as other fences around here. It now means all 
of us neighbours have to put up with noise” (One News 20.7.1999).  
 
The order against Black Power also ran into difficulties, though in this case 
these were due to uncertainties over who actually owned the property (The 
Press 29.6.1999), before being pulled down by the gang, which they quickly 
replaced; and the new one was not covered by the court’s ruling (NZ Herald 
15.10.1999).  
 
Despite police saying more fortifications would be targeted, no other orders 
were successfully made in Christchurch. And I have only found one other 
example anywhere in New Zealand, a removal order made against the 
Outcasts MC in Hamilton in mid-200575 (Gray v Hamilton Property 
Investments Limited, Unreported, District Court, Hamilton, Wolff R P, August 
2005). After the failure of the law when it was initially enacted in 1987, the 
new provisions do not appear to have been a great deal better. Gang 
fortifications, erected to secure gangs from opposition groups, had once again 
proven remarkably resilient to police and legislative challenges. 
 
Because the majority of the new legislative measures were general law 
enforcement tools, it is impossible to judge how often they have been used 
specifically against gang members as official statistics do not distinguish 
between gang and non-gang convictions. This, however, does not prevent a 
judgment being made on the new crimes of habitually associating with violent 
                                                
75 Judge Wolff ruled that much of the fortification had to be removed but that the fence could remain, 
along with a single video surveillance camera. 
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or drug offenders as per the changes made to the Summary Offense Act. 
Ministry of Justice data supplied to me show that by 2007 just two people 
were charged with associating with a violent offender, and one of those 
people was convicted. No charges at all were brought in relation to 
associating with drug offenders. By anyone’s measure, these laws cannot be 
heralded as a gang-busting success. 
 
One measure that was ostensibly gang specific was section 98A of the 
Crimes Act, regarding participation in a criminal gang. Keeping in mind the 
claim, originally made by Commissioner of Police Peter Doone and 
subsequently promoted by Mike Moore, that New Zealand had just five years 
to tackle the gang problem, data obtained from the Ministry of Justice by 
National MP Chester Burrows, and subsequently given to me, show that just 
13 people were charged and only two convictions gained in the first five years 
of the law’s enactment. Like many of the others laws, it had fallen flat. 
Following that initial period, the law was amended in 2002 to make 
convictions easier by redrafting what constituted a criminal group, but by 
2006, just 45 convictions had been gained. Interesting, the numbers I gained 
from the Ministry following this, showed an even more miserable story, with no 
convictions prior to 2006, and just seven in 2006 and 2007. The reason for the 
discrepancy in data is unclear, but the underlying story is consistent. 
 
Police gang liaison officers I have talked to have told me that the majority of 
the new laws were either not particularly well targeted or simply unnecessary. 
One said: 
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There was no expert advisory panel for the government on gang stuff, 
where they talk about how you’re actually going to apply this law and 
how’s it going to work, what are the benefits and what are the short 
comings. It just goes to the police legal section and then it gets spit out 
as legislation. They bring in laws without talking to the practitioners at 
street level that have got to go and enforce them, and they sort of miss 
the point. 
 
Another told me: 
 
I think they made some progress on some of the judicial things like 
witness protection and all that, that was an area that needed 
strengthening, but by and large we were using the Crimes Act, the 
Misuse of Drugs Act, and the Arms Act. I didn’t have any problem with 
the [existing] powers that were there really. It was more resourcing 
than anything else. I had five detectives when I could have kept 25 
busy. 
 
In relation to the powers to remove gang fortifications that were originally 
enacted in 1987, and amended in 1997, one told me: 
 
In relation to gang fortifications, we looked at that but we were too flat 
out with everything else to really even enter in to it. We looked at each 
clubhouse to see which was a problem and none of them really were 
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too major for us getting in, so our efforts were just on criminal 
investigations rather than that. We sought of saw those things as a 
luxury to do if we ever had time rather than a priority for us. 
 
Despite the dire threat that the gangs were said to pose, and the great 
urgency that was required to deal with the issue, much of the resulting 
legislation has been rarely used and/or has proven superfluous; in fact, if a 
clearer break down of many of the provisions was available, it would almost 
certainly find that the laws have overwhelming been used against people not 
in gangs. But even ignoring that assertion, it is difficult to conclude anything 
other than that the laws had little or no effect on New Zealand’s gang scene. 
They did, however, have an indirect effect, via the process which they were 
derived; that being to create a public perception that gangs were the country’s 
foremost crime problem and that the gangs existed solely for reasons of 
crime. These ideas continued to be promulgated by police, particularly in 
relation to organised criminal activity. 
 
Gang Activity in Perspective and Police ‘Blue Vision’ 
The legislation that stemmed from the build up to the country’s first MMP 
election stands not a reflection of the great threat gangs posed, but instead as 
a testimony to political folly, the failure to gain an informed view, and the 
power of moral panic. But the perceptions created at this time endured. In 
keeping with the rhetoric that began in 1996, two years later the Police 
Association, with Greg O’Connor as its president, claimed that gangs were 
responsible for 80 percent of serious crime in New Zealand (NZ Herald 18-9-
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1998). That this claim was made as part of an argument for increased police 
staffing levels, indicates an element of lobbying by the association76. But more 
than that, I will argue it exemplifies what I call ‘blue vision’; something that 
was at the heart of the transformation of the public’s perception of gangs. But 
before explaining the concept of blue vision, it is important to seek a clearer 
perspective on criminal offending related to gangs; something that brings into 
serious question many of the persistent claims that had their genesis in the 
1996 moral panic.  
 
 
Although it was mostly from within the police that the claims of gang 
dominance in crime stemmed, remembering that Mike Moore was largely 
reliant on police sources for his public statements, it was a systematic police 
study from late in the decade that sharply drew into question many of these 
assertions. In 1998, the Office of the Commissioner established an Organised 
Crime Project (OCP) in order to prepare a police strategy on combating 
organised crime (McCardle, 1999: p.3). The OCP, headed by Detective 
Sergeant Hamish McCardle, published a report in 1999 that outlined the 
findings of a comprehensive survey of senior police officers. The report 
identified five types of organised crime groups (McCardle, 1999: p.12). These 
were: 
 
Category A – Structured gangs 
Category B – Structured groups other than gangs (like Asian crime groups) 
Category C – Family crime groups 
                                                
76 Such calls also occurred before the 1996 election (The Press 26.6.1996) 
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Category D – Activist or Paedophile crime groups 
Category E – Career criminal crime groups 
 
In total, the report identified 337 organised crime groups in New Zealand, but 
suggested that as many as 660 such groups could exist (McCardle, 1999: 
p.3). The report concluded that more than half of the known groups were 
involved in organised burglary, drug sales, car theft, intimidation or violence, 
and drug cultivation (McCardle, 1999: p.24). Just over a third of the groups 
were involved in robbery and fraud, and there was lesser involvement in drug 
importation, running illegal bars, prostitution, gambling and pornography. The 
study categorised the 337 groups into: 115 structured gangs, 44 structured 
groups other than gangs, 82 family groups, 15 activist groups, and 81 career 
criminal groups. Therefore, although traditional patched gangs were the single 
largest group, they made up just 34% of the total organised crime groups 
within New Zealand (McCardle, 1999: p.15).  
 
If, as the public had been told, gangs dominated 80 percent of serious crime 
in New Zealand, then it meant that two thirds of New Zealand’s organised 
crime groups were remarkably under-employed. Moreover, McCardle (1999: 
p.30) explained in the report that while the number of ‘structured gangs’ was a 
highly accurate number, other groups were likely to have been significantly 
under represented due to their covert nature – hence the fact, as noted 
above, that the estimated overall number could be double those reported. 
This being the case, and remembering my assertion from Chapter Nine that 
not all patched gangs were engaged in organised criminal activity, the rhetoric 
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about gang involvement in organised crime was a long way from the objective 
reality. 
 
This assertion is particularly evident in the drug trade. As was highlighted in 
the previous chapter, many gangs did have significant links to drug dealing, 
and tinnie houses were often gang operations. The dominant discourse of the 
1990s, however, linked gangs and drugs so often that it appeared as though 
gangs monopolised the industry. Wilkins and Casswell (2003) have 
challenged police assertions that gangs control marijuana cultivation in this 
country. They suggest that gang obviousness leads to police targeting them, 
that police intelligence is often is often narrow in focus, and that  “the New 
Zealand police experience of…gang involvement in cannabis cultivation may 
lead to an exaggerated and false perception of the prevalence of these types 
of operations in the illicit cannabis market” (Wilkins & Casswell, 2003: pp.773-
774). In short, the idea that gangs dominate marijuana cultivation is false. 
 
Moreover, as Newbold (2004: p.60) has made clear, “numerous operators 
outside of gangs manufactured, imported, and distributed drugs in an 
organised or semi organised way”. Some of the most highly profiled arrests 
during the decade demonstrate the significant non-gang involvement in drug 
importation. For example, in 1995, Alan King was arrested in Hamilton for 
importing $2m worth of heroin (Newbold, 2000: p179). Similarly unrelated to 
gangs was the largest attempt to import cocaine into New Zealand in 1998, 
and the two largest ecstasy busts that occurred in 1997 and 1999 (Newbold, 
2000: p.181). Indeed, data from the Department of Justice prison census 
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conducted in 1991 shows that just 2.2 percent of gang members were 
incarcerated with their major offence being drugs, compared to 8.5 percent of 
inmates without gang affiliations (Braybrook, 1990: p.72). By 2003, the last 
time such a survey was undertaken, this gap had closed, and 8.5 percent of 
gang members and 8.9 percent of non gang affiliated inmates were 
incarcerated due to a primary conviction for drugs (Harpham, 2004: p.31). The 
closing statistical gap lends support to the fact, outlined in Chapter Nine, that 
gangs more significantly entered the drug trade in the 1990s, but offers little 
support to the argument that they monopolised, or even, dominated it.  
 
A further point to consider here is that while certain gang members were 
gaining significantly from profit driven crime, the vast majority were 
demonstrably hand-to-mouth men, with very little, if any, significant assets. 
 
And finally, it is also important to note that the drug trade is demand driven. 
This being the case, any successful effort at eradicating gangs would simply 
create a vacuum in the market that would quickly be filled, and therefore little 
or no long-term effect on New Zealand’s drug trade is likely to ensue. Gangs 
may be an easily identifiable target for the frustration of society’s ills, but the 
focus on them tends to oversimplify more complex issues.  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter Seven that the police attitude toward gangs 
was roundly and pointedly criticised by the Select Committee on Violence in 
1987 in what was known as the ‘Roper Report’. Similar criticisms appear valid 
in the 1990s and beyond, when considering many of the public statements 
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made by police, but it is more useful to understand the police view rather than 
to simply condemn it.  
 
In my experience, the police are not being deliberately dishonest about the 
nature of the gang situation. Most individual police officers truly believe, and 
will vigorously defend, the picture that has been created, and therefore uphold 
what I have termed ‘blue vision’, a form of ‘group think’ or cognitive 
dissonance whereby police officers only accept information that supports their 
preconceived notions of gangs and dismiss evidence that counters it.  
 
Although its key influences are derived from a lack of research and problems 
in intelligence gathering, I believe that the foundations of blue vision, as it 
pertains to gangs, derive from both similarities and differences between the 
gangs and the police. Veno (2003) described the outlaw club view of the 
police as the ‘big blue gang’, and many police officers quip that they are the 
biggest gang in the country77. Indeed, I would suggest that the camaraderie 
within the police and the gangs is very much alike. Furthermore, when a new 
police officer steps out onto the street in their uniform, the feelings of pride 
and power are very similar to those experienced by gang members wearing 
their patch for the first time; although these feels undoubtedly dissipate over 
time, they nevertheless remain. Although it easy to overstate this case, these 
similarities appear to create the basis for a natural confrontation between the 
groups.  
                                                
77 Suggesting this is not a new development, in the late 1970s, the New Zealand Herald (23.4.1979) 
reported that, “A couple of North Shore policemen let a carload of Black Power members know 
precisely where they stood last week. The officers introduced themselves as members of the exclusive 
Blue Power group, the biggest gang in the country with more than 4000 members”.  
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But significantly adding to this, although paradoxically in contrast to it, is the 
fact that many of the groups' core values – largely relating to issues of law 
and order – mean that they are diametrically opposed. For the police, the 
gangs are an affront to the principles they are charged with upholding. 
Consequently, there is a widespread, and often deeply held, disdain of gangs 
within the police. It is on the basis of this prejudicial view that many police 
seem drawn to information that highlights negatives and ignores positives, 
which thereby works as a shutter against information that does not support 
the view that has built up about gangs as inherently criminal entities. 
 
Because interactions between the police and gang members generally occur 
in antagonistic circumstances, police are unable to get close enough to gang 
members to gain a true sense of the gang scene.  Moreover, the police tend 
to view the world in ‘black-and-white’, in ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ a 
somewhat natural result of an institution that seeks clear-cut outcomes of 
‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. Obvious, rebellious, and often criminally inclined, 
patched gang members provide a perfect focus for law and order issues, and 
therefore police zero in on them. This was noted in McCardle’s (1999: p.30) 
report, which stated that gangs come to police attention so often that a focus 
is always on them, meaning police form what he called the “normal ‘gang’ 
view of organised crime”. 
 
Adding to this, police tend to have an operational focus and are not often 
informed by higher level systematic research that may give perspective to an 
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issue (Hagedorn, 1988; Jankowski, 1991; Reuter, 1995). It is therefore not 
surprising that when McCardle undertook such a study (1999), his findings 
conflicted strongly with the assumed collective knowledge of police. However, 
blue vision meant that the findings of such a report were glossed over or, 
possibly unconsciously, ignored; certainly it appears to have done little to 
change overall police perceptions.  
 
Moreover, much of the gang intelligence collected by police is informally 
gathered and comes from either paid informants or other people who have a 
vested interest in telling police something (such as those seeking bail, getting 
charges reduced etc) or via street information that is often based on rumour or 
misinformation. One of the most striking things that emerged throughout my 
fieldwork was the numerous stories and myths that exist within the gang 
scene itself, and particularly between different gangs. Those able to move 
between the groups and get close to them can better appraise this information 
but the nature of the relationship between the police and the gangs generally 
prevents this from occurring. I discovered that many claims that I heard in and 
around the gang realm proved to be false; often ridiculously so78. Some 
claims are made purposely to save face or are cultivated to demonise a 
particular group because of animosities or a falling out. Others appear to 
become enlarged or distorted by boasts, ‘big noting’, or simply by ‘Chinese 
whispers’, the natural distortions that occur when stories are on-told.  
 
                                                
78 Many of these involve stories about individuals, but others are about whole gangs or their activities. 
One that I have heard, from several members of outlaw clubs, is that members of the Hell’s Angels 
have to sign over all of their possessions to the club when they join. Another I heard was that one gang 
had paid another $50,000 following a dispute. Both of these stories – and many others – proved to be 
utterly fictitious. 
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It is unsurprising that police come to hear stories such as these, but without 
independent means of confirming the veracity of such tales, they can become 
accepted as ‘fact’. This is not to say that all police intelligence is wrong, rather 
that it can be difficult to distinguish the good from the bad. The ‘Fat Mexican’ 
intelligence report noted earlier is a clear example of this. Similarly, the claim 
that Andrew Sisson was the world secretary of the Hell’s Angels is a 
commonly held but incorrect belief among police, and is used to link the local 
club to the nefarious activities of overseas chapters – which may then 
informed by international popular literature79 and thereby further distorting 
matters. Similarly, some police intelligence can be based on truth but then 
misinterpreted. It will be recalled from Chapter Six that police, after becoming 
aware that an outlaw club member was buying red phosphorus, believed the 
substance was being purchased to make smoke bombs. As previously noted, 
police were quite right to believe the purchases were suspicious, but the 
conclusion they drew was quite incorrect.  All of these examples show the 
difficulties faced in gaining accurate intelligence, and the misleading picture 
that can be created when it is incorrect or misconstrued. A former Detective 
Inspector in the New Zealand Police, Dave Haslett, in his Master of Arts thesis 
on outlaw clubs, said that due to issues such as these, there is “considerable 
room for distortion of fact, prejudice, and outright misinformation and 
mythmaking” (Haslett, 2007: p.128). One such myth that has been 
                                                
79 The dearth of literature on gang in New Zealand means that overseas literature is often the only 
source of information of gangs. Because books tend to be written about extreme examples of criminal 
activity, they may work to instil or support an unrealistic understanding of the local situation. A 
reliance on overseas books is evident in a submission by a former police officer, Trevor Morley (2008), 
to the Law and Order Select Committee in 2008, who recommended two Canadian books be read in 
order to understand gangs “in our society”. 
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perpetuated by blue vision since 1996 was that patched gangs dominate 
organised crime in New Zealand.  
 
One undercover police officer told me that when he first entered the field, the 
local police were adamant that a particular chapter of the Mongrel Mob was 
controlling the drug trade in the area. What he found, however, was quite 
different:  
 
At [place name] the detective there was telling us about this – it was 
[president’s name] at the time – and he had just got out for rape and he 
was supposed to be this big time drug dealer… really well organised – 
it was presented like these guys were a well oiled machine and they 
were dealing in every commodity available and they’re trying to take 
over the whole town. I went down there and I think it took two attempts 
to buy a tinnie and they just couldn’t put an ounce together – they tried 
and tried and they couldn’t do it. I could go to [non-member’s name] 
house … and he could have a pound on his doorstep in 5 minutes. 
They [the Mob members] were violent thugs, basically, and that was 
them, they weren’t trying to take over any town [through drug dealing]. 
 
Having interviewed the former undercover agent in late 2005, I questioned 
him about comments made in the New Zealand Herald (18.4.2005) in April of 
that year by the head of the Auckland’s organised crime squad, Detective 
Sergeant Daryl Brazier. Brazier said that 90 percent of drug crime is linked to 
“motorcycle gangs”. The undercover agent said such views were common, 
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and went on to use an example of how information is spread in the police: 
“Where does he – where did he get that from? I was at a drug conference last 
year and this guy – a Taupo detective was telling us that you can’t sell 
cannabis – because of methamphetamine – you can’t sell cannabis in Taupo 
now they’re just giving it away. What bullshit!” He continued on to say that he 
struggled coming out of the undercover programme and back into mainstream 
policing where myths around gangs and their activities were in abundance: 
“This is where I differ from a lot of police, unfortunately. I’m not alone, don’t 
get me wrong, I’m not saying I’m the only one that thinks this”. What makes 
him distinctive is that he has had firsthand experience, yet his views remain in 
the minority. And like many people in small subsets with alternative views, 
their voices are often marginalised, dismissed or subsumed by the majority.  
 
Although blue vision, as part of a sub cultural belief system, is largely confined 
to the police realm, and discussed and affirmed in police bars, conference 
rooms, and training facilities it can, under certain conditions, spread more 
widely. Because of the respect and authority that the police generally enjoy, 
many people accept the knowledge that they impart without question. Either 
directly, or via intermediaries like politicians, the information built up and 
supported by blue vision is then transmitted through the media. In this way, 
the wider public, who, without sufficient information to counter it, begin to see 
the world through the distorted lenses that blue vision provides. In the build up 
to the 1996 election, within the mercurial context of a moral panic, blue vision 
was transferred like a contagion. The police view that gangs dominated profit 
driven crime in New Zealand and were vehicles established for criminal 
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offending, became deeply, and seemingly permanently, ingrained in the 
collective psyche of the country. Blue vision, as it were, became an epidemic, 
the symptoms of which endure to this day. The fundamental change in 
perceptions about the gang issue was so significant as to make it the fourth 
pivot point in New Zealand gang history. 
 
Conclusion 
Previous pivot points in this country’s gang history have occurred because of 
events or activities that have happened within the gang scene. As such, the 
pivot point that occurred in 1996 is unique – deriving as it did from political 
influences. Although this pivot point was clearly linked to gang violence in 
Christchurch and Invercargill, these events were not unprecedented, and 
there is little that gives them great importance to the gang scene, excepting 
that they acted as the spark that set aflame a moral panic; and it was upon 
these developments that the pivot point hinged. Stemming from political 
rhetoric in an important election year, and reliant a police view clouded by 
what I have called blue vision, a wide and encompassing perception of the 
gang scene was created, and the effects of this were manifold.  
 
It will be recalled that during the 1970s and 80s, gangs were seen as 
countercultural or rebellious communities that could be managed, primarily 
through work schemes, and were therefore seen as legitimate, or at least 
semi-legitimate, entities. By the late 1990s, this perception had transformed 
dramatically and gangs were seen as inherently criminal and illegitimate. One 
upshot of this is that when gangs are seen as entities existing solely for 
criminal ends, the fact that they are constructs of social and economic 
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influences tends to be ignored. In turn, therefore, they become not a concern 
of social agencies or policies, but are firmly affixed to the police as an issue of 
law and order. 
 
While it was true that many gangs or individual gang members were involved 
in profit driven crime, the degree to which gangs were seen to dominate such 
activity appears demonstrably incorrect. Moreover, the framing of gangs as 
organised criminal groups tended to mask the reality that the vast majority of 
gangs were not primarily profit driven entities and that they existed for, and 
were sustained by, reasons other than crime. These complexities were lost in 
the generalisations of political rhetoric, and have not been seriously 
challenged since; although certain cracks in this enduring perception of gangs 
– in very recent times – are beginning to appear.  
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  Eleven.	  	  
 
11. The Trials & Challenges of Patched Gangs: 2000- 
 
 
Introduction 
For much of the first decade of the new century, New Zealand’s economy 
enjoyed a boom time. This buoyancy, however, was not reflected in the 
patched gang scene, which faced significant problems. A number of well 
established outlaw clubs folded, and while the patched street gangs fared 
somewhat better, they too faced problems rejuvenating their numbers with 
young members, particularly given the arrival of a new form of street gang in 
New Zealand. 
 
This chapter will examine the problems facing the outlaw motorcycle clubs 
and the patched street gangs, and the numerous and complex nature of the 
problems facing these groups. It will then explore the rise of LA-style street 
gangs and the similarities and difference that exist within this important new 
development within the gang scene. 
 
The Economic Recovery and Political Changes 
By 1999, after nine years in power, National and National-led governments 
had overseen a moderate recovery from the dire economic situation of the 
early 1990s. New Zealand’s unemployment rate had dropped from its double 
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digit peak in 1992 to 7.2 percent by the end of the 20th century (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2000: p.326). Economic growth, however, though buoyant between 
1993 and 1996, stalled through to 1999 (Dalziel & Lattimore, 2004: p.9).  
 
In 1998, the National/New Zealand First coalition government, struggling to 
adjust to the new political environment following the introduction of the MMP 
electoral system, disintegrated and New Zealand First withdrew from the 
coalition agreement. The National Party was able to remain in power until the 
following year’s November election with the support of a number of New 
Zealand First MPs who defected from their party. But the voting public was 
ready for a change and after the election, the Labour and Alliance parties 
were able to form a minority coalition; the first of three governments that 
Labour was to dominate over the next nine years.  
 
Although the economic framework that had been established from 1984 to the 
early 1990s did not substantively change, the successive Labour-led 
governments “became engaged in economic planning to a degree that could 
not have been contemplated during the previous 15 years” (Dalziel & 
Lattimore, 2004: p.vi). Furthermore, led by the highly intelligent but a 
somewhat divisive Prime Minister, Helen Clark, Labour also sought to 
proactively manage social problems such as poverty and educational under-
achievement. It announced a policy of ‘closing the gaps’ that was intended to 
ensure that those sectors of society worst affected by the previous decade’s 
reforms did not continue to be alienated from the country’s success 
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(Humpage, 2002). The government’s approach and its outcomes impacted on 
the gang scene during the new millennium.  
 
During Labour’s reign, New Zealand enjoyed a period of sustained economic 
growth, unprecedented for a generation of younger New Zealanders. The 
Gross Domestic Product increased more than 60 percent between 1999 and 
2008 (Statistics New Zealand, 2008: p.340). The stock market soared, with 
the share price index rising from 1778 in 1999 to 4107 in 2007 (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2008: p.446), and the average house price appreciating in value 
from $183,000 in 1999 to $362,500 in 2006 (Statistics New Zealand, 2002: 
p.478; 2008: p.413). 
 
Reflecting this economic buoyancy, by late 2007, the unemployment rate had 
dropped to 3.6 percent (Statistics New Zealand, 2007). In addition, in 2007 
those deemed to be on ‘low incomes’ – defined as those living on less than 
60% of the median income – were 13 percent of the population, down from 17 
percent in 2004 and 20 percent in 1994 (Ministry of Social Development, 
2008a: p.62). Furthermore, during the period between 2004 and 2007, the 
income of those in low and middle income households grew strongly, while 
the incomes of families in the top 40 percent increased between two and four 
percent only (Ministry of Social Development, 2008a: p.60). The Minister of 
Social Development, Ruth Dyson, said that this was largely due to the 
government’s ‘Working for Families’ package (NZ Herald 29.8.2008), which 
offered ‘tax credits’ to supplement the incomes of working parents. 
(www.workingforfamilies.govt.nz).  
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While much of the population benefited from the economic successes, and 
despite the explicit intent of the Labour government’s policy, some sectors of 
society still remained behind.  Although unemployment in 2008 was at two-
decade lows, Maori and Pacific Peoples remained over-represented in 
unemployment statistics, with rates at 7.7 and 6.5 percent respectively. Some 
communities evinced intergenerational unemployment and were suffering as a 
result of the clustering of state housing communities, discussed in Chapter 
Five. These areas became islands of poverty – unreachable by the economic 
good times – and it was within these communities that significant gang issues 
arose. 
 
Indeed, despite Labour’s efforts, social and economic ‘gaps’ still remained 
between Pakeha, and Maori and Pacific Peoples. Both Polynesian groups 
featured poorly in many key social indices such as health, education, crime 
and overcrowded housing (see for example Harpham, 2004; Lang Consulting, 
2005: pp.26-28; Ministry of Health, 2009: pp.7 & 9; Ministry of Social 
Development, 2008a: pp.23, 27 ,39, 43 & 67; Statistics New Zealand, 2006; 
Tobias & Howden-Chapman, 2000). These indices reflect the inherent 
problems of depressed and marginalised communities, and highlight 
contributing factors to the ‘multiple marginality’ of certain youths, which aid 
gang formation and membership. 
 
Given the severe economic downturn that began in late 2007, following a 
crisis in world financial markets that started in the U.S, the issues facing Maori 
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and Pacific communities seem unlikely to improve in the near future, and in 
fact may be set to become worse. In New Zealand, the consequent recession 
has resulted in a sharp decline in the share market, serious falls in property 
prices, increasing unemployment and large projected government budget 
deficits. But by November 2008, these were not Labour’s problems. Under the 
moderate and populist leadership of John Key, the National Party was 
triumphant at the polls and, supported by a number of smaller parties, formed 
a minority government. 
 
The Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs  
While the booming economy during much of the first decade of the new 
millennium was good for New Zealand generally, it was not so salubrious for 
the outlaw clubs, many of whom failed to refresh their membership with new 
recruits or maintain existing members, and subsequently faltered or folded. 
Although this was evident throughout the country, nowhere was it more 
obvious than in Christchurch, a city that had previously been highly populated 
with outlaw clubs.  
 
Conflicts between Highway 61 and the local chapter of Black Power in 
Christchurch had occurred sporadically throughout much of the 1990s due to 
the close proximity of their clubhouses in the central city. It will be recalled 
that following one clash between the groups, noted in Chapter Eight, Black 
Power member Max Shannon had walked from the Christchurch District Court 
laughing, after witnesses refused to testify against him. However, this was not 
the end of the matter. In the early hours of Sunday 6 August 2000, a relatively 
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insignificant incident outside the Revelations nightclub in the central city 
between Shannon and Highway 61 member Murray Simms re-sparked the 
ongoing conflict.  
 
Highway 61 took exception to the fact that Shannon chose to fight Simms, 
who had previously lost partial use of one arm as a result of a motorcycle 
accident. Later on the morning of the fight, Highway 61 members were 
summoned to their clubhouse on Maces Road in Bromley where they decided 
that retribution was required. The club’s president, Mathew ‘Bomber’ Grant, in 
fact, suggested that someone had to die (R v Grant, Unreported, High Court, 
Christchurch, Chisholm J, August 2001). Detailed retaliatory plans were made 
and it was decided that Max Shannon would be shot while at his rugby league 
training. For the remainder of Sunday, Monday, and much of Tuesday, 
several of the club’s 19-strong membership made preparations; gathering up 
a shotgun, a .38 pistol and ammunition, and stealing a car to use in the 
shooting.  
 
Just after 7.45pm on Tuesday 8 August 2000, Max Shannon, having finished 
training at a sports field in Woolston, got into his car. As he did so, the stolen 
car carrying at least three members of Highway 61 drove past him and 
numerous shots were fired at Shannon as he prepared to drive away, inflicting 
injuries that resulted in his death the following day.  
 
Despite members preparing the clubhouse for Black Power retaliation or ‘back 
up’, it was from within the club that the biggest threat to Highway 61 existed. 
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At the clubhouse after the shooting, Bomber Grant told his members that, “If 
everybody keeps their mouths shut no one will do a big lag” (italics in original) 
(R v Grant, Unreported, High Court, Christchurch, Chisholm J, August 2001). 
Unfortunately for Grant, one of the members, fearing prosecution, broke ranks 
and agreed to testify against those involved80. Five members of the club were 
subsequently charged with murder. Simms, whose initial fight had led to the 
attack, decided to plead guilty to the murder, and three others, including 
Grant, were found guilty by a jury, while another was found not guilty. All of 
the guilty men received mandatory life sentences with minimum parole 
conditions ranging between eleven and 14 years (R v Grant, Unreported, High 
Court, Christchurch, Chisholm J, August 2001). 
 
The convictions were a significant blow to Highway 61 in Christchurch. In the 
mid-1990s, the club had had three chapters in the city, but these were already 
in decline by the time of the Shannon murder. One chapter, situated on 
Vagues Road, had been decimated by police following convictions for drug 
dealing from the clubhouse, which was subsequently confiscated under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act (1991), and the other two chapters had dwindling 
numbers. The remaining members from these chapters had consolidated 
under Grant’s leadership at the Maces Road address. With Grant and four 
others in prison (one, not charged with murder, was jailed for firearms 
                                                
80 It will be recalled from Chapter Nine that the killers of Christopher Crean were brought to justice 
largely due to testimonies given by gang members who turned and give evidence against those 
involved. This situation is rather common, and has led to convictions in numerous other cases. For 
example, Nomad leader Dennis Hines was convicted of attempted murder due to evidence given by his 
former deputy in 1996. A further example involved a member of Highway 61 testifying against 
member Kingston Heemi for killing Nomad associate Malcolm Munns in 1997. Although brotherhood 
is upheld as tantamount within the gangs, self interest often takes precedence when a member’s liberty 
is in danger.  
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offences in relation to the attack on Shannon) and another having left the 
gang in order to testify against his comrades, the club was in tatters and 
eventually the clubhouse was sold.  
 
Although the fall of Highway 61 in Christchurch was punctuated by dramatic 
events, other clubs in the city found themselves arriving at the same end 
point. Along with the three chapters of Highway 61, in the 1990s Christchurch 
had been home to chapters of the Epitaph Riders, Devil’s Henchmen, 
Templars and Road Knights. By 2010, with the exception of the Epitaph 
Riders – which had fewer than six members and no clubhouse – none of 
those clubs remained81. The situation in Christchurch, however, was 
somewhat representative of the decline in the outlaw motorcycle scene 
around the country, with many clubs suffering similar fates.  
 
By 2010, both chapters of the Tyrants (Pahiatua and Levin), the Hastings 
chapter of the Hell’s Angels, the Sinn Fein (Upper Hutt), and at least one 
other chapter of Highway 61 (Auckland) had all folded. The Lost Legion 
(Blenheim) and the ‘Gold Coast’ (Kapati Coast) chapter of the Satan’s Slaves 
have also either closed or appear to be in terminal decline82. Moreover, in 
                                                
81 A renegade group of the Devil’s Henchmen formed in 2008 following the official chapter being 
forcibly closed down by the Timaru chapter – but at time of writing this appears to have folded. 
82 Interestingly, it was the police who almost added to the faltering patched club scene. In late 2005, in 
the publications of both the New Zealand Police Association (Police News December 2005) and the 
International Police Association (Ipagram November 2005), calls were made for the formation of a 
local chapter of the Blue Knights Motorcycle Club. The Blue Knights are just one of several patched 
motorcycle clubs around the world made up of law enforcement officers; with the best known being the 
Wild Pigs (Lavigne, 2004: p.421). But the thought of police forming a club mimicking and similar to 
outlaw motorcycle clubs (Librett, 2008), was galling to officers involved with gangs in New Zealand 
and disquiet was expressed in the Police News (March 2006) The police officer behind the idea, 
Geoffrey Lester, told me in 2009 that he was “overwhelmed” with interest from police officers to join, 
however, he also received correspondence from others that “went to the top of the organisation” 
opposing the club. In the end, Lester decided that it “wasn’t worth the hassle” (pers.comm.).  
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2010, clubs comprising six or so members are considered by many outlaw 
club members and associates to be in reasonable shape, a number that 
would have been considered small just a decade earlier. Using the criteria 
that I outlined in the introduction, a ‘gang’ was defined as having a minimum 
of six members, and therefore one might best view groups falling below this 
number as a gang in ‘recess’; a state from which they could either rise again, 
or, equally likely, disappear. 
 
A Complex Decline 
As has been clear throughout this work, there have been numerous internal 
and external factors that have affected and contributed to the rise and 
development of outlaw clubs and, indeed, gangs generally. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that there are numerous factors contributing toward their 
decline in the new millennium. The individual importance of each factor is 
difficult to assess, but together they have proven damaging to the scene 
generally, and ruinous to many outlaw clubs.  
 
One of the most significant and obvious signs of the problems facing the 
outlaw clubs is the advancing age of most members. As previously outlined, 
since the early 1980s, the outlaw clubs had benefited from the stability and 
loyalty of a longer-term membership base. However, by the end of the 1990s 
and into the new millennium, the clubs were struggling to recruit new and 
younger members; and there are a number of explanations for this. As 
discussed above, by the late 1990s, the New Zealand economy had 
recovered from the difficulties of the early 1990s, and went on a path of 
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tremendous growth through into the mid-2000s. With unemployment among 
Pakeha at record low levels, the pool of rebellious and disaffected Pakeha 
youth, from which many outlaw clubs tended to draw members, was shrinking. 
It is perhaps significant, then, that the Hell’s Angels83, the Tribesmen and the 
Filthy Few, three multi-ethnic outlaw motorcycle clubs, appear to have 
survived best during the new millennium. Although, reflecting the complex 
nature of the overall decline, the same cannot be said for Highway 61, a 
similar group that has gone into a noticeable nationwide decline, although it 
still maintains a number of its North Island chapters and a presence in 
Australia.  
 
But this economically determinist argument requires caution. It will be recalled 
from Chapter Four that the outlaw motorcycle clubs first emerged in New 
Zealand during prosperous times, and therefore the strengthening labour 
market offers only a partial explanation for the scene’s problems.  
 
A further, and, in my view, more significant explanation for the lack of youthful 
rejuvenation stems from broad societal changes in social pursuits and 
fashion. It seems that for many rebellious youth, European and American 
motorcycles no longer held the appeal that they once did, and instead 
modified Japanese cars have become increasingly de rigueur. Termed ‘boy 
racers’, and inspired by overseas media – particularly such American movies 
as the The Fast and the Furious film franchise84 – these motor vehicle thrill 
                                                
83 Despite losing the Hastings chapter the Auckland and Wanganui chapters remain strong. 
84 The Fast and the Furious film series began with a film of the same title, which was released by 
Universal Studios in 2001. The film proved to be a box office hit and spawned four further films, the 
latest of which is due for release in 2011.  
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seekers and/or enthusiasts, in driving through streets en masse, congregating 
together, drinking, and often racing one another, can be seen to be engaging 
in behaviours similar to the milk bar cowboys of the 1950s and 60s, who, it will 
be recalled, were equally inspired by pop cultural influences. The boy racers 
are also causing similar consternation, demonstrating that the problems 
associated with rebellious youthful activities are not solely confined to the 
issue of gangs. Although some cliques appear to exist within the boy racer 
scene, and these are sometimes advertised via specific decals on cars, the 
broad sub culture does not exist in anything other than friendship groups or 
mainstream car clubs that do not conform to the definition of gangs used in 
this thesis; nor are they viewed as gangs by the wider public.  
 
To what degree boy racers have siphoned off potential recruits for outlaw 
clubs is moot, but what is quite clear is that young people are not being 
attracted to join the clubs and that this lack of youthful rejuvenation had a 
significant impact on the outlaw club scene. As the average age of members 
slowly increased, a generation gap was created between existing members 
and wider groups of rebellious young men who might have considered joining. 
In the past, there had been a seemingly limitless of supply of young men 
wanting to join such groups, and because of this, outlaw clubs were not 
accustomed to having to actively seek members. Their failure to respond to 
the changing social market conditions meant that the issues of aging 
membership went unchecked. Moreover, the existing members had 
undergone rigorous prospecting periods – in times of greater competition for 
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patches – and few were willing, to simply let new members join in an ‘easy’ 
way.  
 
Perpetual changes in bellwether factors that help define generations, such as 
in music, fashion, and social activities, as well as a natural affiliation that 
exists between men of similar ages, created something of an age-related 
‘generational barrier’ to membership, and many clubs gradually lost touch with 
youths who in the past may have been drawn to prospect. 
 
By the 2000s, rebellious young males who showed an interest in the clubs 
often found themselves surrounded by a bunch of older men, full of wild 
stories of the past but no longer engaging in the behaviour that created these 
stories. In the previous chapter, I argued that one of the reasons for a 
diminishing number of gang wars in the 1990s was that the country’s gang 
geography had been divided up. But increasingly, another reason for the lack 
of violence between gangs was their aging memberships. Due to the natural 
maturity that tends to come with age, men of 40 or 50 are not as likely to fight 
as men of 20, something supported by age related data of violent offenders 
(Harpham, 2004) and recidivism rates (Spier, 2002). Indeed, I have found that 
older members tend to put a handbrake on youthful members or associates of 
the clubs because they are wary of youthful bravado leading to police 
attention or sparking inter-gang confrontation. Although in certain clubs older 
members may not want to draw police attention because it may interfere with 
illegal money making ventures, it has been my experience that it is usually 
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because they simply cannot be bothered with conflict and, often with families 
of their own, they are more wary of the effects of a long jail sentence.  
 
Somewhat ironically, given that I began this section with the devastating 
effects of violent actions undertaken by Highway 61 members in Christchurch, 
I believe that the lack of physical confrontations between gangs may have 
contributed to their overall decline. In Chapters Four and Six, I discussed the 
importance of conflict in aiding gang cohesion and highlighted how battles 
with police or other gangs create strong group solidarity. It stands to reason, 
then, that when these conflicts are removed, so too is a key driver that helps 
to forge important elements of a gang’s internal dynamics. Without an enemy 
for a sustained period of time – without the mirror upon which to reflect – a 
gang begins to lose some of its sense of self. When an enemy threat is 
present, there is sharpness to the group; weaker members may leave the 
gang during times of conflict but those who remain have an increased 
commitment to the gang, which is therefore strengthened. As the enemy 
threat diminishes, so too, I suspect, does the gang.  
 
A further factor that negatively impacted on the outlaw motorcycle club scene 
relates to the liberalisation of liquor licensing laws that occurred with changes 
to the Sale of Liquor Act (1989). Amongst other things, changes to the law 
allowed for extended opening hours for drinking establishments, including 
provisions sanctioning 24 hour licences. As more pubs and bars were open 
for a greater number of hours, particularly late at night, gang clubhouses were 
no longer the only place open for people to drink late at night or on Sundays 
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and the competition decreased their role as a social hub. Numerous club 
members have told me that this severely impacted on their support base and 
their profitability. Like any social institution, people often beget people, so as 
numbers began to fall away from club houses, this precipitated an even 
steeper decline as the social function that the clubhouse provided to many in 
the community was reduced. This had two related effects; one was that fewer 
people were being introduced to the club, and therefore an important 
recruitment avenue was diminished; the other was that for people who might 
have sought membership, the general lack of atmosphere lessened their 
enthusiasm to join the gang. The important community function of a social hub 
that clubhouses had provided in the past was all but gone. 
 
Moreover, with fewer people having direct connections with the groups, a 
greater number were reliant on media depictions to shape their opinions of the 
outlaw clubs; representations that made people cautious – or outright scared 
– of going to the clubhouses. On several occasions I have been out with gang 
members and we have met people while socialising, but when they are invited 
back to the clubhouse they have balked, fearing violence. In one particular 
instance, I met a man who worked with an outlaw club member and they had 
formed a friendly relationship over a mutual interest in Harley Davidson 
motorcycles. The member invited the workmate to the clubhouse, something 
the man told me he was quite keen to do but was fearful his bike may be 
stolen by the gang. I told him that, in my experiences with the club, his 
motorcycle would likely be safer inside the clubhouse walls than anywhere 
else in the city, and that the club members would not even consider stealing it. 
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But his fear – based on media representations of gangs – was much stronger 
than my assurances. These general, and often unfounded, fears also meant 
that the number of people coming to the club houses further declined, 
shrinking the pool of ‘associates’, and therefore undoubtedly contributed to 
the overall malaise that has affected the outlaw scene.  
 
But perhaps the most significant development to negatively impact on the 
outlaw clubs – and, the gang scene generally – was the rising popularity of a 
smokable form of methamphetamine, commonly referred to in New Zealand 
as ‘P’, which is an abbreviation of ‘pure’. 
 
Methamphetamine or ‘P’ (Part I) 
As noted in Chapter Eight, methamphetamine had been evident within the 
outlaw club scene since the 1980s and had traditionally been ingested by 
nasal insufflation. When intended for ‘snorting’, methamphetamine is often 
mixed or ‘cut’, typically with glucose, which lessens its strength and increases 
the profit margin for dealers. Pure methamphetamine, however, is uncut to 
ensure that it is clean to vaporise when heated, and there are significantly 
greater health problems associated with its use in this form (Topp, 
Degenhardt, Kaye, & Darke, 2002).  
 
Notwithstanding that, moderate (defined as monthly) use of pure 
methamphetamine only slightly increases a person’s chance of suffering 
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some psychotic symptoms85 (Rebecca McKetin, Hickey, Devlin, & Lawrence, 
2010). Habitual use, however, not only increases these health risks but can 
also led to addiction; and those who withdraw from the drug incur moderate 
depressive and psychotic symptoms for around a week and a ‘craving’ that 
can persist for more than a month (Zorick et al., 2010). Furthermore, the purity 
of P means that the cost of the drug is high. Priced at more than $100 for a 
‘point’ (one tenth of a gram), habitual P users can quickly be faced with 
significant financial costs.  
 
Although it can be liquefied and delivered intravenously, the use of needles in 
the patched gang scene was universally banned by the early 1980s, as 
discussed in Chapter Eight.  P, therefore, is usually smoked using a glass 
pipe and, to a lesser degree, snorted. Although smoking P may be associated 
with less severe dependence than injecting it, both means of taking the drug 
result in similar levels of other harms (Rebecca  McKetin et al., 2008). This 
may be in part be due to the fact that those who smoke the drug tend to use 
more of it than those preferring other forms of delivery (Kinner & Degenhardt, 
2008; Rebecca  McKetin et al., 2008). Anecdotally, at least, this appears to be 
the case in the gang scene and, from my observations, members who ‘burn’ P 
are typically heavier users than those who snort it. In speaking with numerous 
members, it is clear that the sociable nature of passing around a pipe and the 
inoffensive vapour produced by P makes it easy and enjoyable for members 
to consume together; and over time this meant that the means of taking the 
drug became as important as the ends (the drug’s effect). For example, 
                                                
85 Such as delusional moods, grandiose delusions, delusions of control, delusions of persecution, or 
hallucinations 
599 
 
instead of using a line of two of speed to gain the energy to make it through a 
long night’s activities, smoking P often becomes the focus of an evening, and 
therefore consumption of the drug is increased.  
 
Certainly, habitual use became widespread within the scene and 
consequently problems, both social/psychological and financial, became 
common. I witnessed numerous outlaw clubs become concerned by the 
behaviour and reliability of members who had become ‘fried’ through P usage, 
and a number of clubs banned smoking P – although many still allowed 
snorting it; evincing a common belief, based on the results of collective 
experimentation and observation, that smoking the drug is at the root of the 
problem rather than the drug itself.  
 
In Chapter Eight I argued that the organisational structure adopted by New 
Zealand gangs meant that they were able to identify risks and mitigate them. 
Yet, despite this, P was largely not identified as great concern nor rapidly 
addressed by most. I believe there are at least two reasons for this. The first 
reason is that the drug itself was not new. As mentioned above, 
methamphetamine ingested via the nose had been used by some outlaw 
clubs since at least the 1980s and had apparently not caused significant 
problems. Adding to this, the fact that P was smoked – like marijuana – added 
a familiar element to the drug, and passing around a pipe became a sociable 
group activity. The second reason the drug took hold in many groups is that it 
was only identified as a problem after a period in which the drug was widely 
used, by which time many members were habitual users, and psychologically 
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or physically addicted to the drug, and therefore were unwilling or unable to 
give it up. In many gangs, this meant that there was insufficient support 
amongst members for a ban. Certainly it appears that banning it quickly was 
the key. Without exception, the groups that I have observed that did not ban 
the smoking of P have been the ones to suffer the most significant declines.  
 
In one outlaw club that I have had significant dealings with throughout my 
research, the effect of P was dramatic. The substantial financial cost involved 
in using P habitually forced members into debt – to both the club and to 
outsiders. Although certain members were dealing the drug, the trade only 
supported its use; and before long it failed to do even that. One member could 
not afford the payments on his motorcycle and it was repossessed, two others 
sold their bikes to pay for their habit. Another member suffered a mental 
breakdown and was committed to a psychiatric hospital for several months. 
All four were expelled from the gang due to outcomes associated with the use 
of P, but the drug was still tolerated because key members among the 
dwindling group still used it and were unwilling to give it up.  
 
In the ever shrinking outlaw motorcycle club chapter, the loss of four members 
was significant, and the situation was compounded when the remaining 
members, becoming demoralised, began to forego their rostered nights on 
duty at the clubhouse, which meant that associates were unable to access the 
clubhouse or the bar. Therefore support for the club – offered by an already 
meagre group of core associates – waned further, almost becoming non-
existent. The formal weekly club meetings began to start later and later as 
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members were not turning up on time, if at all. Eventually the meetings 
stopped altogether. Soon after, the club was failing to pay its power, 
telephone and pay-television bills.  
 
Within the five years that I closely associated with the chapter, which had 
more than a 30 year history, it had transformed from a strong and committed 
group, to a disparate, unmotivated one. During that time, membership 
dropped from around a dozen to finally just three members, and eventually it 
collapsed and dissolved. Given numerous other factors described above, P 
cannot be totally blamed for the fall of the club, but in this case, without a 
doubt, it played a primary role.  
 
The problems facing outlaw clubs in New Zealand, then, are many. Indeed, 
the complexities involved in the decline of the scene appear as many and 
varied as those involved in their rise. In fact, the outlaw club scene in New 
Zealand at the end of the first decade of the new millennium was weaker than 
it has been at any time since the formation of such groups in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. But despite the rapid and obvious contractions of outlaw 
clubs and outlaw club members, it is unlikely that such groups will vanish 
altogether; at least not in the foreseeable future.  
 
Signs of Life 
Although P may yet claim more clubs, many of the remaining groups have 
banned smoking the drug and thus have nullified a significant threat. Indeed, 
many of the clubs that have banned smoking P remain in relatively strong 
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positions. For example, The Devil’s Henchmen in Timaru, the Mothers in 
Palmerston North, the Hell’s Angels in Wanganui and Auckland, and the Head 
Hunters ‘East’ Auckland chapter86 are showing no signs of collapse. 
Moreover, many clubs are beginning to recognise the difficulties they are 
facing, and some may begin to take measures to proactively recruit new 
members. Exactly what form this will take is difficult to predict, particularly 
given that many of the factors negatively affecting them are beyond their 
control.  
 
Through the fall of numerous outlaw clubs, however, a natural equilibrium 
may be achieved; in effect, balancing supply and demand with fewer clubs 
servicing a smaller pool of prospective members. In this way, the outlaw club 
scene may consolidate around the surviving clubs. Moreover, the Hell’s 
Angels in April 2009 gave the scene a potentially significant green shoot by 
forming a new club in the city of Nelson called the Red Devils. The Red Devils 
is an alliance of motorcycle clubs around the world that support the Hell’s 
Angels. But whether or not this new club evinces new life within the scene or 
proves to be a false dawn, may be dependent on the ability of the outlaw 
clubs generally to engage a younger membership.  
 
While it is conceivable that the recently deteriorating economy may bolster 
some clubs by providing a greater number of disenfranchised people, unless 
the unpredictable pendulum of fashion swings back and the motorcycle finds 
                                                
86 This Head Hunter chapter, under the leadership of Wayne Doyle, is one that is growing considerably 
in member number and community function, running events like boxing/kick boxing ‘Fight Nights’, 
one of which I have attended and I found incredibly professional and impressive. The chapter also has 
a large gym that is open to the community. It is important to note, however, that as outlined in Chapter 
Five, the Head Hunters are something of a crossover between an outlaw club and a patched street gang. 
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a resurgent market among rebellious youth, the heyday of the outlaw clubs in 
New Zealand appears to be over. 
 
The Patched Street Gangs 
Many of the problems faced by the outlaw clubs in the 2000s were also being 
experienced by the patched street gangs, and consequently I will draw on 
many of the arguments I have used in the section above.  Once again, it is an 
incident in the city of Christchurch that helps illuminate issues relating to the 
scene.  
 
Early in the first decade of the new millennium, a Mongrel Mob ‘Aotearoa’ 
chapter was established in the Christchurch suburb of Phillipstown. The 
chapter members transformed an old villa into the gang’s clubhouse. Typical 
of all gang clubhouses, the property became the hub for the Mongrel Mob 
members and their associates to meet and party, but atypical of clubhouses in 
the 2000s, the gang pad also became a ‘tinnie house’, or what were later 
renamed ‘drug dealing houses’.87 
 
Police attention became focused on the gang when an internal feud erupted 
after one member of the Aotearoa chapter was expelled from the gang, but 
was then re-patched as a member of the ‘Notorious’ chapter, a largely North 
Island-based chapter of the of the same gang, and subsequently attempted to 
get members from his old chapter to join the new one. During investigations 
                                                
87 To better reflect the fact that a greater assortment of illicit drug were being sold from ‘tinnie houses’, 
police began to call such places ‘drug dealing houses’(Organised & Financial Crime Agency New 
Zealand, 2010: p.9). Despite cannabis remaining the primary drug of for distribution, I believe to be a 
better and more accurate description. 
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into violence between the established and new chapters of the Mob, police 
became alerted to the telltale sign of numerous short-term visitors to the 
Aotearoa Mongrel Mob’s address on Wilsons Road and launched Operation 
Crusade – the name taken from the region’s ‘Canterbury Crusaders’ rugby 
team, whose home stadium was situated a short distance from the clubhouse. 
The gang’s drug dealing was brash, perhaps best highlighted by the note I 
saw that was pinned inside the gate to advertise the price of one tinnie, “$25 
or Fuck Off”.  
 
The police officer in charge of the operation, Detective Sergeant Ross 
Tarawhiti, told me in 2009 that the investigation began in late July 2002, and 
ran for 14 months before being terminated in early September 2003. During 
the operation, police officers purchased drugs, installed wire taps and bugs, 
and took surveillance photographs in order to gather sufficient evidence to 
charge all of the members of the gang and numerous associates with various 
offences. The resulting trial appears to be New Zealand’s largest criminal 
case, in terms of the number of defendants; 18 were tried at one time.  
 
The trial lasted four weeks, and 15 of the defendants – including all of the 
chapter’s 13 members – were found guilty of conspiracy to sell cannabis, 
along with a range of other crimes that came to light during the police 
investigation, notably firearms and violent offences. The guilty parties were 
sentenced to between eight months and four-and-a-half years imprisonment, 
depending on the degree of involvement (R v Beattie, Unreported, High Court, 
Christchurch, Panckhurst J, November 2004).  
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The Mongrel Mob’s activities in Christchurch are important when considering 
certain issues relating to gang involvement in organised criminal activity, as 
well as issues relating to law enforcement of such groups, both of which will 
be discussed in the following chapter. But for now I will examine three issues 
relating to this case study and demonstrate how these reflect issues facing 
the patched gang scene generally. The first of these issues is the loss of the 
gang’s clubhouse, the second is the age of those members convicted 
following Operation Crusade, and the final issue to consider is the effect this 
bust had on the Mongrel Mob. 
 
Following the arrests of the Aotearoa Mob chapter in Christchurch, the rented 
villa in Philipstown became a pad without a gang to occupy it and it was 
subsequently pulled down by the owner, becoming a vacant lot88. Similarly 
around the country, formal clubhouses were disappearing from the patched 
gang scene. On a tour around the North Island with a Mob member in 2004, I 
came across numerous towns and cities where the gang had left, or been 
evicted from, properties that had served as gang pads (three of them, 
following eviction, were burnt out by the gang). Similarly, three chapters of the 
                                                
88 Interesting to note, Operation Crusade (although only temporarily) led to the near eradication of the 
Mongrel Mob in Christchurch further cleared the gang scene in that city. As outlined above, outlaw 
clubs had virtually disappeared from Christchurch, yet despite various claims, such as those noted in 
Chapter Nine surrounding the relationship between gangs and criminal offending, little had actually 
changed. Crime statistics – specifically, statistics recorded for ‘drugs and anti social’ offences and 
‘violence’ offences, two grouping synonymous with gangs – appear to have been affected little. In the 
Canterbury District, an area dominated by Christchurch, drug and anti social offences increased from 
4,474 in 1999 to 6,053 in 2008, while offences of violence increased from 4,148 to 5,285 (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2009a). One can see from the data that the disappearance of most of Christchurch’s 
patched gangs had failed to reduce incidences of these crimes, in fact, instances of these crimes 
actually increased. Although these data offer a broad picture only, they support the notion that even if 
all gangs were to vanish, the social problems associated with them – like crime – are unlikely to be 
affected in meaningful ways. 
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Black Power chapter (in Christchurch, Wellington, and Hawkes Bay), with 
whom I had dealings, are all without formal clubhouses. These changes were 
also evident to police, as reflected by the Police Association which in 2009 
said that “to a very large extent” the traditional clubhouse “is very much a 
phenomenon of the past” particularly in urban centres (New Zealand Police 
Association, 2009: p.7). Although the Police Association attributed this 
regressive development to gangs pursuing a lower profile due to moves into 
organised criminal activity, in reality the situation is less deliberate and more 
complex. As with outlaw clubs, and outlined above, the niche social function 
performed by the street gang clubhouse was reduced, in part, by Liquor 
Licensing Act of 1989 (with a greater array of competing drinking 
establishments available in the cities). Moreover, greater demands from 
families as members matured meant many clubhouses lost their centrality. In 
many instances, leases expired on rental properties and another venue was 
never sourced, or the gangs simply failed to make payments and they were 
evicted. Other times, as happened with the Mongrel Mob in Christchurch, an 
event impacted the group to such a degree that the clubhouse was no longer 
viable. In my view, the loss of clubhouses evinces a wider weakness and 
decline within the setting generally, and one that may in fact exacerbate this 
decline by removing, what has hitherto been, a key component of the patched 
gang existence. 
 
This is particularly relevant given that the Black Power and the Mongrel Mob 
were also facing recruitment issues. Of those convicted following Operation 
Crusade, the youngest was 26 years old, and most were over 40. Like the 
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outlaw clubs, the patched street gangs were creating generational barriers to 
new members and a greater maturity is evident in many of these gangs, 
which, as I argued in relation to outlaw clubs, can result in fewer violent 
incidents.  Following the Highway 61 killing of Black Power member, Max 
Shannon, outlined above, senior Black Power member Shane ‘Baldy’ Turner 
appealed for calm, saying that anyone seeking vengeance should think of 
their families: “My concern is the women and children. Your kids come first, so 
if a leader wants to drag their families or kids through a war…it’s not good for 
them” (The Press 18.8.2000). As Turner explained to me, it was not like it was 
in the “old days” and there is greater effort to avoid war, whereas in the past 
“we looked for any excuse [to engage in violence]”89. Although I have found 
the large patched street gangs – particularly the Mongrel Mob – prone to 
violence (at large functions that I have attended, it is rare  that there is not one 
or more fights between members or attacks on prospects), the lack of large 
scale wars between the groups is further testimony to the influence of the 
maturing membership. 
 
A combination of this increasing restraint, or age-related inertia, and a drive 
toward more family-orientated approaches that I have observed among 
numerous chapters of the patched street gangs, has helped fortify 
generational barriers to these traditional gangs and, unintentionally, created a 
niche market for a youthful new form of ‘LA-style’ gang. This development is 
                                                
89 Clearly Turner’s attitudes have changed over time as he was actually the instigator of a dramatic 
gang battle in Christchurch’s Cathedral Square in 1980, which resulted in a Black Power member being 
hit on the back of the head with a small axe; an incident caught on film. A series of stills were 
reproduced in a book by Ray Comfort (1980). 
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potentially so critical to the street gang scene that I will investigate it further in 
a discrete section below.  
 
But while youthful recruitment appears to be a significant issue, and many 
chapters of the large patched street gangs have contracted, overall they seem 
to have maintained their existing membership far better than their motorcycle 
equivalents; and there are a number of reasons for this.  
 
The incarceration of the Mongrel Mob chapter in Christchurch would have 
likely been enough to destroy a smaller gang or most outlaw motorcycle 
clubs, but the size of the Mongrel Mob meant that it had no discernable 
impact on the nationwide group. The large street gangs have been able to 
survive in part due to their sheer weight of numbers, and as such, negative 
influences on them have been less obvious than on the smaller outlaw clubs. 
If a group falls away in one place, members from other regions can bolster it, 
or remaining members can move to join another chapter. Moreover,  large 
contingents of members of these gangs in prison means that attachments and 
associations remain strong – and are indeed beneficial given the realities of 
‘might makes right’ that exist in prison life – during periods of incarceration. 
 
Furthermore, although the economy strengthened throughout the 1990s, the 
economic benefits did not impact to the same extent on Maori and Pacific 
communities, from which the patched street gangs have tended to attract 
members, meaning these gangs were not as threatened by reducing recruits 
or the loss of members to mainstream society. As outlined in Chapter Ten, a 
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survey of Mongrel Mob members from the mid-1990s showed how 
significantly they had become divorced from the legitimate workforce, and 
while no similar survey has been undertaken since, one can reasonably 
assert, from anecdotal evidence alone, that this separation has only increased 
in the new century, making integration back into mainstream life near 
impossible. 
 
But while macro economic factors have certainly played a part in this social 
isolation, its entrenchment has been solidified by member commitment to 
gang life. And it is within that we may find a further explanation as to why 
patched street gangs have better maintained member numbers. As variously 
outlined throughout this work, member allegiance to gangs is strong across 
the board, but within the patched street gangs commitment has often been 
made patently, and permanently, obvious via facial tattoos of gang or gang-
related insignia. Through interviewing early patched gang members, I have 
traced the origins of gang related facial tattoos to the country’s prisons in the 
early 1980s, and I suggest they have obvious implications for members who 
might consider leaving the gang; acting as they do as a powerful means of 
social control.  
 
One policy used in New Zealand prisons to inhibit the threat of gang violence 
during the influx of gang prison numbers during the 1970s and 1980s was the 
banning of wearing or displaying gang related insignia (Meek, 1992: p.270). 
Although prison guards could confiscate gang drawings and the like, tattoos 
were impossible to regulate.  
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The genesis of these facial tattoos appears to come from a jailhouse 
subculture, and they were not initially gang related. In what can be seen as 
secondary deviation (Lemert, 1951) and, quite literally, an exercise in self 
labelling, some incarcerated men began to imprint dots or stars below the 
outside edges of their eyes to represent their time in jail; something that 
criminologist Greg Newbold (2010 pers. comm.) believes has occurred since 
as early as the 1960s. As gang members began became a significant part of 
the prison muster a decade later, many followed suit. By early 1980s these 
tattoos became larger, more obvious, and gang specific. One such inmate to 
mark his face in this way was Mongrel Mob member, Dennis Makalio. Makalio 
was sent to Paremoremo in the early 1980s after attacking two police officers 
in the gang’s Porirua clubhouse. He told me: 
 
Ahhhh, they came in waving their fuckin’ batons like Starski and fuckin’ 
Hutch. I thought, fuck that! [So] the gates were closed and I switched 
off the lights. Well, I fucked them, punched and kicked them, burnt 
them with cigarettes and all that. The cunts were…bleeding like fuckin’ 
pigs. 
 
The crime was such that Makalio was sent to the New Zealand’s maximum 
security prison at Paremoremo, where he was among long term inmates. 
While there, Makalio marked his face with prison tattoos, 
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But they [the small facial tattoos] represented jail, eh? I thought what 
the fuck am I representing jail for when I represent the Mongrel Mob? 
So I fuckin’ did that (pointing to the word ‘Mobster’ tattooed on his 
forehead). 
 
It was an extraordinary way to express commitment to the gang, and one that 
quickly became common among the Mongrel Mob’s membership. Facial 
tattooing, with words like ‘Mongrel’, ‘Mobster’, or ‘Mob’ and/or incorporating 
the gang’s bulldog motif, in many instances grew to cover the face in what the 
gang calls ‘masks’. Many members of Black Power too began to mark their 
faces with motifs representing their gang. As an example, of the four 
members convicted of the murder of Christopher Crean, an event discussed 
in Chapter Eight, just one did not bear gang related facial tattoos.  
 
In 2006, I asked Makalio how he knows when a prospect is ready to be a full 
patched member. With an explicit understanding of the power of facial tattoos, 
he replied, “Give me his face”. But such tattoos do not just exemplify a 
tremendous degree of loyalty to the gang; I argue that they also work as a 
powerful form of social control. Once a member is marked in such a visible 
and permanent manner, his ties to the gang become that much harder to 
break and, as such, the tattoos work to place limits on a member’s thoughts of 
leaving the gang. Even if membership is severed, a man with such tattoos is 
always going to be perceived as a member by the public, and by opposition 
groups, yet he will lack the social and physical support offered by 
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membership. In this way, these tattoos may have helped to maintain numbers 
in Black Power and the Mongrel Mob during the first decade of the 2000s.  
 
Methamphetamine or ‘P’ (Part II) 
Like the outlaw clubs, however, the patched street gangs are struggling with 
the effects of members smoking P. Reflecting the growing popularity of 
methamphetamine use by the end of the 1990s, an updated version of Black 
Power’s national rules taken from a meeting held in Auckland in January 
1999, states that the outlawing of “Hard drugs” is “Deleted”, undoubtedly 
reflecting the popularity, and potential profitability, of methamphetamine. By 
the mid-2000s, however, many Black Power chapters were beginning to 
rethink the decision. I am aware that chapters in Auckland and Hawkes Bay 
have since banned members from smoking P. One Black Power leader from 
Hawkes Bay, Mane Adams, told me in 2003 that because its use is so 
widespread amongst members, it is difficult to ban it at the national level. He 
said that the general feeling is that it’s “not desirable, but that if you are using 
it you are still my brother, but don't do it in my area [where it’s banned] or in 
my face”. Christchurch Black Power president, Shane ‘Baldy’ Turner, told me 
in 2005 that his chapter has banned it, though the ban seems to operate on 
the principle of ‘out of sight, out of mind’:  “Well, it’s banned in my club, 
anyway. If you want to do it and you’re in my group then good luck, that’s all 
we say, good luck but we don’t want to see you around as long as you’re 
doing it”.  
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The Mongrel Mob appears similarly conflicted. The Notorious chapter has 
publicly scorned P, and in association with the Salvation Army is attempting to 
get its members off the drug (NZ Herald 2.10.1010). The Notorious president, 
Roy Dunne believes that up to 80 percent of the gang was addicted to the 
drug, and he links the deaths of 12 of his members to its use (ibid). 
 
But banning the drug is not easy and how strictly any ban is enforced is 
difficult to gauge. For example, a member of the Mob with whom I have had 
significant associations strongly advocates the drug’s ban, but on two 
occasions while he was under the influence of alcohol, I saw him use it. Within 
many chapters of the large street gangs, the drug’s use has become so 
prevalent that to ban it would mean splitting the gangs into two groups, users 
and non-users. At this stage, at least, its use is tolerated to keep the gangs 
together; an ironic situation given that in many instances, such as those 
outlined above in relation to certain outlaw clubs, P is doing significant 
damage to gangs; making members who habitually use the substance 
unreliable and more committed to the drug than to the gang.  
 
The problems that P is creating within the gang scene are not going unnoticed 
by the police. Gang intelligence officer, Senior Constable Mike Watkins told 
me in 2006, “If I could take credit for introducing P into the gang scene, I 
would. It’s done more damage to the gangs than we ever have”. Despite the 
gangs being linked to the drug’s production and distribution, with few 
exceptions I would argue that overall gangs and gang members are victims of 
the drug rather than benefactors of it.  
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Since the mid-2000s, social worker and life member of Black Power, Denis 
O’Reilly has taken up the anti-P cause and runs a national project called, 
Mokai Whanau Ora, which seeks to engage both Mongrel Mob and Black 
Power leadership in an effort to educate them away from the drug’s use and  
trade (O'Reilly, 2005). O’Reilly told me that it is a “struggle” and that within the 
large street gangs, “We wax and wane a bit according to availability and the 
addiction level of leaders but the trend is, I think, downward and away from 
P”. As noted in Chapter Eight, gangs have previously banned the use of 
heroin, and it is likely that such a ban around the smoking of P will eventuate 
due to the increasing awareness of its detrimental effects, but this will only 
occur if – perhaps when – the drug fades from popularity and the ratio of 
users versus non-users shifts so that the non-users are able to enforce 
prohibition.  
 
Small Gains 
As noted earlier, the problems facing the patched street gangs have not had 
as devastating an impact as they have had on the outlaw clubs, and in certain 
instances, Black Power and the Mongrel Mob have benefited from the decline 
in the outlaw motorcycle club scene. One town where this has been 
particularly evident is in Timaru, formerly a stronghold of two outlaw 
motorcycle clubs. After the establishment of the Devil’s Henchmen and Road 
Knights chapters in Timaru in the late 1970s, no other patched gangs 
attempted to move into the territory for 30 years. However, by the mid-2000s, 
both Black Power and the Mongrel Mob had chapters there; the shrinking size 
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and changing internal dynamics of the Devil’s Henchmen and Road Knights 
chapters has meant that neither chapter is willing to engage in a territorial war 
to protect their turf from new arrivals. Similarly, the Mongrel Mob now has a 
presence in Blenheim – a town that used to be the exclusive territory of the 
Lone Legion, and which they had successfully defended against other groups 
until their apparent collapse in recent times. In Invercargill during June 2006, 
a fire lit by members of a new Mongrel Mob chapter, who also stole and 
destroyed at least two of the Road Knights’ motorcycles, gutted the Road 
Knights’ clubhouse (Southland Times 20.6.2008). Retribution by the Road 
Knights does not appear to have been forthcoming.  
 
But despite these small gains, overall the patched street gang scene is far 
from flourishing, and while the struggling economy of recent times may offer 
them support, perhaps their greatest challenge comes from youthful 
competition via the emergence of LA-style street gangs, which are a surging 
and potentially critical new development in New Zealand’s gang scene. 
 
LA-style Street Gangs – A look at the Future? 
Since their inception in the early 1970s, patched gangs have almost 
exclusively dominated the New Zealand street gang domain. But during the 
1990s, another form of gang was quietly emerging as a threat to patched 
dominance, one which will arguably shape the future of gangs in this country. 
In 1990, a small article in The New Zealand Herald (23.5.1990), reported 
concerns about a group of youths in South Auckland who were wearing 
“colours” (bandanas) and dressing like “violent American street gangs”, and 
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calling themselves the ‘Tongan Crip Gang’ or ‘TCG’. This form of gang was so 
unfamiliar to New Zealand that the media source incorrectly spelt ‘Crip’ as 
‘Crypt’. Using knowledge that reflected the rather homogenous – that being 
patch wearing – nature of New Zealand’s gang scene, police told the Herald 
that they were not a “gang” and were “nothing more than five teenage thugs” 
(ibid). While that may have been true at the time, within a decade of so, by the 
mid-2000s, these groups had grown in size and in number and may represent 
the future of New Zealand’s gang scene. 
 
Crip gangs are one half of a predominately African-American gang 
phenomenon. With their counterpart rivals, the Bloods, these two groups were 
initially formed in the city of Los Angeles in the 1970s, but, driven significantly 
by popular cultural influences, soon spread throughout America and much of 
the world; (Covey, 2003; Germet, 2001; Gruter & Versteegh, 2001; Hagedorn, 
1999, 2005b). Increasingly throughout the 1990s, these influences became 
obvious in New Zealand, and these LA-style street gangs became 
increasingly prominent (see Eggleston, 2000).  
 
The trends becoming obvious among youth in New Zealand in the 1990s and 
2000s were a reflection of a modern vogue coming out of America, based on 
hip-hop and rap music. As Covey states, “One only needs to walk through any 
major city to hear the pervasive influence of ‘gangster rap’ and hip hop music 
that promotes the street gang lifestyle” (Covey, 2003: p.30). Hip-hop is seen 
as a wider cultural trend within the context of poor African-American 
communities and includes speech patterns, ‘Mcing’, ‘Djing’, graffiti, dance, 
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ideals and music (Richardson & Scott, 2002). Rap music is a part of hip-hop 
culture and this type of music is supported by an enormous multi-million dollar 
industry. In 2000, for example, rap music is believed to have generated 
U.S.$1.8b in sales (Rose, 2001: p.22). 
 
‘Gangsta rap’, one particular type of rap music, consistently contains violent 
lyrics, as well as misogynous themes and hypermaterialism (Ro, 1996). The 
behaviour of some of its artists has attracted significant publicity. Numerous 
celebrated rap artists have participated in gang violence and some have been 
killed, most famously Tupak Shakur and Christopher ‘Biggie Smalls’ Wallace 
in 1996 and 1997 respectively (Kathy Scott, 2000). 
 
That rap music often equates violence to masculinity and problem solving 
(Ro, 1996) is significant. Glamorised violence and an emphasis on 
ostentatious wealth – typically, achieved via crime – is a potential driver of 
New Zealand’s developing youth gang culture; and something that sets apart 
these gangs from the early formation of the traditional patched street gangs; a 
point to which I will return. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of music and music videos, a further influence 
came about from Hollywood interpretations of gangs including the film Colors 
released in America in 1988 and followed three years later by Boyz n the 
Hood. Eggleston (Eggleston, 2000: p.160) reported that early members of 
these new gangs in New Zealand linked the rise of Crips and Bloods in this 
country to the film Colors. 
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Referring to this type of emerging youth gang in New Zealand in the late 
1990s, Eggleston believes that the Americanisation of New Zealand has been 
increasingly influential on this country’s youth. He sees the new “gangsta” 
style being mimicked by these groups as a feature that demarcates them from 
the existing “more established” New Zealand gangs (Eggleston, 2000: pp.149 
& 160). Be this as it may, as has been shown in the early parts of this thesis, 
New Zealand’s traditional gangs also had their genesis in American culture, 
both via the youth movements of the 1950s and later, and more significantly, 
through the Hell’s Angels in the 1960s.  
 
Despite these incipient gangs attracting some media concern during the 
1990s and the first half of the 2000s, it was in 2006 that they became seen as 
a significant and pressing problem. Following one killing in October 2005, 
there were a further nine deaths related to or associated with LA-style street 
gang violence in wider Auckland in 2006 (NZ Herald 11.9.2007). Street 
violence was an ongoing problem in many areas of Auckland, and while the 
close timing of the killings seemed to suggest otherwise, the killings did not 
necessarily reflect a dramatic rise in overall youth gang activity. Just two of 
the deaths were the result of a premeditated intent to kill, with the others 
being, as one South Auckland police officer told me in 2009, “the 
consequence of booze and bad luck”. Be this as it may, the fact that the 
victims or perpetrators were all LA-style gang member, drew focus on these 
new gangs. 
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As will become clear, the spate of deaths sharpened media and public focus 
on this new type of gang, particularly in South Auckland where eight of the ten 
killings took place. The media drew public attention to gangs hitherto unknown 
to most New Zealanders with names like the ‘Juvanyle Crip Boys’ or ‘JCBs’, 
the ‘Motherfucker Ruthless Cunts’ or MRCs, and the ‘Penion Drive Boys’ or 
‘PDBs’. Using the definitions that I have devised, these groups are clearly 
‘incipient gangs’. In the same way as the youth gangs of the 1950s and 
1960s, and the skinhead groups of the 1980s, the vast majority of these new 
formations appear to have little or no organisational structure and they form 
and dissolve rather quickly. 
 
It is clear that some of these groups have connections to established patched 
gangs (Ministry of Social Development, 2008b) and their colours reflect this; 
Those groups associated – through familial ties, social contacts, or simply 
because they share the same neighbourhood – with Black Power wear blue, 
and those with connections to the Mongrel Mob wear red. These are, 
interestingly, the same colours used by the American Crips and Bloods 
respectively. 
 
Perhaps the most evolved LA-style gang is the Killer Beez. The Killer Beez 
were founded in Otara, South Auckland, around 2003, under the leadership of 
Josh Marsters, a member of the predominately Maori and Pacific Island 
outlaw motorcycle club, the Tribesmen (New Zealand Police, 2006: p.14). The 
direct and active involvement of a well established adult gang member – 
Masters turned 30 in 2008 – meant that the group was formed under adult 
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supervision and was not, to use Thrasher (1927), a typical unsupervised ‘play 
group’ that often typifies earlier gang formation. Furthermore, Marsters was an 
impressive figure, and combined with his hard man reputation, earned on the 
street and in the kickboxing ring90, his appeal for many wannabe youths is 
rather obvious. 
 
The gang, with their yellow colours91 reflecting those of the Tribesmen, 
flourished and grew quickly, becoming the most widely known LA-style street 
gang in the country. Their growing profile was aided by media that focused 
heavily on such groups in the wake of the 2006 spate of killings , and such 
groups sprung up around the country, similar to the way that the Mongrel Mob 
spread in the early 1970s. As Inspector Jason Hewett, of the South Auckland 
police, told me in 2009, “If you wanted to join a gang at that time which would 
you join? The Killer Beez – they were everywhere [in the media] at the time” 
(pers. comm.).  
 
But, with a remarkable – and atypical – degree of organisational ability, the 
gang in South Auckland was also creating its own media. Mirroring the links 
seen in the U.S. between street gangs and the rap music scene, in 2007 the 
Killer Beez established a recording studio and formed a record label, 
Colourway Records. The following year they released an album ‘Skull Fingers 
Up’. Like the title, the music videos are clearly linked to the gang – one song 
Put Your Colours On, upholds the theme of gang representation and 
                                                
90 Marsters has held the WKBF heavyweight title. 
91 Initially the group designed a back patch, one of which I have seen, but they have since taken up the 
usual form of LA-style street gang identification of bandanas, and hand signals. The centre motif of the 
original back patch – a skulled hand pulling the ‘finger’ – is still used on t-shirts and other items, 
including tattoos, used to represent the gang; and this was latter augmented with the $ symbol. 
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numerous gang members appear in it. By early 2009, the video had nearly 
400,000 hits on the internet video networking site YouTube 
(www.youtube.com). As a further salute to U.S. developments, that being the 
East Coast-West Coast record label feud92, at least one the albums songs 
featured a ‘diss’ track, which attacked pioneer New Zealand hip-hop label 
Dawn Raid. Unlike the traditional patched gangs, the likes of the Killer Beez 
were attuned to, and reflected, current trends and were therefore more 
relevant and appealing to youth. 
 
In the poor areas of South Auckland, the Killer Beez offered a distinct function 
for members to fulfil the dream of mimicking the gangster life styles portrayed 
by their U.S. counterparts. In February 2008, Marsters told the daily current 
affairs programme, Campbell Live (15.2.2008), that,  “As Killer Beez, we’re 
standing up and saying, if you’re not going to give us the options, we’re going 
to create options for ourselves”. As will become clear in the following chapter, 
the opportunities available to many youth in South Auckland were limited, but 
music was not the only available option to obtain the desired ‘ghetto bling’ 
lifestyle. Despite Marsters’ explicit denial during the Campbell Live interview 
that he or his gang were involved in the illicit trade, it was to be drug offending 
that would bring the Killer Beez to nationwide attention just three months after 
that interview took place. 
 
In May of 2008, numerous members and associates of the Killer Beez, 
including leader Josh Marsters, were arrested on drugs charges, and police 
                                                
92 In the mid-1990s, Death Row Records and Bad Boy Records were locked in a public hip-hop/gang 
war. The two most prominent casualties – one from each side – of this conflict were Tupak Shakur and 
Biggie Smalls, mentioned earlier. 
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raids on several properties in the South Auckland suburbs of Otara and 
Papatoetoe uncovered $200,000 in cash and an estimated $500,000 worth of 
P (NZ Herald 6.5.2008). Detective Sergeant Ross Ellwood of the Counties 
Manukau police said the arrests had “taken the core out of the gang. All the 
Killer Beez leaders are gone. Some are in custody, some are out on bail but 
are on very strict bail conditions,” (Herald on Sunday 21.12.2008). 
Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter Six, prison sometimes has the effect of 
solidifying gang membership rather than breaking it down. Certainly, by 2010 
the Killer Beez have shown no signs of folding and, in fact, there are 
numerous groups also calling themselves Killer Beez, either as formal 
associates  or as copycat gangs, in the increasingly crowded LA-style street 
gang scene throughout the country.  
 
While some of these young gangs appear to be acting as feeder groups to the 
patched gangs, the lack of youthful rejuvenation in New Zealand’s traditional 
gangs suggests that some of these young groups are achieving longevity and 
becoming permanent entities in their own right, and in the future will continue 
to provide greater and more direct competition to the established gangs. 
There is evidence to support this growing permanency; by 2009, it appears as 
though the membership base of many of these incipient gangs is getting 
older, although they are still called ‘youth gangs’ by the police, a minority of 
members are now in their 30s (Jason Hewett 2009 pers. comm.).  
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Looking into the Future 
There appears to be an obvious fork in the road for street gangs in this 
country. As I see it, the first possible path relies on changes to popular culture 
and a diminished influence of hip-hop/gangsta culture that may see these 
young gangs fall away and those members who want to stay involved being 
absorbed into the traditional patched gangs. The second path will see these 
current incipient gangs maintain a distinct identity and mature into more 
organised entities and mark a distinct transformation in New Zealand’s gang 
scene.  
 
I suspect, however, the future will not prove so clear cut and that a middle 
ground is likely to occur. It seems likely that some of these LA style gangs will 
survive, and recognising the threat to their dominance, the patched gangs will 
respond by more actively seeking to recruit young members into their ranks. 
But whether they are absorbed or continue to exist as separate entities, these 
future adult gang members are likely to have a significant impact on wider 
gang activities moving forward. This potential to re-shape the gang scene is 
tied to a fundamental difference between the formational attitudes of LA-style 
street gangs and their patch wearing counterparts. To use Merton’s (1938) 
terminology, we can see a very clear shift from ‘retreatism’ to ‘innovation’.  
 
It will be recalled from Chapters Four and Five, that in the early formation of 
the patched gangs in the 1960s and 1970s, members rejected the ideals of 
the mainstream and demonstrated their desire to drop out of society through 
purposely cultivated ‘ridgie’ dress that was not in keeping with accepted social 
norms; importantly, this response did not require financial resources. In 
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contrast, this new generation of gang members seeks the accoutrements of 
success, including designer clothes and jewellery (known as ‘bling’) that is 
highlighted in the images in many U.S. rap music videos. As Gruter and 
Versteegh (2001: p.141) said of the LA-style gangsters emerging in the 
Netherlands, they “wish to look like the boys in the daily MTV clips”. However, 
this hypermaterialism requires significant financial resources, something that 
most of these young people are unlikely to be able to access though 
legitimate means. One, perhaps inevitable, response, therefore, will be a 
greater degree of profit driven crime within the New Zealand gangs.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the intent of patched gangs to stand apart from society, they are 
deeply rooted in wider social context and affected by societal changes. This 
was true of their rise and is equally true of their faltering existence in the new 
millennium. Like many businesses that have enjoyed a monopoly, the gangs, 
faced with changing trends and emerging competition, have struggled to 
adjust to the challenges of a new era. Although patched gangs have 
dominated the New Zealand gang scene for around half a century, in recent 
times there are clear signs that this dominance is not immutable. 
 
While it is much too early to ring the death knell on patched gangs, the 
challenges faced by these gangs are not insignificant. Nevertheless, these 
groups have proven resilient in the face of past adversity and their revival 
cannot be discounted. However, changing fashions among young people 
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mean that such gangs no longer hold the appeal that they once did for 
rebellious youth looking for a means to express themselves.  
 
While groups of boy racers have none of the formal structures associated with 
gangs, and importantly are not viewed that way by themselves or outsiders, I 
would suggest that many of the youth that are now drawn to the boy racer set 
may once have formed the pool from which the outlaw motorcycle gangs drew 
their members. More significant, then, to the future of gangs in New Zealand, 
is the rise of LA-style street gangs, which are most prominent in South 
Auckland, but exist all around the country. Not only are some of these groups 
perhaps set to challenge the dominant position enjoyed by the patched street 
gangs for decades, but they may prove to be more troublesome and criminally 
orientated than New Zealand’s traditional gangs. 
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12. History Repeats - Offical Responses: 2000- 
 
Introduction 
The rise of LA-style street gangs ignited a response to gangs not seen in New 
Zealand since the 1980s; that being an awareness and recognition of gangs 
as an outcome of social and economic factors. Consequently these gangs 
were targeted with a comprehensive policy programme based on New 
Zealand and international research. 
 
But while this new form of gang was considered as part of a broad context, 
the patched gangs continued to be popularly framed as organised criminal 
groups. As has been the case in recent history, these traditional gangs were 
the target of a suppressive crackdown, this time in the small North Island city 
of Wanganui. The resulting furore and legislative approach in that city is 
broadly consistent with numerous political responses highlighted by this study, 
and it is a further example of the piecemeal approach to policy formation 
around patched gangs. 
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This chapter will examine the informed approach to countering the rise of LA-
style gangs and contrast this with the piecemeal methods, and kneejerk 
reactionism, that continues to define the suppressive efforts targeting patched 
gangs. 
 
LA-style Street Gangs and the Return of Social Policies 
Notwithstanding certain important sub-cultural differences discussed in the 
previous chapter, the surge in prominence of LA-style street gangs in many 
ways mirrored the rise of patched gangs in New Zealand in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Parallels are also evident in the police and political responses to 
the groups; initially repressive but then broadening to acknowledge the social 
causes of such groups. And with this came a comprehensive model designed 
to counter the problems associated with these gangs. 
 
Sparked by the spate of deaths linked to the new gangs in late 2006, the 
South Auckland police established a Youth Gang Suppression Unit, under the 
charge of Inspector Jason Hewett of the Counties Manukau Police District. 
Comprising six police officers, the unit, in two police cars and an aging barred 
truck or ‘paddy wagon’, patrolled the streets of problem areas, such as those 
in the suburbs of Otara and Flatbush. While accompanying the unit in early 
2007, I became acutely aware of the difficulties of distinguishing members of 
the LA-style street gangs from individuals or groups of friends who shared a 
similar sartorial style, also inspired by hip-hop culture93.  
                                                
93 Problems of identification of gang members within broader fashion trends were made abundantly 
clear in a Christchurch shopping mall in early 2010 when a security guard asked a young man to take 
down the hood of his ‘hoodie’ (apparel favoured by, among others, young gang members), saying, “No 
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The fact that there was such crossover between gang and wider fashion 
styles inevitably led to blanket policing in South Auckland – similar in many 
ways to that of the controversial Police Task Force of the 1970s, noted in 
Chapter Six. Although, Hewett’s team can rightly point to the fact that no LA-
style street gang killings occurred in 2007, one wonders if the police attention 
bred resentment among the non-gang or ‘wannabe’ gang youth, who were 
frequently accosted by police, often for doing no more than hanging out on the 
street or in local parks. Certainly, during the time I spent with Hewett’s team, 
the youths I witnessed being targeted by the squad were resentful of the 
police attention. This approach, though undertaken by well intentioned police 
officers, not only raises the issues of cohesion created by police conflict, 
outlined in Chapters Four and Six, but also created a perception among the 
suburbs’ youth generally that the police were a bullying force. As the Task 
Force was renamed Team Policing Units, so too the Youth Gang Suppression 
Unit was rebranded as a series of Youth Action Teams, which, as will become 
clear, was more than simply a euphemistic name change, but rather marked a 
wider and more socially aware policy transformation among the police in 
South Auckland. Hewett told me in 2009 that he quickly became aware that 
suppression alone could not solve the issue but that the tough police 
crackdown was set in motion because “we needed to do something” to 
appease the public in the wake of the media flurry stemming from the string of 
killings.   
 
                                                                                                                                       
gangsta looks here, mate”. The man under the hood was All Black, and occasional fashion model, Dan 
Carter (Sunday Star Times 11.4.2010). This crossover between wider fashion and gang styles made 
police identification of gang members difficult. 
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Hewett and his staff began gathering intelligence on these new gangs, but as 
mentioned above, faced with the difficulties of identifying a bona fide gang 
member from the majority of youths who had adopted hip-hop fashion, they 
had great difficulty. South Auckland police quickly amassed a database of 
some 850 names, and Hewett therefore estimated that there were as many as 
1000 gang members in region, and perhaps twice that amount in all of 
Auckland. These figures were given to The New Zealand Herald (21.8.2007), 
something that Hewett later told me was a mistake. In their early attempts to 
come to grips with the problem, police had identified any likely-looking youth 
as a gang member. Also, the police quickly became aware that many of the 
gangs came and went “in the blink of an eye” (Jason Hewett pers. com). He 
told me that they soon realised the list they had compiled grossly 
overestimated the problem, and that he regretted giving the figures to the 
media. 
 
With a frankness that has defined my dealings with Hewett, he explained to 
me in 2009:  
 
To be honest, we didn’t have our head around it. I didn’t know what I 
was doing, to be honest. We didn’t have a definition of what constituted 
a gang – there was no corroboration in the early days. You know, 
maybe a bandana in a pocket [was enough to be counted]. And on 
reflection, many of them weren’t even ‘wannabes’. 
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Hewett was quick to recognise his lack of knowledge in the area and worked 
to address it, and he soon became the police’s foremost youth gang expert; 
and his knowledge of international research in the area is impressive. 
Consequently, as will become clear, the man who had instigated the tough 
police crackdown quickly became a champion for the need for a broader 
social approach to the youth gang issue. It was reminiscent of the stance held 
by some within the police in the late 1970s, most notably expressed in the 
police association newsletter by Graham Butterworth, as outlined in Chapter 
Six. For Hewett, it was a dramatic turnaround for a police officer who, by his 
own admission, entered the police as a young man set to “lock ‘em all up”, but 
who gradually recognised the need for a more sophisticated solution to youth 
gangs. 
 
The string of LA-style street gang-related deaths in South Auckland 
unsurprisingly also stirred a political response; but for the first time in 
decades, influenced by the socially aware Labour government, the response 
was evidence-led. Research commissioned by the Ministry of Social 
Development (2008b) completed in mid-2006 but not made public until 2008. 
Informed by international research, Greg Newbold and I (2006) contributed to 
this report by, among other things, canvassing the wide range of social 
problems that factor into the gang problem, and by outlining the numerous 
responses employed in the U.S. over many years. The U.S. experience is a 
chequered history of success and failure, but it does provide guidance with 
regard to best practice.  
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Prominent American gang researcher Miller (1990: p.265) has said that, 
compared with other forms of criminal activity, offending by youth gangs, in 
theory at least, should have a much better chance of being reduced. In 
practice, however, gang interventions in the U.S. have traditionally had 
strikingly low rates of success (Klein, 1995: p.137; W. B. Miller, 1990: p.267). 
In fact, it has been said that, “The history of efforts to solve the youth gang 
problem in the United States is largely filled with frustration and failure” 
(Howell, 1998a: p.285). 
 
Responses to youth gangs in the U.S. are generally grouped in to three 
categories; prevention, intervention, and suppression94. Most often these have 
been used in isolation to one another, but in recent times there is a board 
consensus that multifaceted approaches have the best chance of success, 
many of which have shown encouraging results (Howell, 2000: p.38). And it 
was upon this basis that the Action Plan for Counties Manukau was devised. 
 
The New Zealand ‘Plan of Action’ and its Outcomes 
Following a review of the research undertaken by the Ministry of Social 
Development95, in September 2006 the government provided $10m over four 
years to support the launch the Auckland Youth Support Network, charged 
with implementing a ‘Plan of Action’ titled Improving the Outcome for Young 
People in Counties Manukau. Although the additional money was limited, the 
change in approach was significant. 
                                                
94 For a more detailed explanation of these approaches, see Gilbert & Newbold(2006). 
95 Local research and knowledge is therefore essential due to the different nature of gangs in different 
locals (see for example Howell, 2000: p.53; Klein, 1995: p.71; Lafontaine et al., 2005: pp.11&104; 
Vigil & Long, 1990). 
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The approach outlined in the plan signalled a return to thinking about (youth) 
gangs as a social problem and not simply one of law and order. The broad 
approach was reflected in the range of government ministries that supported 
it, including Social Development, Youth Development, Justice and Education, 
as well as local Councils and the police, the Auckland Youth Support Network 
sought to implement 26 actions in Auckland with an emphasis on Counties 
Manukau “as a first step to addressing the underlying factors to social 
disadvantage and youth gang and youth crime issues” (Auckland Youth 
Support Network, 2006: p.6). While the plan was devised for Counties 
Manukau, it was seen as a pilot for action required around the country (ibid). 
 
The plan of action comprised a range of programmes and policies that were 
designed to address the needs of young people in Counties Manukau and to 
encourage the government and social service agencies to work together. 
While much of the plan incorporated existing governmental and non-
governmental organisations' (NGOs) initiatives, such as ‘Family Start’, an at 
home service to support at-risk families, and ‘Youth Transition Services’, 
which helped young people move from school to further training or 
employment, it ensured that there was better focus on at-risk and gang youths 
and that programmes were better coordinated. The plan also devised new 
initiatives, such as an integrated case management model to promote wrap 
around services for at risk youth and their families: 
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Integrated case management involves a youth co-ordinator, whose 
primary focus is the young person, and a family co-ordinator, whose 
primary focus is the young person’s family. They work together and 
with other agencies to develop a plan for the young person and their 
family. The Plan identifies the tasks each agency will undertake 
relevant to the individual case. For example, if the young person’s 
family wants to relocate (to minimise the risk of the young person re-
offending), then Housing New Zealand and Work and Income will be 
engaged to provide support associated with the move. If the young 
person has not attended school or training, then either the Ministry of 
Education or a training provider will be engaged to facilitate the young 
person’s education or training (Auckland Youth Support Network, 2006: 
p.16).  
 
The plan also recommended the employment of youth workers to engage with 
young people, and it also sought to provide opportunities for sport and 
community activities. 
 
In these ways, and numerous others, the plan incorporated many of the 
approaches identified by U.S. research, including suppression. But while a 
hard-line approach to gang offending was maintained, the police role was 
substantially modified. One way that this was evident was in the 
establishment of the police Youth Actions Teams across several Auckland 
suburbs, which, as well as more traditional policing, identified gang or at-risk 
youths and then liaised with other agencies to ensure integrated case 
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management was put in place for them (Auckland Youth Support Network, 
2006: p.19). Hewett championed and embraced the “wrap around” approach 
that focused not just on the youths themselves, but on their family situations 
as well: “You can’t clean up a kid and then throw him back into dirty water” 
(2009 pers. comm.). Furthermore, provisions were made so that unsupervised 
children picked up by police, whose parents could not be contacted, were not 
kept in the police holding cells but were instead placed with Child, Youth and 
Family. Something that the Plan of Action said would better free up police 
time and resources, and also avoid “a highly unsuitable environment for a 
young person” (Auckland Youth Support Network, 2006: p.19). Given the 
police are often at the front line, their cooperation is vital to coordinated gang 
initiatives, and a lack of cooperation has been a factor in such approaches 
failing in the U.S (Spergel, Wa, & Sosa, 2005e: p.11.6). 
 
By October 2007, the newsletter, Patchwork, which was established to inform 
people of issues around youth gangs, reported that the initial 26 actions 
outlined in the plan had been completed (Patchwork October 2007). In 2009, 
Hewett told me that he was “hand on my heart” convinced that it was the only 
way to effectively tackle the issue and he believed that it was working. 
Hewett’s faith was not misplaced.  
 
In January 2010, the Ministry of Social Development (2010) published a 
review of the Plan of Action, which outlined a range of work being undertaken. 
By the end of the 2008/2009 financial year, the plan had delivered 47 
parenting programs to just fewer than 1,300 participants. It also reported that 
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community youth workers reached over 9,000 youth through events and 
outreach activities, and that just under 7,600 young people participated in 
youth clubs and over 1,350 attended school clubs. Furthermore, advocacy 
was provided to over 250 youth in the community and 90 youth in schools. 
The review also said that support was provided to between 230 and 300 youth 
in contact with the youth justice system, and close to 120 youth had been 
involved in family group conferences. Also, the integrated management 
system was providing intensive individualised support to 421 young people 
and a further 76 had used and exited the programme (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2010). 
 
The review reported a reduction in youth gang activity (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2010: p.16). Although this was only supported by certain 
stakeholder perceptions, it may nevertheless be valid, given that a major U.S. 
study (involving 21 cities) found that “perceptions [of gang improvements by 
key stakeholders] correlated perfectly with empirical indicators” (Howell, 
1998b: p.296). Moreover, encouraging signs in relation to youth offending 
were captured by objective indices. Following a peak in 2006, the year the 
plan was devised and implemented, overall youth apprehensions dropped in 
Counties Manukau. Between 2007 and 2008, apprehensions by people aged 
20 years and under fell by 9 percent96, while the nationwide average was an 
overall increase of 3 percent (Ministry of Social Development, 2010). 
 
                                                
96 This decline was evident in every age bracket used to record apprehensions: under 14 years of age, 
14-16, 16-18, and 18-20. 
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In all but one category (apprehensions for sexual violence rose in Counties 
Manukau by 3 percent versus a nationwide 4 percent decline), youth 
apprehension trends in Counties Manukau were better than the national 
average. These categories were: Violence (-6% vs. +5%), Drugs and anti-
social (-4% vs. +6%), Dishonesty (-6% vs. +2%), Property damage (-9% vs. 
0%), Property abuse (-3% vs. +3%), and Administrative97 (-39% vs. -9%) 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2010: p.20). 
 
Furthermore, positive results were found in the Manukau City Council’s 
annual perceptions survey with regards to questions on crime and safety. 
Between 2006 and 2009, residents who felt ‘safe’ of ‘very safe’ in their homes, 
in their neighbourhoods, and in their local town centres (both during the day 
and after dark), increased among all categories (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2010: p.18). 
Percentage of residents who feel safe, by place, 2006–2009 
% of residents who feel ‘very safe’/‘safe’ in their: 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Home during the day 90 92 91 95 
Home after dark 80 82 84 89 
Local neighbourhood during the day 88 90 91 94 
Neighbourhood after dark 61 55 58 77 
Local town centre during the day 80 86 84 94 
Local town centre after dark 37 40 37 55 
 
While these data offer a certain degree of encouragement to the approach 
being undertaken in South Auckland, there needs to be an equal amount of 
caution; in both the indicated results and their overall effect, but also as to the 
security of the approach generally.  
                                                
97 This category was dominated by the offence of failing to abide by bail conditions. 
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When looking at the activities undertaken as part of the Plan of Action, it is 
difficult to definitively tell how they influenced the encouraging data. With 
regard to perceptions of community safety, this was acknowledged in the 
review document, which stated that, “It is important to note that a wide range 
of Council, government and community actions would have contributed to this, 
not just the activities funded by the Youth Gangs Plan of Action” (Ministry of 
Social Development, 2010: p.18).  Indeed, I suggest the same could be said 
for the overall decline in youth offending; there are so many unknown or 
untested variables that could have influenced the results. It appears safe to 
infer the programme had some impact, but it is not possible to ascertain the 
exact degree of impact. Nor is it possible to determine, from the results 
provided, what elements of the programme were more successful than others. 
A longer term analysis is required, but I believe this is by no means certain to 
occur and that the whole approach is perhaps on a knife edge. 
 
A New Epoch or a Political Blip? 
The enormity of the task in combating gang rise and maturation is difficult to 
overstate. As outlined in the previous chapter, the New Zealand economy had 
been on a tremendous upswing in the early 2000s, but the fruits of this 
economic success were not tasted by many communities, which remain 
anchored to poverty regardless of wider economic buoyancy.  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter Five, that Vigil’s (1988, 2002) concept of 
‘multiple marginality’ – social/structural factors that influence gang 
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membership among ethnic minorities – was a useful framework for examining 
the problems facing Maori as an outcome of the urban drift. In that chapter, I 
suggested that the practice of clustering state housing was producing poverty 
‘enclaves’. Following the economic changes outlined in Chapters Seven and 
Eight, by the 2000s these enclaves evinced further significant social 
problems, compounding the issues of multiple marginality. A study of 
Manukau, in South Auckland, undertaken in the mid-2000s, concluded that “a 
vicious cycle of poverty and lifelong, if not intergenerational, under-
achievement is at work in some areas” (Lang Consulting, 2005: pp.5-6). Such 
areas can be seen as the relative equivalent of locales in the U.S. that have 
produced what is known as an ‘underclass’, from which young gangs are a 
seemingly inevitable result (Hagedorn, 1988; Klein, 1995: p.194; Short, 1990). 
As such, an overview of some of the issues facing particular communities in 
South Auckland provides useful context for understanding why youth gangs 
have emerged in places such as this.  
 
Within South Auckland, particular suburbs, including Mangere, Manurewa, 
Otara and some parts of Papatoetoe, have high levels of economic 
deprivation as measured across nine indicators, including income, home 
ownership, overcrowding, transport and employment (Counties Manukau 
District Health Board, 2008). The areas scoring poorly in economic 
deprivation are also those that contain clusters of ethnic minority groups. 
Unsurprisingly, it is in these areas that the gangs are most prevalent. 
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Census data (Statistics New Zealand, 2006) from one of South Auckland’s 
numerous deprived areas, Otara West, provide a snapshot of the problems of 
social and economic disadvantage facing many such South Auckland 
communities. Of the approximately 3,500 people who live in Otara West, 
nearly 80 percent are Maori or Pacific peoples, and as noted in the previous 
chapter, these groups feature prominently in negative health and social 
indices. Fewer than 17 percent of those aged 15 years and over have a post-
school qualification, compared to more than 40 percent of the total New 
Zealand population. The unemployment rate is nearly triple the national 
average and almost 60 percent of people have an annual income of less than 
$20,000. More than 25 percent of those living in Otara West have no home 
telephone and just 20 percent have access to the internet from home, one 
third of the national average. Almost 40 percent of families are single-parent 
families, compared with less than 20% nationally, yet the average number of 
people living in each household, 4.8, is significantly higher than the national 
average of 2.8.  
 
Moreover, these areas tend to be youthful, with 42 percent of the South 
Auckland population under 25 years (Manukau City Council, 2009). In Otara 
West, over 35 percent of the population is under 15 years of age, compared 
with just 22 percent for all of the Auckland region (Statistics New Zealand, 
2006). A significant cohort of young people, then, are faced with the factors of 
‘multiple marginality’ that may result in their being drawn toward gang 
membership. 
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Furthermore, with New Zealand’s wide, and widening gap, between rich and 
poor98, many of these youth will see significant, and disparate, materialistic 
wealth in bordering neighbourhoods or in the media but feel it is unachievable 
and thus seek gang membership as a form of social resistance or in a 
misguided – or, in some cases, perhaps real – belief that their life chances 
and future happiness are better served through membership of a gang. It will 
be recalled from the last chapter that the Killer Beez’ leader, Josh Marsters, 
said he wanted, “More doors to be open. For opportunities to be given to the 
less rich, to the poor because that’s the sort of backgrounds that we come 
from, from round here. But we’re saying, as Killer Beez, we’re standing up and 
saying if you’re not gonna give us options, we’re gonna create options for 
ourselves” (Campbell Live 15.2.2008). In my view, the comments lend strong 
evidence to the fact that arguments of status frustration are far from simply 
academic musings. 
 
Although the social and ethnic dislocation that occurred with the Maori urban 
drift in the 1960s and the rapid immigration of Pacific Peoples in the 1970s, 
and compounded by the lack of social amenities in state housing areas during 
these times, are not as relevant in the new millennium, there are deeply 
entrenched social problems and economic deprivation in many areas. While 
such embedded social and economic problems remain, gang membership – 
patched or unpatched – is set to be an ongoing issue for New Zealand 
                                                
98In 2008, New Zealand’s gap between rich and poor (measured by income distribution) is among the 
highest third of the 30 OECD countries, and, despite narrowing slightly over the term of Helen Clark’s 
government, since 1985 the gap has overall grown at a faster rate than any other of those countries 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). Since 2008, the gap has remained 
largely unchanged (Ministry of Social Development, 2009), but tax changes made by John Key’s 
government in 2010 appear set to widen it further. 
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regardless of even well designed strategies aimed out countering them. As 
Klein (Klein, : p.147) states, “Gangs are by-products of their communities: 
They cannot long be controlled by attacks on their symptoms alone; 
community structure and capacity must also be targeted”. And these are 
issues that would take a generation to remedy. 
 
With this in mind, it will be easy for a disconnect to occur between what can 
realistically be expected of the Plan of Action, or any other broad ranging 
approach, and the expectations of the public and, perhaps more importantly, 
those of politicians, who often require quick solutions to garner immediate 
electoral support. For this reason, social policies targeting gangs, I suggest, 
are highly vulnerable.  
 
Although always a law and order issue, for most of New Zealand’s early gang 
history there was a broad acceptance of gangs as a product of wider social 
factors, however, since the mid-1980s suppression has been the dominant 
means of addressing gangs. As outlined, the fall of the social policy agenda in 
the 1980s occurred for a number of reasons including the fact that gangs 
matured into adult groups, changes in political ideology, changes in police 
views, negative economic conditions, catalytic events that increased public 
hostility toward gangs, and populist firebrand politics. And from this 
experience we can perhaps attempt to forecast the future of the contemporary 
policies targeting youth gangs. 
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Given New Zealand’s weak economy, brought about by the global economic 
crisis, as outlined in the previous chapter, socially-minded policies targeting 
gangs are likely to fall victim to a refocusing of government initiatives on 
supporting the economy, and those worst affected by its recession; and may 
well exclude such groups deemed unworthy of assistance, like gangs. 
Furthermore, with the ascendance of the conservative National coalition 
government in 2008, such social interventions may lose favour. Particularly 
given the signals offered by policy initiatives such as ‘three strikes’99 and the 
euphemistically titled ‘Fresh Start’100, a hard line approach  targeting young 
offenders. But perhaps the greatest risks stem from developments from within 
the youth gang scene itself. In the previous chapter I suggested that such 
groups are beginning to mature. If, as occurred with the membership of 
patched street gangs in the 1980s and 1990s, these incipient gangs become 
institutionalised adult groups, it may only take a few high profile catalytic 
events – like the Killer Beez drug bust, also outlined in the previous chapter – 
to change the political perception of these gangs from requiring social remedy 
to needing to be suppressed. Such events in the past have proven irresistible 
to politicians who gain traction with a hard-line approach on issues of law and 
order, and who have in turn have proven effective in defining public opinion. 
And with these factors in mind, one might suggest that the social initiatives 
targeting youth gangs has not so much taken over from suppression, but 
simply interrupted it.  
                                                
99 The ‘Three Strikes’ legislation was passed in 2010 as a changes made by way of the Sentencing and 
Parole Bill. Among other things, it lengthened sentences for serious recidivist offenders, but for 
purposes here it is enough to say that it signalled an accentuation of ‘tough on crime’ policies. 
100 Fresh Start was passed in February 2010 by way of changes to the Children, Young Persons, and 
their Families Act and allowed children of 12 and 13 years of age to be brought before the courts for 
serious crimes, and instigated ‘boot camps’ for young offenders. 
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Responding to the Patched Gangs  
While the largely youthful LA-style street gangs, which came to public 
prominence in 2006, were viewed as a social problem requiring social 
redress, the patched street remained an issue of law and order by being 
defined as organised criminal groups. 
 
A useful example of how the media have supported this idea is an article 
published in the Dominion Post (8.8.2009) in relation to a massive drug bust 
where 1,125 people were arrested. Only three were associates (none were 
members) of the Hell’s Angels, which is roughly one quarter of one percent of 
all those arrested. Yet the headline read, “Hells [sic] Angels link in 1000 
cannabis arrests”. Although factually correct, the headline clearly overstates 
any link between the gang and the arrests, and highlights the pervasive idea 
that gangs and drugs are synonymous. 
 
In April 2009, parliament passed the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Bill, and 
later that year, the Gangs and Organised Crime Bill. The latter’s title reflects 
how closely gangs and organised crime had become linked, and bolstered 
numerous pieces of legislation that were part of the Harassment and Criminal 
Associations legislation of the mid-1990s described in Chapter Ten. For 
certain measures, like those targeting participation in an organised criminal 
group and gang fortifications, it was the third time they had been addressed 
by parliament, something that reflects their lack of success. The Criminal 
Proceeds (Recovery) Bill increased powers around the forfeiture of assets 
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gained through crime. It will be recalled that the Proceeds of Crimes Act of 
1991 allowed for the seizure of assets following certain criminal convictions. 
The new provisions, however, transferred the burden of proof on to the 
suspected criminal, meaning they had to prove that their assets were legally 
obtained, without the court having to prove any prior criminal activity.  
 
It is a powerful piece of legislation and one that will undoubtedly have success 
in securing assets from wealthy gang members who commit profit producing 
crime, but even a cursory glance at the gang scene reveals the modest – and 
often impoverished existence – of the vast majority of gang members. 
Furthermore, evidence for gangs as organised criminal organisations remains 
rather scant, despite police views to the contrary. In Chapter Ten I outlined 
the reasons why gangs had become framed as organised criminal groups with 
little supporting evidence. As these arguments are as relevant in the new 
millennium as they were in the 1990s, they do not need to be remade. 
Nevertheless, it is important to briefly contemporise the issue.  
 
To the Law and Order Select Committee, which examined the Gangs and 
Organised Crime Bill, the Police Association (2009: p.3) submitted that, 
 
The New Zealand gang environment is now more complex and 
serious….engaged in true organised crime. They are dealing higher 
value drugs such as methamphetamine, and coordinated supply and 
distribution syndicates have replaced many of the old inter-gang 
rivalries. Modern gangs are organised with one aim – to make money. 
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Cash flows and illegally-funded lifestyles are now at levels gang 
members in the 1980s could not have even have dreamed of: the 
methamphetamine trade is currently estimated to be worth $1.5 billion 
a year in New Zealand, of which Association members estimate at 
least 75% is controlled by gangs. 
 
The submission highlights two important common assumptions. The first of 
these is that gangs dominate the drug trade, in this instance 
methamphetamine. The second assumption, commonly held, is that the 
gangs exist solely as illegal money making enterprises. In my view neither of 
these propositions bare close scrutiny. 
 
In relation to drug offending, I turn to apprehension data compiled by the 
police. These statistics are arranged in three, rather ambiguous, categories: 
Drug (Cannabis Only), Drugs (New Drugs), and Drugs (Not Cannabis)101. 
According to Gavin Knight, the National Statistics Manager at Police National 
Headquarters, police statistical data do not include whether or not 
apprehended persons are patched gang members, but they do record 
whether or not “persons apprehended are known to be affiliated in some way 
with a gang” (pers. comm.), and therefore undoubtedly capture a significantly 
wider population than just gang members as well as a large degree of 
offending unrelated to gangs in any meaningful way. But even if all of the 
offending was gang controlled, the data do not support claims of gang 
dominance. In each of the three years from 2006 to 2008, drug dealing by 
                                                
101 I have been told by the National Statistic Manager that ‘new drugs’ are primarily methamphetamine 
and ecstasy, and ‘not cannabis drugs’ are heroin and cocaine. 
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gang affiliates, as measured by apprehensions for ‘possession for supply’, 
averaged 9.4 percent of total apprehensions for ‘cannabis only’, 11.5 percent 
for ‘new drugs’, and 7.6 percent for drugs ‘not cannabis’.  
 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the Mongrel Mob in 
Christchurch were running a drug dealing operation from their club house, 
which led to the incarceration of the entire chapter following the police’s 
Operation Crusade. Although this example shows that police concerns about 
organised criminal activity are not entirely without foundation, it highlights the 
relative ease by which such groups can be apprehended. 
 
The presiding Judge at the trial following the arrests of the Mongrel Mob 
members and others involved in the drug bust, Justice Panckhurst, described 
the gang’s activities as, “short and simple organised crime” (R v Beattie, 
Unreported, High Court, Christchurch, Panckhurst J, November 2004). There 
is little doubt that Justice Panckhurst was correct in recognising that the gang 
was working as a collective to create profit – and in doing so they fall within 
my definition of a ‘criminal gang’ – but the level of organisation was far from 
sophisticated.  
 
One member of the trial jury, who contacted me after the trial was complete, 
told me that from the evidence put before him, he was surprised at the level of 
disorganisation, which failed to meet the image or expectations that he had of 
gangs, which he had formed via media sources. It will be recalled that police 
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and politicians had heralded the gangs as sophisticated organised criminal 
groups since the 1990s. The jury member told me in 2005:  
 
I thought there would be a lot more organisation. I thought a gang was 
organised crime but there’s not much that is too organised with them at 
all. The longer the trial went on the more it became obvious that it’s a 
gang it’s not a syndicate, you know? I never expected it to be like The 
Godfather [movie] but it really fell a long way short of that idea – the 
stylised version of organised crime. 
 
Indeed, the obvious way in which the Mongrel Mob chapter was dealing drugs 
would be a complete anathema to most professional criminals; if one wants to 
minimise the risk of being caught by the police, it would seem logical to avoid 
drawing attention to one’s illegal activities. Although the obvious nature of the 
venture almost certainly says something about the lack of sophistication within 
the Mongrel Mob, and the seeming imperviousness of its membership to legal 
consequence, it also highlights that high profile groups, indicated by their 
wearing of back patches, are easily identifiable targets for police. 
 
A long time Hell’s Angel, Phil Schubert, put it to me in 2006, like this: 
 
They have it in their head that we are a criminal organisation – but 
we’re not real smart criminals [if we’re prepared to go around] with a 
patch on our back – and you only have to look at the majority of 
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brothers who are 5 or 6 day a week [manual] workers…I don’t know 
where all of this money is.  
 
Indeed, the relative scarcity of large drug busts involving whole gangs102 – or 
whole chapters of gangs – support what I have found in my field research and 
that is that, overall, most drug business is the work of individuals, or small 
cliques within gangs, and not the work of the gangs as collectives103. This 
being the case, and the fact that gangs existed long before they had any real 
connections to the drug trade, is a strong argument against the Police 
Association belief that gangs exist for the sole reason to make money. 
 
This misrepresentation, however, is not just a matter of academic curiosity. It 
has had, and continues to have, an effect on public policy. By framing gangs 
solely as organised criminal groups, tough legislative measures are the 
consequence. What this means is that resources are misdirected, and laws 
enacted that will fail to have meaningful impact because they are ill designed 
and poorly targeted, and, additionally may erode basic liberties and rights. 
 
And there is perhaps no better example of this than the response to events in 
the North Island city of Wanganui in 2006. It is an example that reflects the 
                                                
102 A further notable case involved Black Power in, Mount Wellington Auckland. Led by national 
president, Mark Pitman, the gang was involved in a large scale cannabis growing and distribution 
operation, and following police recording 105 recorded conversations and gaining 130 text messages, 
15 members and associates of the group were arrested (Solicitor-General v Pitman, Unreported, High 
Court, Auckland, Hansen, R, June 2006). Following convictions of the accused, the gang’s $500,000 
‘pad’ was confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act – although as at writing, the gang remains in 
control of the property. 
103 An explanation for the reasons for this was offered in Chapter Ten 
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fact that the approach to patched gangs remains unguided by a coherent 
overarching strategy, and instead is driven by kneejerk reactionism. 
 
The Wanganui Battle Ground 
As has occurred in the past, populist policies targeting patched gangs sprang 
to the fore in the new millennium; specifically in 2006, the same year that LA-
style street gangs were making headlines in South Auckland. The contrast 
between the approach taken in combating the new young groups and the 
traditional gangs, however, could not have been more stark. 
 
In a now rather familiar scenario, it was a catalytic event – or series of events 
– and a rhetoric fuelled leader that brought suppressive anti-gang policy to the 
fore again. In late February 2006, the (then) three chapters of the Hell’s 
Angels club (Auckland, Hastings and Wanganui) had travelled to Christchurch 
to attend the annual Sound of Thunder motorcycle racing event. On their 
return home, members of the Auckland chapter stayed in Wanganui for the 
night, and the next day, on 29 February 2006, two members stopped at the 
BP Service Station on the corner of Anzac Parade and Jones Street to get 
petrol for the ride home. As the two Hell’s Angels members were filling their 
motor cycle tanks, members of the local Mongrel Mob stopped and confronted 
the pair. A local Hell’s Angels prospect, travelling in a car, had seen their 
fellows Angels pull into the service station and decided to stop, seeing as he 
did so, the conflict unfolding. One of the outnumbered Hell’s Angels then drew 
a baseball bat from the car. The ensuing fight, much of which was recorded 
on service station security cameras, resulted in the hospitalisation of two 
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Mongrel Mobsters, one with a fractured skull. One of the Hell’s Angels 
suffered a broken leg. As the two groups converged at the hospital, they 
clashed again. 
 
The following day the incident made the front page of the Wanganui Chronicle 
(1.3.2006). In the article, the city’s Mayor, Michael Laws was quoted as saying 
that gang violence in Wanganui was no worse than in other areas “but it’s 
high time that central government equipped local police with the staff and 
resources to deal with them once and for all”. For Laws, a former MP of the 
National Party, a radio talkback host and a newspaper columnist, these 
comments marked the beginning of a concerted anti-gang campaign, in the 
same vein as John Banks and Mike Moore in the past. 
 
The same day as the coverage appeared in the Wanganui Chronicle, Radio 
New Zealand broadcast an interview with the New Zealand Police Association 
president, Greg O’Connor, who asserted, without offering any evidence to 
support his claim, that the battle was a turf war over the control of drugs, 
particularly methamphetamine. But his statements were publicly contradicted 
the following day by Senior Sergeant Duncan MacLeod of the Wanganui 
police, who said they had no intelligence suggesting the violence was related 
to drugs, and who instead believed it was related to an earlier isolated 
incident between the groups (Wanganui Chronicle 2.3.2006). This explanation 
was confirmed to me by members of both the Hell’s Angels and the Mongrel 
Mob. Nevertheless, the same claims by O’Connor were widely published, in a 
different article in the same newspaper, and in The New Zealand Herald 
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(3.2.2006). Links to drugs had become O’Connor’s default explanation for 
such incidents. 
 
At the end of that week, Laws, in his weekly column in the Sunday Star Times 
(5.3.2006), likened the gangs to the “terrorists” that New Zealand troops were 
combating in Afghanistan. He said that police should constantly “harass” the 
gangs and raised the idea of banning gang patches; a proposal he then put 
before the Wanganui District Council at an extraordinary council meeting, 
attended by Greg O’Connor, on 10 March 2006 (Wanganui District Council 
Press Release 10.3.2006). Consequently, the District Council sought to 
introduce a bylaw that would ban the wearing of patches and other visual 
identifiers of gangs in Wanganui’s Central Business District (CBD) and other 
public areas. Interestingly, the proposed area did not actually include the 
locality where the clash between the Mongrel Mob and Hell’s Angels, which 
had sparked Laws’ call, took place.  
 
Although not noted at the time, or in subsequent debates around the idea, it 
was not the first time that such a ban had been proposed in New Zealand. In 
1988, the council in Wairoa proposed a similar ban (NZ Herald 8.2.1988), as 
did police in Ruatoria in 1994 (NZ Herald 28.7.1994) but on each of these 
occasions the proposals came to nothing.  
 
The first iteration of the proposed Wanganui bylaw was ambiguous and it 
seemed to ban the wearing of the colour red, associated with the Mongrel 
Mob and Hell’s Angels, and the colour blue, associated with Black Power – a 
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proposal that I, and a number of others, argued in submissions to the council, 
would be unenforceable. Although this and numerous other issues were 
remedied in a subsequent draft of the bylaw, it was concerns surrounding 
“human rights provisions” that delayed the passage of the bylaw in June 2006 
(Wanganui District Council Press Release 23.6.2006). Eventually, it was 
decided that the bylaw would need parliamentary approval to ensure that it 
was not in breach of the Bill of Rights Act (Wanganui District Council Press 
Release 5.3.2007).  
 
In the meantime, Laws’ calls for strong action against gangs increased when 
Wanganui became the scene of a drive-by gang shooting that killed a two-
year-old girl, Jhia Te Tua, in May 2007. On the day of the killing, tensions 
between Black Power and the Mongrel Mob were evident during a chance 
meeting at a rugby league game in Wanganui. There was no physical 
violence, “but there was posturing, intimidatory and aggressive behaviour 
from both sides (R v Wallace, Unreported, High Court, Wellington, Gendall J, 
February 2009). Following the standoff, several members, prospects and 
associates of the Mongrel Mob, travelled in three cars to ‘hit’ a Black Power 
member’s address – the gang did not have a formal clubhouse in the city. 
Black Power, however, were prepared; pelting the would-be attackers with 
bricks and bottles and smashing a window of one of the vehicles. The 
Mongrel Mob cars left but returned shortly after; whereby the lead car of the 
Mongrel Mob convoy turned off its lights and engine and coasted up to the 
Black Power address in a successful attempt at stealth. As the car rolled past 
the address, Mongrel Mob prospect, Hayden Wallace fired three shots from a 
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30-30 rifle at Black Power members congregating outside the house. The first 
two bullets proved harmless; one ending up in a neighbouring yard and the 
other lodged in a fence post surrounding the Black power property. The third 
bullet, however, went through the window of the house and hit the infant 
asleep on the couch inside, killing her instantly (R v Wallace, Unreported, 
High Court, Wellington, Gendall J, February 2009). The death resulted in a 
public outcry, and this anger was funnelled toward the drive for the anti-gang 
patch legislation. 
 
Jhia Te Tua’s death became a national media issue104. Indeed, few New 
Zealanders, I suggest, recall the initial violent clash that sparked the proposed 
bylaw, but most would remember the death of the infant, and it was utilised by 
the bylaw’s supporters throughout the ensuing political debates. The 
Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill was introduced to 
parliament on 2 April 2008 and in each of its three readings, the Bill’s sponsor, 
National’s Chester Burrows, MP for Wanganui, raised the killing of Jhia Te 
Tua to emphasise the problems of gangs (for example, NZPD, vol.646, 2008: 
p.15337; NZPD, vol.653, 2009: p.1642; NZPD, vol.654, 2009: p.2944). 
However, Burrows did not articulate the basis for his belief that the banning 
the wearing of patches would address this type of conflict, and to date this has 
still not been adequately explained. 
 
                                                
104 An internet search reveals 82 media reports of the killing in May and June 2007. 
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A Review of the Rationale 
Indeed, the key bases for the law change are disputable. There are two 
primary grounds on which the bylaw was argued; preventing incidental gang 
clashes and preventing public intimidation. Data obtained from the police 
show that in 2004, 2005 and 2006 there were 11, 17, and 48 violent offences 
stemming from clashes between gangs in Wanganui; representing 1.5, 2.3, 
and 6 percent respectively of all violent offending in the district105 (Rollo, 
2009). To put this into perspective, domestic violence, captured in criminal 
statistics as male assaults female crimes in the ‘Central’ district, which 
includes the Wanganui region, accounted for between 17 and 19 percent of 
violent offending over the same period (Statistics New Zealand, 2009b). While 
gang violence is an issue, it can easily be inflated to a level of 
disproportionate concern. And while it is quite possible that banning the 
wearing of patches may stop some incidental conflict between gangs, in a 
small city like Wanganui most of the town’s gang members are liable to know 
one another by sight, regardless of dress, so the effect of a patch ban is likely 
to be minimal. Also, gang violence is a problem all around the world, and yet 
New Zealand is unique in that street gangs wear patches, clearly the patches 
alone do not cause violence. Links between patches and violence, therefore, 
must be viewed with some caution.  
 
In relation to arguments about intimidation, one finds more questions than 
answers. Almost certainly some members of the wider public may find patch 
wearing gang members intimidating. But whether this intimidation is warranted 
                                                
105 Figures from the Police show 20 such incidents between January 2007 and June 2009 suggesting the 
spike in 2006 was an anomalous year. 
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is open to question. In October 2009, I oversaw a telephone survey of 
Wanganui residents. The research found that just less than a quarter of the 
total respondents had personally had direct contact with a gang member. Of 
those who had had contact, 56 percent reported this contact as ‘positive’. Just 
3.7 percent said the contact was ‘negative’, with the remainder reporting the 
contact as ‘neutral’ (Jarrod Gilbert, 2009: pp.2&4). Given the relatively small 
sample size (109 respondents), the results of the survey can only be viewed 
as indicative, with an approximate 95 percent confidence level of plus or 
minus 9.5 percent.  
 
Nevertheless, the results do suggest that people’s concerns  about gangs do 
not come from direct contact with gang members, and therefore, are likely to 
have been formed on the basis of third party portrayals, such as those in the 
media and from politicians, which as outlined in Chapter Ten are often highly 
distorted. Moreover, given any number of people will be intimidated by any 
number of things, there is an indelible problem of balancing a person’s 
subjective – and perhaps unfounded – concern when seeing a back patch, 
versus the intent of the person wearing the patch. But even if gang members 
are purposely (or even recklessly) acting in an intimidating manner, there are 
already numerous laws (for example, the Harassment Act 1997, section 21 of 
the Summary Offences Act 1981, and sections 188 & 189 of the Crimes Act 
1961) that can be used to deal with this. Therefore, the law does not seek to 
address the unlawful behaviour per se, but rather criminalises sub cultural 
expression. 
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But perhaps the most baffling aspect of the law relates to the police belief, 
represented most forcefully by the Police Association, that gangs are 
organised criminal groups. Although I have argued that this assumption is 
demonstrably false, if one was convinced that the assumption held true, then 
it is in many ways even more difficult to reconcile support for a measure that 
reduces the visibility of criminals. At the risk of sounding flippant, if terrorist 
groups like Al-Qaeda wore back patches, the ‘war on terror’ would be made 
significantly easier. This paradox becomes even more peculiar given that the 
problem of identifying the non-patch wearing LA-style street gangs was 
emerging around the same time. But while the police hierarchy in Wanganui 
and the Police Association both backed the measure banning patches, this 
support was far from universal among rank and file police. 
 
Not long after the original bylaw was proposed, in March 2006, Detective 
Sergeant Daryl Brazier, the head of the police Organised Crime Unit, wrote a 
letter to the editor of The New Zealand Herald (14.3.06) saying that while 
Laws and his council may “mean well”, the proposal to ban patches was 
misguided. Patches, Brazier said, were a way that gangs “could be identified 
and policed” and that removing them would drive such groups underground. 
These ideas were echoed by Steve Plowman, editor of the police association 
magazine, Police News (April 2006), who suggested that by giving gangs a 
lower profile the bylaw may “inadvertently…advantage” them. These public 
voices of dissent showed rare cracks within the police, and agency that is 
almost always – outwardly, at least – united. As it became clear that the police 
were giving the proposal unqualified support, public arguments from within the 
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police stopped, however, two former police officers continued to lobby against 
the measures. One of these, Mike Watkins, was a former Gang Intelligence 
Officer who worked in and around Wanganui, and who was still in the police 
when the bylaw was first being formulated. He told me that the measure did 
not have his support and that he was surprised the police bosses were in 
favour of the proposal. He would later say in a request to address parliament’s 
Law and Order Select Committee, that the law “will not work as intended and 
may be counter productive [sic] from both policing and community 
perspectives” (Watkins, 2008). 
 
Similarly, but much more publicly, the former head of the Outlaw Motorcycle 
Unit in Auckland, Cam Stokes, repeated these and other concerns in the 
media and on one occasion in March 2006, was quoted in news bulletins on 
Radio Live, the radio station that employs Michael Laws as a talkback host. 
Given the high level of support traditionally offered for hard-line suppressive 
measures, Laws was clearly taken aback by the levels of opposition his 
proposal was receiving and, in keeping with his mercurial reputation, he struck 
out at his detractors. Laws used his radio show to call Stokes an “idiot”, a 
“broken arse” and a “bitter and twisted ex detective” (Radio Live 15.3.2006), 
and similarly dismissed other critics who questioned his idea. He called social 
worker Denis O’Reilly a gang “apologist” (Sunday Star Times 5.3.2006) and 
following concerns raised by a members of the Wanganui Council, he said, 
“There is a complete lack of understanding from Cr Ray Stevens, but that is 
not unusual” (Wanganui District Council Press Release 14.3.2006).  
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In an op-ed piece published in The Dominion Post (7.4.2006), I outlined why I 
considered that certain criticisms of the proposed bylaw were valid, and 
expressed concern that Laws’ attitude toward the bylaw’s detractors was not 
conducive to promoting healthy debate. The day the article was published, a 
staff member from The Dominion Post contacted me to say that Laws was 
“incensed” by my article and demanding a right of reply, which was given to 
him. He never responded directly to the issues that I had raised, however, and 
criticism of the proposed bylaw continued.  
 
Critical Political Debate 
Due in part to concerns being raised publicly, the passage of the Wanganui 
District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia)] Bill through parliament in 2008 
and 2009 was not smooth and it attracted much greater critique and debate 
than past legislation targeting gangs. 
 
As noted, one significant concern was that the bylaw would potentially breach 
the Bill of Rights Act, and this fear proved correct. In February 2008, the 
Attorney General, Dr Michael Cullen, concluded that, “the [Wanganui District 
Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia)] Bill appears to be inconsistent with 
section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act and that the inconsistency cannot be 
justified under section 5 of that Act106” (AJHR, J4, 2008: p.4). But in New 
Zealand, unlike many countries with similar legislation, the Bill of Rights Act is 
not supreme law and is simply an “ordinary statute that gives way to 
                                                
106 As of February 2006, this had occurred just six times since the Bill of Rights legislation was first 
enacted in 1990; and none of these proposals were subsequently passed into law – and in two of the 
cases the Attorney General’s reports were seen as “decisive” in their failure to be enacted (Joseph, 
2007: p.1174).  
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inconsistent legislation” (Joseph, 2007: p.1146), allowing parliament to pass 
laws in spite of such misgivings. Nevertheless, the Attorney General’s findings 
proved significant to many as they weighed the potential efficacy of the 
proposed law against breaches of the important human right of free 
expression.  
 
These concerns in combination with the challenges to the bylaw’s potential 
efficacy by credible sources, some of which were noted in the section above, 
encouraged debate and offered respectable alternative points of view. This 
allowed politicians greater political breathing space to express opposition 
because they were not isolated in their dissent, unlike the moral panic-stricken 
environment that had existed when the raft of legislation was passed in the 
mid-1990s. 
 
The leader of the libertarian-orientated ACT party, Rodney Hide, described 
the Bill as “shocking” and “rubbish”. Hide argued that the legislation would 
have no palpable effect on New Zealand’s gangs, while undermining 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and declared that his party could “never” 
vote for it passing into law (NZPD, vol.646, 2008: pp.15761-15762). Other 
MPs, such as Labour’s Grant Robinson and Clayton Cosgrove, pointed out 
that patches were just one way a gang could identify themselves and thus the 
impact of the law would prove minimal at best (NZPD, vol.652, 2009: pp.1644-
1646 & 1648-1650). The rise in prominence of the LA-style street gangs in 
areas of South Auckland had made politicians aware that gang patches, 
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which for so long had been the key identifier of gang members in this country, 
were not the only means by which gang members could express identity.  
 
Maori Party co-leader Pita Sharples told a child abuse conference in Manukau 
that moves to ban gang patches were “rubbish”. He said, “Clamp down on 
crime, yes. If a gang is doing crime, lock the beggers up. But don’t assume 
that people who form or join roopu107, as they call themselves, are all breaking 
the law and are there to intimidate you, even though you are intimidated by 
them” (nzherald.co.nz 15.4.2008). True to form, Laws responded by saying 
that Sharples’ comments are “more liberal appeasement of crims and cons” 
(Wanganui Chronicle 16.4.2008). Furthermore, he argued that gang members 
do not deserve civil rights (Sunday Star Times 1.8.2008). 
  
Although the vast majority of MPs supported the bylaw going to select 
committee for more detailed debate and examination, by the time of the Bill’s 
third and final reading, on 6 May 2009, its passing was in the balance. While 
the Bill already had the support of the National and United Future parties, it 
was opposed by Labour, the Greens and the Maori Party. The balance of 
power sat with the ACT party, which had initially recoiled at the legislation 
limiting peoples’ freedom of expression, and whose leader, as noted above, 
had said the party could “never” vote for it. Since then, however, ACT, with 
five MPs, had entered a coalition government with National, and Hide flip-
flopped and pledged his support. Although the party split its votes, it was the 
                                                
107 Translated means a ‘group’ or ‘party of people’. 
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backing of three ACT MPs that allowed the Bill to be passed into law by 62 
votes to 59 (NZPD, vol.654, 2009: p.2944).  
 
Subsequent to it getting parliamentary approval, on 22 May 2009, at a 
specially convened meeting, the Wanganui District Council unanimously 
resolved to ban patches across the entire Wanganui district, as of 1 July 2009 
(Wanganui District Council Press Release 24.5.2009). It is important to note 
that the reach of the bylaw was extended further than what parliament had 
intended, by banning gang insignia not only in the central business district and 
public parks but to a much wider area that encompassed practically all of the 
populated area of Wanganui; an important point to which I will return.  
 
Possible Outcomes 
Following its introduction, the patch ban gained immediate results and in the 
first nine months there were 13 prosecutions brought by police for the wearing 
gang insignia in Wanganui (Police News Sept. 2010). By that time, the Police 
Association had heralded the measure as a major success (ibid), but this 
claim is based on little evidence and it is much too early to reach that 
conclusion. Assuming the ban is upheld by the courts, only after several years 
have passed, and we are able to compare gang offending data from before 
and after the patch ban, can an accurate assessment of the impact of the 
bylaw be made. Also, given the arguments I have made in relation to the 
bylaw’s justification, I believe that little, if any, improvements in violent crime 
or intimidation will be seen. Moreover, there may be latent unintended 
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consequences that come in to play, and two arrests thus far highlight certain 
possibilities.  
 
The day following the bylaw’s introduction, Mongrel Mob member, Brett 
Beamsley, was arrested for wearing a ‘beanie’ hat with a bulldog on it. The 
charges against Beamsley were eventually dropped as the motif on the hat 
was actually the Georgia University logo (Dominion Post 23.9.2009). Although 
police said dropping the charges was a mistake (ibid), the issue not only 
highlights ambiguity over what constitutes gang insignia, but also, as will 
become clear, that the law is often futile and one means by which the law may 
make the gang problem worse. 
 
Under Beamsley’s headwear, his face was tattooed with ’MMM’ – a 
contraction of ‘Mighty Mongrel Mob’ – and two bulldogs. With or without any 
additional gang insignia, Beamsley, like many others, is unmistakably a gang 
member. It is worthwhile considering that the bylaw could have the 
unintended consequence of encouraging more members to mark themselves 
in this way and therefore engender a more entrenched and committed 
membership base. While leaving a gang is rarely easy, it is much simpler to 
take off a gang patch when it is on the back of a jacket rather than tattooed on 
one’s face. But such measures do not need to be as extreme, and gangs may 
find more subtle ways to work around the law and make it unenforceable. It 
will be recalled that many groups have numerous ways of expressing 
affiliation including hand signals, catch cries and different colours. A 
successful ban may make back patches used for ceremonial purposes only, 
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but there are any number of other ways gang members can express 
membership, if they so choose. 
 
Another arrest may also highlight possible unforeseen outcomes. On 7 
September 2009, Hell’s Angel Bryan Moore, Moore lingered outside the 
Wanganui police station wearing an old club t-shirt from the failed Hastings 
chapter until he was arrested for displaying gang insignia. Moore was actively 
seeking arrest in order to test the validity of the bylaw, and upon his arrest he 
immediately ripped the shirt to pieces to ensure the police were not able to 
keep it as a trophy (Bryan Moore 2009 pers. comm.). 
 
One of the grounds for the Hell’s Angels’ challenge was based on Michael 
Laws’ interpretation of the legislation which, as noted, above went beyond 
what parliament had intended. Following the Wanganui Council’s decision to 
extend the patch ban throughout most of the city, local National MP, Chester 
Burrows, who had sponsored the Bill through parliament, was reported on 
Radio New Zealand (23.5.2009) as saying that when parliament enabled the 
council to make provisions for banning gang patches, it did so with the intent 
that the bylaw would only apply to small public areas, and he warned that the 
council’s move may be open to legal challenge. Laws responded by saying 
that, “anyone who has studied law knows that the courts always ask what an 
act of Parliament says, not what Parliament meant by it” and the wording of 
the legislation, he believed, “empowers the council to declare virtually 99.9% 
of the district scheme patch-free” (Radio New Zealand 23.5.2009). It was an 
argument the Hell’s Angels decided to test.  
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Following a hearing on 3 December 2009 in Wanganui, Judge Butler 
determined that the District Court did not have the jurisdiction to hear a 
“collateral challenge to the validity of the Bylaw” and Moore was convicted but 
escaped a fine (Police v Moore, Unreported, District Court, Wanganui, Butler 
P, December 2009). It was a finding subsequently upheld, following an appeal 
by the Hell’s Angels, after a hearing in the High Court in May 2010 (Police v 
Moore, Unreported, High Court, Wanganui, Mackenzie J, April 2010). 
Undeterred, the Hell’s Angels then prepared a case to challenge the bylaw’s 
validity via a judicial review set down for November 2010. If the challenge is 
successful it may very well kill the entire issue, but if unsuccessful such bans 
may appear around the country as numerous other councils, including those 
in Blenheim and Timaru, have said they will seek to introduce the measure in 
their respective cities if it proves workable in Wanganui (Marlborough Express 
8.5.2009; Timaru Herald 8.5.2009). But of greater significance, perhaps, is 
that the legislative challenge represents a political awakening of the Hell’s 
Angels, and perhaps of the wider gang scene.  
 
Many of the gangs in New Zealand that I have formed an association with 
throughout this research, not only those in Wanganui, felt that they were being 
unjustly targeted by this legislation. The bylaw appears to be an issue that the 
gangs are steeling themselves to resist.  
 
As a guide to a possible course that this resistance might take, I turn to recent 
developments in Australia and the formation of the United Motorcycle 
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Councils, which were formed in response to suppressive legislative measures, 
and exist in at least four of Australia’s seven states108. These councils are 
made up of the majority of outlaw clubs, including many groups with often 
long histories of tremendous antagonism, including the Comancheros, the 
Bandidos and the Hell’s Angels. The councils offer comment and critique on 
issues affecting outlaw clubs, and through elected spokesmen they have 
sought to actively lobby for public support and counter police claims against 
them; and in doing so they have moved away from traditional ‘no media’ 
rule109. It is an interesting evolutionary development stemming from a reaction 
against suppression and given that two council member clubs have chapters 
in New Zealand (the Hell’s Angels and Highway 61) such a development 
occurring in New Zealand is quite possible. Given the Police Association 
already holds concerns about “old inter-gang rivalries” being replaced with a 
greater degree of cooperation for the “coordinated supply and distribution” of 
drugs (New Zealand Police Association, 2009: p.3), one would assume that 
the development of such a council in New Zealand would be viewed very 
dimly indeed. 
 
While all of this remains speculative with the legal challenge to the law still to 
be decided, it does make some things abundantly clear; namely that there is a 
clear lack of strategic focus when it comes to policy formulation around 
patched gangs. Uninformed by research, based on unsupported assumptions, 
and driven by populist politics, public policies around such gangs remain 
                                                
108 For more on these councils, see their website www.unitedmotorcyclecouncil.com/ 
109 To view an interview on Channel Nine’s Today on Sunday,  see 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_Cq00sOceg 
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mired in sensationalist claims that fail to address gangs as complex social 
institutions that will survive and evolve in the face of misdirected attack. 
 
As Huff (1990: p.313) has said: 
 
There is nothing more inefficient or wasteful (of financial and human 
resources) than policies based on political perspectives and intuitive 
judgments. The realities of life suggest that complex socioeconomic 
phenomena such as gangs (or, for that matter, crime in general) 
usually defy simple intuitive explanations, and yet such explanations 
constitute the model response. 
 
There is no easy answer to the gang phenomenon, but while police and 
political leaders persist in simplistic understandings and approaches they risk 
exacerbating the very problems they are attempting to solve. In the previous 
chapter I outlined a range of issues that is negatively affecting the patched 
gang scene; police and political attack was not one of them. 
 
Conclusion 
In the first decade of the new millennium we have, in many ways, seen history 
repeat. The emergence of the LA-style street gangs has produced an 
important political change; in so much as there has been a return to 
recognition that gangs are derived from wider social and economic issues. 
Through enlightened leadership within the police and evidence-led policy 
development, these new gangs were framed as a social concern that cannot 
be solved by law enforcement alone. Although, if history continues to repeat, 
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and these youthful incipient gangs became more entrenched, then I argue 
that it is likely a return to suppression will occur.  
 
In relation to the traditional patched gangs, the story was equally familiar, and 
knee-jerk populist policies remained in the ascendency. Nevertheless, the law 
to ban gang regalia in the city of Wanganui was questioned and debated to a 
much greater degree than policies of the past. Although parliament did grant 
Michael Laws and his council the power to restrict the wearing of gang 
patches and certain other gang symbols, the effects this will have on the gang 
scene generally are far from certain. Although positive benefits to the wider 
community are likely to be limited, the way that the gangs respond may yet 
prove to be an important pivot point in New Zealand gang history. Either 
through a political awakening, or changes to their public appearance, the 
gangs’ adaptation to this suppressive attack will offer considerable insight into 
their future direction.  
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13. Conclusion – Gang Evolution, Gang Control, and         
s  c                        New Zealand Society: 1950-2010 
 
The primary objective of this research was to trace the rise and development 
of gangs in New Zealand, with a particular emphasis on key ‘pivot points’; 
events that marked a significant moment in New Zealand's gang history, 
where the evolutionary path of the gangs or the political response to them was 
dramatically altered. As outlined in the introductory chapter, this was to be 
achieved through three principal and highly interconnected, themes: the 
changes in gang evolution and development; the response to gangs over the 
years; and the importance of the social and economic context within which 
gangs have existed. It is by revisiting these three themes, then, that I 
conclude this thesis. 
 
Gang Evolution 
The genesis of the modern New Zealand gang can clearly be found in the 
immature youth groups of the 1950s. This youth gang scene was divided into 
two distinct categories: the milk bar cowboys and the bodgies. These gangs 
were of a fragile and ultimately fleeting existence, but there was an ongoing 
churn as new groups sprung up to replace old ones. These groups were the 
tentative precursors to the outlaw motorcycle clubs and the patched street 
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gangs that were to dominate this country’s gang scene for decades. Although 
a few of these young gangs were beginning to show some evolutionary 
development by the end of the 1950s, through the use of common identifiers 
and distinct names, it was the formation of a Hell’s Angels chapter in 1960 
that cemented and advanced these evolutionary traits.  
 
This event marked the first pivot point in New Zealand gang history by 
fundamentally, and quite remarkably, transforming the gang scene. The 
formation of the Auckland chapter of the Hell’s Angels introduced back 
patches, a hierarchical leadership structure and other significant 
organisational components to the gang scene. By the late 1960s, these 
elements were widely adopted by numerous outlaw motorcycle clubs. And by 
the mid-1970s, in a situation unique to this country, street gangs, with varying 
degrees of exactness, followed suit. These developments constructed gangs 
as distinct entities that existed as more than just the sum of their members, 
and importantly, I argue, helped enable the groups to survive membership 
turnover and thereby achieve longevity. Many of the gangs that formed during 
this period – and only those with these elements – became mainstays of the 
New Zealand gang scene. 
 
Augmenting the back patch, many of the patched street gangs created 
numerous sub cultural symbols and behaviours. Both the Mongrel Mob and 
Black Power developed hand signals and catch cries that were used to 
identify members. But despite the obvious similarities – in both demographic 
composition and behaviour – between New Zealand’s largest street gangs, 
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there were unique factors in the development of each that resulted in distinctly 
different elements to their respective cultures and internal dynamics. The 
Mongrel Mob was formed by a core of troubled youths raised as wards of the 
state, and their highly anti-social tendencies became instilled within the group 
and eventually formed a model of behaviour termed ‘mongrelism’. Conversely, 
Black Power had early leaders who had a pro-social agenda and attempted to 
mould the group, with varying degrees of success, as a form of positive 
resistance to personal hardships. Although these differences can be 
overstated, they nevertheless highlight how influential elements, usually within 
the leadership, can distinctively shape different groups. These differences in 
culture and dynamics within individual gangs are then perpetuated in two 
ways: those who share the attitudes of a group are attracted to it, and existing 
members of a gang only accept those who uphold, or are prepared to learn, 
the values of the gang. This I believe to be true of gangs generally. 
 
As the patched gangs grew in number, they began to clash. These battles 
were often over disputed territory, but were fundamentally non-utilitarian, and 
were driven by little more than perceptions of superiority of one group over 
another. But as conflicts escalated and real harms were inflicted, feelings of 
overwhelming animosity led to embittered wars and often decades long 
acrimony and loathing. It is my contention that these conflicts contributed to a 
number of important developments in gang evolution.  
 
These wars often led to arrest and often imprisonment and introduced gang 
member to the criminal justice system and ultimately secured the adoption of 
672 
 
wider criminal code of behaviour.  
 
A further outcome stemmed from the physical and psychological stresses of 
gang warfare, which led many weaker members to leave the gangs, while 
those who remained became more deeply committed to their group. 
Furthermore, to ensure that people who wished to join a gang had the right 
characteristics and commitment to uphold the ideals and mana of the group, a 
more rigorous initiation or ‘prospecting’ period was adopted. This stage of 
testing prospective members further entrenched internal gang dynamics by 
affirming a deeper commitment to the gang and therefore, among other 
things, perpetuated the strength obtained through conflict.  
 
The ability for the gangs to survive over time was eventually matched by long 
term and stable membership, something that became apparent by the 1980s. 
The effect of this change was crucial as the gangs began to become more 
sophisticated entities, what I have described as ‘grey organisations’, neither 
fully legitimate or illegitimate, and deeply imbedded within certain 
communities. The gangs had always provided considerable benefits for 
members, primarily through a number of social/psychological functions of 
fictive kin relationships and a sense of status. Indeed, the fact that such 
groups survived and maintained longer membership is unquestionable 
testimony to the primacy and importance of these functions in the lives of their 
members. But throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, these functions 
became more palpable and sophisticated. The clubhouse provided a social 
hub with many amenities that members could not have afforded but by 
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collective enterprise, and many gangs began to provide or facilitate 
recreational pursuits, such as establishing rugby league teams or organising 
large community events. Many also created opportunities for employment, 
both legal and illegal, but it was the latter that became synonymous with the 
groups, largely via the drug trade. 
 
Notwithstanding a few early pioneering entrepreneurs, profit driven crime 
became a significant element within the gang scene in the 1990s. Although 
certain gangs evolved to become criminally focused, for most groups, profit 
driven crime was the domain of individual members of small cliques within 
gangs. I believe that as time went on, the threat of a large bust bringing down 
an entire gang or gang chapter, and risking the forfeiture of their assets, 
persuaded many groups that had transitioned from ‘gangs’ to ‘criminal gangs’ 
to stop such activities. Another factor that worked against collective enterprise 
was that those members taking the risks did not want to share the rewards 
with others.  
 
Nevertheless, as collectives or not, the gangs, despite their patch wearing 
visibility, provided many advantages to those members who chose to engage 
in the drug trade, including; protection from rip-off and stand over, networks 
for distribution, and a ready customer base in the form of gang associates. 
The strength of gangs within the underworld created something of a form of 
quasi-authority among criminals, and this was often exploited via a form of 
extortion known as ‘taxing’. Although this authority was accepted within 
criminal fraternities, who spurn redress through legitimate agencies of justice, 
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it failed to transfer to outsiders or ‘citizens’. Due in part to a police force 
unwilling to take bribes, those members of the public who complain of gang 
harassment are supported by the law. With this knowledge, gangs have 
tended not to target outsiders for taxing or intimidation, and therefore the 
wider public is generally deemed untouchable and off limits. 
 
Despite their strength within the criminal realm growing, large scale territorial 
wars were largely gone by the late 1990s and I contend that there are a 
number of reasons for this. There is certainly some support for the idea that 
profit driven criminality influenced a slowdown in gang-versus-gang violence – 
wars being bad for business – but this is a minor consideration in my view. 
More important, I argue, was the fact that gang geography had long been 
established, alleviating the need to battle over territory, and that gangs 
struggled to recruit young members who were more willing to engage in 
physical and territorial aggression. Most importantly of all, the gangs had 
aged, and men of 40 or 50 are less prone to violence and wary of possible 
imprisonment.  
 
But the aging membership and lack of young recruits, which was brought 
about by what I have described as ‘generational barriers’, were more critical 
than just contributing to reductions in violence. As the new millennium 
dawned, the seemingly permanent and strong position of the patched gangs 
began to be brought in to question. At this juncture, what had hitherto been a 
steady progression of evolutionary advancement began to show signs of 
ending and, particularly in relation to outlaw clubs, indications of devolution or 
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regression are evident. As important as the problems of generational barriers 
– and therefore rejuvenation – were, I suggest that smokable 
methamphetamine, or P, was the insidious influence that began to cripple 
many patched gangs that were not quick enough to perceive its 
destructiveness. This failure, by many gangs, to adapt to risk and changing 
circumstance, suggests a vulnerability that may prove critical, particularly 
given the increased competition for youthful membership that now exists. 
 
While the outlaw clubs may have been impacted by the popularity of the ‘boy 
racer’ trend, much more significantly, because of the size of the patched 
street gang scene, is the advent of LA-style street gangs. Given the 
emergence of skinhead groups in the 1980s, and more demonstrably in the 
1990s, new developments and new types of gang in New Zealand were not 
without precedent. But the emergence of LA-style street gangs may prove to 
be much more important. 
 
The dramatic rise of LA-style street gangs is undeniable. In many ways their 
inception resembles that of patched street gangs in the early 1970s, in that 
most comprise a young membership and the groups tend to have a fleeting 
existence; but their apparent lack of hierarchical leadership structures and 
formal organisational components, critical to early patched gang evolution, 
means that their evolutionary development is difficult to predict. In other ways 
too, I argue, they are quite distinctive. Perhaps most significant is their ‘pop-
cultural’ inspired materialistic desire for ‘bling’, or visual signifiers of success. 
This may transpire into a greater drive for profit driven crime. If these groups 
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gain longevity, their impact on the New Zealand gang scene is likely to be 
transformative. 
 
Gang Control -The Response to Gangs 
This thesis has highlighted the response to gangs in numerous ways including 
that of the wider public and the importance of media representations, but 
primarily the focus has been on approaches to gang control, and therefore the 
reaction and activities of the police and of politicians.  
 
The Police Response  
Since the inception of rebellious youth groups in the 1950s, the activities of 
gangs have been a significant focus of the police. In early research from the 
late 1950s it was revealed that the police approach to gangs was to target 
them at every opportunity and generally ‘keep on their tails’. This early 
suppression-based approach was one that would go on to almost exclusively 
define the police activity in relation to gangs ever since.  
 
It was, however, the advent of the back patch in the early 1960s that provided 
police with a visual symbol that enabled ready identification of members of 
troublesome groups. For the police, the patch became akin to a target on the 
backs of gang members. This visual representation of rebellion, however, did 
not just serve to make such groups obvious, it also meant that any negative or 
criminal behaviour undertaken by one gang member was seen as a reflection 
of the whole group, and that any stigma attached to the group persisted over 
time – despite the high turnover of membership.  
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I have argued that the inevitable conflict between police and the gangs – often 
aided by overly aggressive police tactics – led to the strengthening of internal 
bonds within the groups, in the same way that inter-gang conflict aided intra-
gang cohesion. Although an aggressive police approach often found public 
sympathy, it may have been counterproductive.  
 
Despite, or perhaps aided by, aggressive policing, such groups continued to 
grow throughout the 1970s and territorial conflicts between gangs increased. 
By the end of the decade, certain members of the police were beginning to 
raise concerns that gangs could not be seen simply as an issue of law and 
order, and that addressing the reasons for gang membership would require 
social policy intervention. 
 
But these voices were seemingly in the minority and by the mid-1980s 
elements within the police hierarchy actively sought to attack government 
initiatives that were putting gangs to work. These efforts contributed to the 
gangs being affirmed as in issue of law and order and a problem solely for the 
police to address. 
 
But despite the rhetoric of some, policing around gangs has not been driven 
by the goal of gang eradication, but toward the more realistic objective of 
restoring, what I have called, the gang/community balance. To this end, police 
have proven capable of implementing strategies (best highlighted by 
Operations ‘Shovel’ and ‘Damon’ in the early 1990s) that target gang 
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members and limit their activities when their behaviour supersedes that which 
communities have been prepared to tolerate. 
 
Despite demonstrating their ability to control gangs when required, since the 
mid 1990s police have been at the forefront of calls for stronger legislation. By 
this time, however, police concerns regarding gangs had transformed from 
violence and disorder to issues surrounding organised criminal activity. While 
it is clear that the gang realm and the drug trade intersect and overlap to a 
considerable degree, the police claims – most significantly and regularly made 
by the Police Association – regarding gang involvement in the underground 
economy appear inconsistent with their own arrest data, the lack of large 
scale collective drug busts, and the rather obvious observational evidence 
that the vast majority of gang members exist in poverty.  
 
I have sought to explain this disconnect through a concept I have termed 
‘Blue Vision’. Blue vision is a multistage process whereby police construct a 
belief that becomes instilled within the organisation’s collective 
consciousness. I contend that the foundations of blue vision are derived, 
somewhat paradoxically, from both the similarities and differences between 
gangs and the police. Both are uniformed bodies with strong internal bonds, 
and both create ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions. But the fundamental ethos of the 
groups are in stark contrast to one another; the police being pro social and 
conformist, while the gangs are anti social and rebellious. The ensuing 
antagonism that is maintained within police (but which is of course mutual), 
mixed with a lack of high level research and a reliance on often questionable 
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street intelligence, predisposes them to a form of cognitive dissonance 
whereby evidence that supports their beliefs is upheld and evidence that 
contradicts it is dismissed.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the police antipathy toward gangs may have one 
positive latent outcome. Because of the animosity that exists within the police 
toward gangs, positive and friendly contact between them is limited. Given 
this, there is an argument that the chances of police becoming corrupted by 
profit driven gang criminals is lessened. The police may break the rules in 
dealing with gangs during their operations, but they do not break the rules by 
aiding gangs through providing tip-offs or inside information; something 
important to the success and viability of organised crime. Certainly, I believe a 
lack of corruption within the New Zealand police that is one key reason why 
organised crime in the gang scene has not gained great traction. 
 
Furthermore, one can sympathise with the invidious position of the police. 
When gangs are defined simply as an issue of law and order, the police are 
often subject to criticism when gangs generate community concern. There is 
often an unrealistic expectation of what can be achieved through suppression, 
and when laws fail to eradicate gang concerns, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the police will seek greater powers in an attempt to avoid such criticism in the 
future. It is something of a catch-22, and without a review of the efficacy of the 
police approaches and an examination of why they fail, a snowballing effect of 
greater and stronger legislation is perhaps an inevitable outcome. 
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The Political Response 
Despite their appearance within New Zealand cities since the 1950s, gangs 
did not become an issue of distinct political concern until the early 1970s. This 
was most obviously demonstrated by populist calls before the 1974 election to 
‘take the bikes off the bikies’. Before this time, the young gangs were viewed 
as part of the wider concern of juvenile delinquency and a dramatically rising 
youth crime rate. 
 
The beginning of this shift is evinced in the problems of disorder that beset the 
Hastings Blossom Festival at both the beginning and the end of the 1960s. In 
1960, the problems at Hastings were broad and undefined, but by 1969 the 
patched wearing gangs were easily recognisable and thereby became a focal 
point for concern; not just for police but politicians as well. 
 
In the early 1970s, a multi departmental research report into the emergence of 
predominantly Maori patched street gangs in South Auckland communities 
highlighted the fact that the groups were an outcome of negative social 
conditions in problematic urban areas. But while the research, partially at 
least, recognised – and warned of – certain signs the groups were becoming 
more structured, the researchers were equivocal about the extent of the 
problems created by the gangs and their future threat  
 
However, as the violence of gang warfare increased throughout the decade, 
growing public fears ratcheted up political concern. When the Moerewa riot 
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occurred in August 1979, an event that I have marked as the second pivot 
point in New Zealand gang history, specific action was deemed both 
necessary and urgent. Under the assertive leadership Robert Muldoon, the 
National government introduced a series of laws giving police greater power 
to target gangs’ unruly behaviour, but it was social initiatives that were to 
define the era. Initially, Muldoon oversaw the implementation of detached 
youth workers to try and transform gangs from negative forces into pro social 
ones. Primarily this was done by encouraging gang efforts toward establishing 
work cooperatives to make use of government funded work schemes that had 
been established to tackle rising unemployment. 
 
Following the report of the Committee on Gangs in 1981, Muldoon’s approach 
was given further weight and the government established the Group 
Employment Liaison Service (GELS). Although the report outlined numerous 
problems that factored into gang membership and violence, it was putting 
gang members to work that became the focus; again reflecting the intent not 
to prevent gang membership but to modify gang member behaviour. Despite 
a belief among many that the schemes were curbing the anti social activities 
of the gangs, the economic reforms of the 1984 Labour government meant 
that the ‘make work’ schemes favoured by the interventionist Muldoon 
government lost favour and a series of high profile incidents – including the 
third pivot point by way of the Ambury park rape – and a realisation that the 
schemes were being widely abused helped ensure their demise.  
 
At a time when unemployment and general community hardship were high, 
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giving favour to openly rebellious groups was politically unfeasible and in the 
1990s the country entered an environment of ‘zero tolerance’. Indeed, given 
political realities that exist with times of hardship, I believe that social policies 
targeting gangs may be more likely to occur in times of economic prosperity, 
when the wider public are more amenable to offering assistance to marginal 
groups. But, either way, the cancelling of the work schemes also signalled the 
collapse of the political belief that the gang situation needed social redress as 
well as a law and order focus; and the latter once again rose to monopolise 
the country’s gang response.  
 
Although a politically commissioned report on violence published in 1987 was 
highly, and unusually, critical of police attitudes toward gangs, these attitudes 
soon became standardised within political discourse. Indeed, a number of 
politicians – primarily from opposition benches – ensured the gang issue 
became highly politicised and gangs became the visible face of numerous law 
and order problems. While the gangs had been difficult to counter, they had 
proven to be an effective means by which to garner electoral advantage. I 
argue that with a mix of good intentions and cynical politicking, political 
leaders have done more to create wider public fear of gangs than the actions 
of the gangs themselves; the problem, however, is that these understandings 
are steeped in misunderstandings and myth.  
 
This became most evident prior to the first MMP election in 1996, at which 
time the gang issue was radically reframed away from violence and disorder 
to one of organised criminal activity. This transformation was aided by a 
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belief, stemming largely from police sources, that the patched gangs had 
become organised criminal groups. Despite scant evidence, no research, and 
never being proven in the courts, this portrayal of the gangs became all 
consuming and widely accepted as established fact and its influence is 
enough to mark it as the fourth pivot point. Notwithstanding that this portrayal 
has often blown the gang problem significantly out of proportion, it has also 
created a barrier to any meaningful attempts to address the groups. 
Suppressive legislative measures specifically targeting gangs have largely 
proven to be ineffective, underutilised or superfluous; and yet, largely without 
comment, they continue to be enacted.  
 
One exception to this is the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1991, which was not 
actually passed with patched gangs in mind. Nevertheless, this legislation has 
helped ensure that a financial powerbase for gangs was not created by large 
profits procured through criminal enterprise, and, in my view, the Act helped 
ensure that the patched groups did not develop into genuine criminal gangs; 
and dissuaded some that did to cease collective crime. Importantly, I believe, 
the legislation attacked criminal behaviour and not the gangs themselves 
(unless they committed crime) and therefore avoided any possibility of the 
gangs drawing strength or cohesion from specifically targeted ‘gang’ 
legislation. It is an important lesson from with to draw; as the success of this 
law stands in stark contrast to other, more numerous, suppressive policy 
failures. 
 
It is perhaps no surprise that during this very era when suppression took a 
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monopolistic hold on gang control efforts, there was a distinct lack of research 
undertaken on the gangs. It was acknowledged at the time the raft of 
legislation introduced in the 1996, that no independent research was available 
to judge the extent of the ‘gang problem’. Before this time, in 1970, 1981, and 
1987 governmental committees had examined the gang situation and each 
time made it clear that, as a social problem, it required social redress. Without 
this more considered input, ‘easy’ and populist measures reigned supreme. 
 
The political response to the rise of LA-style street gangs in the new 
millennium contrasted with this suppressive approach. With the government 
commissioning a study on the phenomenon – the first in more than two 
decades – the social causes of gang formation once again came to the fore. I 
have, however, suggested that this political change may prove temporary. 
Certainly, the politics around patched gangs have remained largely 
unchanged. Although certain legislative attempts at banning patches garnered 
a great deal more scrutiny than gang laws of the past, the broad cross party 
support for organised crime legislation is evidence that the perception of gang 
dominated organised criminal activity remains firmly entrenched. 
 
Any political turnaround to a more balanced and evidence-based appraisal 
and approach to patched gangs appears unlikely. Not only have politicians 
become bound within the rhetoric around gangs, but any moves to address 
these imbalances are politically dangerous. Not only will an alternative view 
undoubtedly illicit a rebuke of being ‘soft on crime’, but the nature of much 
gang activity means that any number of catalytic events are likely to ensure 
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renegade political figures are never far from controversy. Although MMP has 
thrown up challenging voices, it appears unlikely in the foreseeable future that 
a majority opinion of anything other than suppression will prevail. 
 
New Zealand Society and the Importance of Context 
What is clear from this research is that gangs are deeply connected to, and 
influenced by, broader societal factors. Gangs in New Zealand have been 
shaped by the communities within which they formed, by wider issues existing 
within this country and by international trends. 
 
Although gangs have spread to rural areas, in the immediate post war era 
they were initially an urban phenomenon that emerged within expanding 
towns and cities in New Zealand. The rapid rate of urban growth, mixed with a 
booming economy and technological advancements, allowed young people 
an unprecedented level of free time and in urban centres they grouped 
together; many on motorcycles. The rise of the ‘teenager’ also gave rise to the 
teenage gangs. Inspired by American pop culture, New Zealand youth 
adopted the styles of their international equivalents, something that would 
continue until the present day, most ably demonstrated by the new LA style 
street gangs. Although often seen as new, ‘Americanisation’ of the gang 
scene in New Zealand is as old as gangs themselves. 
 
But despite youthful gangs becoming apparent in the economic boom times of 
the 1950s, these groups were nevertheless situated within lower 
socioeconomic strata, suggesting the importance of relative rather than 
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absolute deprivation in gang formation. Furthermore, and critically, it was the 
abundance of employment opportunities that appears to have been vital in 
ensuring that these early gangs remained youthful, and members matured out 
of the gangs and entered more conventional lifestyles. Even when the gangs 
achieved longevity, membership remained fleeting, as members were easily 
able to leave the gang for work opportunities. This finding has implications for 
gang control, because it highlights the importance of alternatives in ending 
gang membership. 
 
Although gang formation appears to be a natural outcome of urbanisation, it 
was a certain form of rapid urban growth that broke the ground for gang 
development in this country to flourish. The ‘urban drift’ that saw large 
numbers of Maori move from rural to urban centres, was perhaps the most 
important element of widespread gang creation in New Zealand. Ill equipped 
to deal with many of the realities of city living, and with the breakdown of 
traditional forms of authority, young Maori faced with ‘multiple marginality’ 
formed gangs in unprecedented numbers. From the formation of gangs during 
this period we clearly see gangs as symptoms of wider social problems. 
 
But if wider socioeconomic forces were at play in laying the foundations for 
gang membership, it was wider sociocultural issues evident in the 1960s and 
1970s that provided them with fuel. The rise of a widespread protest culture, 
the alternative lifestyle hippies, and, specifically in relation to Maori gangs, the 
Maori renaissance, all bolstered the fledgling gangs by providing a supportive 
environment that was anti authority and questioned mainstream ideals. 
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Ironically, however, while this questioning liberalism aided the gangs, the 
groups themselves remained highly conservative and distinctly apolitical. 
These commitments to resist authority and convention, and a search for 
alternative lifestyles were important in gang development. Indeed, many of the 
social elements that made the 1960s and 1970s unique, continued to exist in 
the patched gangs long after that had become assigned to history books 
elsewhere in society. But these sociocultural elements did not just bolster the 
gangs by providing an incubating climate. They also influenced how the 
groups were perceived and responded to, as evinced by efforts, undertaken 
the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, to make the gangs pro-social – largely 
by putting them to work – rather than through efforts to break them up. 
 
But while these social changes aided gang development and boosted their 
longevity, it was the faltering economy of the 1980s that assisted longer term 
membership and thereby fundamentally changed gangs in New Zealand by 
beginning a process in which the groups shifted towards a more mature 
membership. With few employment options to entice gang members toward 
conventional lifestyles, the gangs became not just vehicles of resistance but a 
means to achieve social and material fulfilment.  
 
As part, of this transition, the patched gangs became deeply embedded within 
the communities within which they grew, creating what I have described as 
the gang/community balance; a situation that reflected the fact that 
communities had accepted, wilfully or begrudgingly, that the groups were 
permanent fixtures.  
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I believe that the community's relationships to gangs can be loosely divided 
into three categories; associates, incidental associates and the wider public. 
Associates of the gangs highlight the often overlooked fact that these groups 
have considerable support within their communities. Gangs exist outside of 
societal norms, but they do not exist there alone. These people enjoy the 
rebellious or more relaxed moral environment provided by the gang, and also 
benefit through functions and events the gangs provide. In this way, the gang, 
and their clubhouses, have existed as social hubs in many communities. At 
the other end of the spectrum is the wider community that has no direct 
contact with gangs or gang members. This sector of society, reliant largely on 
often sensationalist media and political portrayals of gangs, tends to be the 
group most concerned by gangs. It is most often when this, the largest section 
of the community, expresses rising concerns around gang behaviour – and 
consequently the gang/community balance is disrupted – that politicians tend 
to act. Spanning these two groups are the ‘incidental associates’ that have 
largely non-deliberate contact with gangs or gang members because they 
share the same neighbourhoods, familial relations, or work associations; and 
it is here that the gang community balance finds its nexus. 
 
Although a perception of permanency was crucial in the formation of the 
gang/community balance, I believe the explanation is more complex than just 
this. Generally, the communities that uphold a strong gang presence share 
with gangs many social and economic demographics and, therefore, there 
exists a strong vein of similar values, troubles, concerns and outlooks of gang 
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members – meaning that they less likely to be concerned by a gang presence 
or behaviour. Notwithstanding this, however, this community acceptance of 
the gangs is not immutable and often requires maintenance, as recognition 
exists from both sides that peaceful coexistence is preferable to conflict, and 
that each side has an ability to disrupt the other. 
 
As the economy deteriorated further in the 1990s and many gang members 
became locked out of the workforce, gang involvement in organised criminal 
activity became apparent, most notably in the drug trade. Although economic 
disadvantage and a lack of alternative options provided a push to the black 
economy, the expanding drug market, and its promise of high profits, provided 
a pull. Gang, and in fact any peoples, involvement in the drug trade needs to 
be contextualised in New Zealand’s demand for illicit drugs. In illicit markets, 
as in legal ones, where a demand exists, supply will invariably occur. The 
drug problem, in my view, is not a gang problem. 
 
The economy did not just affect the patched gangs, however, and new 
developments became apparent. As unemployment reached unprecedented 
levels in the early 1990s, it began to bite into Pakeha poor and with this 
skinhead and white power gangs formed. Although a number of pop cultural 
influences were important in this development, I contend that the rise of 
Pakeha street gangs during time evinces the fact that social conditions and 
not ethnic tribalism are at the heart of gang formation.  
 
At the turn of the millennium, patched gangs were deeply entrenched 
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elements of New Zealand society, and they naturally became seen as 
ubiquitous but in recent times, almost unnoticed, their hitherto evolutionary 
advance is faltering. And just as the rise and development of patched gangs is 
intrinsically linked to an ever changing social context, so too is their current 
seemingly moribund state. One explanation is that changing fashions have 
meant that many of these gangs appear to be lacking relevance with youth; 
an important component of ‘generational barriers’. Despite the ongoing efforts 
of police and political leaders, the problems facing the patched gangs are 
linked to factors largely beyond their control.  
 
While the flash of skinhead gangs gave hint to it, the rise of LA style street 
gangs offers a reminder that gangs, of whatever style, will probably always be 
part of the New Zealand social landscape. The historical dominance enjoyed 
by patched gangs in this country belies the fact that while gangs may always 
exist, the style with which they present themselves is always likely to change. 
 
Just as the rise of the patched gangs highlighted certain social and economic 
problems, so too does the rise of this new form of gang. The unique social 
and economic conditions that existed in the 1960s and 1970s have changed 
considerably. The factors breeding recent gang formation came not from 
social instability caused by rapid urbanisation, but from entrenched 
intergenerational poverty. Youths from such areas face a potent and 
uncompromising mix of severe disadvantage and socially proscribed goals, 
often specifically targeted through pop cultural influences, of materialistic 
wealth. I believe that these two factors will conspire to create a status 
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frustration that will undoubtedly influence gang behaviour in coming years.  
 
The Final Word 
When examining the above themes it becomes clear that each provides a 
different angle or lens with which to view the history of gangs in New Zealand; 
and while each offers insight, it is only by combining them that a more 
complete picture is built. Oftentimes, it is important to look at gang activities 
and consider not what they say about the gangs, but about the society within 
which they exist. In many ways this is also true of gang control methods, 
which may say more about those seeking to control the gangs than the gangs 
themselves. 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I said that my intent was that this broad 
historical study would offer a springboard for further research. This remains 
an important goal. Ideally, certain findings of this thesis will attract testing and 
scrutiny, for example, the concept of blue vision, the idea of the 
gang/community balance, gangs as ‘grey organisations’, the degree to which 
gangs are involved in profit driven criminal enterprise, the factors influencing 
the patched gangs apparent weakening state, and particularly the influence of 
‘generational barriers’, are among those that may appear controversial or, at 
time of writing, currently occurring, and therefore may benefit from further 
study.  
 
Notwithstanding my calls for more specific research, I end this thesis by 
making a number of general, but extremely important and, in my view, 
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inescapable conclusions. The first of these is that the basis for gang 
membership is largely built upon adverse social and economic conditions. 
Despite this, even within an environment of better social conditions, gangs will 
still be evident, as society will always have non conformist elements or rebels 
but, one would expect that these groups to be smaller in number, less 
entrenched and generate fewer community problems. While the country 
continues to have communities faced with problems such as poor education, 
overcrowded housing, unemployment, family abuse and poverty, New 
Zealand will always have gangs. Just as steam is an inevitable result of water 
being boiled, gangs are similarly resultant of certain social conditions. And just 
as one cannot stop steam by putting a lid on the pot, gangs will not be 
countered by efforts to forcibly suppress them; and indeed, the pressure that 
is built up by such undertakings may cause greater problems than those that 
were seeking to be solved. Certainly gangs are formed due to unfortunate 
social and economic conditions, but they are enabled also by positive 
elements such as freedoms to associate and freedoms of expression and 
lawmakers must be mindful of chipping away at the latter blindly or due to an 
inability or unwillingness to tackle the former.  
 
If we are to accept that gangs are an inevitable part of society, the predictable 
disquiet that accompanies such a stance can be tempered by another 
important finding of this research; that being that the concern surrounding 
gangs has become greatly exaggerated. The fear and unease generated 
within the public mind has been cultivated by the incorrect or unfounded 
beliefs of certain police commentaries, distorted through the media and, at 
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times, recklessly inflated by political rhetoric. Although difficult to quantify, this 
perception is, in my view, at odds with reality. At the risk of over simplification, 
I believe the fear of gangs is analogous to that of sharks, in so much as 
everyone at the beach who has seen the movie Jaws is afraid of them, but 
very few will ever encounter one, let alone be bitten.  
 
A further conclusion of this research is that gangs provide important social 
functions for their members, primarily by way of status as well a sense of 
belonging – what the gangs describe as brotherhood – and they are not 
primarily vehicles for criminal enterprise.  
 
Whether riding in a pack of an outlaw club, or walking into a public place with 
members of a patched street gang, I could not help but appreciate the sense 
of power that exists within a group that will stand by one another. The feelings 
of being a part of something strong is rather exhilarating, and this was only 
enhanced by the furtive glances of curious onlookers from afar and the 
respect paid by those who came in direct contact with the group. At these 
times I had to look little further for an explanation as to why somebody would 
be enticed by gang membership. Unless other options exist to achieve status 
and social fulfilment, gangs will endure. 
 
Indeed, I believe that without these pro-social functions, patched gangs would 
not exist. Legislation that seeks to attack gangs on the basis that they are 
simply groups of criminals, without recognising the significant social functions 
they provide, is almost certainly doomed to fail. We must understand the 
694 
 
complexities of the issue that we are dealing with before we have a 
reasonable chance of successfully addressing it. It is important to be cautious 
of political figures proffering simple solutions to undeniably complex social 
phenomena.  
 
By no means do these findings suggest that gangs do not require policing – at 
times they most surely do. They may also require further legislative measures 
to combat future nefarious developments; but these must be evidence led. 
The point here is not to forget about issues of law and order, but to extend the 
debate past them to create policies that are both responsible and effective. 
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